Lecture
The modern army represents an extraordinarily complex socio-organizational structure possessing a number of distinctive features.
One of the features of the modern army is the unprecedented saturation of the troops with weapons and equipment. This is due to the fact that a peacetime army cannot wage a large-scale war; it can hold back an aggressor only for the length of time needed to carry out mobilization, and it serves as the basis for deploying the wartime armed forces, whose strength usually increases by an order of magnitude compared with peacetime. For this reason many units, formations, and large formations in peacetime consist, in essence, of nothing but headquarters staffs and arsenals, which in world practice is considered not merely quite normal but optimal.
In addition, for all subunits, units, and formations there exist peacetime and wartime tables of organization. Personnel strength under wartime tables may be increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2 compared with peacetime. As an example, one may cite the measures taken by the government and the command of the US armed forces in preparing the well-known Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf region. All US units and subunits earmarked for combat operations in that zone were brought up to wartime strength within a few days. It should be noted that this reinforcement was carried out not at the expense of the troop contingent, but through the call-up of 40,000 reservists — and specifically those reservists who were assigned to the units being brought up to strength (the so-called assigned reserve personnel). In peacetime these assigned personnel periodically undergo refresher training in their own units and subunits and are called up by the government in the event of military necessity. Naturally, such an approach to manning the troops requires considerable expenditure from the state.
A second feature of the modern army is the circumstance that all the principal weaponry with which it is equipped is collective weaponry. Today only small arms and certain types of antitank and antiaircraft means are individual weapons. It is obvious that in modern war these cannot be the decisive armament. Moreover, the diversity and abundance of weapons and the striving for the greatest effectiveness in their use has led to the creation and adoption by modern armies of various weapons control systems. To the uninitiated they are invisible, but it is precisely these systems that constitute one of the most important links in the qualitative changes in the means of armed struggle.
It must be said that the collective character of modern weaponry not only does not diminish the role and significance of each individual person in the conduct of combat operations, but on the contrary raises it considerably. Every service member in a modern army is, above all, a specialist responsible for some sector of the activity of a subunit or unit. Today in a single motorized rifle regiment alone there are more than a hundred military occupational specialties. Yet as recently as the beginning of our century, in speaking of some military unit one could say that it had "so many bayonets, so many sabers," and this already constituted a fairly complete characterization of its combat capabilities.
A unit or formation of a modern army can no longer be regarded as a simple aggregate of a certain quantity of weapons and a certain number of soldiers. The diversity of subunits performing various combat and auxiliary tasks, and the need for rigorous coordination of their actions in time and space, gave rise to a requirement for troop control systems, which constituted yet another stage of qualitative change in the development of military affairs.
A third feature of the development of the modern army is that today our compatriots increasingly feel themselves to be not only citizens but also taxpayers. And sooner or later taxpayers begin to take an interest in, study, analyze, and compare the figures of the defense budget. The main part of military expenditure consists, first of all, of weapons procurement, their operation, repair, modernization, and disposal. Then comes combat training and combat duty. Finally, the maintenance of infrastructure and the creation of mobilization resources require substantial outlays. Let us cite just a few average figures which, we hope, will give at least a minimal idea of what is decisive in the military budget. The cost of a modern tank is approximately 3 million rubles, of a round for a tank gun 5,000 rubles, of a combat helicopter about 15-30 million rubles, of a fighter aircraft from 50 million rubles, of a strategic bomber 100 million dollars. At one of the European air shows, the new Eurofighter aircraft was demonstrated at a cost of 60 million pounds sterling (about 100 million dollars); one flight hour in a combat trainer aircraft without the use of weapons costs from 15,000 rubles. The cost of a nuclear submarine is no less than 6 billion rubles.
The creation and use of systems for the operational control of different types of weapons and of the various services and branches of the Armed Forces increases defense expenditure many times over. Unfortunately, Russia's historical fate is such that, by virtue of its geopolitical position, it is condemned to the necessity of possessing a powerful defense potential. Without this it could not exist as an integral state.
The army, in addition to belonging to the most important institutions of state power, is at the same time an important social institution as a historically formed, stable form of organizing joint activity. Concentrating within itself a comparatively small part of the population, the army commands a force incomparable with any other force in society. This force is based, above all, on the direct and exclusive possession of powerful weapons, on an exceptionally rigid organizational structure, and also on the well-known — and, incidentally, entirely natural — separateness of military-professional activity from other spheres in which human energies and capabilities are applied.
