Lecture
Crew interaction in the presence on board of a check pilot or a check-and-training pilot differs in a number of respects from interaction
under standard conditions. The specific atmosphere created by the presence on board of this category of flight personnel is determined by the functions
they perform, which come down to monitoring, evaluating the actions of the trainee (the person being checked), and instructing. It is well known
that a check (evaluation) situation creates additional emotional tension, which is already more than enough to create an unfavourable, nervous atmosphere in the
crew. This emotional tension is multiplied many times over when instructor pilots or check pilots, not fully realising their role in the crew,
and not realising how their actions are perceived by those around them, violate a whole series of existing psychological laws, the consequence of
which is a breakdown of crew interaction and the emergence of dangerous flight situations. The problem of breakdowns in crew interaction caused by
ill-considered actions of instructors and inspectors can only be counteracted by understanding what results from ignoring one or another psychological regularity (Evstigneev D.A.,
Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). The exceptional role of the instructor pilot's personality in shaping the professionally important qualities of trainees has repeatedly
been emphasised by researchers in the field of aviation psychology and flight safety (Platonov K., Schwartz L., 1948; Golubev G.G., 1958; Kartamyshev P.V.,
Tarasov A.K., 1974; Kartamyshev P.V., Ignatovich M.V., Orkin A.I., 1987; Gander D.V., 1999, 2007; Ponomarenko V.A., 2004). As K. Platonov and L. Schwartz
(1948) point out, the more deeply the instructor studies the cadet, the more active and well-founded his role in training will be, and
the sooner and better the cadet will learn to fly. A cadet can even learn to fly without the help of an instructor
who does not know how to teach and can only "back him up" in flight, correcting excessively large deviations in flight mode and
preventing an accident. But how much effort and time such "teaching" costs (Platonov K., Schwartz L., 1948). To get to know cadets better,
the authors recommend that instructor pilots use three basic methods: observation, conversation, and experiment. In the opinion of P.V. Kartamyshev and A.K. Tarasov
(1974), an instructor pilot must possess the following qualities: 1) high moral and volitional qualities, presupposing high standards of morality, purposefulness, diligence, initiative,
independence, exactingness, persistence, and self-control; 2) deep knowledge of special disciplines; 3) excellent piloting and navigation technique, ensuring complete flight safety; 4) good
methodological preparedness, ensuring the rational organisation of the training process; 5) pedagogical tact; 6) well-deserved authority among the personnel of the unit; 7)
the ability to identify the peculiarities of character and abilities of trainees; 8) the ability to use the qualities of one's own personality
in organising the activities of trainees. Among the qualities listed, P.V. Kartamyshev and A.K. Tarasov (1974) particularly single out pedagogical tact, the absence
of which, in the authors' words, rules out any possibility of grasping the work of an instructor pilot. It represents a special sense
of proportion and pedagogical expediency in the activity of an instructor pilot, manifested in a thoughtful and attentive attitude towards trainees, in unhurriedness
in drawing conclusions and making decisions about the trainees' behaviour, in the soundness and flexibility of the measures of influence applied, in the
ability to rise above the purely personal, in the ability to quickly assess the situation, and in the ability to understand trainees, show
sensitivity towards them, and picture their point of view. According to V.A. Ponomarenko (2004), the instructor pilot "gives himself to another, not to
the trainee's detriment but to his benefit," which occurs through three channels: the psychological channel (the transfer of knowledge and skills that provide
the ability to feel and control space and time, and to anticipate the aircraft's reactions), the physiological channel (the transfer of the fine
coordination structure of movement patterns, the smoothness of control inputs on the controls, and the development of the ability to form a mental
image of the flight using non-instrumental cues – the ability to translate forces on the controls and sensations of angular and linear acceleration
into meaningful representations relative to instrument readings), and the cultural channel (through courtesy, tact, concreteness of action, diligence, tolerance, trust, exactingness, taking responsibility
upon oneself, honesty, openness, and thorough knowledge of the person being trained). One of the instructor pilot's tasks is the development of professionally
important qualities, which include: professional intelligence; self-sufficiency and organisation; motivation for flying; independence and responsibility; conscious risk-taking; adaptability of behaviour; professional health; critical
thinking; purposefulness; cognitive activity; the need for self-improvement; and spirituality of thought and general culture. The author (Ponomarenko V.A., 2004) has formulated a
very important proposition: after a flight, the trainee (or the person being checked) should experience two joys – one from the instructor, and
one from himself, for having been lucky enough to have such a teacher. According to a study conducted by D.V. Gander (1999), pilots
who have become established in the profession had a good instructor. A good instructor, according to D.V. Gander (1999), is distinguished by that
flying composure, calmness and collectedness which instil confidence in trainees, rule out nervous strain, and allow them to concentrate fully on carrying out
the flight task. The best way to educate the trainee is through the instructor pilot's own behaviour in flight – it must be
impeccable not only in terms of piloting technique but also in fulfilling the requirements of regulatory documents (Gander D.V., 1999). In a number
of cases, instructor pilots and check pilots violate the requirements of regulatory documents, jeopardising flight safety and their own reputation, the result of
which is a conflict with trainees. The most dangerous thing is that the conflict often develops within the trainee on an internal plane
(Gander D.V., 1999), and once it does, the opportunity to resolve it is lost. The consequences arising from such an unresolved intrapersonal conflict
are quite alarming (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009): the instructor (inspector) receives no reaction from the trainee to his actions and, in the
case of insufficient reflection (the ability to understand one's own behaviour and how one is judged by others), will assume that the behaviour
he displayed was justified; the trainee forms his own understanding of the instructor's (inspector's) behaviour, and it is often not in the latter's
favour; the trainee is left with unprocessed negative emotions connected with the conflict situation, which hinders an objective perception both of the instructor's
(inspector's) personality and of the requirements of regulatory documents; there is a likelihood of an incorrect assessment of the conflict situation that has
arisen, owing to the absence of a discussion and review of it together with the instructor (inspector); and the absence of resistance to
