5. The nature of the relationship (relationship) language and thinking

The thinking in general psychology is considered to be an intellectual process aimed at resolving a particular problem situation, [179] designed to establish new relationships between the facts of reality. This "dominant" (over other mental processes) type of mental activity is carried out by a complex of interacting operations (establishing similarities-differences, dismemberment-connection, generalization-concretization), acting in their implementation in the figurative, figurative-effective, conceptual and, of course, linguistic form. [180]

Very often, the diverse relationships between the systems "psyche" and "language" reduce to one relation - "thinking" - "language" (speech), which, in our opinion, is not always legitimate.

One of the most important scientific concepts of linguistics is the position on the role of language in human intellectual activity. The position that “language is a condition of thought” was expressed by many linguists of the 19th and 20th centuries. (23, 177, 208, etc.). So, G. Schleicher wrote that language is “thinking expressed by sounds,” “the language has the task of creating a sound image of ideas, concepts and relationships existing between them, it embodies the thinking process in sounds. A language, through its precise and mobile sounds, can display the finest nuances of the thinking process with photographic accuracy. ”[181]

The well-known Russian scientist A.A. paid great attention to the problem of language and thinking. Potebnya. Based on the ideas of G. Steinthal, A.A. Potebnya believed that the region of language is far from coinciding with the region of thought, and at the same time believed that thinking could exist without language. For example, “the creative thought of a painter, sculptor, musician is not expressible by word and is accomplished without it, although it presupposes a considerable degree of development, which is given only in language. The deaf-and-dumb also constantly thinks — and not only by images, as an artist, but also by abstract objects — without a sound language, although, apparently, it never reaches the perfection of mental activity that is possible for speakers ”(176, p. 218 ).

A.A. Potebnya believed that the history of mankind knows periods when language was not connected with thinking: “In the middle of human development, thought may be associated with a word, but at first it, apparently, has not yet reached it, but leaves it with a high degree of abstraction as not satisfying her requirements "(177, p. 52). At the same time, it is meant that in a primitive society a person could not yet use all the possibilities of the language, and at a high stage of development of society, the language must be very specialized in order for a person to have the opportunity, using various means of language, to convey in his speech subtle semantic nuances .

Currently, the psychological attitude "language" (language activity) - "thinking" in psycholinguistics, there are two main points of view.

According to the first, the connection between language and thinking is inseparable, language (or rather, speech activity) determines, mediates thinking (including the perception of semantic information).

According to the second, the systems “language” and “thinking” are autonomous, and ambiguous relations arise between them in mental activity; thinking (even in its "higher" forms) can be accomplished without language.

Let us first consider the connections that actually exist between language and thinking, and then a critical analysis of the ideas about both their “inseparable” connection and the “complete autonomy” of these components of the psyche.

First of all, we recall that there are several types of thinking: figurative, figurative-effective, conceptual and implemented with the direct participation of language, the so-called. "Linguistic" (or "speech"); the latter can “merge”, “penetrate” into the first, “serve” them, or act independently. [182]

If an individual needs to use the signs of language in the processes of thinking, then the participation of language in this process is obligatory, and its role is decisive. We give the arguments.

As many researchers point out, the participation of language in the formation of the psyche and, in particular, thinking during ontogenesis is extremely large (13, 45, 95, 148, etc.). Lack of language or its incomplete or distorted development, as a rule, lead to delay and other developmental disorders of certain types and aspects of thinking (for example, in children with hearing impairments, in children with alalia and aphasia, etc.). In the existing mental activity (in its various forms), thinking reflects and rearranges reality, and signs of language provide a process and express the results of thinking; with the help of linguistic signs consciousness regulates the thinking process.

The process and results of thinking, if it is used in interpersonal communication, should always be “embodied” in a generally significant, i.e. language form, informative components should also be sufficiently “strictly” structured, have a certain presentation logic, and so on. p. [183] The content of mental activity, as the well-known foreign linguist W. Chafe wrote, should be “packaged” in the most efficient way (248). All specified is possible only on the basis of active and purposeful use of speech activity and the corresponding signs of the language (all variety of words-tokens, sentences of various functional directions, texts).

