Lecture
The "sunset" of the capitalist mode of production, which coincides not by chance in social time and space with the "sunset" of the economic social formation, gives rise to phenomena of the future that are incorporated into the departing present in the perverted forms subordinate to it. This is what happens with the key attributes of the creatosphere that sublates the world of alienation and with the social forms of the "realm of freedom" adequate to it. The birth of the former presupposes a transition from reproductive labor and, correspondingly, from the dominant social being of the human as a bearer of labor power, to creative activity and, correspondingly, to the being of the human as its subject — an integral personality, Man as a generic being (K. Marx, G. Lukács). The genesis of the latter is marked by the transformation of humanity's socially transformative activity and its non-alienated social relations, i.e., associated social creativity, into what the classics called "the fundamental factor of the new sociality." Under these conditions, the global hegemony of capital, which subordinates to itself not only the economic sphere but the whole of social life and its subject — Man — cannot but generate, in the course of its expansion, processes of two kinds. The first is the transformation of the human as a bearer of labor power and subject of reproductive labor into Man as an integral personality, a subject of creativity. This is the most important direction of technological progress, without which the vital activity of capital in general, and of late capitalism in particular, is impossible. But this phenomenon can serve capital only if it is subordinated to capital, at least formally (in the sphere of production relations), and has itself acquired a [perverted] form of capital. The latter, unlike the variable capital into which the commodity labor power is transformed once acquired by the capitalist, has precisely a perverted appearance. The reason for this is that, for Man as an integral personality, alienated existence in the social "garb" of capital is inadequate, and herein lies the difference between Man and the human's labor power, his capacity for [reproductive] labor, for which, under capitalism, transformation into a commodity and, further, into capital, is organic. The second phenomenon — social creativity — turns out to be necessary for late capitalism, both as one of the forms of mitigating its contradictions (social reformism) and as an adequate form of organizing creative activity (recall: by its essence it is co-creation, a subject-subject dialogue). As such, social creativity (just like Man in his quality as a "generic being") is non-alienated in character; it is a phenomenon of the activity of a free, voluntary, working association, presupposing the dominance of relations of solidarity and subject-subject dialogue.1 As such, this form of social interaction among individuals can likewise be subordinated to capital only by means of some perverted form, and herein lies its difference from relations of competition and other commodity-capitalist social relations that are alienated by their very nature. Thus we are confronted with the problem of "capital-like" forms of Man's being and of non-alienated social relations in a world of global capital hegemony.
The problem of Man in economic theory has existed, at the very least, since the time of Adam (Smith), and the term "human capital" itself appeared and became widespread in world literature many years ago. For all that, the approach to the problem largely remains applied rather than theoretical. Fundamental theoretical problems and questions of methodology are raised comparatively rarely. It is all the more important, then, that at least some authors (in Russia, in particular, V. Avtonomov, A. Verenikin, K. Markaryan3) have made precisely these aspects the subject of their research. However, even these works are largely characterized by a pull toward neoclassical methodology and/or by a striving to develop and further substantiate an approach to the economic quality of the human as "capital," which provokes polemics with these authors rather than a reproduction of their conclusions. We shall try briefly to substantiate the following system of theses: a historical-systemic view allows us to show that in the economy of the 21st century, Man increasingly appears as (1) a subject of creative activity who, at the same time, (2) is subordinated in many respects to the total market and capital, and by virtue of this (3) acquires the perverted form of "human capital." Substantiating these propositions will, in turn, allow us to show the contradictions and limits of the development of human qualities (above all, creative and personal potential) under conditions of the total hegemony of capital. In contemporary economic science, developing predominantly within the "market-centric" paradigm, the historical-systemic approach enjoys no popularity whatsoever, and this holds in particular for research on the problem of Man. Meanwhile, it is fairly well known that Man plays many qualitatively distinct roles in the economy, each of which changes substantially over history. Man is (1) a subject of activity. This point matters because it allows us to show the qualitatively different nature of Man (as an active subject), compared with other economic phenomena (money, commodities), and to draw a distinction between reproductive labor and creative activity. Moreover, this allows us to note that certain functions of the human as a subject of activity can be alienated from the human (for example, under the division of labor, the function of goal-setting — which most sharply distinguishes human activity from animal function — can be separated from the immediate worker). Further, (2) the human is a subject of historically specific economic relations (the buying and selling of goods, or subordination to communal traditions, hiring for work or slavery, receiving social transfers or appropriating rent, etc.), which differ historically. The human enters into these relations (3) in some particular historical guise (a concrete-historical socioeconomic type of human, one example of which is homo economicus). This type, in turn, determines the system of values and motives of activity, behavior, and decision-making in the economy and beyond. Let us continue. Economic theory must take into account (4) the different socioeconomic status of representatives of different social groups, above all classes. And here too, the distinction (in terms of the content of activity, role in the economic system, etc.) among the lumpen, the classic wage worker, the manager, the small entrepreneur, the oligarch, and the state official appears rather important, even leaving the Marxist class approach aside. Finally, let us not forget that the human is not only a function of objective economic relations but also (5) (within the Marxist paradigm) a creator of history, a subject of social creativity (institutionalism, in this case, would say — a creator of institutions), as well as (6) a citizen, a person with a particular culture, morality, and so on, and that all of this (7) has significant national, historical, and other particularities. With such an approach, it is fairly obvious that the view which in effect reduces the status of the human in the contemporary economy to "human capital" is, at the very least, limited (one piece of evidence for this being the almost universal substitution, in economic works, of the concept "human" by the term "human capital"). And yet the appearance of this term (as well as the desire to use it as a synonym for human qualities) is by no means accidental. Moreover, the reasons for the genesis of the category "human capital" will also point us to why it is so