Lecture
Neurosis (Gr. neuron – nerve, sinew) is a reversible disturbance of nervous activity caused by psychic trauma (which reflects the blocking of needs important to the individual) and constitutes a pathogenic conditioned-reflex formation. In this
regard, neuroses belong to the group of psychogenic (Gr. psyche – soul + genos – kind,
origin) illnesses (psychogenies) – diseases caused by the signal (informational) significance of a stimulus.
Neuroses arise when a person experiences negative emotions, affect, at the
moment of which partial amnesia occurs, and the nature of this amnesia may be
either selective (individual thoughts or actions are forgotten) or non-specific. Earlier
we already outlined these patterns on the graph of the dependence of activity productivity on the strength of emotions (see Fig. 8.1).
Psychic trauma may be caused by either speech (verbal) or non-speech (non-verbal) influence. Non-verbal psychic traumas in aviation
are just as common a phenomenon as verbal traumas. These include:
failure of aviation equipment, an aircraft entering zones with special flight conditions, loss of radio communication, failure of the primary and backup power supply at a control point, the sight of an aircraft making an emergency landing or that has suffered
an air crash.
Information that affects the
probability of satisfying needs (achieving a goal) is significant (and consequently psychotraumatic). Information that necessitates a decision on how to act further is especially significant, that is,
information that affects a person's future (Svyadoshch A.M., 1971, 1982). Thus, in a neurotic patient we observed, improvement in condition (previously characterized by shortness of breath, cardiac rhythm disturbance, "unbearable feeling, sensing, perceiving reality," extreme depression, and a sense of doom) occurred immediately (within the same minute!) after a decision was made on how a difficult life situation could be resolved (Evstigneev D.A., Karnaukhov V.A., 2005).
A.M. Svyadoshch (1971, 1982) points out that psychic trauma is usually not something that
is turned toward the past, but something that threatens the future, generates uncertainty about the situation, and therefore requires a decision on how to proceed. Even if the neurosis is a reaction
to an event that has just occurred – the loss of a loved one, the departure of one of the
spouses from the family, or an insult received – the traumatic effect is largely
determined by the significance of these events for the future. Thus, it is sometimes not so much
the fate of the deceased that is mourned as the fate of the survivor. At the same time, anticipation of an unpleasant
event and forecasting its consequences can sometimes cause even greater nervous tension and anxiety than the event itself once it occurs.
Each of us is unique in the set of needs we possess; there is not a single
person whose set of needs coincides exactly with another's (social needs, being conditioned-reflex formations, are shaped by the influence of the environment
in which a person lives), so the significance of any given information will be specific to each person. There are, nevertheless, certain psychic traumas that are perceived as equally severe by people
of very different personality types. These are serious illness or the death of relatives and loved ones, since the needs to be alive and healthy, and to see loved ones and relatives alive and healthy, are equally significant for practically all people. In aviation, in addition, equally painful is
information related to the risk of an aviation occurrence; it entails the threat of dismissal and criminal prosecution, blocks the need to be a professional, and brings anguish over the fate of passengers who may be disabled or even killed as a result of erroneous actions
by flight and air traffic control personnel. Despite the shared understanding of the pathogenic nature of this
information, the ranking of the above motives differs among aviation specialists (for some the dominant motive is anticipation of possible punishment for incorrect, erroneous actions; for others – concern for the passengers' lives; for a third group, all
these motives are equally significant).
Pathogenic effects can result both from a single super-strong stimulus and from repeated weaker stimuli that are capable of summation. In the first
case one speaks of acute, and in the second – of chronic psychic traumas.
The work of a pilot or air traffic controller abounds in psychotraumatic stimuli and by
definition contributes to the emergence of various neurotic states
– this is in addition to those that are in principle characteristic of the population as a whole (arising
outside the workplace). It is precisely this that provided the grounds for granting aviation specialists
special working and rest conditions: strict regulation of working hours, and earlier retirement.
