- THE SPECIFICS OF CREW INTERACTION WHEN INSTRUCTOR PILOTS AND

Lecture

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such behaviour on the part of crew members, emphasising its exceptional importance for ensuring flight
safety. If the concerns turn out not to be justified and the crew members' judgements turn out to be mistaken, they must
nonetheless be analysed and assessed, and it is essential to instil firmly in the crew members' minds the understanding that, despite the
fact that their judgements turned out to be erroneous, it is extremely important that they were voiced and that the person was
not afraid to express them (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009): first, because the very act of voicing these mistaken judgements
aloud creates an opportunity to see gaps in logic that might otherwise have remained unknown (through analysing mistakes a person understands why
his forecast did not come true, and also gains invaluable experience – experience that will prevent similar mistakes in future); second, because
the concerns voiced could indeed have come to pass, and there have indeed been examples of this in the history of aviation,
albeit under somewhat different conditions; third, because an atmosphere of open exchange of opinions rules out the possibility that, in special situations,
crew members will remain inactive or passive. Let us analyse one more occurrence connected with the actions of check pilots. It occurred
in 1962 with a Yak-12A aircraft belonging to the Muynak air squadron of the Nukus combined detachment (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009;
Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). The Yak-12 crew was to fly the route "Muynak – Aktumsyk" in order to evacuate a woman in labour
from a meteorological station located on Cape Aktumsyk (on the western shore of the Aral Sea). The crew had the following meteorological
information at its disposal: 8–10 tenths cloud cover, snow, cloud base at 200 m, icing in cloud, visibility 2,000 m. The pilot-in-command
was cleared to fly solo down to a minimum of "100 × 1,000 m." Apart from a temporary deterioration of visibility to
1,000–1,500 m, the flight to Cape Aktumsyk proceeded without any particular incident. The woman in labour was successfully brought aboard the aircraft.
After take-off, contractions began. The commander decided to consult crews of other aircraft flying near the cape about weather conditions and the
possibility of proceeding in a straight line across the Aral Sea (the standard route involved flying along the shoreline), which would have
halved the flight time. Permission to shorten the route was granted by the squadron's duty flight commander on the basis of the
weather forecast and reports from the commanders of An-2 aircraft arriving from Nukus to Muynak (according to those commanders, visibility was no
worse than 2,000 m and there was no icing). Thirty minutes into the flight the Yak-12 commander reported light icing at an
altitude of 150 m. At the same time an An-2 took off from Muynak, and, at the duty commander's request, the crew
of this aircraft, on board which the check pilot was the deputy squadron commander, reported that there was no icing in the
vicinity of Muynak airport. The duty commander relayed via the controller to the Yak-12 a message stating that the pilot could continue
on to Muynak, since there was no icing. The pilot acknowledged receipt of this information, and 25 minutes later reported severe icing
– owing to a continuous layer of transparent ice covering the windscreen, nothing could be seen through it. The pilot was flying
the aircraft by instruments alone. Guided by the information from the An-2 crew, which had a member of command flight personnel on
board, the duty commander continued relaying, via the controller, recommendations to proceed to Muynak. After 1 hour 30 minutes the Yak-12 reached
the Muynak beacon. The approach proved very difficult for the pilot because of the aircraft's complete icing – a continuous coating of
ice over every part of the aircraft. For manoeuvring the pilot used take-off power, and he landed with the left cockpit vent
window open. The flight ended safely thanks to the pilot's high level of preparation. After landing and sending the woman to hospital,
an inspection was carried out of the Yak-12, as well as of the An-2 aircraft that had recently landed at the aerodrome.
