Lecture
Это окончание невероятной информации про причинность.
...
the individual soul, the senses, effort, and the oversoul.
According to Monier-Williams, in the Nyaya theory of causation drawn from Sutra I.2.I, 2, within Vaisheshika philosophy, actual non-existence follows from causal non-existence, but causal non-existence does not follow from actual non-existence. The cause precedes the effect. The metaphor of yarn and cloth has three causes:
Monier-Williams also suggested that the causation of Aristotle and of Nyaya alike is regarded as conditional aggregates necessary for a person's productive work.
Karma is a principle of causation focusing on 1) causes, 2) actions, 3) effects, wherein it is precisely the phenomena of the mind that direct the actions performed by the actor. Buddhism trains the actor's actions toward sustained and unintended wholesome outcomes aimed at reducing suffering. This corresponds to the Subject – Verb – Object structure.
The general or universal definition of pratītyasamutpāda (or "dependent origination," or "dependent arising," or "interdependent co-arising") is that everything arises in dependence on multiple causes and conditions; nothing exists as a single, independent entity. The traditional example from Buddhist texts is three sticks standing upright, leaning against and supporting one another. If one stick is removed, the other two will fall to the ground.
Causation in the approach of the Chittamatra Buddhist school, Asanga's mind-only-oriented Buddhist school (c. 400 CE), holds that objects cause consciousness to take on the image of the mind. Since causes precede effects, which must be different entities, subject and object are distinct. For this school, there are no objects that are entities external to the perceiving consciousness. The Chittamatra and Yogachara Svatantrika schools acknowledge that there are no objects external to the observer's causation. This largely corresponds to the Nikaya approach.
The Abhidharmakośakārikā is Vasubandhu's commentary text on the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivada school (c. 500 CE). It has four intricate causal constructs: 1) the primary cause, 2) the immediate antecedent, 3) the support of the object, and 4) predominance. The six causes, then, are: 1) instrumentality (kāraṇahetu), regarded as the basic factor in obtaining a result; 2) simultaneity, or co-existence, linking phenomena that arise at the same time; 3) homogeneity, explaining the uniform stream that gives rise to the continuity of phenomena; 4) association, which operates only between mental factors and explains why consciousness appears as an aggregate of mental factors; 5) predominance, forming habitual cognitive and behavioral dispositions; and 6) the fruit, referring to what is the active beneficial or harmful result. The four conditions and six causes interact with one another in explaining phenomenal experience: for example, each moment of consciousness acts both as a homogeneous cause and as the immediate antecedent condition for the state of consciousness and its accompanying factors in the following moment.
The Vaibhashika (c. 500 CE) is an early Buddhist school that favors direct contact with the object and accepts simultaneous causes and effects. This rests on the example of consciousness, which holds that intentions and feelings are mutually accompanying mental factors that support one another, like the legs of a tripod. By contrast, those who reject simultaneous cause and effect say that if the effect already exists, it cannot act in the same way again. How the past, present, and future are treated is the basis for the differing views on causation among the various Buddhist schools.
All classical Buddhist schools teach karma. "The law of karma is a special instance of the law of cause and effect, according to which all our actions of body, speech, and mind are causes, and all our experience is their effect."
The Baháʼí concept of causation has become a unifying force for this young religion. The belief in a shared biological and ideological origin has made it possible for Baháʼís to recognize the Buddha, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad. Unfortunately, this has led to the systematic persecution of Baháʼís by many caliphates.
Aristotle distinguished four kinds of answers, or explanations, to different "Why?" questions. He held that for any given subject, all four explanatory modes are important, each in its own right. As a result of traditional specialized philosophical features of language, together with translations among Ancient Greek, Latin, and English, the word "cause" is nowadays used in specialized philosophical writing to denote Aristotle's four kinds. In ordinary language there are different meanings of the word cause, the most common of which refers to the efficient cause, the subject of this article.
Of Aristotle's four kinds, or explanatory modes, only one, "efficient cause," is a cause as defined in the opening paragraph of this article. The remaining three explanatory modes can be represented by material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, the criterion of completion. Aristotle used the word αἰτία. For this purpose, this Greek word would be better translated as "explanation" than as "cause," since these words are most often used in modern English. Another reading of Aristotle is that he meant the "four causes" as four types of answers to "why" questions.
Aristotle believed that efficient causation referred to a basic fact of experience, not explicable or reducible to anything more fundamental or basic.
In some of Aristotle's works, the four causes are listed as (1) the essential cause, (2) the logical ground, (3) the moving cause, and (4) the final cause. In this list, stating the essential cause is demonstrating that the object in question fits the definition of the word that applies to it. Stating the logical ground is an argument for why a statement about the object is true. This is a further example of the idea that "cause," generally, in the context of Aristotle's usage, is an "explanation."
The word "efficient" as used here can also be translated, in Aristotle, as "moving" or "initiating."
Efficient causation was tied to Aristotle's physics, which recognized four elements (earth, air, fire, water) and added a fifth element (aether). Water and earth, by their inherent property of gravity, or heaviness, by nature fall toward it, whereas air and fire, by their inherent property of levity, or lightness, by nature rise away from the center of the Earth — the fixed center of the universe — in a straight line, accelerating as the substance approaches its natural place.