At the early stages of aviation's development, the concept of "aeroneurosis" (Gr. aer – air +
neuron – sinew) arose, together with the associated "burnout theory," according to which a pilot could
remain capable of work for only a few years, after which various illnesses would arise and he would no longer
be able to cope with flight duties. Both the term "aeroneurosis" and
the "burnout theory" were subsequently abandoned, as neither was in fact confirmed
by evidence. In reality, no specific forms of neurosis exist among flight crews. The loss of health observed in the course of flight duties was linked to imperfect pilot selection procedures (Platonov K.K., Schwartz L.M., 1948; Komendantov G.L., 1963).
It can only be said that certain types of work activity (flying in particular) contribute to a more frequent occurrence of neurotic disorders, but not to any
specific forms of them. It is known that lesions of internal organs (psychosomatic
disorders) that accompany many neurotic disorders and represent the bodily manifestations of neuroses are more widespread among flight and air traffic control personnel compared
with the general population.
One of the main dangers associated with neurotic disorders is that a person does not associate certain organ dysfunctions with psychic traumatization, perceiving them as having arisen on their own and unrelated to the psyche, which closes off the only possibility of preventing such illnesses and of their prevention!
What can be said about psychosomatic disorders, which most people do not even associate with psychic activity or neurosis, when many people perceive neurosis itself as
something unrelated to the personality of the person affected! In this connection, let us cite the self-explanatory data of V.A. Tashlykov (1984). In the course of conducting pathogenetic psychotherapy
aimed at forming in the patient an understanding of the true causes of the illness and ways of overcoming existing difficulties, the author traced the dynamics of patients'
ideas about the causes of neuroses. The majority of patients (69%) indicated before the start of treatment that the causes of neurosis lay outside the features of their own personality: according to the views of some
of them (41% of patients) neurosis was associated with the after-effects of past or existing diseases of internal organs or organic disorders of the nervous system, while according to the views of others (28% of patients) neurosis was associated with adverse effects of social and environmental factors – family, everyday, and occupational problems (this category of patients placed responsibility for life difficulties on those around them).
In the course of psychotherapy, patients' ideas about the causes of neurosis changed – the frequency of attributing
the cause to a possible organic factor and to non-specific influences (overwork, overexertion, heightened nervous system sensitivity) decreased (12%), while the
leading place among the causes of neurosis, as assessed by patients, came to be occupied by emotional difficulties stemming from
traits of their character that had hindered them from overcoming an unfavorable life situation
(88%).
Neuroses in aviation are among the most dangerous psychophysiological factors –
they are a cause of serious aviation occurrences. At the same time, aviation occurrences themselves also give rise to neurotic disorders. Thus, neuroses can both generate aviation occurrences and be generated by them.
Vivid examples of aviation accidents linked to pilots being in a neurotic state are the hard landing of a Tu-134 with a broken nose landing gear strut in
Riyadh (Saudi Arabia, January 13, 1991) and the crash of an An-124-100 in Kerman
(Iran, November 15, 1993).
Before the departure of the Syrian crew's Tu-134, the aircraft commander rolled his car on the way to the airport and did not
report the incident during the pre-flight medical examination (he had a material interest in completing the flight and initially did not sense any obstacle to carrying it out – a state of bravado was noted). The crew was flying the route "Damascus (Syria) – Riyadh (Saudi
Arabia)." During the aircraft's descent, the commander (ignoring the instrument readings)
attempted to visually establish contact with the runway (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). The descent took place at night, with a cloud base of 80 m and
visibility of 400 m. While attempting to establish visual contact with the runway
lights (disregarding repeated activations of the ground proximity warning system), unexpectedly
for the commander, at a speed of about 320 km/h, the aircraft touched the ground (3 km from the runway). The load factor (ny) at the moment of ground contact was 3.6. After the touch,
the commander proved unable to control the aircraft, and the co-pilot together with the flight engineer took over control: they engaged takeoff engine power, as a result
of which the aircraft, at a speed of about 260 km/h, lifted off the ground (the aircraft had rolled along
the ground for about 200 m). The co-pilot and flight engineer successfully carried out a landing at Riyadh airport. Already on January 16 (after the minimal necessary repairs) the aircraft departed for Damascus (Saudi Arabian airspace was being closed for an indefinite period due to military operations in the Persian Gulf). The final repair of the aircraft was carried out in Minsk.