Along with other means of intellectual activity, language (being realized through speech activity) allows us to think not only about real things that go beyond the “present situation”, but even about things that are beyond the borders of the real world (for example, fairy tale characters, non-existent but possible events, etc.). Language (first of all, its “semantically” significant elements) allows one to judge not only the present and the past, but also the future.

Like thinking, language serves primarily to express the connections and relations between the objects of the reality surrounding us. Like thinking, speech by means of signs of language classifies and unites objects and phenomena in our mind.

“Division” (more precisely, “structuring”) of thinking in speech activity, encoding it into a language form, objectifies thinking processes. The language does not just “order” the thought, when it needs to be conveyed verbally and especially in written or mimic-gestural form, it directly participates in the creation and embodiment of the thought itself, not only denoting objects and phenomena, but also expressing (in an objective and generalized form) a) essential links and relationships between them. To this end, it has in its “arsenal” appropriate means — unique in nature, universal in their functionality, signs, which are the semantic codes of our thinking and all intellectual activity in general. [184]

Along with this, speech (RD), possessing a limited set of language units and rules for their combination, allows expressing an unlimited number of thoughts, which is very important for all types of non-speech activity and for speech communication (as part of communication activities ). At the same time, however, it should be borne in mind that, being a special system that is different from the "psyche" system, as a rule, one way or another, it modifies an emerging and already formed thought. If the main purpose of thinking is the knowledge of the world, then the most important goal of the language is the formulation and (to a certain extent) the formation of thoughts. Therefore, grammatical categories in a peculiar way contribute to the expression of thoughts.

Undoubtedly, the "reverse" influence of thinking on language. Thinking (namely, the process of reflection) determines the choice of language means. [185] In our consciousness, the world around us (with the help of operations of thinking) is divided into things (objects, phenomena) and relations (actions, states, processes, qualities, properties of objects). At the same time, the world of things in the language corresponds to nouns , [186] and to the world of relations, verbs, which in this case are the verbs themselves and all other parts of speech (adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, etc.).

Thinking "structures" some object (event) situation or its fragment. In the language of this corresponds to the text as a detailed coherent statement or sentence.

Language (language signs) can be used at different stages of the thinking process:

(1) at the stage of identifying a problem situation, where the known and the unknown stand out ; (2) at the stage of setting the intellectual task; (3) at the stage of establishing the method (s) of its resolution, (4) at the stage of solving a mental task and, finally, (5) at the stage of comparing the result of the thinking process with its purpose. The way of realization of signs of language in mental actions is the speech activity itself, individually carried out mainly in the form of internal speech. Providing (through the use of "semantic signs" - signs of language) thinking processes, speech activity is connected with the activity of thinking, "merges" into it, which turns the RD into the activity of speech-thinking. Recall here the ingenious definition of LS. Vygotsky about the specifics of the flow of thinking (real-speech-thinking) activity - “thought is accomplished (created. - Note by the author) in a word,” that is, in a speech (language) sign.

There is no doubt that the influence of conceptual categories on the composition of the terms of the sentence: the subject is the subject, the predicate is predicate, the object is addition, the attribute is definition , etc.

In thought, as a rule, the subject and the predicate are present (“psychological” subject and predicate, ie, as semantic units). In the sentence, they correspond to the syntagmatic articulation into the “subject group” - what one (or about what ) is said in the sentence, and “predicate group” - what is said about the subject (subject of speech).

The content of thought is related to reality (the subjective attitude of the speaker and the listener to the content of the utterance), according to which the main modal varieties of sentences are distinguished in the language: narrative, interrogative and motivating.

Many other facts speak about the influence of thinking on the language. Here we will mention only one of them: an increase (decrease) in the volume of a dictionary, an expansion of the meanings of words (for example: “satellite” - as companion or companion, “satellite” - as a spacecraft); meanings of the same words (for example, earlier the word “charming” once meant seducing, seductive; now it means “very cute, wonderful”).

In different forms of thinking, language plays a larger or smaller role (of course, the nature and conditions of non-speech and speech activity, the form of activity, and many other factors are important). For example, when the process of creative thinking is carried out for oneself, the language (in the “explicit” form peculiar to external speech) may not be used or used “rudimentally”. When creative thinking is carried out “for others” and even more so with the use of external speech (when we think out loud), then the participation of the language (in the traditional embodiment) is not only necessary, but also significant, decisive. At the same time, in such situations, language helps us to refine, “organize” thoughts.

