10. Crew Interaction Under Poor Teamwork and Incompatibility Among Crew Members

Lecture

The problem of compatibility and teamwork within aviation crews is one of the most acute – precisely because we are dealing with what is known as a collective operator – a community of people
united by joint activity – activity that none of them, individually, could manage alone. Thus, crew members and
air traffic control shift members find themselves in a situation with no way out – whatever relationships develop within the group, the work must be carried out in full and flight safety must be ensured.
It follows that if crew members or air traffic controllers on a shift genuinely wish to
work comfortably and maintain the proper level of flight safety, only one choice remains –
to work on themselves, to learn to be compatible with people of different types. Thus, while other professional groups may to a greater or lesser degree get away with leaving relationships within their community unresolved, crew members and controllers on
a shift cannot. And relationships within a group cannot be managed without knowledge of the laws
governing the psyche, without knowledge of psychotherapeutic techniques and rules.
Let us define what the phenomena of compatibility and teamwork actually are. Compatibility – is a type of interaction in which both
communication partners derive satisfaction from it, that is, each person's needs find satisfaction in the process of communication. Teamwork – is a type of interaction in which there is coordination in the work between its participants, that is,
there is mutual satisfaction of needs related to the performance of professional duties.
As N.N. Obozov (1979) points out, in teamwork the partners' mutual satisfaction
with the interaction is mediated by professional activity. Given
high success of joint activity, partners come to feel satisfaction not
only with themselves (as in individual activity), but also with their partner. If people have worked well together while engaged in a particular type of activity, they most often feel mutual sympathy, which is one of the common preconditions for compatibility. Teamwork – is the effect of the combination and interaction of individuals, characterized by the maximum possible productivity (in joint work) with minimal
emotional and energy expenditure (on the activity and interaction), against a background of sufficient subjective satisfaction (closer to average). Compatibility – is the effect
of the combination and interaction of individuals, characterized by the partners' maximum subjective satisfaction with one another, with significant (above-average) emotional and energy expenditure (Obozov N.N., 1979). The author notes that the main component of teamwork is success, while the main component of compatibility is
subjective satisfaction. It is important to note that compatibility can act both
as a condition for the emergence of interpersonal sympathy and as its result.
Lack of teamwork or incompatibility leads to various conflict situations and
is a precondition for a whole range of flight incidents.
Lack of teamwork can arise for the following reasons.
1. Communication barriers (in the form of double interpretation of phrases, a mindset geared toward perceiving
particular information, failure to confirm information received from the controller,
appropriation of someone else's information).
2. Crew members being in different emotional states
(one is in a state of emotional tension, while the others, perceiving the situation as routine, remain calm).
3. Loss of skills due to breaks in flying activity and the emotional tension caused by this.
4. A clear divergence in the structure of the flight picture (something obvious to the captain may not be
obvious to the first officer, flight engineer, or navigator, and vice versa).
5. Lack of complete information about the negative personal qualities of crew members.
6. Inadequate preflight preparation.
7. Indulging non-professionals, especially those with higher status.
8. Different levels of training among crew members (this refers to differing levels of training both within the regular crew and differing levels of training between
instructor pilots (or check pilots) on one side and the rest of the
crew on the other).
9. Absence of a clear division of duties among crew members.
10. Formal, rote reading of checklists, absence of conscious monitoring of
whether an action has actually been performed.
11. Deviation from the habitual algorithm of actions.
12. Errors in the use of navigation equipment.
13. Clear gaps in the professional training of crew members combined with a conviction to the contrary.
14. Excessive workload for one of the crew members.
15. Crew members' attention being outside the cockpit.
16. Emotional tension caused by the unusualness of the situation.
17. The presence of unauthorized persons in the cockpit.
18. Deliberate violations of work procedures (aircraft overload, landing below the weather minimums, attempts to "catch up with the glideslope," delayed go-around, failure to go around, cutting corners on the route) and their subsequent concealment.
19. Incompatibility.
Let us examine the above-mentioned forms of poor teamwork in more detail. One
type of communication barrier that quite often leads to serious disruptions in crew performance is the double interpretation of a particular phrase or expression. The reason for double interpretation is that the perception of a word or phrase depends on the context of the message and the individual's prior experience (the meaning
that person attaches to the word or phrase). In other words, the double interpretation of expressions is determined by differences
in the thesaurus of those communicating. Thesaurus (Greek: thesauros – treasure) – is the shared system of meanings, accepted by members of a particular group.
As a first example of the captain and flight engineer understanding the same phrase differently is an incident described by N.A. Nosov (1990). During landing, on the captain's command, the flight engineer was supposed to use a switch to extend the flaps to an angle of 38° at a precisely defined moment, which the flight engineer knew well. At the
required moment, the captain, meaning the command "Extend flaps to 38°," gave a shortened version of this command: "38°." At that moment the flight engineer, monitoring the engines, was looking at the fuel control lever position indicator – lever position is measured in degrees, and is adjusted using the engine control levers (throttles) – and had his hand on the throttles. In response to the command, the flight engineer began moving the throttles to the 38° position, thereby increasing flight speed. Only after the captain pointed out the sharp increase in speed did the flight engineer realize what was happening.
A second example of differences in the thesauri of the captain and flight engineer is the double
interpretation of the phrase "Refuel 900" (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). After arriving
from the Kachug airport in Irkutsk, the young captain of an Il-14 aircraft instructed the flight engineer, "Refuel 900," and quickly went to the flight operations office to file paperwork for a flight to Bratsk
airport. Having filed the paperwork, the captain returns to the aircraft. He is met by the flight engineer, who reports: "The aircraft is ready for flight, 900 kg refueled. Passengers are aboard." Having inspected the aircraft, the captain boards, in a hurry, since the arrival from Kachug had been delayed due to weather (morning fog). The crew
takes off and sets course for the Osa turning point. Having passed this point, the captain glances
at the fuel gauge and is stunned. Very emotionally, the captain addresses the flight engineer: "I asked you to refuel 900 kg!" The flight engineer replied that he had indeed refueled
900 kg: "Captain, the remaining fuel was 400 kg, I added 500 kg, for a total of 900 kg, as you asked." The captain continues: "I meant the remaining fuel of 400 kg, and 900 kg more needed to be added, otherwise there wouldn't be enough fuel
to reach the alternate airport!" After this, a heavy atmosphere settled over the crew. Since there was a tailwind, ground speed was 380 km/h, and by calculation the remaining fuel
over the Bratsk radio beacon corresponded to the norm, so the crew continued the flight to the destination airport. This incident was thoroughly analyzed within the crew, and an