widespread, what the actual content is of the processes that brought this term to life, how that content is refracted in the term "human capital," and why it is precisely this term that is so actively used in contemporary scholarship. First of all, the question arises of why the concept of "human capital" appeared in the apparatus of economic theory, while traditional notions of "labor" (pedantic Marxists would say — "labor power"), as the commodity that the worker sells on the market, proved insufficient. There are several well-known grounds for this. The first and main ground is connected with changes in the practical life-activity of capital: starting from a certain stage, a significant portion of firms found that their use of human resources was not exhausted by the problem of acquiring on the market and using in production the commodity "labor power" ("labor"). Practice posed the task of substantial investment in developing the human qualities of workers and, as a consequence, the necessity of accounting for these expenditures, measuring their efficiency, and so on. Since, on the surface, these expenditures and the returns from them, in terms of their mechanism of reproduction, resemble capital, this phenomenon could not, within the neoclassical paradigm, receive any other name. The practical necessity of accounting for the new role of the human factor built up gradually, but from a certain point on, quantitative changes clearly led to a qualitative leap. This moment turned out to be connected with substantial changes in the technology and structure of production. The second ground for the widespread use of the category "human capital" was the substantial change in the quality and role of the worker under the influence of the genesis of post-industrial society. There was a significant growth in the importance of creative activity and a corresponding change in human qualities. Under these conditions, the rapid growth in the volume of use and the economic significance of highly skilled labor power — requiring substantial expenditure on education, healthcare, and so on — became evident. Capital was faced with the problem of acquiring and using in production not simply labor power, whose bearer is engaged in reproductive labor, but a subject whose goals, organization, and effectiveness are set from outside. A new task arose — that of interacting with a subject of activity that is (at least to some degree) creative. Here a whole set of new theoretical and practical problems immediately emerged, reflecting not only changes in business practice but also substantial shifts in the quality of the worker. First, as we tried to show above, the labor power of a subject of creative activity is, by definition, inalienable ("inspiration is not for sale..."). This subject independently determines the basic parameters both of his own labor process and of cooperation with partners; moreover, in the limiting case, he can independently set the outcome and goals of the entire process of production, that is, he performs a number of the functions of capital (of the entrepreneur), and in this sense he is akin to capital-as-function. Second, creative activity creates universal wealth that is, a priori, (like any phenomenon of culture — for instance, Einstein's theory of relativity or Leo Tolstoy's novels) a socially necessary good possessing social value irrespective of market recognition. In this sense, creative activity has a nature akin to money (a socially necessary good that is always needed by everyone), and one that is constantly increasing in volume, that is, akin to capital. These first two points already make creative activity and its bearer outwardly "capital-like." But the matter does not end there. Third, the development of human capital is not accidentally coincident with a period of vigorous growth in such spheres as the financial market (and, in general, all the institutions and infrastructure ensuring market transactions), management, consulting, auditing, as well as mass culture and the production of media content — other spheres which the authors of this text have designated the "perverted sector." In this sector there occurs no creation of material goods and cultural values serving the progress of material production and/or the harmonious development of the personality; rather, what is created are predominantly social forms called into being by the market system itself and having no value outside it (unlike bread, a machine tool, a synchrophasotron, a scientific theory, or a work of art). Here the development of "capital-like" labor becomes an especially mass phenomenon. Finally, fourth, the period of expansion of the neoliberal model of the market economy led to substantial changes in the functioning of the spheres in which human qualities are created and reproduced. The former existence of education, healthcare, culture, and so on as spheres for the creation and use, predominantly, of public goods is gradually shifting, to an ever greater degree (as a result of their ever more widespread commercialization and privatization), into the private sphere. Correspondingly, the reproduction of human qualities has to a greater degree become the private business of individuals and firms. This is how yet another objective precondition arose for the development of the theory of "human capital." All this allows us to formulate the following assertion: "human capital" is (1) a perverted form of a certain real content, namely, of actual changes (2) in the quality of activity and of its subject, as well as (3) in the role of the human in the market economy, occurring under conditions of the genesis of post-industrial technologies and the expansion of neoliberal tendencies. These changes are summed up in (4) the development of a new quality of Man (homo creator) and of his activity (its creative content), which render capital (as a particular economic relation, an institution) superfluous. We have tried to elaborate points (2) and (3) above. Theses (1) and (4) constitute a theorem to be proved. Let us examine the main points of such a proof. As we have already noted, the term "human capital" owes its origin to an obvious resemblance to "ordinary" capital in terms of the form of reproduction. In both cases we are dealing with the long-term expenditure of funds (investment) for the creation of certain factors, which are then applied and provide a return on the funds invested. Like material capital, "human" capital (the terms "intellectual" or "cultural" capital are also used) provides, upon application, an effect that exceeds the volume of expenditure on its creation. Moreover, certain substantive features of the "capital-likeness" of creative activity in the contemporary market system were shown above. However, the differences between human capacities for creative activity and capital are substantial enough that, from a scientific point of view, it would not be justified to unite them into a single class of phenomena — "capital." Let us begin with the fact that the concept of capital, however it may be interpreted by various schools of economic theory, presupposes such a fundamental fact as the application of capital by the human in the process of activity (labor or entrepreneurial). It is obvious that this interpretation no longer fits "human capital." Behind the outward "capital-likeness" here lies a different content: the formation and use, by Man himself, of his own capacities. Human capacities, unlike capital, do not represent some inert potential requiring, for its productive application, an active human force external to it. On the contrary, the human capacities for creative activity, like living labor in general, act as a necessary condition for the productive application of capital. This alone is sufficient to draw a