Thinking acts as a proper “linguistic” in those cases when it is necessary for a person as a “linguistic” (for example, when reading, in perceiving oral messages, etc.). Even the so-called "routine" thinking or thinking, which is carried out in the "automatic mode", often uses language patterns (for example: "Twice two - four"; "Learning is light, ignorance is darkness", etc.).

From all that has been said, it follows that thinking and language are intimately connected with each other, but the connections between them are not unambiguous and not at all “mechanical”.

Let us turn to a critical analysis of the scientific concept of almost complete autonomy of thinking and language from each other in human intellectual activity.

Evidence in favor of this point of view can be divided into 4 groups: logical, psychological, ontogenetic, and evidence related to the field of pathology and temporary deviations of a non-pathological nature.

Consider first the so-called logical proofs.

The form of the existence of thinking is images of different modalities and different degrees of generalization (images of perception, images-representations, concepts and their relations — judgments and conclusions). The form of existence of a language is signs and their relations. The images, as mentioned above, directly or indirectly reflect the properties, relationships and relationships inherent in objects - the originals (single or cumulative, "simple" or "complex"). Signs replace images that are not similar to the signs themselves. For example, when we look at a table or present a certain table, we have an image of a table, and in this image there are properties inherent in this subject - the table. But in the word “table”, as a certain sequence of sounds (or letters) there are no properties of the table; the word “table” only refers us to the image of the table, or the image of the table “provokes” the use of the word “table”. In the same way, when the notion “beauty” arises in a person’s consciousness, for example, a very complex system of connections between different images, a system of connections, is the result of an individual’s life experience, the result of his diverse mental activity. The very word “beauty” does not contain any concept of beauty. The word "beauty" refers to the concept of "beauty." Or the concept of "beauty", arising from the individual, prompts him to use this word.

So, if a sign is a substitute (and it is such), then the sign cannot replace itself, it must replace something behind the sign. This “something” - images (of different modalities and different degrees of generalization) and their relations.

It has long been known to have already become a trivial judgment: each word summarizes. The judgment is certainly fair. But if the word generalizes, then it should not generalize itself, but something behind the word. This “something” is the experience of human mental activity, the meanings behind the signs. (Not without reason, except for orthoepic dictionaries, there are also explanatory dictionaries.) As Confucius wrote in his time, words themselves are empty, unless they are filled with human emotions and ideas.

The “semantic” signs of a language (word, sentence, text) possess not only the “representative” function of designation (“names”, “markings”) inherent in any sign, they have a meaning. The latter is a generalized and objective reflection in the human consciousness of objects and phenomena of the surrounding reality, their relations and relations. A word as a universal sign of a language does not simply mean a particular object (or its property, quality, etc.), it includes generalized information about this subject, its properties and functions. The word has such properties because it is not (accidentally or not accidentally established) a combination of sounds. A word is also a combination of morpheme codes with their lexical-forming (or, almost the same, semantic-forming) function. A word is not only a universal “analyzer” of an object designated by it, but at the same time a “tool” for systematizing knowledge. Denoting an object, the word simultaneously relates it to a certain category of objects (phenomena) of the surrounding reality. Finally, through semantic connections with other words (phrases), through its “semantic field”, the word displays multifaceted connections and relationships of the object designated by it with other objects and phenomena of the world around us. Proceeding precisely from such a “semantic nature” of the word, L.S. Vygotsky defined it as the unity of the sign ("name") and meaning. It is therefore wrongful to consider the word (and other signs of the language) only as a means of expression, transmission of thought (some mental content), assigning the role of “keeper” of information exclusively to images-representations. By themselves, not being connected with signs of language, images and representations are not universal “holders” of information (in any case in human mental activity). It is impossible not to take into account that the signs of language (and first of all the word ) are material carriers of meaning (“semantics”), while images-representations are their ideal carriers. But without mastering the meaning of language signs (through “appropriating” the latter in the process of mastering speech), a person is deprived of the possibility of using images-representations as “carriers” of meaning and, accordingly, as “semantic units” - units of the “informative field”. It is the word, being a universal “matrix” for fixing and storing information at its “connection” with the representation image, transferring to it its “semantics”, and ensures the effective use of the latter as a tool of thinking. It is the word through its meaning and the second component of its "semantics" - "meaning" [187] - and acts as the main "fixer" of life - the social and personal experience of a person.Image-representation itself (no matter how vivid and emotionally saturated it may be, no matter how generalized it may be), without relying on the meaning of the corresponding signs of the language (first of all the word), is very limited in its “informative capabilities”. By absorbing (in the course of mental ontogenesis) the informative component of the meanings of words and other "semantic" signs of language, the images-representations of the objective world around us are transformed into a universal means of intellectual reflection of the surrounding reality, into a unique tool of our thinking .