The circumstances named place the army in a special position within the system of socio-political institutions and give rise to the problem of civil-military relations, which are far from always cloudless. The question "Who will protect us from the protectors?" was posed as early as by the thinkers of antiquity. In our time this question is more relevant than ever. A number of prominent foreign and domestic scholars working on the problems of civil-military relations believe that the role of the military is increasing. This is happening on both the global and the intrastate scale. The future of the world depends in large measure on what policy the military will serve and how their relations with the state and society will take shape
The American sociologist David Trask holds that the military possess a real capacity for drawing peoples into war. However, this is not because the military are uniformly bad, malevolent, bloodthirsty people. On the contrary, he supposes that "military affairs are the occupation of the most worthy." Perhaps the resolution of this contradiction lies in the statement of Samuel Adams, one of the "founding fathers" of the USA: "A standing army always represents a danger to the liberties of peoples, since the ideology and rules of an army differ from the spirit of a free people and the laws of a free government." Indeed, the army is nothing other than an instrument of violence, and therefore demands an exceptionally sober, balanced attitude toward itself and its activity. Taking this circumstance into account, society must seek optimal means of reducing the danger emanating from this instrument of state policy and of harmonizing civil-military relations.
It should be emphasized that, since the army is a part of society, the contradictions between it and society exist, in the main, only within the framework of the social division of labor. In this connection there arises the problem of elucidating the essence of military labor.
Military labor falls under the general definition of labor as the purposeful activity of people directed at creating material and other goods necessary to satisfy the needs of each individual and of society as a whole. The armed forces meet the social need for the military defense of the state. It is with this that the necessity of military labor as a socially useful occupation for a certain part of the adult population is connected. Military labor plays a decisive role in attaining a given level of aggregate productivity of all the working members of society. Its significance is determined by the end result (product), which takes the form of a service. Thus the military are the producers of a special, specific service — the defense of society.
Professional activity presupposes remuneration for labor. Its size is determined by market conditions, in particular by the ratio of supply and demand for military labor. Historical experience testifies that market relations between the army and society have always existed. Even the rigid regulation of these relations by totalitarian states was unable to reduce them to zero. It should be borne in mind that payment for military labor need not necessarily be made exclusively in money. It may also take the form of benefits of the most varied character. For example, in tsarist Russia an officer who rose to a military rank of Class IX of the Table of Ranks acquired the right to personal nobility, while one who rose to Class VIII acquired the right to hereditary nobility. Nobility conferred no material advantages; rather the opposite, it obliged one to additional expenditures. However, the transition from a lower estate to a higher one under the conditions of a semi-feudal state could have far-reaching consequences for a person.
But how is one to determine, at least approximately, the starting market value of military labor? This question may be formulated differently: for what does the state (and, in the final analysis, society) pay professional military personnel?
First, only healthy people are fit for military service. This is beyond doubt, as is the fact that not all people are healthy and fit for service. A person's health is his personal asset; in this case it represents an indisputable market value and must be paid for.
Second, military service demands a certain qualification of a person. Beyond this, every service member, and especially a highly qualified one, must possess a certain set of moral and psychological qualities which by no means all people possess. The factors named must likewise have a market value.
Third, the state partially restricts the rights and freedoms of service members; consequently, it is obliged to compensate these restrictions materially.
Fourth, the state pays for the military labor of a person as such, taking into account the inconveniences, deprivations, and risk to health and life associated with it.
Finally, fifth, in engaging a person for service for a limited term (20-25 years), the state must compensate him for opportunities forgone. Since ancient times a so-called severance benefit has been used for this purpose.
Retrospective analysis and the study of international experience on the problem of paying for military labor give grounds for holding that the factors named above are always taken into account to one degree or another. Nowhere and never has the profession of officer offered the possibility of growing rich by honest means. It is another matter that people who are wealthy to begin with always have the possibility of devoting themselves to military service. But in that case other, non-material incentives are already at work. Any state, as a rule, strives to maintain the property position and social status of professional military personnel at the level of society's middle class. This measure, besides solving the problem of manning the armed forces with select personnel, contributes to consolidating the social pyramid and strengthening the role of the army as one of the principal guarantors of statehood.
At the same time, it may be repeated that the army is an implement of the state. The forms and limits of its use are determined by state power in the person of its supreme legislative and executive organs. They, precisely they and they alone, are competent to take the decision to use the army.
There is no question that an army which has escaped obedience to the government is dangerous, and that a government which the army does not obey is worth nothing. Truly democratic forces, therefore, should not speculate about whose side the army will take, but should see to it that it remains faithful to the Constitution and to the country's lawful government.