All of them were covered in ice, yet not one of these crews, any more than the crew that included the check
pilot in the person of the deputy squadron commander, had given truthful information about the icing, which, given the circumstances, could have
led to a tragic outcome. The cause of the false reporting was simply the pilots' unwillingness to disrupt the flight schedule (Evstigneev
D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009; Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). Following this occurrence a flight debrief was held with flight personnel, the main purpose of
which was to make clear that misrepresenting actual weather conditions is impermissible. In the occurrence described above one can see an underestimation
of just how critical and important truthful information about weather conditions can be. Even more alarming is the underestimation of this fact
on the part of a member of command flight personnel, who, together with the rest of the crew, misinformed the Yak-12 crew
about the actual weather conditions, when the function of any member of command flight personnel is precisely to demonstrate strict compliance with
safety standards and governing documents. Moreover, information coming from check pilots is perceived as more valuable, more reliable, more authoritative, and is
therefore accepted less critically, and people are more inclined to succumb to such information, which is (among other things) exactly what happened
with the Yak-12 crew. Once again we can observe an absence of proper reflection on one's own thoughts and actions, an absence
of understanding of one's true purpose within the crew (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009; Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). Even more dangerous behaviour was
demonstrated by a check pilot on board an Il-18 aircraft. In 1967, on an Il-18 belonging to the Uzbek Directorate, a scheduled
flight "Tashkent – Moscow (Domodedovo)" was being carried out. Among the crew was a check pilot – the deputy head of the
Directorate, who was travelling to Moscow to take part in a Ministry of Civil Aviation board meeting (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009;
Evstigneev D.A., 2010a, b). After take-off the commander gave the order to set the engine power levers to the rated (nominal) power
setting, and after reaching the assigned flight level, the order to set the power levers to the cruise power setting. The check
pilot, seated in the right-hand seat, used his left hand to prevent the flight engineer from setting the power levers to cruise
power. The flight engineer reported that the engines were operating "at rated power." The commander again instructed: "Set cruise power." The check
pilot, this time verbally, countermanded the commander's instruction: "Continue the flight at rated power." The flight engineer again reported that the engines
were operating at rated power. The commander, for the third time, gave the order to set cruise power, citing the relevant clause
of the flight operations manual. The check pilot again prevented cruise power from being set. The flight to Moscow was carried out
entirely at rated engine power. After landing, the check pilot made no comments whatsoever to the crew (unsurprisingly!) and went off to
a meeting. After inspecting the aircraft, the commander made an entry in the aircraft's technical log stating that the entire flight had
been carried out at rated power, and refused to fly the same aircraft back, citing a breach of the flight manual, which
stipulates that engines may only be operated at rated power for a limited time. Owing to the delay of the return flight,
the case became known within the Ministry (flights to and from Moscow were strictly regulated, and their punctuality was subject to particularly
close monitoring). During the investigation it was established that the deputy head of the Uzbek Directorate, who was on board, would, had
the flight arrived on schedule, not have made it to the Ministry board meeting in time, and, with the aim of shortening
the journey time, had forbidden the switch from rated to cruise power. All the engines on the aircraft were checked at the
Domodedovo aviation technical base and were subsequently cleared to fly, but their service life was shortened. The crew was commended by order
of the Uzbek Directorate. The commander was awarded a valuable gift – a wristwatch. The deputy head of the Directorate received a
severe reprimand with loss of bonus, after which he was compelled to change his place of work (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009;
Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). The circumstances of the occurrence described show that, for the check pilot, personal interests came to outweigh compliance with
safety standards. Moreover, in striving to satisfy some of his needs (not being late for the board meeting), he was unable to
foresee that this was fraught with the blocking of other needs of his – needs whose existence he did not yet know
of and which would only manifest themselves after his own act (the need to preserve respect as a professional, and the need
to preserve his official status once his conduct on board became public). The most interesting thing is that timely (unlate) arrival at
the board meeting would have guaranteed the preservation of his official status, but the actions he took to prevent cruise power being
set – so necessary to him for reaching Moscow more quickly (read: "for satisfying his need to preserve his official status") –
in fact placed the satisfaction of that very need at risk, though the check pilot never gave this threat a thought; it
did not occur to him that the commander would not be intimidated by him and would report all the circumstances of the
