Lecture
Historical experience testifies that in the past, right up to the middle of the twentieth century, the foremost factor of world power and of states' influence on the world stage was military force. The strength and scale of a given power's authority in the world were directly proportional to its military might. Power was identified with force, which was considered the foundation of power. Whoever had the strongest army possessed the greatest power.
The appearance of nuclear weapons would seem to have outlawed war between nuclear powers.
The view prevailed that the two nuclear powers, the USA and the USSR, possessed a guaranteed capability to destroy one another. This understanding of the fatal outcome of a nuclear war, right up to the dissolution of the USSR, spurred Moscow and Washington, and the entire world community, to search for the foundations of a system of collective security. There came an awareness of the threat of, if not the destruction, then the irreversible degradation of humanity. People's notions of the admissibility of "conventional war" proved more tenacious.
Soviet and American scholars carried out extensive work to give effect to the new thinking, which was proclaimed in 1955 by Albert Einstein and Lord Russell. It seemed that the use of military force in international relations would decline, and that the nuclear countries, the world community, the UN, and such movements as Pugwash, the Dartmouth Conferences and the peace movement, would defeat thoughts of the unthinkable, of nuclear war. With the collapse of the bipolar world system these hopes evaporated.
In present-day conditions, despite the general decline in the significance of the military factor in the system of international relations, military force likewise continues to remain an inalienable attribute of policy and a most important means of defending a state's vital interests and ensuring its security. Moreover, as world experience shows, the aggravation of international contradictions often leads to the use of military force to resolve them.
In this connection, at present, as world experience shows, practically all states, even the most peace-loving, take measures in advance and on a continuing basis to strengthen and improve their military force and assign it a corresponding place in the system of ensuring national security.
The military force of a state, being an instrument of policy, constitutes an exceptionally complex social phenomenon. Evidence of this is that to this day there exist differing points of view on the essence of military force, its structure, content, forms of realisation and functions performed, and on the relationship of this category to another category close to it in meaning - "military might".
For example, A. Kh. Shavaev and N. I. Turko identify military force with the military might of the state. N. D. Tabunov and others hold that military force is derivative of the state's military potential and military might. There are other judgements as well concerning the essence of military force.
It should be noted that military force today is regarded, on the one hand, as a means of "violence", a "capacity to influence other states", and on the other hand as a "means of preventing violence", a "means of ensuring security".
As already noted, the category "military force" interacts most closely with the category "military might", and is sometimes identical with it.
Military might is a constituent part of the aggregate might of the state and is used to accomplish military tasks. The aggregate might of a state comprises all available material and spiritual capabilities that society is able to bring to bear in accomplishing the tasks before it.
In essence, military might is the realised part of a state's military potential. In peacetime conditions, as a rule, only a partial realisation of military potential is carried out. As the threat of war and preparation for it increase, the degree of realisation of military potential grows.
Possessing a certain military might, a state uses it to meet its needs both within the country and on the international stage. At the same time, the greater part of the military might of modern states is, as a rule, intended for meeting foreign policy needs.
For assessing a state's military might there exist definite methodological principles and requirements.
Principle one. A state's military might is directly conditioned by the character and particularities of the epoch. Its qualitative and quantitative parameters are conditioned by changes in the balance of forces in the world and in its individual regions. It must be flexible and mobile, with clearly expressed development priorities, and capable of reacting quickly to changes in the situation.
Principle two. The dependence of the character of military might on the type, social content and political regime of a particular state. A given historical type of state determines a corresponding type of military might (feudal, bourgeois and so on). The essence of each type of military might is revealed through its social-class basis and historical purpose. That is why the social functions of different types of military might do not coincide. Moreover, they acquire specific features depending on the particularities of the military-political course of a particular state and on the methods and means of implementing it within one and the same type. Identifying the characteristics noted makes it possible to determine which social forces' political interests this military might serves to realise and whose class objectives it fulfils.
Principle three. A state's military might is a relative quantity. The absolute magnitude of military might is not a comparative characteristic for determining a particular state's capacity to achieve victory in armed struggle, since the maximum magnitude of the military might of an underdeveloped state and of an economically powerful one are simply incommensurable. This capacity depends on the state's ability to withstand a specific adversary. The dimensions of military might are therefore determined by comparing the real (actual) capabilities of the opposing countries.