agreement was reached that the captain would say "total aircraft fuel before departure ...
kg." Subsequently, regulatory documents were amended to require the captain to personally verify the actual amount of fuel loaded and confirm that it matched the figures in the documentation.
A third example of differences in the thesauri of those communicating is the double interpretation of the word "pallets" (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). The crew of an An-12 aircraft was to transport cargo to Mirny airport. At the warehouse there was cargo marked as "pallets,"
with a total weight of 16 tons in a quantity of 8 items, placed on 4 wooden pallets. In
the pilots' understanding, the term "pallet" means a reinforced wooden platform of a certain
size on which cargo is placed to avoid damaging the floor of the aircraft's cargo cabin. Acting on the crew's request, an employee of the transport department asked the loaders to load 4 pallets into the aircraft, believing this corresponded to the aircraft's maximum permissible load of 8 tons.
While preparing the next An-12 aircraft, the transport department employee again asked that the remaining pallets be loaded. The loading foreman replied that all the pallets had already been loaded onto the previous An-12, which had departed for Mirny. Immediately afterward, an urgent telegram was sent
reporting that the aircraft flying was over its maximum permissible takeoff weight. After the An-12 landed, sagging was discovered in the aileron cables and other
control elements. It turned out that each wooden pallet held 2 iron grates, which were also called "pallets," meaning the aircraft's load had been exceeded by a factor of 2
: instead of the required 8 tons, the aircraft carried 16 tons of cargo. Following this event,
technical training sessions were conducted in the transport service departments and flight squadrons to prevent
future cases of double interpretation of the same terms.
Failure to confirm information received from air traffic control and appropriation of someone else's
information have repeatedly been the cause of aviation events of varying severity. As an example, let us consider the precursor to an aviation accident in the form of a dangerous convergence of a Tu-154 and an An-8 near Bykovo airport
on February 10, 1986. At 18:17:32, the senior controller instructed the crew of an An-26
of the Air Force: "94459, climb to 3,900, maintain this heading for now, work with 'Approach-7' on 131.2."
At the moment the controller was transmitting this instruction to the An-26 crew, the crew of the Tu-154 keyed their radio transmitter and reported: "85433, reached 3,600." Releasing the transmit button, the crew heard the rest of the controller's instruction, addressed to the An-26 crew: "Climb to 3,900,
maintain this heading for now, work with 'Approach-7' on 131.2." Taking this instruction as meant for them,
and without confirming that it was addressed to them, the Tu-154 crew acknowledged: "433, current heading, climbing to 3,900, over," after which they switched to communicate with the "Approach-7" controller while climbing
to 3,900 m. The procedural monitoring controller heard that the Tu-154 crew and the senior
controller had "stepped on" each other's transmissions, but did not warn the senior controller of this in time (Collection of Informational..., 1988). The "Approach-7" controller, upon receiving a report within his area of responsibility from the Tu-154 crew that they had reached 3,900 m, recognized the conflict and issued an instruction to the Tu-154 crew: "85433, hold at your current altitude for now (3,740
m)." Having received a report from the Tu-154 crew: "433, maintaining 3,900," and seeing that the Tu-154
and An-8 were converging at the same altitude on opposing headings, the "Approach-7" controller instructed
the Tu-154 crew: "Descend to 3,600 m," which was promptly carried out by the crew. The aircraft
passed each other with a vertical separation of 160 m.
Record-setting in the number of communication barriers involved was an aviation event involving an Il-76 of the "Volga-Dnepr" airline, whose crew was flying a route
"Kuwait – Iraq" and landed on a closed runway. During predescent preparation, the crew had considered two options for the approach: runway
32 and runway 30. Authority to conduct radio communication in English had been delegated to the radio operator – as having the higher level of language proficiency (Tsibulkin V.A.,
2008). The air traffic controller made contact with the crew and reported: "Reach 987, TOWER, wind
300°/6, gusting 18, pressure 29.80, on final for runway 32 at a distance of 2 miles, a large fixed-wing aircraft." The radio operator confirmed receipt of the information with the phrase
"copied all." The controller then informed the crew: "Reach 987, cleared to descend in a left-hand pattern, report on base, runway 32." The radio operator acknowledged the clearance, but with an error, naming runway 30 instead of runway 32. The radio operator's error went unnoticed and uncorrected by the controller. The navigator, monitoring the radio traffic, noticed
the error and tried to draw the crew's attention to it with the phrase: "I think we were given runway
32," to which there was no adequate response. During the third turn,
the radio operator reported to the controller: "Reach 987 on third turn, ready for landing left-hand,
gear down, locked." The report was incomplete, as the runway number was not stated. The controller's reply was as follows: "Reach 987, roger, wind 310°/8, gusting 18, runway 32,
cleared to land, aircraft on takeoff roll, will not conflict." The radio operator acknowledged the landing clearance, but again made an error, naming runway 30 instead of runway 32.
When the controller saw that the aircraft was heading in to land on runway 30, he issued the command: "Reach
987, go around, this is runway 30!" The radio operator did not hear the first part of this command, as it was drowned out by intercockpit communication, and relayed to the controller: "Reach 987
cleared to land, runway 30." This was followed by a repeated command from the controller: "Reach
987, negative, go around!" This command came about 1.5
miles from the runway. The radio operator did not pass this information on to the pilots, but merely said: "Cannot comply,"
based on the fact that the landing process was already underway. The radio operator informed the crew about the controller's go-around command only after landing.
Above we noted that a cause of interaction disruptions can be crew members being in different emotional states. In particular, this is what happened
during takeoff with an An-26 aircraft crew at Saransk airport on February 6, 1986.
The captain, thrown into a state of affect by ground lights he saw and
mistakenly took to be the lights of an oncoming aircraft, with the word "Aircraft," addressed to the first
officer, managed to infect the latter with his emotional state, so that the first officer
a second later said "I see it." A detailed description of this aviation event is given earlier in Chapter 4.
If one crew member is in a state of emotional tension while the others
retain an adequate perception of reality, there is a chance the situation can return to normal. In
this connection it should be remembered that it is always easier to transmit emotional agitation to another person, to infect them with strong emotions, than to infect a person with your own calm and
rationality. But however difficult it may be, it is precisely awareness of the importance of maintaining
adequate perception for a safe outcome to a dangerous situation, and of the importance of conveying this
state to other crew members, that makes it possible to preserve a working atmosphere in the crew –
focused on solving the problem rather than on one's own feelings (Evstigneev
D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007).
As an illustration of the above, let us cite an episode that took place in the cockpit
of a twin-engine aircraft. One engine failed, to which the captain calmly said: "Looks like an engine's failed," while the first officer became agitated – moving into a state of emotional tension. Seeing that the captain was treating the situation as
routine, the first officer gradually calmed down. After this situation, the first officer adopted this model of the captain's behavior "for future use."