The crash of the An-124-100 aircraft near Kerman airfield occurred on November 15
1993, under conditions of reduced visibility. The crew was performing a charter flight along the
route "Dubai (United Arab Emirates) – Kerman (Iran) – Tashkent (Uzbekistan)." The crew consisted of the aircraft commander, co-pilot, navigator,
radio operator, senior flight engineer, flight engineer, and trainee navigator. Also on board were
6 technical personnel and 3 passengers. During maneuvering in the
holding area of Kerman airfield and on approach, the crew transmitted contradictory
information about its location over the radio, failed to fly the holding pattern correctly, deviated from the prescribed pattern with a drift northward of up to 47 km, and began descending
while visibility on the runway was below that established for the given approach pattern.
Departure from the approach pattern led to the aircraft's collision with a mountain (to the first ground proximity warning, the commander and co-pilot reacted appropriately – by climbing; to the second – one climbed while the other descended).
As established by the investigation commission, the crew had never previously flown to the mountain airfield of Kerman, and in violation of the requirements of the flight operations regulations (NPP GA) an instructor pilot had not been included in the crew to "familiarize" the crew with this airfield; preliminary preparation
had been inadequate. It is also important to note that in providing air traffic services,
the Kerman airfield controller did not react to the crew's contradictory reports, transmitted 9 seconds apart ("our range is 20 miles" and "holding in the zone over Kerman"), and offered the crew an approach pattern that violated the weather minimums.
In the case described above, the aircraft commander and co-pilot (brothers by blood),
who had recently buried a relative, were in a neurotic state (Evstigneev
D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007), which accounted for their contradictory reports to air traffic control services and their differing reactions to the activation of the ground proximity warning system (one pulled the control column toward himself, the other pushed it away).
Being in a neurotic state is primarily determined by the fact that a person
becomes inadequate: all mental energy is spent processing the psychotraumatic information, and the entire consciousness is absorbed by this process (Evstigneev
D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007): work is performed largely on the basis of existing skills, and only situations of increasing operational complexity that require the active
engagement of thought processes can pull (more precisely – snatch) a person out of the neurotic state, forcing them to act, but all their actions will succeed only
if the resulting complication of the flight situation is familiar and they are able
to cope with it. A person in a neurotic state tries to perceive the situation adequately, but this occurs through overcoming distressing
sensations (this includes not only psychological discomfort and depression but also disturbances in the
functioning of internal organs – this will be discussed separately). Many neurotic
disorders are difficult to detect during the pre-flight medical examination; some of them
are deliberately concealed (thus, in neurasthenia people tend to conceal their illness from those around them, especially at work), or they are simply not given importance –
their harmful effect on performance and safety is underestimated (one often hears from flight and air traffic control personnel: "I have a family at home to support, there's no time to pay attention to trifles, so what if I'm not feeling well").
A number of neurotics, on the contrary, try to immerse themselves in work as much as possible so that
there is no time to dwell on the various memories that traumatize their psyche.
Among the neurotic reactions that developed as a result of intimidation of aircraft commanders by a squadron commander is the behavior of a Tu-104 pilot described below,
on April 30, 1969 (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). In operation, the Tu-104 aircraft made landings on runways with an asphalt-concrete surface. The presence on
the runway of slush or water seriously affected the effectiveness of the braking
system and increased the landing roll length by 30–50% compared with the roll on a dry runway. At a landing weight of 60 tons under ISA conditions, the roll length is about 1,850 m (the runway margin
under these conditions is no more than 300 m when landing at the threshold marker). During landing, conditions frequently arose that could result in overrunning the runway. Reacting to the situation, the commander of one of the Tu-104 flight squadrons stated at a debrief: "Whoever overruns the runway will be demoted to co-pilot." This directive from the commander was quickly picked up by the heads of the flight units.