qualitative boundary between the categories under consideration. Further, capital appears in its monetary form, as value advanced for the acquisition of the material elements of production. Even if we speak of means of production with a long production cycle (the construction of buildings, shipbuilding, pipeline laying...), the advancing of money for forming the creative capacities of a human still differs from the advancing of money for creating means of production with a long cycle for the mastering of the advanced funds. A human continuously forms his creative capacities and carries out their use (at least in the process of learning). He begins to apply them long before the process of their formation is complete. Correspondingly, the cycle of advancing funds is stretched out over the entire period of a person's active life (continuous education, the exchange of knowledge and information, the improvement of one's capacities). Moreover, the very process of applying a person's creative capacities is simultaneously a process of their improvement, which can in no way be said of the material elements of capital — they merely wear out in the process of use. Let us add that "human capital" cannot be acquired by simple purchase, for example, of the "services" of education. The purchasers of such "services," simultaneously with (and in active cooperation with) their seller, act as "producers" of the human's creative capacities, which cannot at all be said of the purchaser of capital goods. Not only can "human capital" not be bought, it cannot be sold either, since a human's creative capacities are inseparable from their bearer. As for the family's "investments" in raising the younger generation, these cannot be regarded as capital at all, even in terms of the form of movement, since these "investments" are made, as a rule, without any calculation of subsequent commercial return. The hope for material support from one's children is qualitatively distinct from a concrete calculation of the benefit of investing in them — such a calculation, strictly speaking, is impossible, since it runs up against factors of uncertainty. This also fully applies to what was said above about educational services. Furthermore, profit on capital in turn splits into capital (reinvested profit) and income. If we draw the analogy, then the income obtained through the application of a human's creative capacities in production is "reinvested" wholly, that is, it is spent on the human's consumption. Hence it is altogether impossible to draw a boundary here between consumption and "investment." Finally, treating human capacities as capital — as value advanced for the production of additional income — contradicts the general tendency in the evolution of the motives and incentives of human activity.1 It is entirely possible for a human to regard himself as an instrument for obtaining higher earnings, which follows directly from the concept of "human capital." But then one must categorically reject the other concept, according to which the specific feature of the changes occurring under conditions of the genesis of post-industrial society is the development of quite different tendencies: the creative motives of human activity, the striving to realize oneself, one's capacities, one's creative potential, push material and monetary incentives into the background. And, conversely, one must categorically assert that the striving to develop one's human qualities is determined exclusively by the striving to make one's capacities a basis for claims to higher income. But even if we accept the latter assertion, even in this case the goals of investing capital and of spending, say, on higher education, will differ, since the striving to secure for oneself a reliably high income base is nonetheless different from the striving to obtain the highest possible profit on invested capital. Behind all these outward differences lies the essential opposition between Man as a subject of creative activity and capital. This opposition, however, can be expressed only within the Marxist categorical apparatus, since the neoclassical apparatus fundamentally restricts the analysis (1) to the field of exchange, refusing to analyze the content of activity, and (2) to the consideration of exclusively market forms, classifying all other phenomena as market failures. If, however, we examine the problem using the Marxist categorical apparatus, then creative activity is defined as a process of direct, non-alienated cooperation, dialogue, and co-creation among subjects of activity. To be included in this process requires (1) personal capacities for objectification and de-objectification [of the results of creativity], and (2) open access to cultural values, unrestricted [by private property] (since these values are in themselves boundless, they can also be used without limit: read books, listen to music as much as you like — they will not diminish...). Capital, on the contrary, presupposes the alienation of a human's personal qualities and private property in knowledge and other cultural values (a kind of "means of production" for forming human qualities). However, within the bourgeois system in general, and the contemporary one in particular, the human and his creative activity are reproduced (leaving aside market failures for now) through the market and capital. As a consequence, they cannot but acquire corresponding forms. But there are nuances here (understandable, however, only to those who remember or have rediscovered the subtleties of Marxist methodology). If the commodity form was adequate for labor power under capitalism (under this system labor power indeed is a commodity, and, moreover, cannot be used otherwise in the process of production), then "human capital" is a perverted form. Let us elaborate this thesis, already formulated in the announcement of this text, in more detail. "Human capital" is a form that creates the appearance of content other than the actual one. This form creates the appearance that human qualities are capital, which brings its owner profit (that is, an income greater than the worker's wage).1 In reality, however, a different relation takes shape here. If we leave aside the sphere of self-employment of creative workers (individual activity, cooperatives, temporary creative collectives, state universities) and look at the relation of the creator with the corporation, then what occurs here is (1) the acquisition by the owner of capital of the worker's human qualities, which are not reducible to the quality of labor power (the human's creative potential, that is, his inalienable personal qualities), and, as a consequence of this, (2) the acquisition of the greater part of the universal social wealth created by this creative activity. The worker, for his part, (1) loses control over his creative potential but (2) receives a certain (contractually stipulated) share of the wealth he has created. In the practice of developed capitalist economies this share is, as a rule, greater than the mere price of labor power. In other economic systems (for example, under Russian conditions) the situation may be different. Thus, the actual content of the category "human capital" is the relation we have described of the subordination to capital not only of labor power and of the [reproductive] labor process, but also of Man as an integral [creative] personality, and, correspondingly, the appropriation (in the form of the so-called "intellectual rent") by capital of the universal wealth created by this personality in the process of his creative activity. The "induced," perverted content of "human capital" (this is an actual, practical "semblance") is the function of some subject investing in the development of the human qualities of some subject (possibly himself) with the