As an example of how breaks in flying activity and the resulting
emotional tension can affect crew performance, let us examine an incident that occurred during the landing of a Tu-134A aircraft at Kazan airport on December 22, 2000. At night, in difficult weather conditions, the aircraft ran off the paved
runway onto the right safety strip, then returned onto the runway (Informational Bulletin..., 2001, No. 3).
The crew carried out predescent preparation for a landing heading of 112°. Upon entering the
Kazan regional control zone, the crew established contact with the controller, received clearance to
descend to an altitude of 4,500 m, and requested confirmation of the landing heading of 112°, to which they received the reply: "Plan on landing after the Yak-40." The crew did not
analyze the information received and continued descending to flight level 4,500 m at an average speed of 770 km/h,
thereby creating a time shortage for air traffic control to arrange a landing on heading 112°. After leveling off at 4,500 m and establishing contact with the approach controller, the crew was informed of the Yak-40's position and advised to maintain minimum speed. The investigation showed that already at this point the relative positions of the aircraft did not allow the Tu-134 to land on heading 112°. At a level of 1,500 m, the crew received an instruction from the circuit controller to descend to 500 m on the same heading. Because
the Yak-40 had not yet landed by this time, the circuit controller changed the instruction to the Tu-134 crew to carry out a landing on heading 292°. The crew acknowledged receipt
of the new instruction, carried out predescent preparation for the new landing heading, and tuned the radio compasses to the outer and inner marker beacons. After entering the glide path, the captain took over control. At the altitude where assessment of the aircraft's position was to begin, the navigator gave the command "Assess," to which the captain replied "Landing," which did not comply with the requirements of the crew's operating procedures. The first officer did not respond to the
"Assess" command and did not inform the captain: "I'm on instruments." After the navigator's command the captain's attention shifted away from instrument flying and he began searching for the approach lights.
The inner marker beacon was overflown at an altitude of 59 m, a speed of 289 km/h, on
heading 296°. At an altitude of 50–40 m the captain saw the threshold lights of the paved runway. At this moment the aircraft was to the right of the runway centerline, at a distance of 750 m
from the threshold. From this point on, the crew's main attention was focused on correcting the lateral deviation caused by an incorrect assessment of the aircraft's drift angle on the landing heading. In doing so, the crew practically stopped monitoring the flight heading. After a whole
series of inadequate control inputs by the crew, the aircraft touched down at a speed of 268
km/h on heading 298° at a distance of 430 m from the runway threshold, with a load factor

of 2.08 g (rudder deflected right by 2.34°, left aileron raised up to 2°). 0.5 s after touchdown the captain moved the rudder from the right position to the left, to 4.23°. The aircraft became airborne again, flew 145 m and
touched down a second time at a speed of 261 km/h with a load factor of 1.44 g (rudder deflected left by 14°, elevator – up by 5.38°). After the second touchdown, the nose gear came down, the spoilers deployed, and
"Wheel braking" indication appeared. Because the landing had been made on a heading greater than the runway heading, the aircraft began drifting right of the runway centerline. An attempt to bring
the aircraft back onto the runway heading failed, as the nose landing gear ran onto a section of the runway that had not been cleared of ice and lost steering. The aircraft's
nose gear ran off the runway, knocking out one runway light. By the time the aircraft ran off
the runway, the rudder was deflected left to 23.6°. 7 seconds after the first touchdown, at a speed of 207 km/h, the crew engaged engine reverse, after which the speed began to decrease and directional control improved, and the aircraft gradually began returning
to the runway. At a speed of 131 km/h the aircraft returned to the runway, knocking out two more runway lights with its left gear
.
It turned out that the captain had not, for over a year, performed landings on the Tu-134 to the assigned minimums under natural conditions, and the first officer had only 25 hours of flight time on this type of aircraft.
The circumstances of the incident clearly demonstrate a lack of coordination among crew members (arbitrary interpretation of operating procedures, manifested in the absence of a number of
required crew callouts) and the captain's low psychological readiness, on
whom the appropriate mindset for the work largely depends. Low psychological
readiness first showed itself when the captain ignored the controller's recommendations to take into account the Yak-40 that was on approach and to maintain minimum speed: the captain, being prepared for a certain course of events, did not want to accept that the situation was different and consequently called for different actions, for working out
a different short-term strategy. What is most interesting is that, by ignoring the air traffic controller's recommendations, the captain himself predetermined the development of events that would prove far more inconvenient
for himself: because of the reduced interval between the Tu-134 and the Yak-40, the controller changed the landing heading, thereby arranging yet another "test" of the captain's readiness to act under less certain, changing conditions (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007).
Lack of proper interaction can also arise due to a divergence in the flight
picture held by different crew members. Unfortunately, not all actions of other crew members can be checked and correctly assessed by the captain. One example of this