However, since air remained on Earth and did not fly off from the Earth, which would eventually reach an infinite velocity — an absurdity — Aristotle concluded that the universe is finite in size and contains an invisible substance that held the planet Earth and its atmosphere, the sublunary sphere, at the center of the universe. And since the heavenly bodies exhibit continuous, unaccelerated motion, revolving around the planet Earth in unchanging relations, Aristotle did conclude that the fifth element, aither, which fills space and composes the heavenly bodies, by its nature moves in eternal circles, the only constant motion between two points. (An object moving in a straight line from point A to point B and back must stop at either point before returning to the other.)
A thing left to itself exhibits natural motion, but may — according to Aristotle's metaphysics — exhibit forced motion, imparted by an efficient cause. The form of plants endows plants with the processes of nutrition and reproduction, the form of animals adds motion, and the form of humankind adds reason on top of these. A stone ordinarily exhibits natural motion — explainable by the material cause that the stone is composed of the element earth — but a living being can lift the stone, a forced motion, deflecting the stone from its natural place and its natural motion. As a further explanation, Aristotle identified the final cause, specifying a goal or criterion of completion in light of which something is to be understood.
Aristotle himself explained:
Cause means
(a) in one sense, that in virtue of whose presence something comes to be — for example, the bronze of a statue and the silver of a bowl, and the classes that contain these [i.e., material cause];
(b) in another sense, the form or pattern; that is, the essential formula and the classes that contain it — for example, the ratio 2:1, and number in general, is the cause of the octave — and the parts of the formula [i.e., formal cause];
(c) the source of the first beginning of change or of rest; for example, the man who deliberates is a cause, and the father is the cause of the child, and in general that which produces is the cause of that which is produced, and that which changes is the cause of that which is changed [i.e., efficient cause];
(d) the same as "the end"; that is, the final cause; for example, as the "end" of walking is health. Why does a man walk? "To be healthy," we say, and in saying this we consider that we have stated the cause [final cause].
(e) all those means toward the end which come about at the instigation of something else, as, for example, reducing fat, purging, drugs, and instruments are causes of health, since they all have the end as their object, though they differ from one another in that some are instruments, others actions [i.e., necessary conditions].
- Metaphysics, Book 5, section 1013a, translated by Hugh Tredennick
Aristotle further distinguished between two kinds of causation: proper (prior) causation and accidental (chance) causation. All causes, proper and accidental, can be spoken of as potential or actual, particular or general. The same language applies to the effects of causes, so that general effects are assigned to general causes, particular effects to particular causes, and actual effects to operating causes.
Avoiding an infinite regress, Aristotle inferred a prime mover — an unmoved mover. The motion of the prime mover, too, had to be caused, but, being an unmoved mover, it could only move toward a particular goal or desire.
Following Aristotelian cosmology, Thomas Aquinas established a hierarchy giving priority to Aristotle's four causes: "final > efficient > material > formal." Aquinas sought to identify the first efficient cause — now simply the first cause — as all would agree, said Aquinas, to call it God. Later in the Middle Ages, many scholars acknowledged that the first cause was God, but explained that many earthly events occur within God's design or plan, and so scholars sought to investigate the numerous secondary causes.
For Aristotelian philosophy before Aquinas, the word cause had a broad meaning. It meant "an answer to a 'why' question" or "an explanation," and Aristotelian scholars recognized four types of such answers. With the end of the Middle Ages, the meaning of the word "cause" narrowed in much philosophical usage. It often lost this broad meaning and was restricted to just one of the four kinds. For authors such as Niccolò Machiavelli in the field of political thought, and Francis Bacon in science generally, Aristotle's moving cause was at the center of their interest. The widely used modern definition of causality in this new, narrowed sense was adopted by David Hume. He undertook an epistemological and metaphysical investigation of the notion of the moving cause. He denied that we can ever perceive cause and effect except by developing a habit or custom of mind, whereby we come to associate two types of object or event, always contiguous and occurring one after the other. In Part III, Section XV of his book A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume expanded this into a list of eight ways of judging whether two things might be cause and effect. The first three are:
1. "The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time."
2. "The cause must be prior to the effect."
3. "There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect. 'Tis chiefly this quality that constitutes the relation."
Additionally, there are three interrelated criteria that derive from our experience and are "the source of most of our philosophical reasonings":
4. "The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause. This principle we derive from experience, and is the source of most of our philosophical reasonings."
5. Building on the above, Hume says that "where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality which we discover to be common amongst them."
6. And, "founded on the same reason": "The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular in which they differ."
And then two more:
7. "When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or diminution of its cause, it is to be regarded as a compounded effect, derived from the union of the several different effects which arise from the several different parts of the cause."
8. "An object which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect is not the sole cause of that effect, but requires to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward its influence and operation."
In 1949, the physicist Max Born distinguished determination from causality. To him, determination meant that actual events are so connected by natural laws that reliably certain predictions and retrodictions can be made from sufficiently plentiful data about them. He describes two kinds of causation: nomic, or generic, causation and singular causation. Nomic causation means that cause and effect are linked by more or less definite or probabilistic general laws covering many possible or potential cases; this may be recognized as a probabilistic version of Hume's criterion 3. The occasion for singular causation is a specific occurrence of a definite complex of events that are physically linked by precedence and contiguity, which may be recognized as criteria 1 and 2.
Mathematics
Physics
Philosophy
Philosophy of mind
Statistics
Psychology and medicine
Pathology and epidemiology
Sociology and economics
Environmental issues
Часть 1 Cause and Effect - Causality in Logic, Philosophy, and Criminal Law
Часть 2 See Also - Cause and Effect - Causality in Logic,
Comments