aim of obtaining a result whose value exceeds in magnitude the amount that was invested. This, very briefly, is how this layer of relations may be characterized if we remain within the Marxist paradigm. In this case one cannot deny a certain outward resemblance between a human's creative activity under capitalism and capital; nor can one deny that the application of a human's creative capacities in production tends to take the place of capital as the leading factor of production. For these reasons, the use of the words "human capital" as a figurative expression is not accidental — provided one does not forget that this is not capital in the scientific sense of the word. It is fairly obvious that the economic valuation of the sum of a human's creative capacities cannot be reduced merely to the price of his labor power or the price of his labor. And there is no particular ground for polemics here. But should one, on this basis, agree with the assertion that paying for the life-activity (not merely the labor!) of a creative worker means not the purchase of his labor power but the acquisition of labor services? Or would a different formulation be more accurate: the appropriation by capital, and the subordination to it, of human qualities, of the personality (of the "divine soul," the essence of which is precisely that "inspiration" which was not for sale in Pushkin's time but has now become an object of market-capitalist relations)? Undoubtedly, in both the first and the second case, the volume of the transaction between the capitalist and the creator cannot be reduced to compensation for the costs of forming capacities for labor of a given quality. Correspondingly, this magnitude (the creator's "wage") may extend far beyond the magnitude of the costs of forming labor power. But the question of the nature of this transaction remains. We agree that the owner of capital may acquire "labor services." However, such a relation between capital and labor arises only if the provision of these services is not controlled by the owner of capital, is not conditioned by the application of capital, and, on the contrary, is carried out entirely by "labor" at its own discretion and at its own expense. In other words, this is the case in which capital does not hire the worker but purchases the services of the creative activity of an independent producer (worker). However, as we showed above in analyzing the mechanisms of the subordination of creative activity to capital, in most cases under late capitalism a different relation is present. In form it resembles a "dispersed manufactory," leaving only the appearance of the "intellectual's" independence. In substance, what is present here is a new kind of subordination to capital of labor that, incidentally, retains the old form of wage labor. In this case the payment of the worker's labor is determined not by the results of creative activity but by the wage rates stipulated in the contract of hire. At the basis of these rates lies the mechanism described above, essentially similar to the mechanism of the buying and selling of labor power. The basis of the value of "human qualities" (the "immortal soul") is — as always under commodity production — nothing other than the socially necessary expenditure of living and objectified labor on the reproduction of this "commodity" (including, naturally, expenditure on higher education, on ensuring a healthy way of life and a long life expectancy, on ensuring social stability, and other conditions without which it is difficult to secure the mass-scale reproduction of the stratum of "professionals"). The price of this commodity, as with other commodities, fluctuates around its value under the influence of the ratio of supply and demand, national particularities, the place of a given economy in the global world, and so on. However, one should not regard the concept of "human capital" as a banal attempt to disguise the exploitation of creative workers by capital. Unlike workers engaged in reproductive, routine labor, creative workers often represent not merely a unique but a critical resource for a given firm, the main source of its income — insofar as this source is everywhere becoming the technological application of science.1 It is precisely for this reason that the relations of such workers with the owners of the firm's capital may be built not solely on the basis of the buying and selling of labor power: the owner of capital may enter into an actual agreement with such a creative worker to share part of the profit, achieving the subordination of creative labor to capital not on the basis of economic compulsion but on the basis of compromise. For, in essence, the activity of such a creative worker now serves not only as a necessary condition (like the living labor of all other workers) but as a unique condition for the effective functioning of the firm's capital, without which that capital depreciates. Herein lies perhaps the deepest foundation for the development of the concept of "human capital." Within the neoclassical paradigm this problem is, naturally, resolved quite differently. In this case human qualities appear as merely one of the types of resources and can therefore quite well be regarded as "capital" — a concept that is extremely polysemous within this school. Moreover, since this paradigm presupposes (based on the well-known Say's formula) that every factor of production creates a certain income, it appears quite logical to assert that human capital, like physical capital, creates a sum sufficient for depreciation and for its owner to obtain profit. A further question may then arise: what form does the "profit" obtained by "human capital" actually take in practice? Some theorists believe (and their theories are actively used by a number of trade union leaders) that the profit of human capital is a part of the profit obtained by the firm from the sale of the commodity (net profit should be distributed between workers and the owners of physical capital in proportion to the value of each of these two components). Others believe that, upon the conclusion of an employment contract, the market (the competition of workers and employers) has already determined the proportion in which the final income should be distributed, and the whole problem consists in specifically identifying, within the wage, the share corresponding to the "depreciation" of human capital and its profit. A return to the Marxist categorical field requires not only stating that the phenomenon of "human capital" turns out to be a reflection of law-governed changes in the role of the human and in the quality of his activity, occurring under the influence of post-industrial shifts, but reflected in the form of a perverted form, and that this form is not accidental. It also requires an analysis of other problems generated by the practice of the wide deployment of creative activity under the new quality of market and capital characteristic of late capitalism. These problems and contradictions deserve the closest attention because of their practical relevance both for critics of the capitalist system and for its adherents, for wage workers, and for entrepreneurs and owners of capital who wish to face actual problems with open eyes. Within the neoclassical paradigm these problems and contradictions are simply invisible. It proceeds from the assumption that "human capital" is nothing more than a new variety of capital resources,1 certain particularities of which require nothing more than certain corrections in accounting for the expenditure on this type of capital and in assessing the efficiency of its use. Everything else is a market failure, which, as is well known, must be minimized. Within the Marxist categorical field, however, one sees a fundamentally complex and significant