the instructor's (inspector's) inadequate actions leads to aviation occurrences of varying severity. As for the latter, there have been quite a few of
them throughout the history of aviation. Given the great danger arising from the presence on board an aircraft of a check pilot, it
became necessary to single out such a psychophysiological hazardous flight factor as the "phenomenon of the senior person's presence" (Kozlov V.V. et al.,
2000). According to the authors, this phenomenon manifests itself in the fact that the presence of a check pilot on board an aircraft
brings about substantial changes in the psychological climate in the cockpit, leads to a change in the structure of crew interaction and in
the evaluation of the actions performed (the senior person's mistakes go unremarked), and reduces mutual monitoring. To illustrate how psychological regularities operate in
the communication between mentors (instructor pilots or check pilots) and trainees (persons being checked), we analysed a number of problem situations that occurred
on board aircraft (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009; Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009; Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). First we consider situations involving
trainees' interaction with instructors, and then with check pilots. Instructors, as a rule, are the most well-prepared pilots, possessing a high level of
professional training, but what is it, then, that sometimes prevents them from effectively passing on this experience to trainees, and the ignoring of
which psychological regularities lies at the root of this? The first situation we will consider occurred on board an Il-62 aircraft. The pilot-in-command
(a trainee captain) was undergoing type conversion on the Il-62. The approach to landing at Tashkent airport was carried out under conditions of
a maximum crosswind component and moderate turbulence. On passing the inner marker beacon, the aircraft developed a tendency to drift off the landing
course. The instructor pilot warned the trainee captain with the phrase "You're drifting left" and corrected the deviation. The trainee captain again allowed
a leftward deviation. To draw the trainee's attention, the instructor pilot, this time without saying a word, deflected the rudder to the right
(kicked the right pedal). In response, the trainee captain demonstratively took his hands off the control column and crossed them over his chest.
The instructor took over the controls and barely managed to "save" the aircraft. The first thing worth noting in connection with this situation
is that any mentoring or teaching work by its very nature presupposes that the trainee's level is lower than the teacher's, and in
this connection the latter must do everything possible to ensure the trainee masters the necessary material. It is no secret that the degree
to which material is mastered differs from person to person, and consequently training cannot always follow a single template or assume an identical
level of mastery among trainees. Furthermore, insulting actions directed at trainees are absolutely impermissible – as soon as a person is evaluated negatively,
contact with him and any possibility of influencing his behaviour is immediately lost. This psychotherapeutic rule can be reformulated as follows: "no person
wants to be evaluated negatively, and no person considers the behaviour he is currently displaying to be wrong." Therefore remarks to trainees must
be made with extreme correctness, so as not to create the impression that they are being insulted, as the aforementioned trainee captain perceived
it (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). But the trainee captain's behaviour in the situation described was almost as inadequate as the instructor's –
demonstrating disagreement with the instructor's insulting actions turned out to be far more of a priority for him than his own safety (Evstigneev
D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009; Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). And this is only possible when strong negative emotions arise (in this case caused by the
blocking of the trainee captain's need for respect), giving rise to an inadequate perception of the situation (as a result of experiencing strong
negative emotions, an enormous quantity of biologically active substances is released, leading to a biochemical shock – an affect). In a state of
affect a person cannot objectively assess either his own actions or those of others. But what must one know in order to become
immune to insults and similar actions? Immunity to insults and conflict situations can only be developed through a psychotherapeutic perception of reality. Such
a perception is born under the condition of a clear understanding of the causes of one's own behaviour and that of another, and
of knowledge of the psychotherapeutic rules, a summary description of which is given at the end of the present chapter, as well as
in Chapter 14. In 1964, with the aim of preparing for the autumn-winter navigation period, the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MGA) instructed the
Nukus combined flight detachment to carry out training of An-2 captains at night and in cloud conditions, which was necessary to reinforce instrument-flying
skills. The training of the captains was conducted by an instructor pilot of the Tashkent training-and-conversion unit (UTO). That night six captains underwent
training. Three of them completed their training flights and independently performed circuit and area flights, while the remaining three continued their training flights
(Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009; Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). The instructor pilot of the UTO who conducted the training was quite well prepared for
night flying and instrument flying in cloud, but had an "explosive" temperament. During a training flight, one of the captains, while flying in
the area, showed deficiencies in maintaining bank angle in a turn, for which the instructor pilot struck the captain's hands with his flying
helmet and declared that he would not permit him to fly solo. Later, having completed the training flights, the instructor pilot cleared
two of the captains for solo flights, while assigning the captain who had not been cleared for solo flight the role of
co-pilot. In the course of the solo flights an An-2 crashed, with three people on board – two captains and one co-pilot.
All those on board perished. The commission established that spatial disorientation had occurred in the flying area. The aircraft was being piloted
by one of the two captains who had been cleared for solo flight. The instructor pilot was immediately relieved of his post
for poor preparation of pilots for piloting in difficult conditions. Although the investigation into the crash made no mention of the incident
of the instructor's insulting treatment of one of the trainees, the captains who had completed the training programme before the crash together
with the aforementioned instructor believed that the crash might well have been provoked by the instructor pilot's inadequate behaviour. The captains' opinion
regarding the causes of the crash is far from surprising; there are serious grounds for it. Simply from the episode in which
the instructor struck the trainee's hands with his flying helmet, one can state with confidence that as a mentor he had failed.
