- 7 TYPES OF TEMPERAMENT AND CHARACTER: THEIR INFLUENCE ON

Lecture

Это окончание невероятной информации про темперамент у авиаспециалистов.

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for pilots,
was physically weak owing to difficult material conditions in his family, as well as to the fact that as a child he was frequently and seriously ill. In children's games with his peers he often suffered defeats,
enduring mockery and beatings. All of this bred in him a sense of aloofness, timidity, and estrangement
from the group. Having once fallen off a horse, he became afraid of all large animals in general.
He was afraid to walk alone in the forest, and was afraid of the dark as well.
And this timid young man, weighed down by the awareness that he was physically weaker and more weak-willed than
his comrades, decided to test his health and his strength – and went before the commission selecting candidates for the flying school. Yerofeyev was convinced he would be rejected, but he passed the tests successfully and found himself among the cadets.
In the early period of flight training, Yerofeyev often had to experience fear.
It was frightening even to get into the airplane. His face would grow pale, sweat would appear on his temples,
his fingers and knees would tremble. In flight, Yerofeyev would experience intense tension.
When he flew with an instructor to practice aerobatics, each new maneuver
would provoke such fear in him that his heart would pound, his breath would catch, and his hands would convulsively
grasp at whatever object was within reach. He was ashamed of all this and strained every effort to overcome his fears.
Yerofeyev's determination to suppress his fear was supported and reinforced by the fact that he
saw some success from his efforts. On repeating a maneuver that had frightened him,
he already experienced less intense fear, and when he tried the maneuver himself and became convinced that he could do it, that he knew how to perform it, the feeling of fear gave way to joy. On subsequent flights he was no longer afraid to perform this maneuver, and over time he began
to strive to master it even better. As his knowledge and experience grew, the cadet's confidence in his own abilities grew as well, and along with it his courage developed and strengthened.
On one occasion, during a solo flight, Yerofeyev's engine failed. He successfully chose a landing site in a field and brought the plane down on it. He felt no fear whatsoever during this.
The squadron commander commended Yerofeyev before the assembled cadets for the composure he had shown when the engine failed in the air. After this, Yerofeyev no longer considered himself
weaker than others, and not only stopped fearing danger but began to look for an opportunity to demonstrate
his courage.
When it comes to the influence an instructor's word has on a cadet, and how one must act upon trainees, the following should be known. As G.G. Golubev (1958) rightly
notes, in flight training, when a student is straining every effort
toward the successful completion of a flight, when they themselves do not yet see their own successes but see only
what is not working, a single encouraging word from the instructor multiplies their strength tenfold.
And conversely, when a student is trying hard but makes a mistake, and the instructor, shaking their head,
says: «Tsk, tsk, tsk!» – these words strike them like a blow to the head with the blunt end of an axe.
The cadet discussed above was fortunate in his mentors, and had he ended up with
different (rough, insensitive) instructors, he would never have mastered the flying profession. From