This psychological pressure on aircraft commanders led to the result that, when conditions for an overrun arose, commanders switched the nose-wheel steering into taxi mode and began moving along the runway not down the centerline but from one
edge of the runway to the other, thereby increasing the distance the aircraft would travel along the runway, after which they would taxi off onto the taxiway.
A sharp swing in night and day temperatures (up to 20°C) on April 30, 1969, at Irkutsk
airport caused frost to form on the runway (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov
V.Kh., 2007). During the landing of the Tu-104, after the brake parachute was deployed, the
safety ring failed, and the aircraft continued its landing roll without the parachute. The aircraft commander, realizing that speed was not being reduced and also recalling the directive
issued by the squadron commander, switched the nose-wheel steering into taxi mode (making wave-like movements along the runway) and attempted to taxi onto a taxiway joined to the runway at a 90° angle. Since in such a movement the aircraft's velocity vector does not coincide with the plane of rotation of the landing-gear wheels, a slip angle is formed, and
the aircraft begins to move sideways, skidding (inertial forces shift and drag the aircraft off
the runway). After the aircraft ran off onto the ground, the right shock strut compressed and burst (it had been filled with air instead of
nitrogen at an intermediate airport); a fire broke out. Thanks to prompt action, the fire was quickly extinguished.
The aircraft was beyond repair and was written off. During the investigation, no assessment
was given to the directives of the squadron commander, who had provoked the inadequate actions
of the aircraft commander. Moreover, everyone subsequently began to claim something entirely
different and to argue with the same ferocity that overrunning the runway in a straight line at low speed does not lead to any serious damage or material costs to eliminate it.
The criminal case that had been opened against the aircraft commander was
closed due to a metallurgical defect in the parachute's safety
ring, whose failure had predetermined the aircraft's movement along the runway at an impermissibly high speed. The aircraft commander was removed from his position and for a long
time worked in the airport's production and dispatch service.
Another example of how dangerous and psychotraumatic words can be
is the events connected with the collision of an An-12 and an An-2 aircraft at Irkutsk
airport on November 4, 1974 (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). The local airport traffic controller, without coordinating with the approach controller, authorized the takeoff of the An-2, without warning the An-2
commander that training flights along a rectangular pattern were being carried out by an
An-12. The weather conditions were as follows: snowfall, visibility 1,500–2,000 m. The An-2 crew, after taking off from the local airline runway along the established pattern,
climbed to an altitude of 300 m and reported to the local airline control tower controller that they had passed the center of the main runway, after which contact with them was lost.
The An-12 crew, while performing another approach using the SP-50 system on a magnetic
heading of 296°, reported to the approach controller that they were going around. According to the pattern, the An-12
was to fly over the runway at an altitude no higher than 200 m. However,
the flight supervisor (who at the time was performing the duties of approach controller), believing that An-2 flights were prohibited, instructed the crew to perform the first turn while climbing to 600 m. The An-2 and An-12, flying in snowfall on intersecting courses at 90°, collided at an altitude of 300 m over the center of the main runway. The An-2 crew and its passengers were killed.
The An-12 crew shut down the engines, feathered the propellers, and made a forced landing with the landing gear retracted 5 km from
the center of the main runway on the bank of the Ushakovka River. The aircraft was destroyed, and the crew members sustained bodily injuries.
The mother of the deceased An-2 co-pilot, every time she met the An-12 commander,
accused him of her son's death, although he was not at fault, as was established by the investigation commission. The commander of the An-12, an instructor pilot, as a result of the psychic traumas he had suffered (directly during the collision of the aircraft, after receiving information about the
death of the An-2 pilots, and after repeated accusations from the relatives of the deceased)
died soon afterward.
In connection with the episode discussed, it is worth turning to the recent crash of a Tu-134A aircraft that occurred on March 17, 2007, at Kurumoch airport. The fate of the surviving
crew is tragic: however differently each of the crew members reacted to what happened, they will not be free of anguish over the six people who died. The extent to which this
psychic trauma affects the crew members' health will depend on
how significant the deaths appear to each of them, and how much
responsibility each of them takes on for what happened (recall: the traumatic nature of psychic trauma is determined by the significance of the information).