Examples of just how ruinous the formation of pathogenic conditioned reflexes can be for the process of flight training are numerous, and
the episode of striking the hands with the flying helmet is a vivid illustration of this (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009; Evstigneev
D.A., 2010b). Why exactly is the situation described above so dangerous? First, as we have already noted, during the experiencing of strong
negative emotions (affect), an adequate perception of reality is absent, a person ceases to belong to himself, and cannot cope even with
elementary tasks. Second, the formation of a conditioned reflex under strong negative emotions occurs in a single instance, without repetition! Owing to
strong negative emotions, a pathogenic conditioned reflex was formed, incorporating the imprecisely performed action (maintaining bank angle in a turn), the extremely
negative assessment on the part of the instructor, and the physical impact. All these components of the conditioned association, having coincided in
time and having been formed against the background of an affective state, now represent not separate stimuli but a single one. Now
any one of them will "trigger" negative emotions – for example, merely the fact of this instructor's presence. But that is not
yet the worst of it – every element making up the conditioned association is linked to other elements, so that an expansion
of the pathogenic association is possible, one frequently encountered example of which is the transfer of negative emotions onto all other instructors
– negative emotions connected with a specific instructor are transferred onto instructors in general! This leads to the disruption of the flight-training
process, and there is no shortage of examples of this, which is especially damaging to the psyche of cadets rather than adult
pilots. We have discussed how any element of the association that has formed can now evoke unpleasant sensations, and we have considered
only one of them – the instructor's personality. Disproportionately unpleasant sensations will now be evoked by insufficiently precise maintenance of bank angle
in a turn, and, as one might already guess, not only by this imprecisely performed operation but by other imprecise and erroneous
actions as well. That is, we again see the mechanism of expansion of the pathogenic association along a chain of associations. As
unexpected as it may seem at first glance, the physical impact, too, will now be assigned a new meaning – again we
will be dealing with a disproportionate reaction on the person's part to this type of impact, as well as with a gradual
expansion of this pathogenic association. But since practically every element of a conditioned reflex is linked to hundreds of other elements, we
may in the end obtain very serious changes in the psyche – owing to associative links this whole process gradually captures ever
new spheres of the psyche, and what is known as the process of generalisation (broadening, expansion) of the pathogenic association occurs. It
is precisely in this way that various kinds of obsessions develop – varieties of neurotic formations. The most frequent manifestation of the
generalisation process described is the occurrence of unpleasant sensations on approach to landing following a serious occurrence that took place at this
stage of flight in the past – a non-specific experiencing of unpleasant sensations now occurs, even though the actual approach conditions are
always different (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009; Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). This happens because any stimulus that coincides in time with a psychologically
traumatic situation (the second stimulus) can subsequently evoke unpleasant sensations (Svyadoshch A.M., 1971, 1982). In support of what has been said above,
let us dwell on two flagrant examples described in the work of V.L. Marishchuk, K.K. Platonov and E.A. Pletnitsky (1969). In the
first case, owing to emotional tension a cadet was consistently flaring the aircraft too high before touchdown. It turned out that what
the cadet feared most was not mastering the technique of landing and being expelled for poor flying performance. His doubts arose and
grew stronger after his first unsuccessful landings, especially after the instructor shouted rudely at him in flight. In the cadet's own words:
"As I bring the aircraft down to the ground, I have no confidence that I will do everything correctly, and I wait
in fear for the moment when the instructor will again tell me that I'm a 'blockhead.' I probably won't amount to anything."
In the second situation, the instructor's actions were, without exaggeration, criminal – comparable to what took place aboard the An-2 in the
situation analysed above. It seems important to reproduce the text in which the cadet describes everything that happened to him in the
course of his flight training. This is important because, in reading this text, everyone can understand what happens to the psyche of
a not-yet-formed person under treacherous and thoughtless interference. The situation was as follows: "Shortly before finishing the flight school, owing to
family circumstances I took leave and went home. After returning from leave I learned of an expansion of the training programme and
began mastering a new, more advanced type of bomber aircraft. But I now had a different instructor. Preparing for the first flight,
I was anxious, since I was constantly plagued by a feeling of insecurity. During the flight my anxiety grew because of the
instructor's nervous behaviour – at the slightest error he reacted with a harsh shout and hastily corrected the error himself. Excitable and
fussy, the instructor intervened in the controls prematurely, and all his actions contributed to creating tension, as a result of which I
became, as it were, muddled and stupid. At the end of the flight the instructor's verdict was expressed in the words: 'You
don't know how to fly, you're sure to crash!' I spent a sleepless night mulling over the instructor's words. At times it
seemed to me that he was right and that I ought to leave the flight school immediately. In the morning, having mastered myself,
I firmly resolved to pursue my goal. I flew with this instructor another 15 times, and each time heard threats of expulsion
and unflattering epithets. As the instructor noted, and as I myself felt, my tension increased from flight to flight. After the instructor
reported my failures to the squadron commander, the latter checked me himself and ordered another instructor to continue my training. This instructor
was the exact opposite of the first. He did not intervene in the controls prematurely, giving me the chance to notice and
correct deviations myself. In the air he was very calm, and this calm was transmitted to me. After each flight the instructor
explained my mistakes clearly and calmly, noted my positive results, which gave me strength and confidence in the successful completion of the
programme. After a number of flights, I received a good assessment in all elements of piloting technique and was cleared for solo
flight." Events developed similarly in the case described by first-class military pilot V. Filimonov (1971). A modest, shy and impressionable cadet initially
had difficulty mastering the flying programme. His instructor hastily concluded that nothing would come of the cadet, after which the latter began
to fall even further behind. The flight commander, without understanding the true causes of the lag, raised the question of expulsion. This,
however, did not happen, since the cadet was transferred, together with his group, to another unit. The new instructor treated the cadet