is an unjustified decision made by a captain in connection with unprofessional
actions by the flight engineer. The incident with an An-12 aircraft took place on January 5, 2001.
The aircraft was flying the route "Domodedovo – Omsk." The crew made a forced landing at Koltsovo airport (Yekaterinburg) due to uneven
fuel consumption. During the climb, the flight engineer noticed uneven fuel consumption from the zero tank groups of the left and right wing halves: the right wing half had
150–200 kg more fuel (Informational Bulletin..., 2001, No. 3). After leveling off, in order to balance the fuel between the left and right wing halves the flight engineer switched to manual
transfer mode, but due to unprofessional actions failed to solve the task set.
The flight engineer's actions created the illusion of a malfunction in the fuel system, leading the captain to decide on a forced landing.
A clear divergence in the structure of the flight picture also occurred in an aviation event
described by E. Kolomiets (1989). 5 minutes before approaching an unfamiliar airport, where
the crew was expected to receive a ceremonial welcome for the opening of a new route, the crew received
clearance for a straight-in landing. 30 seconds after this the navigator shouted: "Captain, the runway is right below us!" The captain, seeing the runway, initiated an emergency descent and
landed on the short concrete strip of an agricultural aviation airfield at an excessively high speed, as a result of which the aircraft lost its landing gear and was partially destroyed. The crew and passengers survived. It turned out that the navigator, unexpectedly
seeing a concrete strip, thought he had made an error in his calculations, and so
took the strip he saw for the one on which landing was planned according to the flight plan. However, while descending toward this strip the navigator realized it was not the right one, but because of the shame he felt (he was ashamed of the mistake he had made) he
did not inform the captain of this (the need to preserve life and health was
overridden by the need to preserve his previous image in the eyes of his colleagues). Let us note
that the emotion of shame, like other emotions common in flight situations
such as anger and fear, triggers an affective state, during which consciousness narrows drastically
or shuts down entirely due to the release of large amounts of biologically active substances (see Fig. 8.1). After the navigator's warning about the runway he had seen, the captain also entered an affective state, though caused by the blocking of entirely different needs: the report about the runway was unexpected and
required urgent restructuring of the action algorithms, and this against a background of enormous motivation to complete the landing – all of this further intensified the dominant state of the psyche – to land no matter what. V. Grishchenko, Yu. Kravchenko, and A. Baratov (1992) explain the described phenomenon in a similar way: "an elevated

level of emotional tension when solving a highly motivated target-search task
under stressful conditions strengthens the influence of the mindset regarding its location."
In this event there were not only deformations of the flight picture, but there was also
incompatibility among crew members. The first officer knew perfectly well that the airport the captain was trying to land at was not the right one at all: "I saw from the very beginning
that it wasn't the right airport. But I wanted everyone to become convinced that the 'moonlighter' is a weak
pilot" (Kolomiets E., 1989).
The next example, illustrating how different the mental representations that guide upcoming activity (representations contained in the flight picture) can be for two pilots, is the behavior of the captain and first officer before departure. While preparing for departure from "Strigino" airport (Nizhny Novgorod), the crew, while reviewing the flight documentation, discovered a fault in the aircraft's anti-icing system. According to the MEL (minimum equipment list) for the ATR-42, departure with this fault is permitted provided there are no actual or forecast icing conditions.
At the weather office, the forecaster informed the captain of an approaching cold
front from the west; the actual weather at the departure and alternate airports was good, without significant cloud cover. But because of the approaching front, overcast cloud and freezing rain were forecast at the destination airport.
The aircraft's captain had relatively little experience as a captain on the ATR-42
(having previously flown the An-24). The captain disregarded the forecaster's warning and proposed to the first officer that they depart, explaining that "if necessary we'll fly around it." The first officer
was against departure, since the fault was significant – the anti-icing system of the airframe on the right wing half was not working. The first officer suggested consulting the forecasters once more. In the course of a detailed follow-up consultation with the forecaster
it was learned that encountering the front was expected roughly half an hour into the flight along the route.
A sound decision was made – not to depart on this aircraft, which was reported to the flight control center. After that the aircraft
was replaced with a serviceable one. The crew then departed with minimal delay and safely completed
the flight. The encounter with the front did occur – there was moderate icing in the clouds. The first officer
chose not to comment in any way on the fact of encountering the front and the resulting icing, which was entirely correct, since he was dealing with a captain who would not have understood it (with other captains the first officer could comment on mistakes they made).