problem. If we proceed from the fact that the analysis of the real system of relations of the contemporary market economy indicates that at its basis lies a system of subordination of Man (and not only of labor) to capital under conditions of the latter's global hegemony, then it turns out that the problem of the relationship between the concepts "Man" and "human capital" is not reducible to a terminological one: the difference in theoretical interpretations is directly connected with a difference in the strategic orientations for the development of the economy. Let us clarify this proposition. Theoretical debates about the nature and role of Man in the market economy could be considered a purely academic dispute over words, were it not for certain very important circumstances. First, the interpretation of the human as a special kind of "capital" also determines a corresponding attitude toward his development. Within this paradigm Man is defined as (1) private property (whether of the worker himself or of the firm that invested in the development of this "capital"; here, consequently, a whole range of well-known theoretical and practical problems arises: who may and should receive income from investments in education and why, and how to ensure that new knowledge obtained by the worker at the firm's expense is used exclusively in the firm's interests — one more step, and "contractual serfdom" would be introduced1). If human qualities (recall: this is not only labor power but, above all, creative potential, that is, the personal qualities of the human) are defined as private property and, moreover, as capital, then they (2) become alienable. Consequently, they (3) can be sold (had Pushkin been a proponent of the theory of "human capital," he would probably have written an Ode in honor of venal inspiration... Don't like it? But the theory of human capital directly asserts that genius and venality are two things... combined, moreover, organically united for contemporary man. Second, another consequence is easily derived: if human qualities are capital held in private ownership, then their development and augmentation is the private business of each individual owner. The task of the state consists merely in creating "guarantees of [intellectual] property rights" and a "favorable investment climate." As a result, the privatization of education and healthcare, culture and sport, becomes socially progressive and theoretically well founded. And, conversely, the interpretation of human qualities as inalienable properties of the personality serves as one of the theoretical grounds for substantiating the necessity of developing culture, education, healthcare, and so on, as universally accessible spheres. Third, the interpretation of the human as "capital" directly determines that the measure of his development and effectiveness becomes the monetary income obtained through market transactions with this "capital." From this several consequences follow. First: the "quality" of a human (the value and intrinsic worth of the Personality) becomes, from an economic point of view, equal to the market price of his "human capital" (hence one more curious consequence: if one proceeds from the doctrine of "human capital," it turns out that the human qualities of a teacher from the Russian provinces are hundreds of thousands of times lower than those of a successful financial speculator, while for a billion of humanity's poorest inhabitants they are close to zero altogether...). Second: education and other forms of "investment in human capital" must be aimed at forming the maximum market value of this "capital," and hence oriented, above all, toward market conditions (hence the practical consequence: the quality of an education and of the institution that provided it is determined by the graduate's salary...), rather than toward the free and harmonious development of the personality. This chain of consequences can easily be extended. Finally, and this is obvious, the interpretation of the human as a bearer of "human capital," applied to the wage worker, "definitively" removes the problem of exploitation: it becomes "obvious" that in the contemporary economy nothing more takes place than the interaction (competition, social partnership) of two types of capital. All talk of the opposition of the (strategic, long-term) interests of labor and capital becomes, in this context, a "relic of the past." Yet somehow this relic refuses to depart from practical life... What has been said, however, should not be understood as a denial of the possibility of using the term "human capital." On the contrary. The authors have sought to show that this is a concept that has arisen, in a law-governed way, within the mainstream, reflecting those perverted forms of being of human qualities (above all, creative personal potential) that become especially significant with the transition to a knowledge-intensive economy and that are created by the general atmosphere of total marketization. In this setting of the dominance of market fundamentalism (to use, once again, George Soros's term), the creative properties of the human, having come to the fore, will objectively be turned into private property, which corporate capital will strive to appropriate (or at least to use), putting on the creative personality the mask of "capital" and denying all forms of non-alienated development of human qualities. Meanwhile, not only the progress of contemporary society — including its economic progress — but its very capacity for progress, and even for survival, increasingly depends on the breadth of development of precisely these non-alienated forms, on the widest possible development of the creative potential of all people, regardless of their capacity to "invest in themselves." The phenomenon of "human capital" has become perhaps the first in a series of various new kinds of "capitals" — intellectual, cultural, natural, and so on. As for the historical priority of "human capital," the authors cannot state this with certainty (we have not undertaken any special historical-bibliographical research on this topic), but logically it occupies first place for good reason. It was precisely the subordination of human qualities that became the law-governed first (though not the last) step of capital into the sphere of appropriating non-economic resources. Leaving aside nature as a source of raw materials, the progress of capital in the 20th century ran up, above all, against the necessity of subordinating to itself science, education, and culture, which gave rise to the problem of Man and capital and to the phenomenon of "human capital." The unfolding of scientific and technological progress inevitably generated a set of global problems, among which the ecological ones are perhaps the most crucial. Here, in principle, the question of the development of Nature (as an absolute precondition for the life-activity of humanity and as a cultural value) should have arisen in full force, and one might have expected the emergence of the problem of "natural capital" as one of the most pressing. But here's the rub: Nature as a cultural value proves rather resistant to privatization and capitalization, and so the category of "natural capital," although it did appear, never became especially popular. It is a different matter with the non-alienated social relations of people as personalities, as subjects of one or another form of social dialogue. This phenomenon became an inevitable practical and logical consequence of the development of human qualities, and capital, naturally, could not pass by this sphere without turning it into an object of its expansion. Thus arose the problem of the "privatization" and capitalization of social interpersonal interactions and the concept of "social capital."