In rare cases, the onset of severe neuroses can give rise to more severe pathology – organic brain lesions. An example is the aftermath of the Tu-104 accident
that occurred on July 17, 1976, at Chita airport (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007).
The crew made the decision to depart, violating several provisions of the NPP GA-71 flight regulations at once. The aircraft's takeoff
weight exceeded the limit for the given takeoff conditions by 5 tons.
The aircraft commander was secretary of the flight squadron's party organization, with extensive flying experience. The flight was performed just before he was to go on leave, and on the day of the accident
airport services fueled the aircraft only as far as the first stopover – Irkutsk, whereas according to the schedule a landing at Novosibirsk was required. The crew debated
the question: if an additional landing were made at Irkutsk, the crew's duty time
would exceed the established limits. When preparing for the flight, the crew calculated the maximum permissible load for the given conditions. In that case, not all passengers could be taken on board
(the number of people had to be reduced by 20), but the commander was verbally informed that, if all passengers were taken on board, the aircraft would be fueled through to Novosibirsk. The crew began considering various takeoff options (with flaps extended to 10°, 20°,
takeoff heading east, and others). In all cases, performing the takeoff was dangerous. Note
that already at this point the crew members were behaving inadequately due to emotional tension (an active struggle of motives was under way amid external pressure from senior officials who had assured them that "it's all right to break the rules"). Despite the developing situation, the commander gave the order to fuel the aircraft through to Novosibirsk and to board all 112
passengers. The commander lifted the aircraft off at the end of the runway at a speed of 275
km/h instead of the required 303 km/h due to insufficient runway length, and after 322 m ran
off onto the ground and struck a railway embankment.
As a result of the lengthy judicial investigation and the recognition of the commander's absolute guilt, his wife died (the psychic traumas proved fatal for her). In turn,
the commander was also in a severe neurotic state, which over time was replaced by organic changes in brain tissue: during the court hearing the commander burst out laughing and was sent for treatment. Some time later he was employed as an
apron inspector. The organic damage made itself known again – he would walk around the apron laughing.
In the end he was removed from even this "simple" job. None of the officials who
had been accomplices in the events described bore any responsibility for what had happened: their
authorizations for the takeoff to proceed with the violations had been given verbally, making it almost
impossible to prove their existence (they all denied their own words). In connection with
this, it is important to remember that no matter who provokes a crew into violations, after an unsuccessful
flight outcome it is the crew that will primarily be blamed for all the violations, while those who pushed the crew toward the dangerous decision will remain on the sidelines and will invariably
deny everything (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007).
As we can see, the number of people affected by an aviation occurrence is by no means limited
to those on board the aircraft; the relatives of both crew members (as happened with the wife of the Tu-104 commander) and
of passengers also suffer from its consequences. Moreover, those victims who were outside the aircraft and were injured (or killed) when it fell on them, together with their relatives and
close ones, also develop serious neurotic disorders accompanied by
some of the most severe psychosomatic illnesses. This happened to the relatives and
close ones of those affected when a Su-27 fell on spectators at an airfield near Lviv (July 27, 2002) and when an An-124 fell on a residential district of Irkutsk (December 6, 1997). In this connection, when making various disputed decisions, it would be useful for crew members
to be guided not only by regulatory documents but also by how a violation of prescribed procedure would affect themselves and other people in the event of an unfavorable flight
outcome, which would undoubtedly further strengthen the desire to act in accordance with the existing
regulatory documents rather than against them.
Neuroses among crew members can also arise from personal incompatibility. Thus, in the crew of a transport aircraft, consisting of the commander, co-pilot,
navigator, and radio operator, during the performance of the most demanding and difficult operations (dropping parachutists at night, landing in complex weather conditions), due to
uncoordinated actions between the commander and the navigator, preconditions for aviation
occurrences arose. Because of this, their professional activity was accompanied by severe emotional tension among all crew members. Frequent, stormy conflicts arose between the commander and the navigator, resulting in mutual hostility. As a result,
the navigator developed neurasthenia, necessitating temporary suspension
from duty. The commander, for his part, developed a duodenal ulcer. After
both had recovered, they ended up in different crews and successfully continued their flying careers. Over 6 years of observation, no relapses occurred (Leonov A.A., Lebedev
V.I., 1971).