If we are dealing with a person who has difficulty accepting criticism, it is best not to comment on the situation: in that case there is a better chance the person will correctly perceive the situation and draw the necessary conclusions. Again we encounter the pattern noted earlier
– it is necessary to invite your opponent to resolve the conflict situation, to invite them to draw the necessary conclusions themselves, but never to force them to. Anything
done against a person's will, with pressure applied to them, is naturally rejected, but if
the situation is left "as is," without emphasizing what happened, the person will sooner or later
draw the right conclusion. Recall that conclusions formulated by another person tend
to be received worse than those a person reaches on their own, even though
the conclusions are exactly the same!
The first officer's decision not to comment on the icing that had indeed occurred (which would have underscored his greater competence on the matter) is an
action aimed at avoiding blocking the captain's need for respect, his need
to be seen as a professional. Every person has a need for respect, but the meaning
each person attaches to it differs (this is determined by the conditioned-reflex organization of the psyche): for one person, respect will mean not accepting help or hints from colleagues, while for another respect will consist in the opposite – in accepting help, in openly discussing a problem situation, in actively
exchanging experience. Fortunately, since social needs, being conditioned-reflex in
nature, do change, all that remains for us is to create the conditions for their swiftest
change: the need for respect itself is retained, but its content changes.
How, then, could the content of the need for respect have been changed in the above-mentioned
captain even before the analyzed situation arose? One way
is – in the course of casual conversation (so that the captain would not suspect that the information being conveyed was intended to change his views) – to tell various stories about flight situations and crew members' behavior in them. Among this series of stories
there should be some in which crew members, by offering colleagues
their view of the situation, helped avoid an aviation event. In doing so it should
be emphasized that authority grows both for those who suggest the correct solution and for
those who gratefully accept that solution. It is no accident that we spoke of a series of stories, since the specific information directed at the captain must
be dissolved in a stream of entirely different (non-specific) information (one should
talk about various types of aviation events, without any bias toward a single topic),
all so that the captain does not suspect he is being "worked on."

A divergence in the structure of the flight picture occurred with the crew of an An-24 during
an attempted takeoff at Cheboksary airport on November 5, 2000, due to uncoordinated actions: the check pilot, given the presence on board of a person new to the crew, communicated with the crew members he knew using gestures (with a gesture understood by the flight engineer
he cancelled the command to retract the landing gear) without announcing the instructions given over the aircraft
intercom, as a result of which the trainee pilot, who had earlier given the flight engineer the command to retract the gear, knew nothing about the fact that his instruction had been cancelled by the check pilot, given that the aircraft had not yet left the runway. A detailed description of the circumstances of this aviation event is given in Chapter 12.
A divergence in the structure of the flight picture is often generated by a lack of monitoring of colleagues' actions. Thus, a premature descent of an Il-62 aircraft between the third and fourth
turns occurred because the captain (1st class, total
flight time 14,970 h, on the Il-62 – 4,225 h) was not monitoring the piloting of the first officer (total flight time 11,257 h, on the Il-62 – 610 h). In this situation the day was saved by the navigator's report of a premature turn, an early descent, and a distance of 16 km, after which the first officer gave the command to change the flight mode (Onufrash A.I., 1981a). Thus, while on the captain's part there was a lack of monitoring and the resulting breakdown in interaction, on the navigator's part there were competent actions that can be classified as exemplary.
In other cases the navigator and first officer did not help the captain determine the aircraft's position, did not prevent deviations from the assigned flight pattern, and did not prompt
the captain about the need to go around, make a repeat approach, or divert to an alternate airport. Crew members often try to suggest the correct decision to the captain,
but the latter is in a number of cases ignored. Thus, at Baykit (March 25, 1979) the captain of an An-26 did not respond to the navigator's calls to change heading during a
go-around. Nor did the captain of a Yak-40 respond to repeated warnings from the first officer and flight engineer about an impermissible rate of descent (Onufrash
A.I., 1981a). Before this, during the landing approach the crew had cut a corner off the route; the traffic pattern was flown at an altitude higher than recommended. On final approach the captain increased the rate of descent to 8 m/s, against which the first officer and
flight engineer began to object. In his written explanation, the captain stated that he "was overconfident, thought he would land normally, and that's why he didn't go around."
Behavior on the part of the captain similar to the examples above was observed in the crew of a
Tu-154M on a flight along the route "Dubai – Samara" on January 9, 2007. After takeoff, the Dubai airport controller issued an instruction to turn to heading 30° and

climb to 5,000 feet, which was acknowledged by the crew (Informational Bulletin..., 2007,
No. 3). 600 feet before the assigned altitude, the captain was warned by the navigator that they were approaching
5,000 feet. As they approached this altitude, the navigator, with the captain's permission, began
establishing contact with the Iranian military sector, since less than 10 minutes
remained before entering its area of responsibility. At that moment a blue-colored aircraft symbol appeared on the TCAS (traffic alert and collision
avoidance system) display. Since there had been no
warnings from controllers about an oncoming aircraft, the first officer, after
the target appeared on the TCAS screen, became distracted trying to visually spot the oncoming aircraft. On reaching the assigned altitude of 5,000 feet, the captain did not fully arrest the climb rate,
and the aircraft continued climbing. After the controller's instruction
to descend immediately, to reach and maintain 5,000 feet, the crew acknowledged
correct receipt of the controller's instruction and began a slow (at a vertical speed of 0.5–1.0 m/s) descent while turning to heading 360°. The conflict was resolved, but the captain maintained the altitude assigned by the controller with an overshoot of
244 feet (75 m), and, despite repeated remarks from crew members and demands from the check pilot
(the squadron commander) to immediately reach 5,000 feet, the captain did not respond – he continued to maintain 5,244 feet (1,599 m) for 3 min 33 s, never
reaching 5,000 feet.
The next example of a divergence in the structure of the flight picture is a precursor to
an aviation accident, consisting of the flight technician retracting the landing gear during landing.
After the wheels touched the concrete surface of the runway, due to an error made by the captain, the aircraft bounced back into the air to a height of about 1
meter (a "bounced landing" occurred). At the same moment the landing gear struts began to fold, but did not fully retract. It turned out that the flight technician thought the captain had decided to go around. That is why the flight technician set the landing gear switch to the "retract" position.
Immediately after this he saw that the runway was approaching again. Realizing
his mistake, he decided to correct it at once, but in his haste (that is, in a state of
emotional tension) he only moved the switch to the neutral position. As a
result the aircraft landed with the gear half-retracted (Korchemny P.A., 1977).
For the flight picture to be unified across all crew members (so that it is not the case that each is flying his own aircraft), it is necessary to continually monitor the work of the other crew members, in turn welcoming monitoring from them, maintaining friendly relations and fostering the understanding that mutual monitoring is the norm, not evidence of distrust (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). Monitoring is often perceived precisely as an

