Lecture
The geopolitical situation in the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century is changing turbulently and is characterized by constant clashes of the political, economic and military interests of countries and coalitions of states. Threats to Russia's national interests in various regions of the world cannot be regarded as improbable and unrealistic, as, unfortunately, many Russian analysts and politicians do. As proof of this, one might cite an excerpt from the report of the Director of the US CIA, G. Tenet, before the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2001: "Another country pursuing the goal of being recognized as a great power is Russia. Allow me to be absolutely frank. There is almost no doubt that President Putin is attempting to restore certain features of the Soviet past - great-power status, a strong central authority, and a stable and predictable society - at times at the expense of neighbouring states or of the civil rights of individual Russians. ... . The war in Chechnya is destroying morale, and hence the effectiveness, of the Armed Forces. Despite its superiority in force, Moscow has found itself in a hopeless position, with its units subjected to constant attacks by militants. And the end is not near. Thousands of Russians have died in Chechnya, and the Russian army is accused of brutal treatment of the civilian population. Public dissatisfaction with the war is growing."
The greatest thinker of the eighteenth century, Montesquieu, maintained that small states most often perish from a blow struck by an external enemy, while large ones perish as a result of internal treachery. Unfortunately, in Russia's history there have been, in the opinion of A. S. Pushkin, not only glorious heroic times, when it entered Europe like a newly launched ship amid the sound of the axe and the thunder of cannon in the days of Peter the Great. There have also been base times in Russia's history - the times of the Time of Troubles, when Grishka Otrepyev brought into his own country marauders of every stripe and nationality. The greatest national catastrophe befell the Soviet Union in December 1991. How brilliantly Montesquieu foretold the fate of a great country!
The starting point in assessing the level of military danger to Russia is that the significance of military force in the system of international relations has not diminished in recent times. Moreover, the military-political situation does not exclude the possibility of the emergence, close to Russia's borders, of major armed conflicts affecting its security interests, or of the emergence of a direct military threat.
Every state has permanent basic national interests. These include: state sovereignty, territorial integrity, the socio-political stability of society, the constitutional order, strategic stability within the system of the world community, free access to vitally important economic-strategic zones and lines of communication, and others.
National interests, including basic ones, may be subject to the impact of a diverse spectrum of threats, which are formed as a result of one or another development of the military-political situation and may manifest themselves in political, military-political and force-based forms. It may be said that in the contemporary international situation there exist three types of threats, the neutralization of which is to one degree or another a function of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: external, internal and transborder.
The main external threats include:
the deployment of groupings of forces and assets with the aim of a military attack on Russia or its allies;
territorial claims against the Russian Federation, and the threat of the political or forcible severance of individual territories from Russia;
the implementation by states or socio-political structures of programmes to create weapons of mass destruction;
interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation on the part of foreign states or of organizations supported by foreign states;
the demonstration of military force close to Russia's borders, and the conduct of exercises with provocative aims;
the presence, close to the borders of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies, of centres of armed conflict that threaten their security;
instability and the weakness of state institutions in border countries;
the build-up of troop groupings leading to a disruption of the established balance of forces close to the borders of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies and in the maritime waters adjoining their territory;
the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security of the Russian Federation or its allies;
the activity of international radical Islamic groupings and the strengthening of the positions of Islamic extremism close to Russia's borders;
the introduction of foreign troops (without the consent of the Russian Federation and the authorization of the UN Security Council) onto the territory of states neighbouring and friendly to the Russian Federation;
armed provocations, including attacks on military facilities of the Russian Federation located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on facilities and installations on the State Border of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies;
actions that impede the functioning of Russian systems of state and military command and control, the operation of the strategic nuclear forces, missile attack early warning, missile defence, outer space surveillance and the combat sustainability of the troops;
actions that hinder Russia's access to strategically important transport communications;
discrimination against and the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states;
the proliferation of dual-use technologies and of components for the manufacture of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.
The main internal threats include:
attempts at the forcible alteration of the constitutional order;
the planning, preparation and carrying out of actions to disrupt and disorganize the functioning of bodies of state power and administration, and attacks on state, economic and military facilities and on facilities of life support and information infrastructure;
the creation, equipping, training and functioning of illegal armed formations;
the illegal distribution (trafficking) on the territory of the Russian Federation of weapons, ammunition, explosives, etc.;
large-scale activity by organized crime that threatens political stability on the scale of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation;
the activity of separatist and radical religious-nationalist movements in the Russian Federation.
