9.7 Logic of norms

The logic of norms, also called deontic logic, already in the first years of its existence convincingly showed that reasoning, including norms, does not go beyond the scope of "logical" and can be successfully analyzed and described using the methods of logic. This created a good ground for criticism of concepts stating the incoherence of such reasoning and insisting on the impossibility of any convincing substantiation of moral, legal and other norms and their codes.

Knowledge of the logical characteristics of norms and assessments is necessary to decide questions about their place and role in scientific and other knowledge, on the interrelationship of norms and assessments, on their connections with descriptive statements, etc.

Interest in the logic of norms is understandable: the scope of norms is very broad, they play a crucial role in the life of society.

The concept of duty that is central to the logic of norms can be attempted to be clarified by contrasting it with other kinds of necessity. Depending on the basis of the statement of necessity, two of its types were previously singled out: logical necessity and physical necessity. Now you can add to them also a regulatory need or obligation.

Logically necessary is everything that follows from the laws of logic. Physically necessary is what follows from the laws of nature. Normatively, it is necessary that follows from the laws or norms of society, i.e. the denial of which is contrary to such laws or regulations.

As for the mutual relations of the three kinds of necessity, then, as already noted, it is assumed that the action imputed to the obligation is logically and physically possible. It is impossible to do something that is contrary to the laws of logic or nature. It is unreasonable, therefore, to oblige a person to do something that obviously exceeds his powers.

The analogy between logical and physical necessity, on the one hand, and normative necessity (mandatory), on the other, is not complete. What is necessary by virtue of the laws of logic or the laws of nature really exists. The statement “Everything that is logically necessary is true” is the law of logic. The statement "Physically necessary - really exists" is also a logical law. However, from the obligation of any action does not follow that it is certainly executed. Principles of morality, state laws, rules, customs or rituals, etc., are known to be violated, and this often happens. The statement “If an action is necessary, it is executed” cannot, of course, be a law of the logic of norms.

The laws of the logic of norms include, in particular, such simple provisions:

- “No action can be both mandatory and prohibited at the same time”;

- “It is impossible that any action was obligatory and indifferent”;

- “No action can not be together and prohibited, and indifferent.”

The evidence of these provisions becomes especially visual when they are interpreted in terms of concrete actions: “Caring for loved ones cannot be both mandatory and prohibited”. “It is impossible for work to be carried out without violating safety precautions to be mandatory and normatively indifferent,” “Environmental damage cannot be combined and prohibited, and indifferent,” etc.

The term “normatively indifferent” is used here in its usual sense: normatively indifferent action, which is neither obligatory nor prohibited.

For example, normatively it doesn’t matter how a person calls his dog, unless it is necessary to call him by a specific name, and it is not forbidden to call him by any name.

When using the concepts of "mandatory", "allowed", etc. there is always some kind of regulatory system, imposing obligation, granting permission, etc. There are various systems or, as they are called, "codes".

Take, for example, the following normative statements: “Love your neighbor,” “Allowed to ride the bus,” and “It doesn’t matter if you grow flowers.” These three statements refer, obviously, to three different regulatory systems. The duty of love of neighbor is a characteristic of a certain range of actions in terms of moral principles. Permission refers to an action subject to a legal framework. Regulatory indifference is affirmed with respect to a rather vague system of norms, say, a set of requirements of custom, tradition, etc.

Different systems of norms are often not consistent with each other. An action that is mandatory in one system may be indifferent or even prohibited within another. Say, morally binding may be indifferent from the point of view of law. Prohibited in one legal system may be permitted by another such system.

When interpreting specific examples of the operation of the laws of the logic of norms, one should keep in mind that every single example implies some kind of one - and only one - regulatory system, otherwise the example becomes simply meaningless.

Duty can be defined through prohibition, and prohibition through duty:

- “Mandatory action, which is forbidden to abstain”;

- "It is forbidden to act, from which it is necessary to refrain."

For example, "It is obligatory to pay taxes when it is forbidden not to do this" and "It is forbidden to violate the rules of the road if and only if it is necessary not to do it."

Permission is definable through duty:

- "The action is allowed if and only if it is not necessary to abstain from him."

Responsibility is determined by permission:

- “Action is necessary if and only if it is not allowed to refrain from it”.

For example, be sure to follow the rules of the road only under the condition that it is forbidden to violate them. It is forbidden to engage in medical practice to anyone who is obliged to refrain from it.

Examples to the laws of the logic of norms, as well as any examples to logical laws in general, do not just sound like tautologies (that is, repeats of the same thing), but in fact are tautologies. The laws of logic, as already mentioned, are tautologies and do not carry specific, substantive content. They do not give any information about the real world. Naturally, the examples to these laws are also uninformative.

It is obvious that in any system of norms the same action should not be together and allowed and prohibited. This requirement to the system of norms expresses the principle:

"If an action is allowed, it should not be prohibited."

For example, if it is allowed to cross the street to the green light of a traffic light, this is not prohibited.

Of particular interest is the reverse principle "Not prohibited - allowed." Sometimes it is stated that it, like the previous principle, is universal, i.e. applicable to all systems of norms and to all persons related by normative relations. In fact, it is not. The activities of state bodies, officials, organizations, etc. because of their special position and the functions they perform, they are not built on the basis of the principle “Everything that is not prohibited is allowed”, but proceeding from another rule: “What is specifically allowed is allowed, is included in the competence, etc.”.

In the logic of norms, it is customary to distinguish between a “liberal regulatory regime,” in which case the principle of “Everything that is not prohibited is valid” is permitted, and “despotic regulatory regime,” when this principle is not applied and only those activities are considered permitted, which are specified.