flight to management, thereby demonstrating exemplary behaviour – behaviour showing unswerving adherence to flight-safety standards. Thus the check pilot had problems both
with the ability to forecast the development of a situation and with reflecting on his own actions (problems with reflection) – the
check pilot not only failed to understand his role as a mentor but cynically violated safety standards as well (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan
T.A., 2009; Evstigneev D.A., 2010b). On the role of check pilots on board aircraft, and on some of the causes underlying actions
by command flight personnel that are incompatible with flying duties, V.T. Gerasimov (2011) has written informatively. The author points out that some
pilots from among command flight personnel, flying only sporadically, can no longer act as full-fledged inspectors owing to insufficient professional skill. Attempts
to handle an aircraft after a long break and without proper preparation end in a series of mistakes. Instead of critically assessing
the causes of mistakes made, inspectors try to arrange to fly with friendly colleagues or with subordinates. All this weakens the crew,
disrupts habitual interaction, and unqualified intervention in the aircraft's controls may bring about a difficult situation. The presence of an inspector in
a unit does not always become an event with which flight personnel associate hopes of receiving recommendations from a more experienced person,
an assessment of shortcomings in the organisation of flights, an enrichment of information about new tasks, or the passing on of proposals
from the field to the directorate's leadership (Gerasimov V.T., 2011). As an illustration of the standards from which V.T. Gerasimov proceeded in
conducting his flight checks, the author describes the circumstances of an inspection of the flight service of the Latvian Directorate of Civil
Aviation. As check pilot, V.T. Gerasimov flew on a Tu-134. The pilot-in-command was a first-class pilot, cleared to fly to the highest
weather minimums. In the course of the flight the crew committed 14 deviations, omissions and outright violations. At the post-flight debrief (after
landing at the aerodrome in Riga) all the remarks were discussed, and the crew accepted them without objection. V.T. Gerasimov asked the
crew: "Which senior commander flew with you the day before?" The crew replied that it was the squadron commander, to which the
check pilot asked, "What remarks did he have?" The crew answered that there had been no remarks whatsoever. Reacting to this answer,
V.T. Gerasimov said: "I see, so this is not your fault. That's why I'm not suspending you from flying. But since you
cannot fly to minimum No. 1 (ICAO Category I) with such a bouquet of violations, I am downgrading you by one category.
Correct the deficiencies. You will be checked and your clearance restored." The next morning V.T. Gerasimov went to the flight detachment and
contacted the head of the inspectorate, I.V. Sukharev, and the deputy head of the Directorate for flight service, O.M. Smirnov. Both the
documentation and the command flight personnel (the squadron commander, the flight detachment commander) were checked. The latter, owing to the large number
of deficiencies identified, were suspended from flying by V.T. Gerasimov. At O.M. Smirnov's suggestion, methodological flights were carried out with him and
with I.V. Sukharev, after which unified requirements were worked out. The next aviation occurrence connected with the presence of a check pilot
on board occurred on 19 September 2000 at Tigil airport (Informatsionny…, 2001, No. 1). On board the An-28 aircraft were three crew
members (the pilot-in-command, who was actively handling the aircraft, a check pilot in the co-pilot's seat, and the co-pilot, who was sitting
in the passenger cabin), as well as eight passengers. According to the flight-recorder read-out, there were no deviations in engine operation after
start-up. Already at the beginning of taxiing, the difference in the free-turbine rotation speeds of the left and right engines was about
10% and went unnoticed by the crew. While taxiing onto the runway, the controller passed the crew information about wind direction and
speed at the holding point (050°, 8 m/s) and the take-off heading (magnetic heading 067°). This information in fact related to the
time 01:30. The wind direction established by the weather observer at 02:00 corresponded to 270°. The controller had misinformed the crew, passing
them outdated weather data. The crew proceeded to carry out the take-off, and did so in violation of the flight manual –
without stopping at the holding point. Owing to the asynchronous operation of the engines and the resulting constant leftward drift of the
aircraft, the crew twice aborted the take-off run. As the investigating commission notes, both take-off attempts were carried out by the crew
in violation of the flight manual: without stopping at the holding point and without a controlled advance of the engines to take-off
power, which made it impossible to detect the difference in the left and right engines' turbine rotation speeds before the intensive part
of the take-off run began (either from the twin-needle tachometer readings or from the failure of the green "Take-off. Left AF ready"
signal light to illuminate). The commission noted that determining the difference in engine turbine rotation speeds from the readings of twin-needle tachometers
(at the power settings the crew used while taxiing and during both take-off attempts) was practically impossible owing to the constant movement
of the power levers and the start of the take-off run without the aircraft stopping at the holding point (Informatsionny…, 2001, No.