Principle four. A state's military might and security change qualitatively depending on the presence (or absence) of nuclear missile weapons, their delivery vehicles, and the level of anti-missile defence systems. In the pre-nuclear era an increase in a state's military might was associated, as a rule, with a reduction in the state's vulnerability and was considered synonymous with its security. With the appearance of nuclear weapons the situation changed fundamentally. A number of states had nothing with which to compensate for the absence of such weapons. However, the nuclear potential of other states also laid bare the limits of absolute military force. The problem of humanity's self-preservation emerged with full clarity. The character of the relationship between the quantity of nuclear missile weapons and the degree of a state's security thereby acquired an inversely proportional dependence.
Awareness of the situation that has arisen leads to a logical conclusion: a state's military might ceases to be the determining quantity. Superiority in military might is today no less dangerous a factor than its insufficiency. Moreover, a one-sided emphasis on military force significantly weakens the other components of national security, ultimately making it less solid and stable. Consequently, the adoption of defensive military doctrines is the only possible reasonable path for humanity's movement towards a nuclear-free world and reliable security. The authority of a state will in the future be determined by the level of development of its economy, science and technology, by society's intellectual and cultural reserves, and by the moral and political attitudes of its population. That is why world economic ties and a just economic order are coming to the fore.
At the same time, the mere possession of military might does not presuppose its active and resolute use in the system of international relations. It may well remain an unused capability if the government does not pursue resolute aims and does not set them before its armed forces. Consequently, military might becomes a force ensuring the achievement of definite aims only when it enters into active interaction with the military might of other states.
Thus, if a state's military might, in terms of its impact on the system of international relations, appears to a greater degree as a certain potential capacity for influence rather than influence as such, then force in any of its manifestations (and all the more so military force) presupposes precisely an impact upon another state or group of states.
By its genesis military force is a product of military might, which determines the possibilities, character and degree of the impact of one state's military force upon another. Proceeding from this, by the military force of a state we shall understand the degree and intensity of the actual impact of its military might, for one purpose or another, upon other states or upon the system of international relations.
Fundamental to the contemporary understanding of the place and significance of military force within the system of means for ensuring Russia's national security is the provision of its Military Doctrine that the Russian Federation ensures its security by the entire aggregate of means at its disposal, giving priority to political-diplomatic and other peaceful means, and therefore considers it necessary to maintain Armed Forces and other troops and to employ them for the purpose of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity and other vital interests of the Russian Federation in the event of aggression against it or its allies.
In the national security strategy of the United States, military force is likewise assigned an important place. It is regarded as a source of guarantees and as the foundation of security on both a regional and a global scale. Particular emphasis is placed on the fact that the strengthening of US security is carried out by relying on combat-ready armed forces.
It is important to emphasise that military force acts as an instrument of policy, or more precisely, of its historically specialised part - the military policy of the state. For military policy, military force is the most effective and, arguably, the principal instrument (as compared with economic, political, diplomatic and other means) by which the political leadership can meet its foreign policy needs. However, this instrument must not be absolutised, since the achievement of specific military-political aims is also possible through the action of other structural elements of a state's foreign policy strength. Today military force has ceased to be the chief naturally traditional instrument of policy in all cases, yet it continues to play an important role in ensuring the national security of the state.
While emphasising the necessity of military force as a means of ensuring the state's security, it should be noted that significant changes have occurred and continue to occur in its content and orientation. Above all, military force is developed and improved on the basis of the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defence, which presupposes that all measures in the military sphere are carried out in strict accordance with the degree of military threat and taking into account the socio-economic and scientific-technical capabilities of the state. An analysis of the basic principles of Russia's policy in the field of military security confirms this.
Military force, like any complex social phenomenon, has a structure of its own. Its most important elements are: the armed forces, military-economic force, military-scientific force, and moral force.
The principal structural element of a state's military force is the armed forces. Their status is explained by the fact that they are simultaneously an element of the political system of society and therefore have a clear and legislatively formalised structure. In addition, the armed forces are specially intended for conducting military operations against an aggressor and are equipped with the corresponding means of armed struggle. The state uses them as its most important instrument for achieving military-political aims on the international stage and for supporting the existing authority and stability within the country.
At the same time, there is now an increasing understanding that it is not only the conduct of military actions by the armed forces that delivers deliverance from wars, conflicts and military threats. The very existence of the armed forces and their potential can serve as guarantors of political stability and international security. To perform this seemingly uncharacteristic function, modern armies must fit organically into the mechanism of national, regional and universal security.
Besides the armed forces, the structure of military force also includes many other power elements of the state: bodies ensuring security against the subversive activity of foreign intelligence services; bodies concerned with safeguarding state secrets and protecting state interests; border troops; internal troops; the national guard; civil defence troops; combat state-public armed formations (the people's militia, partisan detachments) and others.