One of the detailed studies of neuroses among flight crews was carried out by G.A. Akimov,
V.S. Videnin, and M.M. Odinak (1981). To study changes in the nervous system, the authors used clinical neurological methods, as well as certain psychophysiological
tests. In the hospital, 19 pilots with neurosis-like states fitting the clinical picture of neurasthenic syndrome were examined. The development of neurasthenic syndrome was promoted by various psychotraumatic factors, both occupational and domestic in nature, as well as somatic illnesses. The main neurasthenic symptoms appeared 3–5 months after the psychic trauma. One of the common symptoms was headaches localized in the temporal
areas, less often in the occipital area. Constricting-type headaches occurred
less frequently. Sleep disturbances were often observed: difficulty falling asleep with frequent awakenings, and in
some cases nightmares related to flight-work scenarios were reported; sleep did not provide rest.
In 6 pilots with neurasthenic syndrome, somatovegetative disturbances were observed, which, in the authors' opinion (Akimov G.A., Videnin V.S., Odinak M.M., 1981), did
not constitute accompanying illnesses but formed a single complex together with the neurotic
disturbances and required a comprehensive approach to therapy. In 11 pilots,
emotional-volitional disturbances were observed: unmotivated anxiety, and in individual
cases specific apprehensions and fears related to their professional activity.
These experiences were aggravated by the pilots' tendency to overestimate the scale of failures, intolerance of real flight factors, and a tendency toward pessimistic assessment of any undertaking.
In the neurological status, in all cases there was noted an enhancement of tendon and periosteal reflexes with an expansion of reflexogenic zones (areas whose stimulation
evokes one or another reflex response). Abdominal reflexes tended to
fade upon repeated and frequent elicitation. In 9 pilots, oral automatism reflexes were elicited with a certain consistency. Practically all subjects examined showed autonomic disturbances, manifested in particular by a mild elevation of arterial blood pressure or, in 3 cases, by its decrease – arterial hypotension (Gr. hypo –
under + tonos – tension) with a tendency toward fainting episodes. In 4 pilots, after
suffering a psychotraumatic situation of an occupational nature, the development
of obsessive-compulsive neurosis was observed. Obsessions and phobias, as conditioned-reflex
formations, arose not only as a result of the psychotraumatic situation itself but also
as a result of the pilots' ineffective processing of it. The authors (Akimov G.A., Videnin V.S.,
Odinak M.M., 1981) identified common traits among pilots with various obsessions. These
are heightened sensitivity, touchiness, somewhat exaggerated conscientiousness, and a tendency toward self-suggestion and suppression of emotional reactions. The clinical picture of obsessive-compulsive
neurosis consisted of painfully experienced fear, fixation on these experiences, and mood changes; phenomena of emotional lability (Lat. labilis –
unstable), anxiety, and autonomic reactions were noted.
One of the common psychosomatic disorders observed after
serious aviation occurrences in flight personnel is the appearance of inflammatory
skin manifestations – ranging from minor rashes to deep ulcerations, which may be either neurasthenic (without secondary gain) or hysterical (with
secondary gain) in nature.
So far we have examined neuroses among flight personnel, but this problem is just as acute among air traffic controllers. Let us give an example of how a controller's
neurotic state served as a precondition for an aviation occurrence. At 19:45:30
in the Eastern sector of the area control center, a DC-9 aircraft at flight level 10,600 m passed a
Tu-154 aircraft at a distance of 1,000–2,000 m near an outer marker beacon. During the passing, the aircraft were flying on converging-crossing courses. Control in the Eastern sector of the area control center was being carried out by controller S.A.V.
At 19:28, the controller of a neighboring area control center passed controller S.A.V. the estimated time for the DC-9 to pass over the outer marker beacon (19:42) and its flight level
(10,600 m). This information was entered on the traffic monitoring chart
(Orekhov A.N., 1989).