attribute of distrust: while on friendly terms, people reduce monitoring, diminish
their share of responsibility, and feel awkward checking on their colleagues' actions, considering it something unseemly. This barrier must be overcome – it is important not to conflate friendly
informal relations with operating procedure. Maintaining this same unity of the flight
picture among all crew members is aided by an intensive level of verbal communication.
Lack of proper interaction can also stem from a lack of complete
information about the negative personal qualities of one of the crew members. As an
illustration of this cause of poor teamwork, let us consider in turn the circumstances
of three aviation events: involving a Yak-42, an An-12, and an An-24.
The flight engineer of a "Tatarstan" airline Yak-42, during takeoff at Kazan airport on 7
October 2000, at an altitude of 10 m, retracted the flaps instead of the landing gear (which the captain had ordered). Realizing his mistake and without notifying (!) the captain of this, the flight engineer moved
the flap control switch to the 20° position. After the flaps extended to 14°
the flight engineer moved the landing gear retraction switch, at a geometric altitude of 122 m, to the "Retracted" position. At an altitude of 170 m the flaps reached the 20° position, after which they were retracted. The investigation commission noted that, in violation of the flight manual, the first officer did not monitor gear retraction
via the indicator lights, and the flight engineer concealed his actions from the crew (Informational Bulletin..., 2001, No. 1).
The commission also found that, due to a reduction in the workload of the Yak-42
fleet, the flight squadron's management had made an unjustified decision to distribute flight hours evenly across each crew, as a result of which flight time per crew over 9 months amounted to
30 h, which is below the minimum level needed to maintain professional
skills. Thus, the captain and first officer each had 19 hours of flight time that year,
and the flight engineer – 15 hours. The check pilot (deputy commander of the flight squadron) was unable to objectively assess the crew's readiness for this flight, and failed to take into account that, besides insufficient flight time, the crew had had a break in flying of more than a month, and
after the crew completed preflight preparation, in violation of clause 8.4.1 of the Flight Operations Manual, he left
the cockpit and took a seat in the cabin.
Although the situation examined here did not end in tragedy, it is extremely dangerous and highly informative regarding the flight engineer's character traits. At the very beginning of the
chapter we already mentioned that an aircraft crew is a so-called collective
operator, and if so, a failure of even one element of this system will lead to a failure of the system as a whole. The danger of the situation lies not only in the fact that the captain and other crew members do not know all the flight parameters, which under certain circumstances will inevitably lead to an accident, but also in the fact that the crew members are working alongside a person (the flight engineer) who could let them down at any moment. If the flight engineer did not

have the courage to admit this mistake of his, then he will not admit to others either, thereby depriving the
crew of information and putting it in a situation of uncertainty. Moreover, it will no longer be possible to work normally with
such a person – that person can no longer be trusted. Emotions of contempt and disgust toward such a person naturally arise. In the next aviation event we can trace something similar – with the only difference that on the part of one crew member (the navigator) what was observed was no longer a mistake, but deliberate intent.
In 1968 an An-12 crew was carrying out work for the Krasnoyarsk civil aviation
directorate. While calculating the navigational elements of the flight along the route, the navigator, without informing
the other crew members, arbitrarily altered the wind direction by the necessary angle
(so that the ground speed would match the true airspeed) and, using the altered wind direction, recalculated the flight time and the fuel required for the flight; he then adjusted the required fuel quantity to match what was actually in the aircraft's tanks (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). At flight level 6,000 m the wind reached 180–200 km/h, and the aircraft's ground speed
was 380–400 km/h. Upon entering the Norilsk airport zone, the crew received a report that the alternate airport, Igarka, had closed due to weather. At Norilsk airport the weather conditions were: snow, blizzard, visibility under 900 m, crosswind
of 15–18 m/s (below the minimums for visibility and crosswind component). Air
traffic control directed the An-12 crew to the alternate airport – Khatanga. While passing the turning point, the "45 minutes of fuel remaining" warning light on the instrument panel came on. 300 km remained to the alternate airport. To the same alternate
airport, ahead of the An-12 at flight level 8,000 m, an Il-18 was also proceeding. At the point where descent was to begin, the Khatanga airport controller asked the An-12 crew: "Are you going to descend?", to which
the crew replied: "Are there any aircraft in the traffic pattern?" Having received a negative answer,
they requested descent. At a distance of 60 km from the airport the crew set the engines to "idle" mode, extended the landing gear, and descended at a vertical speed of 15–20 m/s, continuing the approach. While passing the inner marker beacon (10 s before landing), the engine boost pumps began to surge. During the landing roll the crew shut down two
outboard engines and taxied to the parking stand. An unusable residue of fuel remained in the tanks.
Incidents like this often give rise not merely to poor teamwork, but to outright incompatibility (after discovering certain previously unrevealed traits, people begin to realize that they can no longer trust and work with a person as before).
In the summer of 1985, during preflight preparation at Volgograd airport, the captain
of an An-24, a highly experienced pilot, unexpectedly ran into a former classmate from aviation school, who wanted to get home as quickly as possible and, in order to bribe
the crew, had prepared alcohol (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). The captain agreed

