Lecture
2. Modality and mood
In section 1.1 we distinguished three types of modal meanings.
1. Modality as the status of a situation with respect to the real world (namely, its reality or unreality). This type of modal meaning we call, somewhat narrowing the traditional usage, objective modality, since it concerns the relationship of the utterance to «objective» reality. The narrowing consists in the fact that traditionally all meanings expressed by mood are assigned to the domain of objective modality (see [Grammar 1980(2): 214–215]), whereas in our usage this is not so: the optative meaning of the subjunctive mood (desirability) belongs to the domain of subjective modality, and the imperative belongs to the illocutionary domain altogether. Objective modality is expressed by mood, but not all meanings of moods belong to the domain of objective modality.
2. Modality as the speaker's attitude toward the situation – its desirability, possibility, doubtfulness, and so on. This type of meaning we have called subjective modality, somewhat broadening the usage traditional for Russian grammar, namely by including here desirability (= optativity), expressed by mood, as well as the traditional categories of modal logic – possibility and necessity. This concerns such «subjective» meanings as a psychological or epistemic stance; hence the synonym – attitudinal modality.
3. Modality as the speaker's communicative goal: the expression of assertion, prompting, or a question. This is illocutionary modality.
As is easy to see, the only thing common to all the meanings that we have agreed to recognize as modal is that these or similar meanings are expressed by mood. For example, since prompting (expressed by the imperative) is a modal meaning, so is a question, since it is a meaning of the same kind – illocutionary. Since desirability is a modality, then possibility, necessity, certainty, doubt, and surprise are modalities too, since all of these are different attitudes of the speaker toward the situation. As for objective modality, it can only be expressed by mood. Thus, modal meanings are the meanings of moods, extrapolated in all possible directions.
[hide note]
There is a widespread formulation – «mood is grammaticalized modality», see [Plungian 2011: 423]. It has a right to exist, but it seems more plausible that the empirically identified set of meanings that are expressed by mood in various languages (see, for example, [Dobrushina 2012b]) is a source for delineating the domain of modality, rather than modality in some a priori sense underlying the existing set of moods. Thus, mood in Russian is connected with modality in the logical sense (i.e., with the meanings of possibility – necessity) only through the most peripheral meaning – the optative one.
Having carried out a semantic extrapolation of the meanings of mood even on the basis of Russian alone, we can easily see grammatical modality beyond mood – in the semantics of constructions (see, for example, on the modal meanings of constructions with the infinitive in Peshkovsky 1928/2001: 381–383]; [Dobrushina 2012a]), of parenthetical words, particles, and even in the lexical semantics of ordinary verbs and predicatives (see, for example, on the verb мочь (to be able) in this context, section 4.1.1.1).
Regarding the three types of modal meanings, a number of clarifications should be made.
1. The opposition within objective modality is not binary, as is commonly assumed (see, for example, [Urmanchieva 2004]), but ternary: reality is opposed not only to irreality, i.e. counterfactuality; there is also a third possibility – neutrality, when the relation of the situation to the real world is not defined in the sentence: the proposition is used without reference to truth. For example, the proposition ‘he has arrived’ has neutral objective modality in certain hypotactic contexts: Я думаю, он приехал (I think he has arrived); or in the context of a question: Он приехал? (Has he arrived?). Neutral objective modality is the same as nonveridicality in the sense of [Giannakidou 2002].
In [Plungian 2011: 429] the distinction between real and counterfactual modality is reduced to the probability of the situation occurring. Regarding the conditional clauses in examples (2a) and (2b), it is said that (2a) expresses a real condition, a highly probable event; while (2b) expresses an unreal one, an unlikely event:
(2) a. Если <завтра> пойдет дождь, мы останемся дома (If it rains <tomorrow>, we will stay home). – b. Если бы <завтра> пошел дождь, мы бы остались дома (If it rained <tomorrow>, we would stay home).
Meanwhile, one could argue that the modality of the proposition of the conditional sentence is neutral in both cases. The difference between (2a) and (2b) is rather that (2b) expresses the desirability of the condition-situation. Example (2b) therefore sounds strange; it would be more natural to say, for example:
(3) Если бы завтра было солнце, мы бы пошли гулять (If there were sun tomorrow, we would go for a walk).
The neutral modality of the condition-proposition means that the situation is mentioned without reference to reality: the condition-proposition in (2) and (3) has the same neutral objective modality as the proposition ‘he has arrived’ in the context Я думаю, он приехал (I think he has arrived). Different is sentence (4), an example from [Plungian 2011: 430] – in it the condition-proposition has counterfactual modality; the event did not take place (but it is not unlikely):
(4) Если бы вчера шел дождь, мы бы остались дома (If it had rained yesterday, we would have stayed home).
In English there are verb forms expressing three different types of conditions – real (if it rains, neutral modality), unreal (if it rained, neutral modality), and counterfactual (if it had rained, counterfactual modality). In the Russian conditional sentence, however, the unreal and counterfactual condition correspond to one and the same form – the subjunctive mood, so that only the neutral modality and the counterfactual one are distinguished: the former can be expressed both by the indicative mood (2a) and by the subjunctive (2b), the latter – only by the subjunctive (4).
