Lecture
A target inductive rationale is a rationale for a positive assessment of an object by referring to the fact that it can be used to obtain another object with a positive value. For example, in the mornings, exercise should be done as this contributes to health promotion; one must respond with good to good, since this leads to justice in relations between people, etc. Targeted justification is sometimes called motivational, if the goals mentioned in it are not the goals of a person, it is usually called teleological. As already mentioned, the central and most important method of empirical substantiation of descriptive statements is the elimination of logical consequences from the substantiated position and their subsequent experimental verification. Confirmation of the consequences - evidence in favor of the truth of the situation. Indirect empirical evidence:
(1) Logically follows from A ; B is confirmed in experience; then probably A is true;
(2) A is the cause of B; Corollary B takes place; hence probably the reason And also takes place.
The analogue of the scheme (1) of empirical confirmation is the following scheme of quasi-empirical confirmation of estimates:
(1 *) From A logically follows B; In positively valuable; it means probably And also is positively valuable. For example: “If we go to the cinema tomorrow and go to the theater, we will go to the theater tomorrow; it is good that we will go to the theater tomorrow; it means, apparently, it’s good that we will go to the cinema tomorrow and go to the theater. ” This inductive reasoning justifies one assessment (“It's good that we will go to the cinema tomorrow and go to the theater”) a reference to another assessment (“It's good that we will go to the theater tomorrow”).
An analogue of the scheme (2) of causal confirmation of descriptive statements is the following scheme of quasi-empirical target justification (confirmation) of ratings:
(2 *) A is the cause of B; Corollary B is positively valuable; hence, probably, reason A is also positively valuable. For example: “If it rains at the beginning of summer, the harvest will be large; it is good that there will be a big harvest; then it seems to be good that it rains at the beginning of summer. ” Again, this is inductive reasoning, which justifies one assessment (“It's good that it rains at the beginning of summer”) with reference to another assessment (“It's good that there will be a big harvest”) and a certain causal connection.
In the case of schemes (1 *) and (2 *), this is a quasi-empirical rationale, since the corroborating corollaries are estimates, not empirical (descriptive) statements.
In scheme (2 *), the premise “A is the cause of B” is a descriptive statement that establishes the relationship between cause A and consequence B. If it is stated that the nose – effect is positively valuable, the cause – effect relationship turns into a means – goal relationship ". Scheme (2 *) can be reformulated as follows:
A is a means to achieve B; In positively valuable; then probably And also is a positive chain.
The reasoning following this scheme justifies the means by referring to the positive value of the goal achieved with their help. It can be said to be a detailed formulation of the well-known and always-controversial principle “The end justifies the means”. The controversy is explained by the inductive nature of the underlying rationale behind the principle: the goal is likely, but not always and not necessarily justifies the means.
Another scheme of quasi-empirical target justification is the scheme:
(2 **) non-A is the cause of non-B; but B is positively valuable; it means probably And also is positively valuable.
For example: “If you do not hurry, then we will not come to the beginning of the performance; it would be nice to be at the beginning of the performance; then it seems you should hurry. ”
It is sometimes argued that a targeted justification of assessments is a deductive reasoning. However, it is not. Purposeful justification and, in particular, the so-called practical syllogism known since Aristotle’s time , is inductive reasoning.
Purposeful justification of assessments is widely used in various areas of evaluative reasoning, starting with ordinary, moral, political discussions and ending with methodological, philosophical and scientific disputes. Here is a characteristic example taken from B. Russell's History of Western Philosophy: “Most of the opponents of Locke’s school, Russell writes, admired the war as a heroic phenomenon and suggesting contempt for comfort and peace. Those who embraced utilitarian ethics, on the contrary, were inclined to consider most wars as insanity. This again, at least in the XIX century, led them to an alliance with the capitalists, who did not like wars, as wars interfered with trade. The motivations of the capitalists, of course, were purely selfish, but they led to views more in tune with common interests than the views of the militarists and their ideologues. ” This passage mentions three different target arguments that justify justifying or condemning a war:
War is a manifestation of heroism; she raises contempt for comfort and peace; heroism and contempt for comfort and peace are positively valuable; it means that war is also positively valuable.
War not only does not contribute to the general happiness, but, on the contrary, in the most serious way impedes it; common happiness is something to strive for in every way; then war must be strictly avoided.
War hinders trade; trade is positively valuable; so war is bad.
The persuasiveness of the target justification essentially depends on three circumstances; first, how effective is the link between the goal and the means proposed to achieve it; secondly, whether the agent itself is sufficiently acceptable; thirdly, how acceptable and important is the assessment fixing the goal. In different audiences the same purposeful rationale may have different persuasiveness. This means that target justification refers to contextual (situational) methods of argumentation that are not effective in all audiences.
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Logics
Terms: Logics