without any prejudice, and this gave the cadet the strength to master the training programme successfully. In the end he graduated successfully
from the flight school and became a first-class pilot. This example demonstrates not only the strength of an instructor's influence on a cadet
but also how well-developed the organism's compensatory mechanisms can be. Continuing the theme of the formation of pathogenic conditioned reflexes in the
course of flight training, let us turn to the unique experience of instructor pilot G.G. Golubev (1958), who described both the process
by which a pathogenic association expands and the extreme sensitivity of cadets to the words of authoritative mentors. He writes that fear
of something can take root through a word taken closely to heart. If a person authoritative to a student who is only
just mastering the technique of landing an aircraft tells him that he will crash on landing, and the student attaches serious weight
to these words, then on subsequent flights he may experience an intense feeling of fear. A strong feeling of fear experienced once
under certain circumstances can take root as a conditioned reflex and always manifest itself under similar circumstances thereafter. Frequent episodes of unsuppressed
fear, becoming a conditioned reflex, manifest themselves even where there is no danger at all, but merely some resemblance to the circumstances
under which intense fear previously arose (Golubev G.G., 1958). An example of this is the following episode. A cadet was landing an
aircraft with a slight overshoot relative to the landing marker. During the landing roll he made insufficient use of the brakes, as
a result of which he ran off the end of the airfield. When the cadet saw that he was approaching a deep
ravine, he imagined that he would inevitably fall into it. Instead of increasing the aircraft's braking or retracting the landing gear (and
thereby stopping the aircraft), he let go of the controls and grabbed the sides of the cockpit. The aircraft rolled slowly into
the ravine, its nose section suffering minor crumpling. The cadet was unharmed. After this unsuccessful flight the cadet's landings grew steadily worse.
In all his subsequent flights, as soon as he began approaching the runway, fear again took hold of him. The cadet could
no longer perform even those elements of landing that he had previously mastered well (Golubev G.G., 1958)! In a number of cases
instructor pilots turn out to be so cautious or so exacting about the quality of the flight task's performance that they do
not allow trainees any possibility of making deviations or mistakes, and, should the latter occur, correct them themselves at the earliest stage,
giving the trainee no opportunity to practise the skills of correcting deviations and mistakes. Trainees view the latter negatively, owing to the
blocking of their need to independently identify and correct any inaccuracies and mistakes made during the performance of a flight (Evstigneev D.A.,
Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). Trainees begin to lose interest in carrying out flight tasks, as a result of which gaps arise
in their professional training – negative emotions connected with the instructor's actions allow them to doubt the latter's professionalism, to ignore him,
and, as a consequence, not to take in the necessary information. Dissatisfaction with some of an instructor's actions turns into a rejection
of any of his other actions, and until the trainee comes to view the instructor positively, any influence on the latter's part
will be of little effect (a different meaning will be attributed to that influence). In this connection, until the actions of an
instructor that arouse wariness in the trainee are commented on and explained, the tense situation will persist (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov
V.Kh., 2009). If even one of the two people communicating is in a state of experiencing negative emotions, achieving adequate interaction becomes
extremely difficult or altogether impossible. A person experiencing negative emotions is, by definition, inadequate, and until he ceases to experience them, he
cannot adequately perceive either information coming from another person or his own thoughts and actions (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009; Evstigneev D.A.,
2010b). The situation becomes even more complicated when both partners in communication are in a state of experiencing negative emotions: whereas in
a situation where only one person is in a state of negative emotions the adequacy of one of the parties is preserved
(and in this connection the possibility of neutralising and settling the conflict remains), in a situation where both parties experience negative emotions
the possibility of a competent and conflict-free resolution of the problem situation is practically absent – neither partner in the communication is
able to perceive the situation realistically. And a situation in which only one of the two people communicating experiences negative emotions (for
example, the trainee) can easily turn into a situation in which both experience them: the instructor, seeing withdrawal, an inability to reproduce
what has been demonstrated, or disregard for himself as a mentor (and having no understanding at all that he himself is the
source of this state), begins to experience unpleasant sensations towards the trainee – most often owing to the blocking of his own
need for respect. As regards instructor pilots being excessively exacting about the quality of a flight task's performance, it must always be
remembered that a trainee, by definition, has less knowledge and experience, and therefore it is impossible to demand of him the same
level of preparedness as of the instructor, and still less possible to demand something that the instructor himself has not yet explained
or demonstrated. As regards the aforementioned behaviour of instructor pilots who do not allow the trainee to practise the skills of correcting
deviations and mistakes made, it should be known that such behaviour has various grounds (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). The
first of these is that correcting a mistake at the very moment it is made is less problematic (it is a more
comfortable task in terms of effort and time expended). The second is that an instructor pilot, being unsure of his own professional
competence or having had negative experience of overcoming similar situations in the past, does not risk allowing the trainee to make a
mistake, identify it and correct it. The opposite extreme is a situation in which the instructor allows large deviations to occur in
flight, particularly during the take-off, approach and landing phases. It is known that any deviation from set parameters and the commission of
errors reduces the level of flight safety, and it is therefore very important to be able to determine the boundary between a
"dangerous" and a "safe" situation (in other words, the magnitude of deviation that will not threaten safety) depending on the specific circumstances
that arise (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). An illustration of how negatively excessive independence granted to a trainee in correcting
his own mistakes can affect flight safety is an aviation occurrence that took place with the crew of an An-2 aircraft (Evstigneev
D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). After a series of training flights the trainee suspected the instructor of imperceptibly intervening in the
controls, and that the credit for the successful completion of flight tasks belonged to him and not to the trainee at all.