Neutral and counterfactual modality can be opposed in terms of the set of means of expression not only in the conditional but also in the relative clause (for more detail see section 2.4.1). If the head noun is in an intensional context, then the modality in the subordinate clause is neutral and can be expressed both by the subjunctive mood and by the future tense, see (5). But if the head noun is in a context of non-existence, then the modality in the subordinate clause is counterfactual, and then the subjunctive mood is the only possibility, the future tense being excluded, see (6):
(5) ...искал человека, который согласился бы ему помочь = искал человека, который согласится ему помочь (...was looking for a person who would agree to help him = was looking for a person who will agree to help him);
(6) а. ...не было человека, который согласился бы ему помочь – б. *не было такого человека, который согласится ему помочь (...there was no person who would agree to help him – *there was no such person who will agree to help him).
2. Objective modality differs from subjective modality not only in substance, but also, to some extent, in its manner of expression. Oppositions within objective modality are expressed in Russian (and, it seems, in all languages) only by mood. Subjective, i.e. stance, modality, however, is more often expressed by special stance operators (a verb, a predicative, a parenthetical word, a particle) – such as can, must <that>, desirable <that> – or by constructions (for example, an infinitival one). A stance can be expressed by mood, as with the already-mentioned desirability, expressed by the subjunctive mood in its optative meaning. Objective modality, however, apart from mood, is not expressed by anything else.
An important difference between objective and subjective, i.e. stance, modality also consists in the fact that there are many stances – all parenthetical words, such as fortunately, perhaps, express one stance modality or another. Whereas there are only three objective modalities in total. At the same time, a stance may or may not be present in the semantics of an utterance for a given proposition, while one objective modality or another must necessarily be expressed with any finite verb or predicative. In [Urmanchieva 2004] typological evidence is presented in favor of the idea that the opposition reality – irreality may even form a separate grammatical category. However, in Russian the grammatical category remains mood (whose semantics includes not only the meaning of reality/irreality in pure form), and objective modality can be regarded merely as one of the three semantic spheres of the conceptual category of modality.
3. Among the modalities that come under consideration when discussing the meanings of mood is conditionality. According to [Plungian 2011: 428], this modality is possessed by a situation denoting «a possibility, <…> the realization of which depends on a certain factor», i.e. a condition. The mood of the verb in a sentence expressing a condition can be either subjunctive, example (7) – had it succeeded, or indicative, example (8) – received:
(7) If it had succeeded, everything would have been much simpler. [E. and V. Gordeev. We Will Not All Die (2002)]
(8) If Ivan received my letter, he knows about what happened.
V.A. Plungian treats conditionality as a variety of objective modality, and this is justified by the fact that conditionality can be expressed by mood. (There are languages that have a special mood expressing conditionality, for example, the Italian and, to some extent, German conditional, which is used in the main clause but not in a subordinate clause with a conditional conjunction, and expresses precisely conditionality.) In Russian, however, the main role in expressing this modality is played not by mood (there is no special mood in Russian that would be used only in the position of conditionality), but by the conditional context itself. So conditionality, i.e. dependence on a condition, has been assigned by us to subjective, stance modality. For more detail on the modality of conditionality, which constitutes one of the meanings of the subjunctive mood, see section 2.4.
The mood of the verb in the position of conditionality can be subjunctive, as in (7) – would have been simpler, or indicative, as in (8) – knows, – depending on the counterfactuality or neutrality of the condition. In (8) the modality of the condition is unambiguously neutral, while sentence (7) is ambiguous: the condition, expressed by a verb in the subjunctive mood, can be neutral if it relates to the future, and counterfactual if it relates to the past. Hence the objective modality of the situation in the main clause is likewise ambiguous: it can be neutral or counterfactual.
A condition can also have real modality. In this case it is often formed with the conjunction since (though the conjunction if is not excluded either):
(9) Since you are asking, I will wait! [A. Aleksin. My Brother Plays the Clarinet (1967)]
The modality of the situation in the main clause in (9), as in (8), is neutral.
A condition (i.e. the factor on which the realization of the possibility depends) can be expressed not only by a conditional subordinate clause, as in (7)–(9), but also by many other means – in example (10) the conditions are otherwise, a year ago, without my consent:
(10) otherwise he would haverefused; a year ago he would not have reasoned this way; without my consent he would not have come here.
4. One clarification regarding illocutionary modality. Besides the two obvious non-assertive illocutionary modalities, interrogative (Has Masha left?) and directive (Leave, Masha!), there is a third type of non-assertivity – that of a proposition in a syntactically subordinate position, which lacks independent illocutionary force, i.e. has zero illocutionarity. Such a proposition often has neutral objective modality, as in the context <I think that> Masha has left. However, zero illocutionarity can be combined with the objective modality of «reality» – for a proposition in the status of a presupposition or an implicative, for example: <I am sorry that> Masha has left.