The distinct concept of transborder threats covers political, military-political or force-based threats to the interests and security of the Russian Federation that combine the features of internal and external threats and that, while internal in their form of manifestation, are external in essence (in terms of their sources of origin and stimulation, possible participants, etc.). Such threats include:
the creation, equipping, provisioning and training on the territory of other states of armed formations and groups with the aim of transferring them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation or the territories of its allies;
the activity of subversive separatist, national or religious extremist groupings directly or indirectly supported from abroad, aimed at undermining Russia's constitutional order and creating a threat to its territorial integrity and to the security of its citizens;
transborder crime, including smuggling and other unlawful activity on a scale that threatens the military-political security of the Russian Federation or stability on the territory of Russia's allies;
the conduct of information operations (information-technical, information-psychological, etc.) hostile to the Russian Federation and its allies;
international terrorism, in cases where the activity of international terrorists directly affects the security of the Russian Federation;
the activity of the drug trade, creating a threat of the transportation of narcotics onto the territory of Russia, or the use of Russian territory as transit territory for transporting narcotics to other countries.
The neutralization of external threats, as well as participation in the neutralization of internal and transborder threats, is a task of the Armed Forces and is carried out jointly with other security agencies, as well as with the corresponding bodies of Russia's allied countries.
Actions to suppress threats of this kind are carried out with due regard for the provisions of international and humanitarian law, proceeding from the primacy of the national security interests of the Russian Federation and of Russian legislation. As of today the level of military danger to Russia's security may be assessed as relatively low. None of the existing force-based conflict situations creates a direct military threat to Russia's security. At the same time, taking into account the changes in the geopolitical situation in the world, it must be acknowledged that ensuring Russia's security solely by means of political capabilities (membership in international organizations, partnership relations, opportunities for influence) is becoming impossible.
Of particular concern here are the so-called "uncertainty factors". An uncertainty factor is understood to mean a situation, conflict or process of a political or military-political nature whose development may substantially alter the geopolitical situation in a region of priority importance for Russia's interests or create a direct threat to the security of the Russian Federation. The very character of uncertainty factors, however, precludes the possibility of formulating an unambiguous forecast of their development.
The following are identified as uncertainty factors:
the diminishing role of the UN Security Council, and its formal and actual deprivation of prerogatives for authorizing the use of military force in the world;
the possibility that nuclear weapons will regain the properties of a real military instrument;
the possible intensification of the processes of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear technologies, and of delivery vehicles;
the prospects and orientation of the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation;
the possible directions of the development of the process of NATO enlargement;
the development of the situation in Afghanistan and the possibility of a renewal of instability in that country.
Even a cursory analysis of the existing threats to Russia's security, taking into account the uncertainty factors present, shows the degree of the changes that have occurred in the world over the past decade. It is obvious that, alongside the changes in the sphere of military-political forms and methods, the character of directly military, combat confrontation has been substantially modified.
What, then, is the situation along the perimeter of Russia's State Border?
In the North, the military-political relations of Russia and Norway are complicated by the unsettled question of the boundary of the continental shelf and between the economic zones. The gradual departure of Finland and Sweden from their traditional neutrality is also cause for concern. All the more so since a number of political circles in Finland have already put forward territorial claims against Russia (to part of Karelia), while certain circles in Finland aspire to unite the linguistically related Karelians, Sami, Komi and Veps.
The Baltic states are likewise advancing their territorial claims against Russia (Estonia to the Kingisepp district of Leningrad Oblast, as well as to a change of borders in accordance with the Treaty of Tartu of 1920, under which Izborsk and Pechory were recognized as Estonian territory; Latvia to a district of Pskov Oblast), and there discrimination against the Russian-speaking population (48 per cent of the population in Latvia, 40 per cent in Estonia) has been elevated to the rank of official policy, with residency qualifications and restrictions on registration and the granting of citizenship. At the same time Estonia and Latvia are offering their citizenship to the Russian population of a number of districts of Pskov Oblast. And some of the Pskov residents readily accept this, seeking to avoid service in the Russian army. It is telling that on new maps issued in the Republic of Latvia, the Pytalovo district of Pskov Oblast (the former Abrene county of Latvia from 1920 to 1944) figures as a constituent part of Latvia.