Отдельно следует сказать о таком универсальном средстве мыслительной деятельности человека, как понятие. Представляя собой максимально обобщенное представление о том или ином объекте (факте, явлении) окружающей действительности, понятие неотделимо от знаковой, в первую очередь языковой формы своего выражения. Понятие всегда актуализируется, выражается через основные знаки языка – предложение или текст, без них оно как бы не существует. Отличительной особенностью понятия является то, что оно всегда включает в себя информацию об основных свойствах и качествах того предмета или явления, которое отображает. Понятие – это не только максимально обобщенное, но и максимально «семантически насыщенное», информативно «объемное» отображение предмета в сознании человека. «Актуализация» этой информации в нашем сознании, представление и отображение наиболее важных признаков и свойств объекта, его «функционала» попросту невозможна без использования знаков языка, поскольку именно они в оптимальном варианте «способны» фиксировать и сохранять используемую для мыслительных действий информацию о том или ином предмете. В этой связи намеренное противопоставление понятий знакам языка является не только не обоснованным, но и неправомерным.

Методический аспект проблемы взаимоотношений языка и мышления, на наш взгляд, заключается в следующем. Поскольку образно-понятийный аппарат нашего мышления представляет собой сложную производную, образуемую, с одной стороны, психическими процессами восприятия и памяти, а с другой – «семантическими» знаками языка, поскольку он является продуктом психического онтогенеза (как собственно интеллектуального, так и языкового развития человека), обоим этим компонентам речемыслительной деятельности человека в ходе речевой (и в частности логопедической) работы должно уделяться особое внимание. Как невозможна эффективная мыслительная деятельность без формирования четких, «содержательных», чувственно-информативных образов-представлений о предметах и явлениях окружающей действительности (педагогический аспект речевой работы), так не состоятельна она и вне опоры на универсальные знаки языка (аспект формирования языковой способности – способности к адекватному использованию знаков языка в речемыслительной деятельности ).

Рассмотрим некоторые другие аргументы сторонников теории «автономии» языка и мышления (Л. Блумфилд, X. Джексон, У.Л. Чейф, Л.В. Сахарный и др.).

Если рассматривать связи «мышление – язык» в коммуникационном и информационном аспектах, то они в полной мере неразрывны и многофункциональны. Если же ее рассматривать в аспекте процессуальном, то это связь относительная, возможная, но не всегда обязательная. Системы «мышление» и «язык» автономны. Мышление может функционировать независимо от языка, тогда как язык без мышления функционировать не может.

Есть большое число явлений, которые нельзя или почти нельзя выразить посредством языка. Это так называемые «тонкие» мысли и чувства, некоторые интуитивные состояния, сфера искусства: музыка, живопись, балет и др. Об этом также свидетельствуют поэтические высказывания художников слова. Вот наиболее часто приводимые в психологической литературе примеры:

Ф. Тютчев:

«Как сердцу высказать себя?
Другому как понять тебя?
Поймет ли он, чем ты живешь?
Мысль изреченная есть ложь».

Или А. Фет:

«Как беден наш язык: хочу – и не могу!
Не передать того ни другу, ни врагу,
Что буйствует в груди прозрачною волною».

3. Гиппиус: «Мне кажется, что истину я знаю – И только для нее не знаю слов».

Или, например, «парадоксальное» у И. Бунина:

«Поэзия темна,
В словах невыразима».

V.V. Розанов: «Восторг всегда нем» и т. п.