to fly his colleague from Volgograd to Makhachkala. Being extremely pleased, he entered
the cockpit during the cruise phase and offered the captain a drink, to which the captain, after not very prolonged resistance (about two minutes), turned to the first officer with the question: "Can you finish the flight safely on your own?" and proceeded
to socialize directly with his aviator friend and drink alcohol. During the descent and approach the captain and his friend enjoyed the beautiful weather and wonderful views outside, after which the captain decided to take over the controls. To the first officer's objections he responded at first delicately, yet also forcefully, very skillfully
suppressing the first officer's will with an assertiveness and pushiness brought on by the alcohol, later on resorting to profanity. The result of the captain's "heroics" was a "brilliant" landing – off the runway centerline, with a serious overshoot and quite a noticeable load factor. Oddly enough, after this the captain very sternly began to berate the first officer and navigator for what had happened, adroitly blaming them for the mistakes. The very fact that the captain gave in to his friend's persuasion to drink alcohol
speaks volumes; after such an act there can be no surprise regarding the false accusations leveled at the crew members over what happened. The episode described vividly demonstrates how quickly (after a single incident) one can not only stop being a well-coordinated team, but also stop being compatible. Moreover, the situation described shows
that a single bad act can wipe out all the positive qualities
demonstrated up to that point over many years.
An illustration of inadequate preflight preparation leading to an aviation
event is the crash of an An-26 aircraft, which occurred on June 17, 1993, during the climb after takeoff near Tbilisi. While preparing for the flight, the crew, having
information about thunderstorm activity, did not work out the conditions and flight pattern for the alternate airport. In addition, the crew failed to take into account the impossibility of climbing above 5,100
m to go around the storm while flying at maximum aircraft weight. Only in flight did the crew realize that they could not go around the storm, and they continued the flight through an area of intense thunderstorm
activity. The crew's incorrect assessment of the weather conditions points to overestimation of
their own capabilities and overconfidence. What is most interesting is that this overestimation of their own capabilities had already occurred during the crew's preliminary preparation, which had not been carried out properly: the most likely flight circumstances and ways of correcting the situation had not been considered (the fact that the aircraft, at maximum
weight, could not go around the thunderstorm cell by climbing to a higher flight level had not
been worked out by the crew).

Disruptions in crew interaction can arise from indulging non-professionals who hold high status. A highly instructive aviation event is the one involving an Il-62 of the closed joint-stock company "Aviation Transport Company Tretyakovo," which occurred on October 22, 2002, during a landing at Bishkek (Manas) airport. A detailed description of the accident is given in the
next chapter.
The next cause of interaction breakdown is differing levels of training among crew members. This manifests itself primarily during training flights. As an illustration, let us cite a situation that arose during a check flight on a Yak-18 (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). An approach for landing was being performed. The cadet, still inexperienced in piloting, lost a slight amount of speed (5 km/h) on the glide path, at which the check pilot flew into a rage, let go of his own control column, stopped monitoring the flight parameters and controls, and began hitting the cadet on the head, all the while using foul
language and shouting: "Watch your speed!" By his actions the check pilot not only
created a direct threat to flight safety, but also displayed his own poor
emotional stability, thereby earning himself a loss of respect – a "reputation" among the cadets.
This person, no matter how much he might want to, will not be able to teach – no one regards him any longer
as a person worthy of respect. If a mentor is a person not respected by the trainee, he can have no influence on the latter whatsoever. If only a bad reputation and an inability to influence the cadets were the only consequences of such instructor behavior!
V.L. Marishchuk, K.K. Platonov, and E.A. Pletnitsky (1969), citing G.D. Nilov (1953), give data showing that in one flight school, among the group of cadets being expelled for poor flight performance, most were very disciplined and were top students in theoretical training. As it turned out, the main cause of their failures in flight was an unacceptable, mistaken teaching method used by the squadron commander, who from the very beginning
of flight training demanded absolutely precise maintenance of all flight parameters (speed, altitude, engine RPM, degrees, etc.), using the phrase "Or else you'll crash."
There is often a tendency toward less critical acceptance of prompts coming from more experienced crew members. As an example, let us consider a situation
that occurred on an An-124 while landing at Nairobi (Kenya) airport.
The flight down to the decision height proceeded without any deviations. The runway threshold was crossed at an altitude of 25 meters at the calculated speed. At an altitude of
20 meters the engines were brought to flight idle. At an altitude of 10–12
meters the captain began the flare, and at an altitude of 1 meter the throttles were
brought to 0° on the fuel control lever indicator. The touchdown was smooth (with a load factor of 1.09), but it coincided with a