Theoretically, various situations are possible in which this principle is violated and the combat capabilities of the army are used for purposes other than intended. Here they are. The first: the army turns into a self-sufficient force, escapes subordination to the government, and assumes the functions of governing the country. Moreover, the aims, character, and content of the regime thus established may have different political orientations. The second: the army falls under the influence of one or another social or national movement or political current and is used by them to put pressure on the government. Naturally, this pressure may come from both the right and the left. The third: the country's leadership, having discredited itself and lost the moral right and the capacity to govern, attempts to protect itself and to "discipline" the people with the help of the army. The army, created to defend the people, in this case turns into their overseer. The fourth: the army is used to suppress mass public disorders, that is, it performs the functions of a guard.
World practice has developed various mechanisms for ensuring the political reliability of the army and its loyalty to its government. Among them may be included:
constitutional and legislative acts defining the social status and legal foundations of the activity of the army and of service members; the subordination of the armed forces to the legislative and executive organs of state power; parliamentary and public oversight of the army's activity;
high-quality selection and highly professional training of officer cadres, political and military education of the personnel;
transparency (openness) of the army to society.
True, these traditional mechanisms do not always work. Much depends on the specific socio-political situation in the country, on how far the army is subordinate and devoted to the supreme organs of power, and on how far these organs of power are capable of directing the army organism.
The armed forces, so long as they exist, cannot be entirely divorced from politics, and in fact act as its inseparable attribute. The problem always lies elsewhere: what policy the army serves, to whom its political leadership belongs, and who forms the political responsibility of the personnel toward the state and the people, and how. The political character of the army's conduct and its political role in society may change; however, the transformation of the army into a politically neutral force is, under contemporary conditions, apparently ruled out.
The political role of the army, given the particularities of the established regime, may be either progressive in character, consolidating social forces, or reactionary, repressive-militaristic. In the first case the army restrains society from social clashes and civil war, acts as a peacekeeping force of a kind, and strengthens the integrity of the state. In the second, army subunits may be used for punitive functions, for suppressing any actions by their own people.
A study of the variants of the army's political behavior and of its political role in the history of the development of many countries and peoples shows that there may be several such variants:
Devotion to, and unconditional execution by the army of, the decisions of the forces dominant in the country, and the use of the armed forces exclusively as the most reliable guarantor of power. As a rule, this variant is most characteristic of totalitarian and dictatorial regimes. Political domination in the country is exercised by the ruling party, and political power is concentrated in the hands of the party elite. The military elite may constitute either an organic component of political power or a powerful and influential force exerting decisive pressure upon it. Under these conditions the army is both a central object of political power and its subject. Sometimes the highest army circles may concentrate practically all political power in their hands, having removed the traditional organs of power from governance (for example, the regime of the Brazilian "gorillas," established in March 1964, in effect removed the entire civilian leadership from power). The political role of the army under these conditions comes down largely to the performance of police functions.
Loyalty of the army to the Constitution. This model of army conduct is most characteristic of democratic regimes, for which the military's recognition of the unconditional supremacy of civilian political power is typical. The stabilizing role of the army is not confined to a forceful reaction to some action by forces opposing the government. The army's political role finds its real expression in support for the authority lawfully elected by the people, in defense of the constitutional order and of public order, and in ensuring the stability of the socio-political situation.
A significant role in such conduct by the army is played by effective civilian control over the armed forces, which is exercised in civilized countries with account taken of national specifics. For example, the American variant of control rests on three positions:
Congress has the right to debate and approve the military budget upon the President's submission, to require the highest military officials to report on the state of affairs in the army, and to issue regulations and manuals governing the actions of the troops;
direct military-political administration of the troops is exercised by a civilian department of defense;
service members are restricted in their political rights and freedoms, but this is compensated by benefits in other areas.
In Germany, service members are considered "citizens in uniform." They are guaranteed rights equal to those of all citizens of the republic, including the right to join political parties; combining service with activity as a deputy is permitted, and so on.
Active work on creating an effective mechanism of civilian control over the Armed Forces is also under way in our country. Evidently, in setting up its operation it is necessary to take comprehensive account of the experience of many countries and at the same time to proceed from the actual realities of Russia, the traditions of the Russian army, the mentality of the peoples living in the state, and their attitude toward the army and military service.