Wishing to dispel these doubts, the instructor pilot allowed the trainee to fly the aircraft entirely on his own, taking his hands
off the control column and folding them across his chest. On the approach to landing the trainee allowed the aircraft to sink
at low altitude, and the instructor pilot barely managed to intervene in the controls in time – he increased engine power and
pulled back on the control column, preventing a landing short of the runway (the danger lay in the fact that a deep
vehicle rut lay just before the runway, creating a high probability of the aircraft nosing over). However, a collision with a tree
line lying directly ahead (before the rut) could not be avoided. The aircraft was not damaged, but tree branches (up to two
metres long) became lodged in the landing gear and other parts of the aircraft. Having received a reprimand for what had happened,
the instructor pilot remembered this situation for a long time, as a result of which his attitude towards the boundary separating a
controlled (safe) situation from a critical (unsafe) one changed completely. There is no doubt that an instructor pilot's non-intervention in the controls
in the face of trainees' erroneous actions "to the very last moment" has a more favourable effect on the training process (forming
the necessary skills), but under certain conditions (such as an instructor's untimely recognition of a critical situation) this can sharply reduce the
level of flight safety (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). K.K. Platonov (1960) points out that instructor pilots, in deciding on
the degree of independence to grant cadets in flight, often find themselves caught between mutually contradictory needs: on the one hand there
is the need to train the cadet quickly and well, which requires less intervention in the controls and more freedom of action;
on the other hand there is the need to ensure flight safety, which requires the opposite – greater intervention in the controls
and less freedom of action for the cadet. The author notes that as the instructor accumulates flying experience this contradiction is resolved,
whereas otherwise it can even lead to neuroses. If we comment on this last conclusion, it is not surprising, since contradictory tendencies
are one of the most common causes of neurotic disorders. Situations in which instructors take their hands off the control column have
been described before as well. As D.V. Gander (2007) notes, such situations occur when the instructor wishes to "rule out the temptation
to intervene in the controls" and to demonstrate full trust in the cadet (Gander D.V., 2007). The author stresses that an instructor's
hands should remain on the controls from the moment of taxiing to the end of the flight, thereby guaranteeing timely intervention to
counter complex situations. As practice shows, given the same regulatory documents, each instructor's flight-teaching methodology is his own, and this is something
that does not lend itself easily to unification. As the well-known instructor pilot G.G. Golubev (1958) reports, in the early 1930s, in
one training unit of a flying school, cadets were taught to fly training aircraft by three instructors, each of whom understood in
his own way how the process of flight training should be structured. The first instructor believed that his role in check-out flights
consisted chiefly in showing how to control the aircraft, and, having handed control over to the cadet, pointing out the aircraft's deviations,
explaining errors and helping to correct deviations by intervening in the controls. As a result his students listened a great deal but
acted little and passively, showed little initiative or independence, and waited for prompts and help. The second instructor broadly shared the previous
instructor's approach, but in addition considered it necessary to teach in such a way that there were no gross deviations of the
aircraft during check-out flights, so that cadets would grow accustomed to certain normal aircraft attitudes and, by imitating the instructor's actions, learn
to work the controls. Whereas the first instructor intervened in the controls each time the cadet allowed any deviation, the second instructor
intervened even earlier, as soon as the cadet made an error in his actions, in order to prevent the aircraft's deviation. In
order to prevent deviations of the aircraft in good time, he had to give trainees prompts more often. The students of the
second instructor were even less active in flight than those of the first, since the instructor did the flying himself for the
most part. The cadets merely watched the instructor's actions, tried to imitate him, made mistakes, but did not see the results of
erroneous movements of the controls, did not see the aircraft's deviations, and consequently did not refine their own actions (Golubev G.G., 1958).
The third instructor limited his role in training flights with cadets solely to safeguarding against an accident or damage to the aircraft.