The most important structural element of a state's military force is its military-economic force, which represents the realisation of the state's capabilities to meet the material needs of the armed forces for waging war. The magnitude of military-economic force depends on the level of economic potential, the political course of the state and the military-political situation in the world.
In a period of heightened military danger or in the course of a war, as a result of placing the country's economy on a war footing, the magnitude of a state's military-economic force increases considerably, but only up to a certain limit. The upper threshold of building up military-economic force is the point beyond which the country's economy is engulfed in a state of crisis and regression. The lower threshold of military-economic force means the actual liquidation of military production, which is possible only under conditions of universal disarmament and peace.
One of the constituents of military-economic force is defence expenditure. This is because the level of modernisation of the armed forces depends directly on the financial resources allocated. Depending on the aims of the military policy pursued by the governments of various states, one can today clearly distinguish states that build up their military-economic force proceeding from defensive sufficiency, and states that continue militarist preparations. Thus, for example, if one analyses the evolution of military expenditure in the NATO countries, one may conclude that it varies. In particular, in Turkey it tends to increase, while in the majority of states it tends towards stability (Canada, France, Spain, Denmark and Greece). As for the United States, which is straining to become the world leader, everything here is perfectly clear. In 2003 the United States spent more on defence than the 15 militarily strongest countries. The US military budget in 2004 amounted to 375 billion dollars. By comparison, Russia's military budget in 2004 amounted to only 3.6 billion dollars. For 2005 the United States allocated 407 billion dollars, for 2006 - 427 billion dollars, and for 2007 - 518 billion dollars. There is no question whatsoever of any reduction in military preparations.
Asymmetry in the change of military expenditure is characteristic of the overall global picture: in the democracies of the West and in Russia military spending is decreasing, but in states located in the world's most explosive regions, especially in the Middle East and South Asia, there are no signs of decline. On the contrary, considerable growth is observed: over the past 3-4 years by 42.5% in Iran, 12.9% in Saudi Arabia, 12% in India, 19.5% in Pakistan and so on. Many countries still see the expression of military might in large regular armies and the possession of modern weapons systems.
Under these conditions the traditional problem becomes most acute - how to ensure the security of chronically weak countries which suffer from an insurmountable "deficit of force"?
A structural element of a state's military force is also its military-scientific force, which determines, in accordance with the aims and tasks of the country's military-political course, the degree and intensity of the impact of the state's scientific potential upon other countries.
Drawing on the state's scientific potential and the level of development of equipment and technology, military-scientific force ensures the realisation of specific political and military-political interests within the system of international relations. Relying on their military-scientific advantage and on their ability to produce the most effective modern weapons systems, developed states use military-scientific force as a means of pressure upon potential adversaries in order to increase their political dependence on the possessor of the latest military technologies.
A special place in the structure of a state's military force is occupied by the moral force of its people and of the soldiers of its armed forces. More than once in history an aggressor has been halted and overthrown by the superior moral spirit of a people and of the country's defenders, and by their readiness to endure any hardship for the sake of freedom and independence.
Moral force is manifested in the readiness and ability of the people and the army to withstand the trials of war and to display the will to victory. In concentrated form it is expressed in the totality of the ideas, views, feelings, moods and traditions of the people and of the soldiers of the army and navy, reflecting their attitude to the social and political order and to the policy of the state, as well as in the spiritual readiness and ability of the army to fight to victory in war.
Thus, the military force of a state acts as an integrated quantity, embodying not only the might of its armed forces but also the might of its military economy, its science, and the moral spirit of the people and the army.
Military force is used by the state in various forms, both directly and indirectly. The traditional form of its direct use is war in its various manifestations. At the same time, war (local or world) is the extreme form of armed violence. It affects all spheres of life and is waged using every means of armed struggle. Other forms of the direct use of military force include armed provocations of various kinds, military conflicts, military interventions and so on.
The forms of indirect use of military force are also diverse: conducting manoeuvres and exercises in the immediate vicinity of the borders of a potential adversary or its allies; declaring heightened combat readiness of the armed forces or full (partial) mobilisation; warning of the possible use of military force employing various means of armed struggle; supporting one of the parties to a conflict through deliveries of weapons, military equipment and technology and the provision of military specialists and advisers; creating military-political blocs in a region of interest to a potential adversary; constructing, or assisting in the construction of, military-purpose enterprises, and so forth.
It should be noted that all the listed forms of the use of military force are interrelated. Military conflicts and local wars can rapidly escalate into large-scale war, and some forms of the use of military force can quickly transform into others. The latter depends largely on various circumstances of both an objective and a subjective nature.
Comments