this example (as well as numerous others scattered throughout the textbook) follows the conclusion – what is needed is not to select candidates for training, but to competently teach and correct the existing structure of the psyche based on the set of conditioned reflexes that had formed by the time of enrollment in the aviation school. The formula «competently
teach and shape, rather than select» is confirmed by the outstanding pilot-instructor G.G. Golubev (1958) in the following way: «It is known that in our country
there is (and never has been) any selection into aviation based on individual character traits; there has never even been an attempt
to determine the courage of a young man entering flight school. Aviation accepts everyone who wants to become a pilot and who meets the requirements regarding age, state of health, and general education. Many years of experience show that
young men come into aviation with pronounced traits of courage and composure, as well as young men with equally
pronounced traits of excessive caution, faintheartedness, timidity, and even cowardice. The volitional qualities of those entering flight schools vary. And yet almost all of those who enter flight school become willful, courageous pilots. In flight training there are frequently cases where timid cadets, unsure of their own abilities, after several
dozen flights begin to stand out from among their peers with the opposite qualities: confidence, composure, and courage, and this is entirely lawful and to be expected».
Speaking of the character traits of aviation specialists, their importance for professional performance cannot be overstated. As an example of just how far from merely negative – indeed, without
exaggeration, how terrifying – certain character traits can be, let us examine the circumstances
of the crash of an An-2 aircraft on the bank of the Pripyat River in Kiev Oblast. Unfortunately, the report
of the commission that investigated this crash does not correspond to the truth, and it is only thanks to
Yu.M. Kirzhner (2009), who was one of the members of the aforementioned commission, that we have
complete information about the true causes of what happened.
This was a training flight, and on board the aircraft were 6 pilots who, taking turns
in the commander's seat, were practicing simulated approaches to landing and go-arounds
with the flaps extended to the landing position. The small scatter of the aircraft's wreckage at the crash site indicated that the aircraft had fallen from a low altitude. Over the course of
two days, the aircraft fragments were examined and collected in one place. During these days no plausible version of what had happened emerged.
The possibility of a collision with another aircraft was ruled out by the air traffic controllers, according to
whom no one else was flying in that zone. Questioning of the engineering service showed that all the aircraft that had flown that day had returned without any damage. On the third day, one of the commission members put forward a hypothesis according to which it might have happened that, during a glide
or a go-around, the speed of 140 km/h had been exceeded, which led to the destruction or