In the West, the sources of tension may be:
First, the demands advanced in Lithuania, Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany to demilitarize Kaliningrad Oblast. One variant of the possible development of the situation in the region is the establishment of control over Kaliningrad Oblast by international organizations on the pretext of providing it with comprehensive assistance, with the subsequent conferral of the status of a free economic zone. The variant of its complete separation from Russia in the future, with further reorientation toward Germany or Lithuania, is not ruled out. In this context Russia is assigned the role of a secondary partner in resolving this question, and its subsequent displacement from the Baltic Sea area is envisaged.
Second, the further advance of the NATO bloc to the east. The Baltic states have joined NATO. The bloc's leadership is providing them with comprehensive military assistance, building the necessary infrastructure on their territories and cobbling together new groupings. Thus, for example, the formation of a combined Baltic naval force has been initiated, which is to include ships from Germany, Denmark, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
Third, Lithuania's territorial claims to particular areas, in particular to the Curonian Spit and the area around Lake Vishtytis, may meet with support among part of the West's senior political circles. In this connection, an aggravation of regional conflicts (for example, over territorial problems) may lead to a sharp deterioration in relations between the Baltic states (NATO) and Russia.
Fourth, the situation on this strategic axis, unfavourable for Russia, is aggravated by the active involvement of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic in NATO's sphere of military influence through the "Partnership for Peace" programme.
In the South-West, what causes concern above all is the intensification of separatism and Islamic extremism. The presence of constantly "smouldering" centres of conflict, ready to flare up again at any moment, in the Chechen Republic, between Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the growth of pro-Islamic sentiment in Transcaucasia and the Central Asian republics of the CIS, and the unregulated growth of the Muslim-Tatar population in Crimea create dangerous preconditions for the realization of the ideas of "true Islam" on the basis of militant nationalism.
A conflict situation fraught with serious complications is also taking shape around oil and gas extraction on the continental shelf of the Caspian Sea, the transportation of the extracted raw materials from there, and also from Eastern Kazakhstan (whose oil reserves already today exceed Russia's). According to the most reliable estimates, the oil and gas reserves of Azerbaijan are estimated at 6-10 billion tonnes. In this connection a fierce struggle for influence over the Azerbaijani leadership is being waged between Russia, the West, Turkey and Iran.
In addition, the United States and some Western countries have an interest in preserving a centre of tension in the Caucasus. They are not satisfied with the stabilization of the situation in Russia, yet at the same time the prospect of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism is also unacceptable to them. It is in their interests not merely to preserve a slow-burning armed conflict here, but also to bring about other conflicts of a similar nature that make it possible to drain Russia economically. The causes of such conflicts may be the unresolved interethnic or interstate relations between Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Should a conflict escalate into a local war, a real precondition may emerge for the possible intervention of Turkey in events, and under certain conditions of other NATO countries as well.
In the South, the characteristic feature of the situation is the desire to weaken Russia's positions in the region against the background of a dominant trend toward the aggravation of inter-state and intra-state contradictions of an ethnic, religious and inter-clan character. This manifests itself in support from outside for anti-Russian actions both through the CIS states bordering on us and through anti-federal forces on Russian territory. Already today the actions of international extremist Islamic organizations in Central Asia are exerting their influence on the Volga and Ural regions of Russia. The causes of the emergence of a conflict situation here may be the interstate and intra-state contradictions in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Strategically important industrial areas and lines of communication in the southern regions of Russia, and the main transport arteries connecting the country's western and eastern regions, may thereby come under threat.
Many regard the collapse of the Soviet Union as a historic defeat for Russia and an enormous gain for Turkey and Iran. Here is what the American political scientist S. Huntington writes on this score: "The collapse of the USSR opens up for Turkey a unique opportunity to become the leader of a revival of Turkic civilization encompassing seven countries from the shores of Greece to China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making every effort to construct this new identity for itself." Suffice it to say that Turkey and Iran together have armed forces equal in numbers to Russia's, and together with Pakistan possess a one-and-a-half-fold superiority. There is no guarantee, however, that the five Turkic states - Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan - will drop everything and do exclusively what is required for the ideas of pan-Turkism under Turkey's aegis to "grow stronger and develop". Already today one can identify, both within these states and in their relations with one another, a multitude of problems that require not Turkic unity and solidarity at all, but an adequate response to new realities and challenges.