Participation of the army in the struggle for power on the side of particular political forces. Perhaps the classic example of such conduct by troops was the stratification of the tsarist army in Russia in 1917-1918. The organized armed struggle for state power under conditions of extreme social instability led to an actual split both among the highest army circles and in the lower command echelon. In the end the greater part of the army came out in support of the Bolshevik platform for the reordering of Russia, while another, no less considerable part fought on the side of the forces for the restoration of the monarchical order. Most interesting of all is that American, British, French, and Japanese military formations were drawn into this struggle. That is, the political regimes of other states clearly defined their interests in this struggle and, naturally, wished to obtain the desired results.
Independent initiative actions by army circles as a force opposing the existing regime, and active struggle to change it. Thus, for example, in Turkey in March 1971 the highest army circles compelled the Demirel cabinet of ministers to resign by means of an ultimatum, and in 1983 the military opposition permitted elections to the national assembly to be held under strict army control. Army circles are a powerful political force, frequently dictating their terms to the official political authorities, in Burma, Yemen, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and many other states. The military exerted a decisive influence on the stabilization of the political situation in Peru during the political crisis. With their support and under pressure from army circles, President Fujimori on 5 April 1992 dissolved the parliament, placed a group of its leaders under arrest, and suspended the operation of certain articles of the constitution. Firm support enabled the president to find a way out of the "constitutional impasse" and to control the situation in the country completely.
The army's escape from obedience to the authorities, the establishment by the military of the fullness of power exclusively through army structures, the removal of the opposition and of civil institutions from any political activity — that is, the carrying out of a military coup. Calculations show that in Latin America and Africa alone more than 500 military coups occurred in the last century, in Asia more than 50, and even in relatively calm Europe 11 military coups.
An important aspect of the analysis of military coups is determining their character, or socio-political orientation. Despite the evident unconstitutionality of their nature, in political practice military coups have more than once taken place that were directed against an outdated, unviable, or rotten system of state power which objectively obstructed the process of overdue social reforms. The category "military coup" reflects only the fact of the army's direct intervention in politics and power relations. But this intervention may be carried out on the side of various socio-political forces, may pursue different social and political interests and aims, and may have far from unambiguous political consequences. Since the struggle for power in the form of a military coup is bound up with armed violence and may lead to numerous casualties, progressive humanity considers military coups an extremely undesirable method of selecting those in power.
The political behavior of the army is very strongly influenced by the socio-political and economic factors of a country's development. A particularly favorable soil for the army's emergence onto the forestage of political struggle is created by a situation of political crises, acute constitutional and power-related contradictions, and social and interethnic conflicts.
Undoubtedly, no single variant of army behavior has a historical analogue in "pure" form. The evolution or intermixing of a number of variants was inevitable. Everything was determined by the specific situation.
Under contemporary conditions the scale of the looming threat (the existence in the world of mass armies and colossal stockpiles of weapons; armed conflicts, territorial claims, etc.) and the complexity of other global problems require new arguments in assessing the political role of the army.
Especially acute is the problem of drawing the army into political battles and games in the course of the struggle of various groupings for power. Here the army is assigned the role of a certain independent political force which supposedly threatens society with military dictatorship. In the frenzy of the struggle for power, individual politicians attempt to split the army and to sow discord within military collectives.
It is precisely for this reason that the laws regulating the life and activity of the Russian army state that the use of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation in the interests of particular groups of persons, parties, or public associations is not permitted. The people have the right to see in the army their guarantor of stability and reliability.
The problem of the political role of the army is a complex and all-embracing one. Its socio-political background is considerably supplemented by an aspect reflecting the social characteristics of service members. After all, each of them is an individual, a citizen of the state. Everything that happens in society is reflected in the military organism. It is naive to suppose that young men, having exchanged civilian dress for military uniform, completely withdraw from the problems of political life. Each of them has his own views, interests, orientation, and experience in assessing situations. A soldier is not a thoughtless executor of someone else's will. It is therefore important to form in every service member a high level of political culture and a motivation to serve his country worthily, to break down the nihilistic attitude toward the army and military service, and to raise its prestige. And these are tasks that are not only social but also political. Finally, it should be emphasized that in contemporary politicized society it is extremely important to define the responsibility of political leaders who issue orders for the use of the army contrary to its historical purpose and in violation of existing legislation.
Thus the armed forces of a state are not only a military but also a political institution of society, the most important instrument for implementing military policy, and a guarantor of the security, integrity, and stability of the political system. The relations between the army and political power are complex and contradictory, conditioned by a multitude of factors. Depending on specific circumstances, various models of the interconnection between the army and the organs of power take shape. The experience of civilized states shows that the most acceptable form of interaction between the army and the authorities is a model based on democratic principles of social organization.
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