1). According to the explanations given by the pilot-in-command and the check pilot, before the third take-off attempt the crew was fully
convinced that it was precisely the condition of the unpaved runway and the weather conditions that had twice prevented them from maintaining
direction during the take-off run, and for this reason a drier section of the runway was chosen for the next (third) take-off.
And once again the flight manual was violated – there was still no stop at the holding point. The existing difference in
engine turbine rotation speeds again went unnoticed by the crew. In all likelihood, during the third take-off attempt the crew's attention was
entirely focused on assessing the condition of the ground, which ruled out the possibility of effective monitoring of engine operation. In addition,
the two previous take-off attempts may have heightened a sense of personal professional pride – a need arose "to get airborne no
matter what," and in this connection all the crew's efforts were directed chiefly at maintaining the direction of the take-off run, to
the detriment of other operations (Informatsionny…, 2001, No. 1). Indeed, strong negative emotions cause the release of a large quantity of biologically
active substances, which lead to a narrowing of consciousness, a concentration of attention on a limited number of objects, without monitoring of
the rest. The release of biologically active substances causes the well-known phenomenon of tremor (shaking), increased heart rate, and fluctuations in blood
pressure. Such a state is particularly conducive to emotional contagion – the rapid transmission of one's own emotional state to another person
– and to heightened suggestibility. That is why, once certain actions in the control loop have been initiated, refusing to carry them
through proves very difficult – a person loses the capacity to perceive the situation as a whole and becomes absorbed in tracking
a limited number of parameters (Evstigneev D.A., Kopysov V.Kh., 2007). As the right engine advanced to take-off power, despite full right rudder
deflection, the aircraft continued to drift left until the magnetic heading reached ~40°. At an indicated airspeed of 106–108 km/h the nose
gear lifted off the runway (the aircraft at that point was 20 m from the left edge of the runway and 184
m from the start of the take-off run). Subsequently the power levers were retarded to 0°, followed by a reduction of pitch
angle to –1.4° and the lowering of the nose gear onto the ground at a distance of 12–15 m from the left
edge of the runway. Braking of the aircraft then began (the aircraft was by then off the runway – 5–6 m from
its left edge). The magnetic heading at that moment was 031°. The aircraft finally came to a stop on a magnetic heading
of 350–360° at a distance of about 30 m from the edge of the runway, after colliding with an earth berm, which
destroyed the nose landing gear. The crew and passengers were not injured. It transpired that the malfunction of the left engine was
caused by compressed air from the combustion chamber entering the inlet of the boost pump and the fuel-control pump via the drain
system, as a result of a failure of the combustion drain valve, which remained open as engine power increased owing to soil
particles lodging in the valve, together with a simultaneous blockage, by the same particles, of the fuel-displacement line from the drain tank
to the free-turbine casing's exhaust stub (Informatsionny…, 2001, No. 1). In the situation described, the check pilot, understood to be a more
experienced and more qualified person, did not fulfil his task – together with the crew he repeatedly violated the requirements of the
flight manual and was unable to give a correct assessment of the situation that arose. The check pilot from the "Cheboksary Air
Enterprise" likewise failed to fulfil his duties on 5 November 2000 at Cheboksary airport. An An-24 aircraft was to fly the route
"Cheboksary – Surgut." On board were six crew members: the check pilot in the commander's seat, a trainee pilot in the co-pilot's
seat, the flight engineer at his own station, the commander at the navigator's station, the co-pilot at the radio operator's station, and
the navigator standing behind the flight engineer's seat. The trainee commander from the "Saransk Air Enterprise" was undergoing flying practice after converting
to the An-24. The flight assignment provided for the training of the trainee pilot under operational conditions (Informatsionny…, 2001, No. 2). Take-off
was carried out under difficult weather conditions: wind 150°, 3 m/s, fog on the runway, visibility 200 m, runway visual range 350
m, vertical visibility 40 m. As the investigating commission notes, the actual and forecast weather and the condition of the aerodrome did
not preclude a decision to depart. The violation lay elsewhere: at the holding point, under weather conditions that did not permit the
training of the trainee pilot, the check pilot, in breach of the requirements of the PPLS GA-92 rules ("The co-pilot may carry
out take-off and landing under the pilot-in-command's supervision only in weather conditions no worse than 200 × 2,000 m"), assigned the take-off
to the trainee pilot, giving the command: "Take control on the right." The aircraft's take-off run proceeded with insufficient acceleration (1.8 m/s²
instead of 2.1 m/s² for the actual take-off weight of 22,430 kg). In all likelihood, during the run the wheel brakes were
being lightly applied (or the brakes had not been fully released) by the trainee pilot, who lacked sufficient experience, qualification and clearance
to carry out a take-off under conditions of restricted visibility (Informatsionny…, 2001, No. 2). On reaching a speed of 235 km/h and
the navigator's call of "V1," the check pilot gave the command to continue the take-off (the aircraft was 1,300 m from the
runway threshold at that point). The trainee pilot raised the nose gear with an elevator deflection of –1.5°, and, following the check
pilot's command, increased this to –2°. As a result the lift-off was delayed, and the aircraft reached the safe climb speed of
245 km/h (which, for the aircraft's actual weight, is close to the lift-off speed of 240–245 km/h) while still on the runway.