Средствами мышления, кроме обыденного (идиоэтнического) языка, выступают и другие знаковые системы: так называемые языки науки (например, математики, химии, физики и др.), искусства (живописи, музыки, балета) и др.

Если результат мышления выражается в языковой форме, то это вовсе не означает, что сам процесс мышления протекал в языковой форме.

Мышление и язык имеют разное строение. Если в каком-то языке нет тех или иных форм, которые есть в других языках, то это не свидетельствует о том, что таких форм (скажем, временных, пространственных) нет в мышлении людей, говорящих на этом языке.[188]

Нет изоморфизма между содержанием и выражением, что проявляется в разных подсистемах общей системы языка. Например, когда мы говорим: «Маша пошла в магазин. Там она купила...», то между словом «там» и понятием «магазин» изоморфизма нет, хотя слово «там» в данном контексте отсылает нас к понятию «магазин»; также нет изоморфизма и между словом «она» и собственным именем «Маша».

Идиоматические выражения говорят о том же. Никто (в норме) не понимает в прямом смысле выражений: «Лезть в бутылку», «Играть на нервах» и т. п.

Формы «экспликации»[189] одной и той же мысли могут бить различными. Например: «медлить» — «тянуть резину», «волынить» и т. д.

Не соотносительны категории «понятие» и «слово». Понятие может быть выражено не одним, а несколькими словами, Например: «ученый совет», «стипендиальная комиссия» и др.

Изменение понятия не обязательно приводит к изменению слова, его обозначающего, и наоборот. К примеру «аэроплан» «стал» самолетом (лайнером); слово «грамота» ранее означало «деловая бумага», а сейчас означает «награда»; слово «гость» в Древней Руси означало купец, сейчас же означает «человек, приходящий с визитом (в гости)».

Понятий несравненно больше, чем слов, используемых для их обозначения. С этим связано явление полисемии, когда одно слово (одна словоформа) выражает много разных понятий. Например: читать книгу / мысли / карту / ноты; читать стихи / лекцию / нотацию и т. д.

Это подтверждается наличием в языке слов-омонимов («ключ», «лук», «брак», «ручка» и т. п.).

Язык (вне речевой деятельности) не выражает отношение «субъект – предикат». Он выражает отношения другого рода. Например: «Пятью пять – двадцать пять», «Смеркается!», «Вот те на!», «Да» и др. При этом нередко наблюдается расхождение между логическим и грамматическим субъектом (агенсом) и предикатом. Например, в предложении «Ему повезло» нет логического агенса и предиката, но есть грамматический агенс («ему») и предикат («повезло»).

Некоторые формальные категории языка не соотносятся с категориями мышления. Например, грамматический род, вид глагола. На самом деле вроде бы нет никаких объективных оснований для отнесения слова «стол» к мужскому роду, слова «лампа» – к женскому, а слова «ведро» – к среднему. Но язык (выступая в качестве инструмента РД) «присвоил» им определенней род, так как языку это «нужно» для его функционирования.

Перейдем далее к рассмотрению психологических доказательств, «опровергающих» представление о неразрывной связи мышления и языка (193, 248, 324).

Осуществлять мышление (шире – психическую деятельность) с помощью знаков не значит осуществлять ее знаками. Мышление (как и вся психическая деятельность) имеет не знаковый, а образный характер. Образы имеют модальность. Язык же «амодален», исключая, разумеется, этапы рецепции при восприятии речи и выполнение движений при ее порождении: артикуляторных (в устной речи), мимико-жестикуляторных (в кинетической речи) или мануальных (в письме).

Не следует смешивать два плана: (1) участие языка в онтогенезе психики, в том числе и мышления, где это участие несомненно и очень велико и (2) участие языка в сформированном процессе мышления, где язык выступает одним из многих средств обозначения (иногда – и построения) этого процесса.

Ранее неоднократно отмечалось, что кроме так называемого языкового (речевого) мышления человек прибегает и к другим его формам: образному, образно-действенному, понятийному (без употребления языка); в мышлении могут использоваться символические действия; в мышлении человек обращается не только к идиоэтническому (обыденному) языку, но и к языку науки (формулам, схемам и т. д.), языку искусства и др.