He believed that in the air the cadet should learn on his own, and that the instructor's only duty was to ensure
the safety of these flights. Proceeding from this, he said nothing to the cadet in flight and did not intervene in the
controls until, as a result of a gross error by the cadet and his inept correction of large deviations of the aircraft,
an immediate threat of danger arose. From their very first check-out flights, this instructor's cadets acted actively, almost independently, worked many things
out for themselves, and learned from their own mistakes. However, they also made a good many mistakes that could have been avoided
with more active help from the instructor (Golubev G.G., 1958). As G.G. Golubev (1958) notes, the quality of check-out flights is determined
by when and how cadets go solo. The first instructor, having exhausted the norm of check-out flights, expelled 50% of his group
for poor flying performance. With the remaining cadets he made many flights beyond the established norm and still could not release a
single one of them for solo flight. It ended with the flight commander himself starting to fly with the cadets, while the
instructor was sent off on his next leave. The second instructor had even worse results – he expelled 100% of his students
for poor flying performance. The third instructor made several check-out flights with his cadets beyond the norm envisaged, but released all of
them for solo flight and completed the group's training without a single expulsion! In the author's view, there is nothing more harmful
in flight training than instructors' fear of accidents committed by their students, a fear they cannot conceal. Seeing that their mentors are
afraid of flying occurrences, display excessive distrust of their students, restrict their independence in every possible way, and become flustered and nervous
at the slightest hitch, trainees too begin to fear occurrences, which is often the very reason for accidents. Yet another psychological regularity
operating within the framework of "instructor pilot – trainee" interaction is pointed out by A.V. Chuntul et al. (2009), drawing on voluntary
reports from pilots. This regularity consists in the fact that it is undesirable for the trainee and the training pilots to hold
equal ranks. Retraining of flight personnel onto the MiG aircraft type was under way, and in order not to infringe on the
professional dignity of those being retrained, the instructor's rank had to be higher than or equal to theirs. An incident occurred in
a crew in which the instructor and the trainee held equal ranks, with the latter having greater seniority in that rank. During
the landing roll (after the nose gear had already touched down), braking proved ineffective. The trainee did not respond to the instructor's
commands to deploy the brake parachute. Only when he saw that very little runway remained did he press the button to release
the brake parachute, which fell out of its container but failed to deploy fully (in the second part of the landing roll
the brake parachute is ineffective). The aircraft ran off the end of the runway and became bogged down in soft ground. The
trainee had overestimated his own abilities and had incorrectly judged both the roll-out speed and the timing for deploying the brake parachute.
Continuing the theme of the influence of status on "instructor pilot – trainee" interaction, one cannot overlook the nature of interaction between
young instructors who have only just graduated from a flying institution and cadets. Within this type of interaction, mutually opposite regularities are
at work. The first of these is of a positive nature: young instructors tend to be more patient and sensitive towards cadets'
mistakes, striving to pass on their experience to cadets as fully as possible. This regularity operates thanks to the process of identification:
the young instructor still strongly identifies himself with the cadet, sees himself in him, and therefore does everything in his power to
share his experience, treating the cadet as he himself would wish to be treated. In this case the cadet's response will be
immediate and naturally positive, which without doubt leads to successful flight training. The second of the regularities we identified earlier will be
of a different (negative) nature. This will occur when a young instructor, being methodologically unversed and having insufficient flying experience, can give
the cadet little, and the cadet's reaction to this will be an adequate one – he will find the instructor unpleasant, which
will manifest itself both in open opposition and in expressions of displeasure, as well as in indifference to the flight-training process. Particular
attention on the part of the instructor pilot is required in preparing a cadet for solo flights. This preparation is important primarily
because the instructor is responsible for the cadet entrusted to him, with all the consequences that entails: in the event of an
aviation occurrence without any injury to the cadet, the instructor may feel distressed that he was unable to correctly assess the cadet's
preparedness and was unable to pass on his experience to him; in the event of an occurrence in which the cadet is
injured or, worse, killed, the instructor will find it extremely difficult to rid himself of the resulting sense of guilt and the
neurosis that follows it. A person's life can, in an instant, be divided into "before and after," and it is always best
to remember this, thereby showing care both for oneself and for the other person. Before solo flights the instructor must be guided
not only by the cadet's success in aircraft-handling technique but also by the degree of his emotional tension. G.G. Golubev (1953) already
pointed to this regularity: "Therefore, in determining the degree to which skills have been developed, the instructor must pay attention not only
to the indicators and quality of aircraft handling, but also to how easily or with what strain the trainee performs one element
of the flight or another. Without this, a gross error can be made in determining the trainee's readiness for solo flight. A
trainee may possess all the knowledge and skills necessary for a solo flight and yet not believe in his own ability to
fly solo, and doubt the success of the flight. This lack of confidence before the solo flight will produce tension, which will
significantly reduce the quality of all his actions in flight and may lead to unpleasant consequences." Emotional tension is the experiencing of
negative emotions connected with the blocking of one or another significant human need. Cadets' emotional tension is more often connected with the
blocking of needs related to flight training, but this does not exhaust its causes. The blocking of needs may also be unrelated
to flight training, and if not an understanding of the causes of the tension, then at least the ability to diagnose its
presence is the primary task of a competent instructor. It is not always possible to understand which specific blocked needs have led
to emotional tension (here we are speaking only of those needs of cadets that are unrelated to flight training), but the very
fact of the presence of tension before a solo flight ought, at the very least, to raise concern, or, at the very