The trainee pilot failed to recognise the insufficient nose-up elevator deflection and the fact that the aircraft had not actually left the
runway, and the check pilot did not intervene in the controls to increase pitch angle. With lift sufficient for level flight present
at the speed of ~245 km/h reached by that point, the landing gear was unloaded, which was apparently perceived by the trainee
pilot as lift-off and flight. About a second after the navigator's call of "Safe," the trainee pilot gave the command to retract
the landing gear, having first applied the wheel brakes in accordance with the flight manual. The check pilot, realising that the aircraft
had not yet actually left the runway, cancelled the gear-retraction command with a gesture understood by the flight engineer, without repeating it
over the intercom. Not having heard the check pilot's command cancelling the gear retraction, the trainee pilot continued holding the brakes on.
At the same time the yellow warning lights came on, indicating the normal operation of the automatic wheel anti-skid/de-braking system during braking
after lift-off or, as in this case, with the landing gear unloaded at high speed (over 250 km/h) and the nose gear
raised. Instead of ordering the trainee pilot to "Release the brakes," the check pilot switched off the automatic anti-skid system. Switching off
the automatic anti-skid system while the aircraft was moving along the runway at high speed (~270 km/h) with the wheels braked led,
after about two seconds, to the sequential bursting of all four tyres over the course of about 2.5 seconds. After the tyres
burst, the aircraft continued moving along the wet runway with the wheels braked, on the rubber of the burst tyres and on
the wheel rims. The one-sided wear on the rubber and rims, together with the fact that all the tyres remained on the
wheels, indicates that from the moment the anti-skid system was switched off until the aircraft came to a stop off the runway,
the wheels were not rotating. About 1.5 seconds after the tyres burst, the check pilot made a decision and gave the order
to abort the take-off, forcefully pushed the control column forward, and continued braking the wheels. The aircraft at that point was about
450 m from the end of the runway. At a speed of about 235 km/h the aircraft left the runway onto loose
gravel and then onto soft ground, moving over which caused the nose landing gear to collapse and fold backwards. The crew and
passengers were not injured (Informatsionny…, 2001, No. 2). Besides the situations and psychological regularities examined above, it is equally important that instructors
and inspectors apply identical requirements to all trainees without exception (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). Singling out, for one reason
or another, one (or several) trainees and treating them with greater leniency inevitably gives rise, first, to wariness, and subsequently to an
openly negative attitude towards the mentor. The application of double standards results in a decline in the mentor's authority and, as a
consequence, in the strength of his influence, making effective training impossible. Double standards are also unacceptable when it comes to establishing lesser
accountability for mistakes made by instructors compared with those made by cadets. In one unit, for example, it had become the norm
that only those precursors to aviation occurrences committed by cadets were taken into account. All this came to light after a crash
occurred in the unit, when an investigating commission began its work. It turned out that, from objective flight-data-recorder information alone, the commission
uncovered 13 dangerous precursors connected with reaching critical angles of attack, exceeding load factor and bank-angle limits, and descending below established minimum
altitudes. Six of these precursors had been committed by instructors. More than 20 precursors to aviation occurrences were identified in the sphere
of flight organisation: excessive workload, aerobatics and landings performed at dusk by pilots not prepared for night flying, the absence of a
weather-reconnaissance procedure, and flights conducted according to a schedule not approved by the regiment commander. As for the professional record of the
commander who died in the aforementioned crash, over the course of a year he had carried out 32 similar flights (weather reconnaissance),
in 29 of which gross violations of task procedure and piloting-technique errors were committed (Osipenko A., 1991). Returning to double standards: it
must be remembered that one who demands only of the trainee, without demanding of himself, cannot teach. It is likewise detrimental to
the flight-training process when some instructors, under plausible pretexts (for example, unsuitable weather conditions), do not allow trainees to complete the full
extent of their solo flights, while other instructors, understanding the importance of fully completing the training programme and correctly understanding their purpose