Знаки в силу своей природы не могут передавать всей совокупности психических явлений и, разумеется, совокупности форм и содержания мышления. Знаки языка лишь в определенном контексте неязыковой и языковой деятельности отсылают нас к определенному фрагменту действительности (материальной или идеальной), или же мы используем знаки для означения чего-либо.

Многие проявления автоматизмов (моторных и интеллектуальных), а также явления инсайта, интуиции, имеющие отношение к процессу мышления, обычно выступают в неязыковой форме.

О том, что мышление нередко совершается без участия языка, говорят самонаблюдения выдающихся ученых. Например, А. Энштейн отмечал, что процесс его теоретического мышления протекает без участия языка; по завершении же процесса мышления ученому было трудно найти языковую форму для выражения этого процесса и его результатов.

Посредством языка мы не только передаем мысли, но и скрываем их (конечно, при учете индивидуального и общественного опыта). Вспомним, здесь т. н. «святую ложь».

The situation of reality. It is a process of expression.

Another A. Potebnya said that the word itself does not create concepts. The concept is the result of a diverse human activity, his life experience. [190]

The non-verbal nature of the concept is confirmed, in particular, by cases of bilingualism. To own different languages ​​does not mean to own different systems of concepts or some special types of thinking. We must assume that a bilingual, for example, has one concept of “beauty”, despite the different linguistic forms of its expression: “beauty” (Russian), “beauty” (English) and (wow!) “Uroda” ( Polish), etc. At the same time, of course, it is necessary to take into account that the peculiarities of historical experience, the culture of this or that society determine the peculiarities of concepts, as well as the process and content of thinking. "Bilingv", of course, it may know, but it may not know. In contrast to the theory of linguistic relativity, it is legitimate to say: it is not language that dictates the content of concepts and the process of thinking; their content is determined by a complex set of non-linguistic factors. We use language as one of many means of thinking. If we again turn to the well-known example of a large number of names of shades and “states” of snow among residents of the Extreme North, which (names) are not in practice, say, St. Petersburgers, this difference is not due to language, but to social needs: for example, an Eskimo is vital to distinguish (and name) the shades of snow, most St. Petersburgers do not need it. However, if necessary, they will be able to distinguish the shades of snow and will find in Russian the means to designate them (many, by the way, already or potentially contain: snow - white, silver, milky, zinc, steel, cream, ivory) , colors gray, blinding white, white and blue, dirty white , etc., as well as: loose, dense, deep, sparkling , etc.).

The thought itself often begins to form, not having sufficiently strong "supports". By virtue of this, it cannot be entirely linguistic. Although language, if necessary, is used in the process of thinking and helps its implementation.

It should be remembered that in speech, if it is addressed to the addressee, we transmit not the words in their sequence and combinations, but thoughts, namely, through speech we excite thoughts from the addressee or encourage them to form transmitted thoughts.

It should not be forgotten that not all of the thought is often transmitted through the language, but only part of it, or we transmit some one thought (or several) from the large aggregate of thoughts that we have in this problem situation. It is clear that first of all it is determined by the purpose of the activity, but not only by it. The heterogeneous nature of the “thinking” and “language” phenomena also defines this “reduction”. For example, in the statements “Are you home? (go) - Home (go), the words in brackets exist in the mind of the speaker as concepts, but are absent as language given. Equally in the text: “Peter went for a walk. He took (Peter) with himself (for a walk) Ivan, who ... (i.e. Ivan) " are in brackets the words" reduced. "[191]

Differences in the search for words and syntactic constructions indicate the discrepancy between the non-linguistic semantic program and the language program; in such cases, there are stops in speech, hezitatsii, embolofrazii, pulling; “plug-in” constructions are used (such as “Well, how to say”), etc.

The difference between a non-linguistic semantic program and a linguistic program is confirmed by many other facts. Of these, we name only one - subtext. For example, when a teacher turns to talking students: “You probably forgot that the test is tomorrow?”, He does not remind them of the upcoming test, but calls them to silence.

A person is able to solve complex intellectual problems in a split second. Verbalization usually takes much more time.

At the same time, concepts in speech, as W. Chafe writes, must undergo a process of “linearization”. Often the arrangement of semantic units (“concepts”) and the arrangement of words in a sentence do not coincide. For example, in the "traditional" situation, we should say: "Ivan carried the ball that fell into the pit," but we can say this: "Ivan carried the ball into the pit."