most, to provide grounds for cancelling the flight. Let us note that practically all solo flights are accompanied by emotional tension, and
in this connection it is extremely pronounced emotional tension that ought to be guarded against. The instructor bears enormous responsibility for granting
the cadet clearance for a solo flight. The following situation illustrates what a cadet's unreadiness for solo flight can lead to. The
situation is described by G.G. Golubev (1958) and is unique in itself, since observation of the cadet's behaviour during the solo flight
took place under conditions of a natural experiment – the cadet did not even suspect that in the rear cockpit sat the
flight commander, who had climbed into it out of concern for the cadet's emotional state before the flight. So, in flights with
the instructor, the cadet had successfully mastered all elements of circuit flight. Finishing the check-out flight programme, in his last ten flights
he had piloted without any help from the instructor. In check flights with the flight commander he had also shown excellent piloting
technique. It was decided to grant him clearance for a solo flight. When the instructor gave him his solo-flight briefing, the cadet
turned noticeably pale, his fingers trembled, and he clenched them into fists. He repeated the briefing in a faltering voice, unusually hoarse
and muffled. Climbing into the aircraft's cockpit, he did not immediately find the step with his foot, and once in the cockpit
he took a long time fastening his harness, struggling to insert the strap loops into the buckle openings. Seeing all this, the
flight commander, while the cadet was preparing for the flight, took a seat in the rear cockpit. The cadet did not notice
this and was convinced that he was flying solo, with the rear cockpit empty. While taxiing out for take-off the cadet worked
the throttle abruptly and jerked the pedals erratically; on take-off he raised the aircraft's tail excessively and swung the machine sharply first
to the right, then to the left, as if he had entirely lost the knack of keeping the take-off run straight. He
performed every element of the flight with rough control movements and large deviations of the aircraft. It seemed as though the cadet
had completely forgotten how to fly. On landing the cadet allowed a hard bounce of the wheels against the ground. The aircraft
ballooned up to a height of three metres. A threat of an accident arose. The flight commander sharply opened up the engine,
and the cadet went round for another circuit without noticing his commander's intervention in the controls. While turning, the cadet failed to
notice the aircraft ahead of him and was turning straight towards it, with a clear risk of collision. The flight commander sharply
pushed the control column forward in order to pass beneath the aircraft ahead. The cadet looked round, saw that he was not
alone in the aircraft, and from that moment began piloting flawlessly once again, as before (Golubev G.G., 1958). As an additional illustration
of what admitting a cadet to solo flights can end in, let us give the following example. As V. Lozinsky (1976) reports,
on returning from the training area, as a result of intense nervous-emotional tension a cadet lined up to land on a clearly
visible stretch of highway, which he had mistaken for the runway. The author points out that before solo flights cadets suffer disturbed
sleep and are beset by doubts and obsessive thoughts: "What if the landing doesn't work out?", "Will I find the training area?"
In a number of cases one encounters instructors who do not initiate trainees into all the finer points of handling an aircraft
– they hold back "exclusive" material. There are several reasons for this. The first reason is the absence, on the trainee's part,
of any response to the instructor's attempts to convey as much information as possible and pass on his unique experience, or even
outright rejection of what the instructor demonstrates. The second reason is that, possessing unique methodological experience, the instructor is afraid to pass
it on, since this threatens him with the loss of his own uniqueness (he would no longer be the sole holder of
"exclusive" information), and hence of his competitiveness. But there is no need to be afraid of passing on one's experience in full.
The first thing to remember is that the quality of the trainee's preparation will determine the safety of his future flights, and
hence will determine the number of people saved from various kinds of harm. This, ultimately, is what will measure the instructor's professionalism.
The second point is that, having passed on one's experience in full, one must not stop there but must go on improving
in one's profession, and it is precisely in this case that no one will ever be able to catch up with the
instructor – he will never be vulnerable. Earlier we examined a situation involving an An-2 aircraft; let us now analyse a somewhat
similar situation aboard a Yak-18 aircraft, but in which the mentor was not an instructor but a check pilot (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov
Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). This situation conveys information not only about how fine the line between a controlled and an uncontrolled situation
can be. The check pilot (the flight commander) was characterised by a rather peculiar manner of behaviour towards trainees – extremely rudely,
using profanity both in flight and on the ground, he berated trainees for the slightest deviations from established rules, as a result
of which trainees who had previously coped successfully with their tasks showed their worst results in his presence, with which the check
pilot was clearly displeased. He blamed the trainees' poor professional preparation on the instructor pilots, who attempted to explain the situation to
him, pointing out that it was precisely his rude manner that "paralysed" the trainees, and that this was precisely the reason the
trainees could not cope with the flight elements. Having heard the instructors' opinion, the check pilot decided to change his manner of
behaviour. The next day he gave a trainee the opportunity to fly the aircraft entirely on his own, sending him off before
the flight with the words: "You'll fly the whole thing completely on your own. In the training area you'll do a loop,
two rolls, two combat turns, two spins from level flight and two spins from turns." Having completed these tasks, the cadet descended
to an altitude of 300 m for the approach to landing. At that moment the check pilot asked sarcastically, "Got it all
done?" and, turning away from the trainee, began looking down at the ground. The trainee, remembering that one spin from level flight
had not been performed, began to bleed off speed (at a true altitude of only about 200 m!). The check pilot, intervening
in the controls at the very last moment, brought the aircraft out of the dangerous attitude. The check pilot's temperament showed itself
with even greater force after landing – as soon as the aircraft came to a stop, the trainee jumped out of it
and ran headlong away from the check pilot, who tried to catch up with him (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009).