in the cockpit, allow trainees to fly all the hours allotted for solo flights. It is no secret that trainees talk to
one another and learn that some are given the full allowance of solo flying while others are given less than the full
allowance. Because of this, the latter develop open dissatisfaction with the instructor pilot – resentment at not having been given a full
opportunity to realise themselves (Evstigneev D.A., Svidan T.A., 2009). Thus, in a number of cases check pilots and instructors set an entirely
wrong example of behaviour, violating the rules set out in regulatory documents. It should be noted that this is, as a rule,
done unconsciously, which is evidence of insufficient forethought about one's own actions and of an absence of the ability to see oneself
from the outside, to know exactly which qualities are instilled in a trainee by demonstrating one type of behaviour or another to
him. The building of effective training depends on a whole range of conditions, which can be reduced to certain psychological rules, adherence
to which can ensure the effective transfer of experience from mentor to trainee (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). These rules
prove so effective that one can rid oneself of the emotional tension arising from a distorted mutual perception between mentors and trainees
even by resorting to general psychotherapeutic rules, without identifying the specific cause that led to the breakdown of interaction in the crew.
Moreover, by resorting to such rules, the specific cause of the breakdown in interaction (often not voiced aloud but existing in the
form of a judgement about a person's actions, or an attitude towards him) is uncovered much more quickly than it would be
without being guided by these rules (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). One of the most essential and general such psychotherapeutic
rules consists in the fact that any person, in displaying one behaviour or another, perceives it as normal (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I.,
Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). This is precisely why, regardless of how justified or unjustified our remarks may be, they provoke a responsive indignation
(expressed both in open resistance and indignation and in concealed tension). This happens because, in making a remark, we block the person's
need to behave as he wishes, that is, we encroach on his freedom. In this connection remarks and similar statements must be
made as correctly as possible, resorting more often to formulations in question form – a question provokes the least resistance compared with
other forms of expressing disagreement. When making a remark about a mistake that has been committed, the emphasis should be placed on
what needs to be done to ensure it does not happen again, rather than on the fact that the person is to
blame for the mistake and deserves punishment. This is a far more effective way of preventing mistakes, one that makes it possible
to preserve the goodwill so necessary in relationships. It is important, both for trainees and for their mentors, to know this regularity
– that every person perceives his own behaviour, whatever it is, as normal, as having a right to exist. Understanding this regularity
is capable of eliminating the overwhelming majority of all contradictions and conflicts that arise! However dreadful and unjust another person's behaviour may
seem to us, it is perceived by that person as proper, and by resisting it we will only provoke negative emotions; accordingly,
instead of fighting the other person and zealously proving ourselves right, we need to understand why the other person allows himself to
behave in such a way, what the motives behind his actions are, while also explaining our own position on the matter to
him (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). However paradoxical it may seem at first glance, responding to aggression directed at us
with aggression in the same form as that shown to us almost always means, in practice, losing or aggravating the situation (Evstigneev
D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). It becomes worse not only because the aggressor considers his own behaviour to have a right
to exist, but also because the carrying out of aggressive actions is accompanied by strong negative emotions leading to a narrowing of
consciousness – under these conditions the aggressor may attribute to your actions whatever non-existent intentions he likes; a person in this state
becomes so inadequate that even the smallest degree of displeasure on your part will be perceived as the most extreme form of
insult. In such situations one can proceed along the path of reducing the interlocutor's aggressiveness, since, by definition, we will not be
able to resolve the matter until our opponent begins to perceive us adequately, and an adequate perception will only return to him
once he stops experiencing negative emotions and calms down. This can be achieved in several ways (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh.,
