See also - Qualia as Sensory and Felt Phenomena —

Lecture

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and then, once memories had been implanted, desire and fear. Such a «raw» state has been more formally identified as «non-epistemic». In support of this view, theorists cite a number of empirical facts. The following may be regarded as representative. There are people with brain damage, known as «agnosics» (literally «without knowledge»), who still have vivid visual sensations but are utterly unable to identify any entity before them, including parts of their own body. There is also a similar predicament in which people who were previously blind gain sight for the first time and give us insight into what a newborn infant must experience. The 19th-century German psychologist Hermann von Helmholtz proposed a simple experiment to demonstrate the non-epistemic character of qualia: his instructions were to stand in front of a familiar landscape, turn your back to it, bend over, and look at the landscape between your legs — you will find it hard, in the inverted view, to recognize what was previously familiar to you. [56]

These examples suggest that «bare presence» — that is, a sensation of not-knowing that is nothing more than evidence — may indeed occur. Thus, present-day proponents of the non-epistemic theory regard sensations merely as data in the sense that they are «given» (Latin datum, «given») and are fundamentally involuntary, which is good reason not to regard them as primarily mental. In the past century, proponents of qualia called them «sense-data», but this led to confusion, since the term carried with it an implication of reliable evidence of objective causal origin. For example, one proponent of qualia happily called the redness and roundness of a cricket ball a typical "sense-datum",[58] ). The modern argument, following Sellars's example, focuses on how we learn, in a mode of motivation, to interpret sensory evidence in terms of «things», «persons», and «self» through a continuous feedback process.

Thus, the definition of qualia is shaped by a person's point of view, which inevitably carries philosophical and neurophysiological presuppositions. Thus, the question of what qualia might be raises deep questions in the philosophy of mind, since some materialists wish to deny their existence altogether; on the other hand, if they are accepted, they are not easily explained, since they raise difficult questions bearing on the problem of consciousness. There are committed dualists, such as Richard L. Amoroso or John Hagelin, who hold that the mental and the material are two distinct aspects of physical reality, akin to the distinction between the classical and quantum regimes. [59] By contrast, there are direct realists, for whom the idea of qualia is unscientific, since there seems to be no way to fit them into the modern scientific picture; and there are committed proselytizers of the latter truth, who reject them as displacing knowledge beyond reach.