Another, also unjustified, “promise” is an improperly overestimated assessment of the possibilities of non-speech (that is, not relying on the use of signs of language) thinking, which seems to stem from a one-sided interpretation of the very nature of thought processes in man. The formation of mental actions and operations in mental ontogenesis occurs not only under the influence of "external factors" (in particular, signal stimuli) and subject-practical activity, but also under the direct influence of emerging speech, under the influence of the practice of live speech communication, speech activity in all its types and forms (including emerging internal speech). In the process of "friendly", mutually influencing development of thinking and speech (RD), there is a constantly expanding involvement in the thought processes of signs of language, the transformation of the latter (primarily due to their unique properties) into an effective and universal "toolkit", an instrument of human thinking. This, in our opinion, is the fundamental difference between human mental activity and similar “analytical” processes in animals. The interpretation of the signs of language as a means (first of all) of expressing and transmitting the “products” of thinking (thoughts) looks not only one-sided, but also in many respects “detracting” the dignity of human intellectual activity.

Ontogenetic evidence that "refutes" the idea of ​​the inseparable link between thinking and language (193, 202, 275).

From the first weeks of a child’s life, he needs to meet not only the biological needs, but also the social needs that are born, and for this, make contact with adults and solve, albeit “primitive” (from the adult's point of view), but extremely important tasks for him. The majority of children up to 7–9 months of life do not possess the means of verbal expressive language (although it has a highly developed non-verbal communication system). [192] Nevertheless, as many studies show, the child thinks (193, 284).

Consequently, thinking develops without the participation of expressive verbal language.

The commonly used verbal expressive language that has appeared in children (at 8–9 months) remains imperfect for a long time: vocabulary and syntax are limited and incomplete, word formation and inflection systems, and so on, are largely “wrong” (from the point of view of the “adult” speech norm ). Despite this, the child’s thinking develops, and very significantly in the right direction.

When a child already masters the language system quite well (by about 5 years), this does not mean that he has mastered the system of thinking. Many thinking operations are available to him at a much later age (by 10–11 years and later). For example, the child seizes the relative clauses of the cause, but does not adequately master the inferences about the causal relationships of the phenomena or events.

A number of researchers (for example, G. Firth, 1964) do not detect deaf people who do not speak oral language in their thinking, any significant differences from the norm; [193] moreover, in some figurative thinking operations, deaf people outnumbered those who hear.

Experimental studies A.I. Meshcheryakova, a famous researcher of blind and deaf-and-dumb children, refutes the view that the psyche is born only with the assimilation of language. Language in ontogenesis, as A.I. Meshcheryakov only forms the already established elements of the psyche that have arisen in acts of object-practical behavior. [194]

Cases of aphasia without disturbed thinking [195] (or without pronounced violations of it) testify in favor of the relative independence of thinking and language.

Similarly, the majority of children with expressive (motor) alalia, according to the results of the study of figurative and conceptual thinking, do not differ from the norm, and some children even with severe disruption of the language system outperform normally developing children (X. Jackson, 1996; I.T. Vlasenko, 1990 ). [196]

The speech of patients with schizophrenia in terms of formal language is perfect, [197] but the content of speech (in the sense plane) is often grossly disturbed.

Reservations that appear in healthy people as a result of temporary deviations of a non-pathological nature (fatigue, lack of time for communication, distractions, etc.) also indicate a divergence of thinking processes and language, for example, when we replace words from a synonymous field (“cabinet” " sideboard "," fur coat "" coat ") or from the antonym field (" sit down "-" get up ";" close "-" open ").

The phenomenon of temporal amnesia of words while preserving relevant concepts in their memory also confirms the autonomy of language and thinking. For example, a person is able to give a detailed description of a certain concept, but is not able to remember the word that calls it. This can also be attributed to the "phenomenon of hovering on the tip of the tongue."

The “controversial” conceptual concepts discussed above, which characterize the psychological aspect of the relations of language and thinking, allow us to make a general conclusion that thinking and language (speech) are closely interconnected in human mental activity; thinking depends largely on language, just as language depends on thinking; These relations of interdependence and interdependence of the two main intellectually-forming components of the human psyche are multilateral and far from ambiguous.