2009): 1) by perceiving the situation yourself as a controlled, ordinary one, that is, a situation for which you are prepared (seeing
no resistance on your part, a person, as a rule, stops carrying out aggressive actions towards you, since these, it turns out,
do not have the effect the aggressor was counting on); 2) by concentrating attention on those of the aggressor's statements that are
not insulting in character and building the subsequent dialogue precisely on the basis of these statements, thereby gradually calming the interlocutor; 3)
by demonstrating behaviour completely unexpected by the aggressor – in particular, behaviour of complete acceptance of his opinion and conduct. Other psychotherapeutic
rules necessary for the improvement of communication can be found in the concluding chapter. Instructor pilots and inspector pilots often engage in
a number of actions that have a negative effect both on the mastery of the training programme and on trainees' attitude towards
them. Carrying out the mentoring function presupposes knowledge of certain psychological regularities, which come down to the following. It must be remembered
that the trainee will be guided to a greater extent by the mentor's actions than by his words (a discrepancy between the
requirements put forward by instructors and inspectors and the actions they themselves carry out gives rise to a disregard for these persons'
opinions; their statements cease to carry the semantic weight originally invested in them). It is precisely because of this that consistency of
action on the part of the instructor or inspector is extremely important (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). Some trainees, seeing
violations committed by mentors, are inclined to adopt this style of behaviour and thereafter more calmly disregard flight-safety standards themselves. Another part
of trainees will, under the same conditions, behave differently – owing to well-developed moral and volitional qualities, they will henceforth try to
do the opposite of the behaviour demonstrated by mentors. Not always well-considered and adequate behaviour on the part of instructor pilots and
inspector pilots makes the training process less appealing, and it is well known that only the existence of the emotion of interest
allows complex types of activity to be mastered and a person to become a professional. The latter is formed given two conditions
– interest in the activity and success in that activity. It is precisely compliance with these two conditions that makes the formation
of a professional possible. In a number of situations one observes a low level of verbal activity in trainees' interaction with instructing
personnel, the consequence of which is additional emotional tension owing to considerable uncertainty in the situation (mutual misunderstanding (guesswork) is observed, and
incorrect conclusions are drawn about the other person's actions). Translating thoughts into external speech (verbalisation) and commenting on one's own actions considerably
relieve the tension that arises – they make the situation more determinate: verbalisation allows one to notify the other person of actions
about to be carried out or already being carried out (and in this connection to correct any incorrect ones in good time),
as well as to obtain analogous information from him – information about his thoughts and actions (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh.,
2009). If we speak of the criterion for assessing a mentor's competence, then the latter's level of professionalism is determined not so
much by his experience as by his ability to pass on that experience (Evstigneev D.A., Kuznetsov Yu.I., Kopysov V.Kh., 2009). Persons vested
with the authority of instructor or inspector must express themselves towards crew members with extreme caution, do everything possible to promote a
favourable flight outcome, set certain "rules" through their own behaviour, instil, by their mere presence, a sense of safety, and act as
a benevolent yet at the same time principled mentor who, irrespective of the age, experience or personal qualities of crew members, will,
when they make mistakes, correct them promptly and with extreme correctness, thereby reliably reinforcing, under the natural conditions of flight, the skills
crew members need. In sum, instructor pilots and inspector pilots are a category of flight personnel on whom depends what rules trainees
will be guided by in the future. The activity of mentors therefore presupposes a great measure of responsibility for the actions carried
out – actions that shape trainees' attitude towards flight-safety standards. Review questions and assignments 1. What problem situations have you encountered in
flight, and how did you resolve them – whether in the role of trainee or of instructor? 2. Which of an instructor's
actions have the greatest influence on a trainee's development as a professional? 3. Name the reasons why instructors do not pass on
their knowledge to trainees in full. 4. What knowledge must an instructor be guided by in clearing a cadet for solo flights?