Thus, the hegemony of capital, at the stage of expansion outlined above, makes its object of appropriation nearly the greater part of the sphere of social ties, relations, and institutions as well, designating them with the term "social capital," which "suddenly" (in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s) turned out to be a very convenient and much-in-demand concept.
Let us begin with the fact that the first impulse for the emergence of this term was the "discovery," in the 1980s of the last century, by several scholars, of a phenomenon not described by traditional neoclassical terms and/or the terms of new institutionalism — something that is, in particular, figuratively called a "trust receipt" (membership in a group that grants the right to "credit," in various senses of the word). Besides the phenomenon of "trust," known since the eighteenth century (incidentally, one of the most eminent authors on this subject — F. Fukuyama — largely reduces "social capital" precisely to this phenomenon), this field came to include such phenomena as friendship, membership in voluntary organizations and societies, family and other non-commercial ties, as well as a special role of social structures (more on what exactly that role is, below). The result was a rather amorphous aggregate which, "naturally," was immediately dubbed capital, and the adjective "social" appeared as if of its own accord. Reference works and dictionaries describing this aggregate in the most general terms make "social capital" a truly boundless concept: it is the institutions, relations, and norms that shape social interactions in society both qualitatively and quantitatively (the World Bank's definition). In professional works, however, this amorphousness is partly overcome, which allows the category to be specified somewhat more precisely. Let us begin by singling out a number of persistently recurring phenomena that different groups of authors attribute to "social capital." The first, and most obviously conspicuous, is trust and the related phenomena of acquaintance, recognition, and tolerance. The second is social ties, contacts of various kinds (the list of such ties found in different works is very broad: family, religious groups, alumni networks, communities based on national identity, acquaintances, etc.), with a distinction drawn between informal ties (what we would call "connections" or "pull") and purely personal ones (comradeship, friendship, etc.). The third is social structures. Here the situation is more complicated. The choice of such structures made by a number of authors shows that various kinds of elite structures are most often mentioned (down to closed business clubs and various kinds of "summits" such as the Davos one, which, admittedly, are mentioned less often), but there are also works that speak of various kinds of social networks and/or voluntary organizations, civil-society structures. If we speak of the more or less established types of ties singled out in the literature, they are discussed by authors who place the emphasis either on (1) external ties, also called bridging ties or communal ties, and/or (2) on internal ties — so-called bonding ties. Finally — and this is a very important aspect — some foreign authors note that the relations described by the concept of "social capital" are predominantly non-competitive.1
1 In noting this aspect, we would at the same time like to point out that an emphasis on the predominantly non-competitive character of these ties as one of the distinguishing features of "social capital" is not characteristic of the foreign literature. Even while describing predominantly non-competitive relations, most authors carefully try not to notice this. And, remarkably, they succeed! One more question: if we are to believe neoclassical theory, competition is an attribute of the market (and, consequently, of capital). Does it follow from this that this phenomenon (like many other forms of interaction within the capitalist system) is a non-market phenomenon? Or are non-competitive relations themselves one of the attributes of the market? Indeed, why not regard relations of solidarity as one of the progressive forms of the market, and secure the transition to a market economy in Russia by curtailing competition and developing solidarity instead? Is that foolish? And what, then, is it to regard non-competitive relations as market relations by their very nature?
For the purposes of our study, however, a different division among foreign authors will be especially important. The first and dominant group consists of those who understand "social capital" in a purely commercial sense (or economic in the narrow sense of the word), i.e., as those social parameters (as a rule, primarily trust and acquaintances within one network or another) that can be used to obtain additional commercial (or other) benefit, or, as one of these researchers (M. Schiff) put it, are an argument of the production function and/or the utility function. The second group consists of those for whom it is also a phenomenon describing a special circle of relations (not typical, we would say, of the market) in which "social capital" acts as a public good. These are relations of "cooperation" (Putnam, Brehm, and Rahn), of "providing assistance and support" (de Graaf, Boxman, Flap, Bourdieu, and Wacquant), and the like, which promote "the development of the collective as a whole" (Thomas), "with the aim of solving problems of collective action" (Brehm and Rahn). In other words, one can say that this latter group of authors, taken together, defines "social capital" as... a system of relations of collectivism, mutual assistance, support, and cooperation aimed at the development of the community as a whole. ...Having paused my analysis of the views of Western authors and having written the definition italicized above, I (this passage was written by A. Buzgalin) nearly fell off my chair: indeed, any social scientist who lived through the Soviet era knows that this is nothing other than... the definition of the fundamental production relation of socialism found in the political economy textbook of the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU.1...