So the situation developed as follows. At 19:33, the Tu-154 crew reported to
controller S.A.V. the estimated time for passing the outer marker beacon (19:44
). Controller S.A.V., having analyzed the air traffic situation, noticed the possibility of a conflict between the DC-9 and Tu-154 aircraft in the area of the outer marker beacon. In order to safely separate the aircraft, controller S.A.V., at 19:37,
decided to descend the Tu-154 to flight level 10,100 m, but since there were still
several free minutes in reserve, he began sketching a chart on paper. No other aircraft
were in contact with S.A.V. at this time. While drawing the chart, controller S.A.V. became distracted, absorbed in his own thoughts (discussed shortly), and forgot to transmit
to the Tu-154 crew the instruction to descend to 10,100 m by the outer marker beacon.
At 19:43, in response to a query from the neighboring area control center about the status of the DC-9 and Tu-154, which were on converging-crossing courses, controller S.A.V. reported
"10,000," believing he had already brought the Tu-154 down. He was not looking at the chart or the radar screen at
this time and did not have an accurate picture of the actual situation. According to objective flight-data recorder information, at this time (19:42:20 – 19:43:35) the Tu-154 was performing a turn over the outer
marker beacon, in the course of which it crossed the DC-9's track. A little earlier, the flight director for the area, having concluded that the air traffic situation was simple, had gone to dinner,
so there was effectively no one to monitor controller S.A.V.'s actions (Orekhov A.N.,
1989).
Controller S.A.V. had worked in air traffic services for 8 years, 5 of them in the Eastern sector,
held a 1st-class rating, had well-developed professionally significant qualities, and an even-tempered character. Let us return to what exactly the extraneous thoughts were that occupied the controller's mind while
he was drawing the chart. In the course of the investigation it was established that recently
controller S.A.V. had experienced intensifying distress over long-standing problems: the divorce from his first wife, difficulties communicating with his child, and a desire to marry a second time. Regarding the latter, he believed he could not afford to make a mistake; he often asked himself questions related to his failed past family life. Such thoughts most often occurred to S.A.V. at times
when the air traffic situation did not require his direct intervention and was relatively
simple. That is what happened in the situation described above: having decided that he would have time to bring the Tu-154 down, the controller started drawing the chart, became distracted from his direct duties, and thoughts about the failures in his family life, his child, and his second marriage completely absorbed his mind (Orekhov A.N.,
1989).
Let us give one more example of neurosis in an air traffic controller, which arose after he suffered an acute psychic trauma combined with a subsequent worsening of the situation (Evstigneev D.A., Karnaukhov V.A., 2005). At that time, the airfield's
runway was undergoing reconstruction, and two other (unpaved) runways were in operation, from which takeoffs and
landings were carried out alternately – as their surfaces wore out. The first unpaved runway was located 50 m, and the second – 100 m, from the main (paved) runway. At the briefing (upon coming on shift), the controllers received information that today the operational runway would be the first unpaved one (50 m from the main one), since on
the second unpaved runway the electrical service was laying a cable, for which a trench had been dug. The "approach" and "landing" controllers, guided by the information received, landed an An-24 on the first unpaved runway, as a result of which the aircraft's nose landing gear strut broke. It turned out that the information given to the controllers at the briefing had been erroneous – the trench was located not on the second unpaved runway but on the first
one. The tape recording on which this incorrect information had been captured was
"prudently" erased on the orders of the flight director, as a result of which the
landing controller was blamed for the occurrence and removed from work. After
this air traffic controller suffered this psychic trauma, and following the subsequent lengthy proceedings and the impossibility of proving the correctness of his actions and his own innocence, he resolved to "restore justice" by physically assaulting the superior who had given that fateful information at the briefing. While attempting to commit the crime, the controller was
detained in the superior's office. Some time later he was taken to a psychiatric
hospital. The landing controller had been distinguished by high professionalism and ambition, as well as by inertness of nervous processes, which together significantly complicated his processing of the psychotraumatic information (Evstigneev D.A., Karnaukhov V.A., 2005).
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