control-wheel input "toward himself," which caused the aircraft to balloon to a height of 4 meters (Tsibulkin V.A., 2008). The check pilot (instructor pilot), fearing an overrun, instructed
the first officer to engage reverse thrust, which the latter did. Engaging
reverse at a height of 4 meters caused a rapid decrease in indicated airspeed and a sharp
sink, which deprived the captain of the ability to properly correct the ballooning. Trying to prevent a hard landing, the captain forcefully pulled the control wheel
"toward himself," which triggered the "critical mode" warning of the angle-of-attack
sensor indicator. The aircraft landed hard at a high angle of attack with an impact
(ny = 2.9) of the tail section of the fuselage against the runway surface, which caused damage to structural elements of the fuselage. As V.A. Tsibulkin (2008) notes, the check pilot's inappropriate initiative was a key factor in the development of the situation described. In turn, the captain's actions also contributed to the situation: during the approach the captain did not set the spoiler control lever to the
"ARM" position, and at the moment of touchdown did not move it to the "60" position, as a result of which the spoilers remained retracted, which contributed to the ballooning of the aircraft.
As V.A. Tsibulkin (2008) notes, the regulatory documents clearly specify the actions
for operating the spoilers during approach and landing, and also state the warning: "It is prohibited to set the throttles to 0° on the fuel control lever indicator while airborne, before the wheels touch the runway." As we can see, there was a delegation of decision-making authority in a non-standard situation to a more experienced crew member – the check pilot (formerly a test pilot for the An-124), who was not occupying a pilot's seat.
Interaction disruptions on flights with an instructor pilot are in some ways
similar to those that occur when a check pilot is on board (instructor pilots and check pilots perform a mentoring function). The specifics of crew interaction
when instructor pilots and check pilots are on board is the subject of Chapter 12.
Differing levels of training among crew members can be a source of poor teamwork
both in training flights and in revenue flights. An example of the latter is the aviation event involving a Boeing 737-400 of "Orenburg Airlines" on 26
February 2009. During the day, in normal weather conditions, at the moment of liftoff from the runway
the tire of the inboard wheel of the left main landing gear struck
one of the runway edge lights located at the end of the runway, as a result of which the tire was destroyed. Fragments of the destroyed tire damaged the "A" hydraulic lines and the wing-to-fuselage fairing panel (Informational Bulletin..., 2009, No. 7).

It was established that the aircraft commander, at the start of the takeoff roll, handed
control of the aircraft to the first officer. During the takeoff roll the speed increased steadily; on reaching decision speed the captain called "Go" (continue), and at the
speed for raising the nose – "Rotate"; the first officer began raising the nose
to a pitch angle of approximately 5°, continuing the takeoff roll along the runway until liftoff. At the moment the aircraft lifted off the runway, the crew felt an impact, which is confirmed by a small spike in load factor according to flight data recorder information. During the subsequent climb, while retracting the landing gear, the "Master caution" light illuminated, along with the "Low pressure" light
for the mechanical and electric hydraulic pumps of the "A" hydraulic system. After retracting the flaps and reaching pattern altitude, the crew carried out the actions specified in the "Quick Reference Handbook" – QRH. The captain informed air traffic control of the drop in hydraulic system pressure,
the failure of the landing gear retraction system, and his decision, after burning off fuel, to land
at the departure airport. The landing was completed safely.
The investigation commission drew the following conclusions (Informational Bulletin..., 2009, No. 7).
1. During the nose-raise and liftoff phase the pilot flying did not
establish the required pitch angle. The pitch angle before liftoff was significantly lower than recommended (the required pitch was 9.1°, whereas in fact it
was 4.57°).
2. Insufficient monitoring by the captain of the first officer's
piloting technique.
3. Limited experience of the first officer on this type of aircraft.
4. Takeoff performed with a runway slope of 0.0063.
Inadequate preparation of the first officer (a trainee) led, on July 7, 2009, to the tail section of the fuselage of an Airbus 320 striking the runway after touchdown
on the main landing gear at Pulkovo airport (Informational Bulletin..., 2009, No. 10). The flight was being conducted as part of the first officer's line-training program. After the autopilot was disconnected at an altitude of
227 m, the first officer was actively flying the aircraft. The aircraft touched down on the main landing gear with a load factor of 1.3, at a pitch angle of 5.3° (decreasing to 1.4°
at a speed of 122 knots). In order to gently lower the nose gear onto the runway, the trainee first officer moved the sidestick aft over 1 s from 4.22 to 13.7°, which
caused the elevator to deflect upward from 2.02 to 10°. As a result, the aircraft's pitch increased
over 2 seconds from 1.4° to a value of 12°, which is 0.3° more than the maximum permissible value of 11.7° with
the landing gear compressed. This resulted in the tail section of the fuselage striking the runway. The strike

occurred at a speed of 119 knots, 8 seconds after touchdown on the main gear. The aircraft
sustained damage to the skin of the tail section of the fuselage.
The process of pitch increase lasted 2 seconds. In the second second from the start of the increase, the instructor pilot took over the controls and moved the sidestick forward, but
this was not enough to produce a nose-down moment capable of offsetting the excess nose-up moment created by the trainee. The investigation commission identified the following shortcomings:
1) a long break between the first officer's type conversion and the start of his line training, during which he continued flying the Tu-154;
2) the crew procedures of GTK "Russia" did not specify the sequence of actions for the pilot flying to move the sidestick after the aircraft touches down on the main landing gear, nor the
allocation of attention for the pilot not flying after touchdown (in the flight in question, the instructor pilot, after touchdown on the main gear, shifted his gaze to the system display screen to monitor spoiler deployment, reverse thrust engagement, and the presence of automatic
braking).
The absence of a clear division of duties among crew members can also be a cause of poor teamwork. A vivid illustration of this cause is provided by
the circumstances preceding the crash of a Lockheed 1011 TriStar of
"Eastern Air Lines," which occurred on December 29, 1972, while flying from
J.F. Kennedy Airport (New York) to Miami Airport (Miami, Florida). It all began with the
nose landing gear position indicator light failing to illuminate, after which the pilots tried repeating the gear extension procedure, but the indicator light still did not come on, and
as a result the crew was uncertain whether the nose gear had extended and discontinued the approach. The captain tried to reach the unlit bulb, but because of his seat belt could not manage
to do so. The crew engaged the autopilot and continued at the cleared altitude of 2,000 feet.
The first officer removed the indicator light bulb from the instrument panel. After examining the bulb, the first officer tried to put it back in place, which caused considerable difficulty. The captain