Let us set aside for now this far-from-coincidental resemblance, and simply keep in mind the division outlined above between two groups of Western authors: those who emphasize the market, capitalist effect (the "capitalist" interpretation) and those who consider first and foremost the new type and character of social relations (the "social" interpretation). This division is fundamentally important for our further study, and that is why we have devoted so much attention to it. If we sum up the general approaches to the study of social capital found in the works of most of the authors known to us who write about "social capital" in the West, and who are reproduced in these interpretations in our own country, we get the following set of characteristics:
• the use of a positivist methodology, and hence the singling-out of predominantly empirically observable traits;
• in many (though not all) authors — the dominance of a pragmatic approach, which leads to the singling-out, above all, of those social ties and relations that can secure an increase in the initial resources (in most cases, additional monetary income);
• the singling-out, as the object of study, of processes identified (the legitimacy of which is a separate question) with market, capitalist relations;
• an orientation toward singling out functional and other ties that allow the identified traits of "social capital" to be formalized and quantified, together with an implicit abstraction away from ties, interactions, and aspects of study that do not lend themselves to mathematical modeling; • the dominance of methodological individualism in most works (with the exception of the few authors who also include an analysis of social-group processes)... The parameters listed above do not stand out from the typical landscape of the "mainstream" of contemporary economic and social theory, either in subject matter or in method. This helps explain, in particular, why almost none of the well-known researchers of "social capital" ever even raise the question of how legitimate it is to call the aggregate of phenomena subsumed under this name "capital" at all. Why not call it, say, "the social" — a non-market, non-commercial social bond among individuals? The answer to this question is fairly obvious: authors belonging to the mainstream consider anything productive, like any form of wealth in general, to be capital (for they do not seem to know of any other form of wealth), while anyone who has ever used friendship, nepotism, or ties within national diasporas for their own benefit knows perfectly well that social ties can be productive.
That said, the discovery of the "productivity" of social capital is also regarded as an important scientific achievement, and not without reason: economists now have several methods for calculating the economic efficiency of comradeship, friendship, and family attachments, which (quite seriously) is of considerable importance to any serious businessman or manager. For us here, however, it is not the answer but the question that matters. In posing it, we call into question not the adjective but the noun — the very essence of the phenomenon of "social capital." We raise the problem: is this actually capital? One can, of course, regard anything that in one way or another produces some increase in wealth as capital. And this is correct from the standpoint of the neoclassical narrative. Moreover, even Marxism, which in principle disputes this, confirms that capital, being the universal form of wealth under capitalism, lends the appearance of capital to all the phenomena of that society. But the question remains: can one, for example, regard as capital (even social capital) the social ties created by voluntary and legal organizations that constantly and steadily carry out activity (exclusively legitimate, peaceful, and democratic) aimed at:
• limiting the incomes of the owners of capital and redistributing them (by up to 50%) in favor of the poorest strata of the population?
• nationalizing education, healthcare, natural resources, infrastructure facilities, telecommunications, and the like?
• developing selective regulation of the economy and raising the share of GDP redistributed by society (through NGOs, local self-government bodies, and the state) not merely to 50% (as is the case today in the Scandinavian countries) but, say, to 70–80%?
And were the activities of trade unions, local self-government bodies, and socialist, communist, and other left-wing parties, which secured Salvador Allende's victory in the 1971 presidential election and his launch of socialist transformations in Chile, progress in social capital? Meanwhile, all these phenomena fully fall under the definition of "social capital" accepted in the West: they represent a form of social bond among individuals that secures an increase in a useful effect — in this case, social equality and social justice. Yet contemporary Western studies of "social capital" never pose the question in this way.
And this is no accident. First, the mainstream simply does not notice the processes named above, regarding them as insignificant marginal disturbances at the edges of the system. Moreover, the mainstream generally does not want to see anything indicating the presence, in actual reality, of phenomena other than the market and capital. Yet they exist. Second, researchers of "social capital" who belong to the mainstream are unlikely to regard progress in social equality and justice as a productive act unless it produces an increase in corporate profits or at least in the country's GDP. It is important for us to fix this approach, because by agreeing with it (indeed, it would be strange to call something "capital," even social capital, if it does not increase monetary wealth), we can draw the boundary that researchers of "social capital" themselves rarely draw. We can say that only those social interactions that directly or indirectly result in growth of a market effect — above all, an increase in money, in capital — can be called "social capital." It is not worth calling all other social ties "capital" even by analogy, because in that case the entire set of relations formed in the USSR under the wise leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet government would also turn out to be "social capital," and any society and any economic system would be capitalist... (Indeed, it is unlikely that scholars holding economic-liberal positions would agree that the socialization of the economy represents progress of capital, even "social" capital...). In that case, the interpretation of the concept under study that we called "social" above would fall outside the field designated by the concept of "social capital" — and this is an important aspect to which we shall return. So, before us are two subsets of phenomena designated by the concept of "social capital": (1) certain forms of social interaction, not previously described by economic theory, whose inclusion produces a market, capitalist effect, and (2) forms of social interaction that produce not a market but a social effect. It is essential that these two subsets overlap. Let us now pose the question: what is the nature of these social interactions? Is it the same for the first and second subsets?