The situation examined illustrates both the already noted situation of delayed intervention in the controls and the check pilot's utterly impermissible behaviour,
which for a long time disrupted the flight-training process. Once again we encounter a situation in which negative emotions (in this case
arising in trainees as a result of the mentor's rude treatment of them) paralyse the psyche, rendering trainees incapable not only of
mastering something new but even of demonstrating what they have successfully mastered before. On the other hand, we see in the check
pilot a lack of proper reflection (a reflecting on one's own thoughts and actions, and how they are perceived by those around
one) – an ability so necessary for a mentor's work and manifested in the ability to anticipate both any question from a
trainee and any complex situation. Reflection was so poorly developed in the check pilot that what was obvious both to the trainees
and to the instructor pilots was not obvious to him (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). The type of check pilot
examined above is a widespread phenomenon that has accompanied aviation throughout its entire history. In particular, the problem of nervous and ill-tempered
check pilots and instructors who provoke emotional tension in cadets was examined by K.K. Platonov and L.M. Schwartz (1948). Let us examine
other examples of check pilots' behaviour and the consequences to which it leads. Let us analyse a situation which, despite its extreme
danger and the possible severity of its consequences, nonetheless did not end in an aviation accident (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). The
favourable outcome of this flight was predetermined by the competent actions of a check-and-training pilot, who, intervening in the situation in good
time, made it possible to preserve a working atmosphere in the crew. In accordance with the flight plan, the crew was preparing
for a flight to Khabarovsk together with a check-and-training pilot from the flight-methods department. During the pre-flight preparation, the check-and-training pilot got
acquainted with the crew members, asked about their experience of flying this type of aircraft, and established the order of interaction. It
emerged that the flight engineer was carrying out his first independent flights following confirmation in his post. Having dealt with matters relating
to refuelling, the flight engineer headed to the aircraft. The other crew members, having completed the necessary procedures and signed the flight
assignment, met at the doorway a Ministry of Civil Aviation official. The crew did not know him. To the official's question, "Where
are you headed?", the crew members answered, "To Khabarovsk." In response he said, firmly and decisively, "I'm coming with you." The crew
headed to the aircraft, while the ministry official went to the medical station, after which he boarded the aircraft and took the
pilot-in-command's seat. Through his whole manner he made it clear that he was the most important person in the crew. With the
check pilot's permission, the pilot-in-command withdrew to the passenger cabin. After engine start the flight engineer switched on the air-conditioning system and
reported that the system was faulty. The ministry official turned towards the flight engineer and declared: "If you don't fix the fault
in the pressurisation system, I'll take you off flying duties." A tense silence fell in the cockpit. After a pause, the check-and-training
pilot went up to the flight engineer and said, in a calm, quiet voice: "Switch everything off except the engines, and start
again from the beginning, step by step." Under the check pilot's supervision the flight engineer carried out all the necessary actions one
by one and drew attention to the reading of the UVPD-15 indicator, whose needle was deflected from the zero position. The check-and-training
pilot pointed out that the reading was correct, since the aircraft was still at aerodrome elevation. Realising the mistake he had made,
the flight engineer apologised. In that same calm, trust-inspiring voice, the check-and-training pilot addressed the flight engineer with the words: "Report: the
air-conditioning system is serviceable, ready to proceed with the flight." The flight engineer, not yet fully recovered but already significantly calmer, reported
that he was ready for the flight. The flight was completed without any complications. If in the situation described above the check
pilot's behaviour can be described as exemplary, the situation described below represents the opposite example – behaviour on the part of a
check pilot incompatible with safety standards (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). The situation occurred in the crew of an An-12
aircraft, whose complement included the pilot-in-command, the co-pilot, the navigator and a check pilot. The An-12 crew was flying the route "Irkutsk
– Mirny." In the co-pilot's seat sat a check pilot – the deputy commander of the flying detachment. He needed to fly
first to Mirny and then, aboard an Il-14, on to an airfield where he was to determine his own technical currency for
accepting Il-76 aircraft. After levelling off at the assigned flight level, the check pilot decided to test the pilot-in-command's knowledge of the
flight manual (RLE). Dissatisfied with the answer to the first question he asked, he then asked several more questions, the quality of
the answers to which again struck him as poor. Addressing the pilot-in-command, the check pilot said: "I'm suspending you from flying!" The
pilot-in-command, mumbling something unintelligible, left his seat and left the cockpit. For ten minutes the check pilot flew the aircraft himself. Then
he summoned the pilot-in-command and said, "Sit down!" The pilot-in-command, looking offended, sat back down in his seat. An "oppressive" silence fell
in the cockpit. The check pilot decided to test the pilot-in-command's knowledge once more and again remained dissatisfied with his answers. In
an irritated voice the check pilot said to the pilot-in-command, "I'm suspending you from flying!", to which the pilot-in-command left his workstation.
Fifteen minutes later the check pilot brought the pilot-in-command back to his workstation and once again put questions to him, and once
again (!) suspended him from flying. Just as the pilot-in-command was rising from his seat, a report came from the navigator: "Approaching
the descent point." At the check pilot's insistence, the pilot-in-command remained at his workstation. After landing, the check pilot, realising that the
crew could not stay on in Mirny, gave the instruction: "Proceed to Irkutsk and on arrival report that I suspended you from
flying." The crew made a safe landing in Irkutsk (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). No aviation accident occurred, but the
conditions for one to occur had been created. It is clear that the check pilot did not understand his true purpose in
the crew – to perform the function of a benevolent yet principled mentor, creating in the crew an atmosphere of cooperation, an
atmosphere that is an indispensable condition for flight safety (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). It is precisely conditions in which
one crew member "paralyses" the activity of another that constitute a powerful precondition for an aviation occurrence. A person who feels fear,
timidity or a lack of confidence in the correctness of his own judgements will not be of help in dangerous situations. In
this connection the primary task both of check pilots and of pilots-in-command is to create in the crew an atmosphere allowing concerns
about situations developing on board to be voiced openly, regardless of whether those concerns are subsequently borne out or not (Evstigneev D.A.,
Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). If concerns voiced by some crew members about the actions of others turn out to be justified,
it is the commander's duty to reinforce
продолжение следует...
Часть 1 THE SPECIFICS OF CREW INTERACTION WHEN INSTRUCTOR PILOTS AND CHECK PILOTS CARRY OUT THEIR MENTORING
Часть 2 - THE SPECIFICS OF CREW INTERACTION WHEN INSTRUCTOR PILOTS AND
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