Turkey, with the support of international monopolies, above all American ones, as well as of some Transcaucasian states, is moreover obstructing the Russian project that provides for the delivery of oil and gas to Europe from Central Asia and Transcaucasia via the port of Novorossiysk, while attempting to implement its own project, under which the oil and gas pipelines would pass through its territory with an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. In the longer term the threat may increase if the emerging trend toward confrontation with the Islamic world along the "arc of instability" from Yugoslavia to Tajikistan continues to develop.
In the opinion of many researchers and experts, direct threats to Russia's security from this direction should be expected in 2007-2010. Already today, however, the pro-American stance of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is quite plainly visible.
In the East, Russia's national interests are contradicted by the claims of Japan, China and the United States to a division of spheres of influence and to seizing the leading role in the region, by these countries' territorial claims against our state, and by the predatory plundering of marine resources in the Russian economic zone.
Japan's foreign policy clearly displays a tendency to use economic and political levers in order to resolve the territorial problem in Japan's favour. As is well known, it considers the Russian-held islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai to be its own, and calls the remaining Kuril Islands and Southern Sakhalin disputed. Nevertheless, despite the existence of disputed territories, the probability of an attack by Japan in the next 10-15 years (all the more so without US support) can safely be discounted.
At the same time, the development of relations between the Korean states harbours serious danger. A military conflict between North and South Korea could lead to a clash of the interests of the United States, China and Russia.
The position of China, which continues to strengthen its role in the world and the region and to build up its military and economic potential, must be considered separately. One may assume that in the long term China will emerge as a second-rank superpower. Recent events in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan have compelled China to coordinate its efforts more closely with Russia in countering ideas of a unipolar world and US attempts to bring them about. In its relations with Russia, however, Beijing seeks to obtain unilateral benefits and advantages. China is rapidly gaining economic and military strength. At the same time, it is burdened by the problems of rapidly growing overpopulation and a shortage of natural resources. Today China's population of more than a billion (25% of the world's population) is growing by 1.1 per cent a year, while its economy is growing even faster - by more than 10 per cent a year. For these reasons, in some border districts of Primorye the Chinese have come to outnumber the Russian-speaking population by a factor of 1.5 to 2.
The authors of the Club of Rome and other authoritative organisations are now discussing almost openly the "Russian" option for solving demographic problems, seriously proposing to direct China's surplus population "toward the peaceful and evolutionary development of the underpopulated areas of the Far East in the context of the development of economic cooperation between China and Russia".
Although "such views are still only on their way to the level of open publication", they are already "discussed confidentially at seminars and in private conversations with experts and representatives of the academic world". Despite the agreements concluded with Russia, China continues to advance claims to a whole range of Russian territories (part of the territory of Chita and Amur Regions, and of Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories). A refusal to satisfy territorial claims, or attempts to constrain the enormous Chinese diaspora in the Far East, which is practically not subject to Russian law, could in the future, under certain circumstances, serve as a pretext for resolving disputed problems by force.
In addition, in 5-10 years the emergence of serious contradictions between China and Russia's allies in the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), as well as between China and Mongolia, cannot be ruled out.
The above military-political processes now observable in the world community allow certain conclusions to be drawn that characterise the state of Russia's military-political relations at the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, the contemporary military-political situation is undergoing rapid and at times radical change. Second, on the whole the international situation in the world remains complex and dynamic. Third, the most realistic threats to Russia's security are: the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to Russia's borders, the possible escalation of armed conflicts in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, territorial claims against Russia on the part of a number of states, and moral and psychological expansion. Fourth, for historical and civilisational reasons Russia has been and remains the principal object of hostility on the part of NATO. Fifth, in the period up to 2010 the main threat to Russia will be posed by military conflicts in the "near abroad".
Thus, summing up the most unfavourable factors and trends in the development of the military-political situation makes it possible to identify the direction most vulnerable from the standpoint of military security. It is the junction of the European and Central Asian strategic areas, and in particular the South-Western direction.
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