It is impossible to do something and at the same time not to do something, perform some kind of action and at the same time refrain from it. You can not laugh and do not laugh, boil water and do not boil it. It is clear that it is unreasonable to demand that a person perform the impossible: he will still violate this requirement. On this basis, the principle is introduced into the logic of norms, according to which action and abstention from it cannot be obligatory together:

“It is not true that it is necessary to perform some actions and be sure to refrain from them” (“It is not true that A is obligatory and A is obligatory non-A”).

The French philosopher S. Montesquieu wrote about the Roman emperor Caligula, who once made his horse a senator, that Caligula showed himself a real sophist in his cruelty. He said that he would punish the consuls both in the event that they celebrated the day established in memory of the victory at the Action, and also in the event that they would not celebrate it. When Drusilla died, whom he ordered to pay divine honors, it was a crime to cry for her, because she was a goddess, and not to cry, because she was the emperor's sister.

Obviously, Caligula’s orders contradict logic. At the same time, it is prohibited to perform a specific action and refrain from performing it. Logically, this is impossible, and no matter how behaved by those to whom these orders are addressed, one of the prohibitions will inevitably be violated.

The provision that the execution of an action and the abstention from it cannot be obligatory together is called the law of deontic consistency. This law is a concretization of the logical law of contradiction in the case of normative statements. The reason that leads to the adoption of this law is that it is impossible to simultaneously perform some action and refrain from it. The presence in the regulatory code of conflicting duties puts their subject in a position in which, no matter how he behaves, he will violate one of his duties. It is natural to consider a code that requires the impossible to be accomplished as imperfect.

It is sometimes argued that the requirement to improve such a code by excluding incompatible duties from it is not logical, but ethical or philosophical in nature. The system of norms that does not satisfy the principle of deontic consistency is contradictory in the sense that it contains norms, one of which cannot be fulfilled without violating the other. But this system reflects the actual conflicts of moral, legal and similar obligations and is completely legitimate from the point of view of logic.

Objections against the introduction of the principles of deontic consistency into logic can be answered as follows. Deontic logic does not describe how people actually deduce conclusions from regulatory assumptions. It is quite possible that a person from the obligation to do one action “deduces” permission to perform another action that is completely unrelated to the first. The existence of contradictory codes that require impossible actions is also not denied by deontic logic. The code of norms does not describe actual reasoning using norms and valid codes. It formulates the criteria for rational reasoning in the area of ​​norms. The task of such reasoning is to provide reasonable grounds for action. Obviously, reasoning cannot be called rational if it authorizes the obligation to perform an impossible action.

Many existing regulatory codes are more or less inconsistent. They develop gradually, and the new duties and morals offered by them are often not consistent with the old ones. But this does not mean that the logic that studies the structure of normative reasoning should not require its consistency.

Real natural science theories also develop gradually, and the new in them often contradicts the old. Studying their structure, the logic is completely distracted from the history of their formation and the struggle of various concepts. The inconsistency and direct inconsistency of natural science theories is not considered as a reason for rejecting the requirement of their logical consistency. It would be unnatural to assume that the relation of the logic of norms to contradictions is fundamentally different from the attitude towards them of other sections of formal logic. The inconsistency of the real systems of norms of the National Assembly excludes the requirements of the logical consistency of these systems, just as the inconsistency of real natural science theories does not mean the admissibility of logical contradictions in these theories.

Thus, the principle of deontic consistency must be attributed to the truths of logic. Its adoption is connected, however, with the adoption of certain assumptions about the nature and purpose of normative reasoning, about its connection with action.

In the logic of norms, the law of deontic fullness also takes place : “Every action is either obligatory, or indifferent, or forbidden.”

This law is a concretization of the logical law of the excluded third in case of normative statements. The idea of ​​completeness of the regulatory code can also be expressed by using one of the following statements:

• the action is permitted if abstaining from it is not an obligation;

• any non-prohibited action is allowed;

• regarding any action it is true that it is allowed to either perform it or refrain from it.

If indifference, duty, prohibition and permission are understood as norms explicitly or implicitly contained in the code, the principle of deontic completeness can be said that they are supposed to cover the normative code of all human actions.

It is obvious that many real codes deal only with a limited range of actions and do not determine the normative status of not only behavioral methods that are not yet known, but also of those actions that do not make sense to fulfill or fail to comply with any norms. This means that the inclusion in the logic of the norms of the principle of deontic completeness should be interpreted as a certain limitation of the class of normative systems for the study of which this logic can be used.

From the other laws of the logic of norms we can mention the provisions:

- “The logical consequences of the obligatory are obligatory”;

- “If an action leads to a prohibited investigation, then the action itself is prohibited”;

- "If you must perform two actions together, then each of these actions is necessary."

Deontic logic has found many applications. Understanding the logical characteristics of norms is necessary for deciding questions about the following of certain norms from others, about the place and role of norms in scientific and other knowledge, about the interrelationship of norms and assessments, norms and descriptive statements, etc. Knowledge of the logical laws that obey moral, legal, economic and any other reasoning, using and justifying the rules, allows us to make more clear ideas about the objects and methods of the sciences that operate on the norms, to provide substantial assistance in their systematization.

The source of philosophical and methodological interest is also the fact that deontic logic forces us to take a fresh look at a number of logical problems proper. In particular, the construction of a logical theory of normative utterances that have no truth value means that logic goes beyond the limits of the "realm of truth" in which it was until recently. Understanding of logic as a science of receiving true results from true premises should therefore give way to a broader concept of logic.