The hypothesis that the authors will develop and argue for in this subsection is as follows: the relations and processes designated by the term "social capital" are, par excellence, non-capitalist (and non-market) phenomena that assume the form of capital owing to the universality of the being and dominance of the latter under present-day conditions. These non-capitalist relations can serve the progress primarily of capital ("social capital" of the first kind) or of society ("social capital" of the second kind). In the first case, the inclusion of properly capitalist relations is the rule; in the second, it is the exception. Before we proceed to explain and argue these propositions, let us allow ourselves (as one of the building blocks of the hypothesis) to spell out certain concepts already examined by us earlier in the book. We shall take: (1) the market to be a form of interaction only among subjects who are independent of one another; who function under conditions of a social division of labor; who pursue the goal of maximizing income (which, in a developed market economy, takes a monetary form or monetary equivalent) and minimizing the expenditure of labor and other resources; and who interact through relations of competition; (2) capital to be only that process of growth of social wealth relative to the initial amount (the process of creating a surplus product) which is based on the private ownership, by some persons, of the non-personified factors of this process (in particular, the means of production, including such factors as information), and, by other persons, of labor power — where the owner of labor power is personally free and deprived of any other property; (3) all other phenomena to be non-market and/or non-capitalist.
In particular, we shall regard as non-market: relations of subsistence economy (the production and consumption of output within a single economic unit); gratuitous gift-giving and gratuitous assistance; cooperation and collaboration not oriented toward maximizing a private effect; the conscious distribution and redistribution of goods on the basis of directly social decision-making proceeding from social (humanitarian, ecological, etc.) criteria, and the like. Under this approach, non-capitalist phenomena would include, for example: the process of obtaining a surplus product through the extra-economic coercion of personally dependent workers; or the creation of surplus social wealth by an association of owners of the social means of production; or the creation, by a free creator working on the basis of a socially guaranteed provision for rational needs, of a new cultural phenomenon transmitted to humanity free of charge, as a public good (the scholarly work of a research-institute or university employee in the public sector of the economy); (4) transitional would be any processes in which features of market and non-market (capitalist and non-capitalist) relations are contradictorily combined. It is quite obvious that it is precisely such transitional relations that dominate in contemporary economies: from 30 to 50% of the GDP of developed countries is distributed and redistributed according to non-market criteria on the basis of socially, consciously elaborated decisions; many workers are shareholders, while top managers combine features of both a capital owner and a hired employee, and so on; (5) within the class of transitional processes one can, in particular, distinguish between the dying-out of pre-market (pre-capitalist) relations and the genesis of post-market (post-capitalist) ones in the course of the evolution of the market capitalist economy.
As the basis for such a distinction we shall use a criterion of progress well known in the socio-philosophical literature: the measure of the free, harmonious development of the individual (an indirect socio-economic gauge of which can be the Human Development Index, along with a number of other indicators used by the UN and UNESCO for the comparative analysis of the social, humanitarian, and ecological development of countries). Accordingly, when the transition proceeds from relations less progressive than the market (capital) toward the market (capital), we may speak of the dying-out of pre-market (pre-capitalist) relations. When the transition proceeds from the market (capital) toward more progressive relations, we shall speak of the genesis of post-market (post-capitalist) relations. It is clear that, on the basis of pre-market, market, capitalist, post-market, and post-capitalist relations (as well as their transitional forms), non-economic relations are also formed (friendship, kinship, common local origin, etc.) that cannot be directly subsumed under the categories of market or non-market, capitalist or non-capitalist. It is precisely relations of this kind that are being subsumed under the category of "social capital," with market-capitalist properties being ascribed to them a priori (properties which they may or may not actually acquire). These premises for the proof of the hypothesis formulated above will, naturally, be accepted by far from everyone.
Radical right-wing proponents of the free market and private property will accept neither the thesis of the historical limitedness of the market and capital, nor the proposition that non-market and non-capitalist relations can be more progressive than the market and capital. They will not deny that an economy with free education, free healthcare, and a large public sector in industry, transport, and energy, with selective regulation, with progressive taxation, and so on, is possible. But they will say: such an economy is less efficient than an economy with a minimal public sector and social safety net, as well as non-interference by the state in the process of resource allocation. In saying this, they will thereby be saying that there exist such forms of economic organization that hinder the market and capital and, consequently (this would be a continuation of their own logic), are non-market. In doing so, whether they like it or not, they will be forced to agree that non-market and non-capitalist relations are possible, but only as less efficient ones. Let us keep in mind the conclusion that non-market and non-capitalist mechanisms of appropriation and alienation, of resource allocation, and of the distribution (redistribution) of income, etc., can operate within an economy. Strangely enough, it is the proponents of a socially oriented,
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Часть 1 Chapter 10. Man and Society as Functions of Capital and as Its Limit: Toward a
Часть 2 10.2.3. The relations and processes hidden behind the concept of
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