tearing-off of a flap. Indeed, the flaps had been severely mangled. A man was sent to the experimental design bureau to acquaint the bureau's representatives with the proposed hypothesis and to consult on subsequent steps. Having returned
the following day, he reported that, according to the calculations, the proposed hypothesis could be considered
valid, although, of course, it needed to be confirmed by statistical strength tests.
The members of the investigating commission set off for Kyiv to draw up the report, but some of the people
(for the perfectly banal reason of insufficient seats in the vehicle) stayed behind until the next day. Among those who remained was Yu.M. Kirzhner.
A fitter-assembler, examining the wreckage once again, noticed that a piece was missing from the leading-edge slat
on the upper wing – only the broken hinge fittings remained. It was decided that this piece absolutely had to be found. The unfortunate slat was found at a distance of about 500 meters from the aircraft's crash site. Such a distance of the slat from the crash site is easily
explained by the fact that a dent bearing the tread pattern of an aircraft's tire was clearly visible on the slat's skin
. The cause of the crash became clear: a collision between two aircraft had taken place. The crew of the aircraft whose wheel had torn off the An-2's slat was unharmed and concealed the fact of the
collision (Kirzhner Yu.M., 2009)! Yu.M. Kirzhner took the damaged slat with him and
tried to show it to the other commission members, but it turned out that the commission had «already cooked up the report», and it had already been signed by the majority of the members. Yu.M. Kirzhner refused to sign
such a report.
It is entirely clear that the behavior of the crew members who concealed the fact of the collision between the aircraft is outrageous, but the behavior of those commission members who refused
to change their decision and carry out the investigation to its conclusion is just as vile! The situation described above demonstrates that knowing what a person is capable of (knowing their character traits) is a unique
opportunity to predict their behavior. Let us recall: character traits are complex
individual features that are sufficiently indicative of a person and make it possible to predict, with a certain probability, their behavior in particular situations. It is clear that no one
would want to work alongside those pilots who concealed the fact of the collision, nor alongside
those commission members who cared only about bringing the investigation to a swift close and were unwilling to admit that they had made a mistake. In contrast, the conduct
of Yu.M. Kirzhner is exemplary and deserves respect; anyone would wish to work with such a person!
Above we examined the negative character traits displayed by the crew of the aircraft that fled the scene of the collision, as well as by certain members of the commission investigating the crash. Let us now examine examples showing the negative character traits
of air traffic controllers, and the kinds of aviation events they lead to. The high self-regard
and aggressiveness of the approach-control (DPP) controller P.A. S. (Compendium of information reports…, 1989) led, on 3
May 1985, to a collision between a Tu-134 and an An-26 aircraft in the area of the jointly based airfield at Lviv (Ukraine, Lviv). The events unfolded as follows. At 12
hr 12 min 00 sec, the DPP controller received a report from the An-26 crew that they had reached flight level 3,900 m.
Having mistakenly determined the aircraft's position on the radar display, the controller informed
the crew: «492, range 65», and instructed them to switch to communication with the «Vostok» area control center controller. The aircraft's actual range at that moment was 56 km (Boltachev V.Yu., Kharikov A.A., Yablokov M.K., 1995). At 12 hr 12 min 28 sec, the An-26 crew came
on to communicate with the «Vostok» area control center controller, and at 12 hr 12 min 30 sec, the Tu-134 crew came on to communicate with the
DPP controller. The area control center controller, having assessed the air situation in
the vicinity of the «Zolochev» non-directional beacon, informed the An-26 crew of the presence of an oncoming
Tu-134 aircraft at flight level 4,200 m, and, in order to ensure safe separation between the aircraft, instructed them to continue at flight level 3,900 m.
The DPP controller, having mistaken the blip of an An-24 aircraft flying ahead in the same direction
for the blip of the An-26, at 12 hr 12 min 50 sec issued an instruction for the Tu-134 to descend to an altitude of 3,600 m for the fourth turn on approach to landing on a heading of 312°, which brought about
the emergence of an emergency situation. Despite the warning from the area control center
controller, who had been monitoring the radio exchange between the DPP controller and the Tu-134 crew, about the inadmissibility of the Tu-134 descending because of the oncoming An-26, neither the DPP controller nor the flight
director took timely measures (Boltachev V.Yu., Kharikov A.A., Yablokov M.K., 1995).
In response to the area control center controller's warning, the DPP controller replied rudely:
«I know that already!» (Compendium of information reports…, 1989). On board the Tu-134, which was operating
the route «Tallinn – Lviv – Chisinau», there were 73 passengers and 6 crew members, while on board the An-26, which was operating the route «Lviv – Moscow», there were 9 passengers and 6 crew members. Everyone on board both aircraft was killed.
Among the particular character traits of air traffic controllers that deserve special mention,
one can name: lack of discipline, irresponsibility, overconfidence, ambitiousness, recklessness, dishonesty, and envy. In exercising control over air traffic within
their own zone, a controller prepares aircraft for handover to the zone of responsibility of other controllers. There have been cases where, for various reasons (including a
desire to «give another controller some practice»), certain controllers held aircraft back within their own zone and handed them over to the controllers of an adjoining sector at the most inopportune
moment possible, when the latter already had the largest number of aircraft under their control. In other cases, which are the rule rather than the exception, the opposite is observed: a strongly pronounced readiness to come to another controller's aid when the air situation becomes more complicated

. In a number of cases, such readiness can shift into its own extreme,
already quite differently meant, form – a readiness to justify the erroneous actions
of one's colleagues, and to keep silent about the technology-of-work violations they have committed.
Practice shows that an extremely necessary character trait which pilots and controllers are obliged to possess,
but with which, precisely, there are problems, is the ability to answer for
one's own actions and deeds. The overwhelming majority of aviation events show that
those who committed them are ready to act, but not to answer for their actions. Other negative character
traits of pilots and air traffic controllers that have served as preconditions for the occurrence of aviation events will be examined in subsequent chapters.

Review Questions and Self-Check Assignments

1. Determine the relationship between temperament and character.
2. Within what limits is it possible to compensate for temperament through traits of character?
3. The behavior of a person with which character accentuation is, for you, the most difficult and hardest to predict; what information would you need in order for such a person's behavior to become understandable to you?
4. Are character accentuations a property given at birth, or one formed in the course of life?
5. Can a single character trait belong not to just one, but to two or three groups of character traits
(the group of traits determining one's attitude toward others, the group of traits determining one's attitude toward activity, the group of
traits determining one's attitude toward oneself)?