One and the same proposition can fall within the scope of all three modalities – objective, subjective and illocutionary. That is, it is possible, and sometimes even obligatory, for modalities of different types to combine within a single proposition. Certain rules of compatibility operate here. A stance (subjective modality) can unambiguously predetermine the choice of one of the objective modalities. Thus, the parenthetical hardly gives rise to neutral objective modality for the proposition within its scope (Ivan has hardly arrived), while the parenthetical fortunately is compatible only with real objective modality (Fortunately, Ivan has arrived). (In the context of conditionality, naturally, this is not so: Fortunately, if you don't touch the cursor, you will boot into Windows in 30 seconds.)
There is, of course, no complete predetermination. For example, although the stance of desirability presupposes an unreal objective modality (see section 2.4.2), but already undesirability is quite compatible even with real objective modality: Masha has to wriggle out of things = ‘Masha is wriggling out of things, and this is undesirable – to the speaker and Masha, or only to the speaker’. So within the scope of the stance of desirability an opposition of two values of real modality is possible.
The most important restriction concerns the compatibility of objective and illocutionary modality: only assertion is compatible with real objective modality – a question and a directive require neutral modality. The compatibility of modalities of different spheres is the subject of section 2.5.
Having distinguished the three spheres of modality, we can now turn to the semantics of mood. As synonyms of the traditional Russian terms indicative, subjunctive and imperative mood, the single-word terms are used: indicative, conjunctive [subjunctive] and imperative.
In its basic meaning, the indicative describes a situation as belonging to the real world: the present tense (in speech mode) – as taking place at the moment of speech, the past – as having taken place before the moment of speech:
(11) The soldiers are riding in the back of the battalion truck. Now they are talking about women with unusual ease. [S. Dovlatov. Over the Barriers (1991)]
(12) Grandfather put down his hat, propped his cane in the corner, fell silent for a moment and said... [M.A. Bulgakov. The Life of Monsieur de Molière (1932-1933)]
The future tense of the indicative describes a situation as one that will take place after the moment of speech (though the future tense can also place the situation outside real modality, see below).
(13) We will eliminate mass illiteracy! A cook will run the state! [S. Dovlatov. Chirkov and Berendeev (1985)]
The indicative is opposed to the subjunctive and the imperative, which do not characterize the situation as real.
A sentence with a verb in the indicative is intended, above all, for use in an utterance with assertive illocutionary modality, and in this context the indicative means that the situation is real, i.e., that it holds. However, the same sentence can be inserted into contexts in which the indicative does not express the reality of the situation. These are contexts of suspended assertion (suspended assertion, neutralization of assertiveness per [Weinreich 1963/1970]; [Paducheva 1985: 33, 94, 95]; [Paducheva 2005]), cf. the English term non-veridicality, for example in [Giannakidou 2002], non-veridictality, i.e., non-commitment to reality.
In the context of suspended assertion, the semantics of the indicative is neutralized. Thus, sentence (14a) has assertive illocutionary modality, and the indicative in this context expresses real objective modality – it means that the situation holds. But the same proposition in (14b) and (14c) occurs in a syntactically subordinate position, where the governing predicate (called non-factive, see Presupposition / item 4) has the property of removing the real objective modality of the subordinate proposition, so that the indicative does not express the reality of the situation:
(14) a. Vasya lives in Moscow now. b. I think that Vasya lives in Moscow now. c. I do not think that Vasya lives in Moscow now.
In example (15) the proposition is expressed by a conditional clause; here too the indicative does not express the reality of the situation:
(15) If Vasya lives in Moscow now, he will help you.
[Isachenko 1960: 474ff] advances the view that «the indicative contains no indication whatsoever of the reality or unreality of the action»; that is, the indicative is treated as an «absolutely unmarked category.» This cannot be agreed with. The primary function of the indicative consists in presenting a situation as holding, i.e., as real. A special context is required to strip the indicative of this function: in the context of suspended assertion, a proposition with a verb in the indicative has not real but neutral objective modality, i.e., non-commitment to truth. In many languages, contexts of the type in (14b), (14c) use not the indicative but the subjunctive.
Neutral objective modality is possessed by the proposition in the context of a question and an imperative – that is, in a context of interrogative or imperative, rather than assertive, illocutionary modality. Indicativity is also neutralized in the context of syntactic subordination – in a complement-clause context, as in (14a), (14b), in a conditional context, as in (15); and also in a context of conditionality, as in (16):
(16) {If he was ordered to return,} he returned.
The indicative also expresses neutral objective modality in the context of other operators of attitudinal modality – such as possibility, necessity, desirability:
(17) He has, possibly, already returned.
The description of the meaning and use of parenthetical words in item 4.3 relies essentially on the opposition between real and neutral objective modality of the associated proposition of the parenthetical word, i.e., of the proposition within the scope of the propositional attitude that it expresses.
Thus, the indicative outside the context of assertive illocutionary modality presents a situation without commitment to its reality (and a proposition without commitment to its truth). A special case is a proposition in the status of a presupposition or an implicative (see the entry Presupposition); such a proposition has zero illocutionary force but real objective modality. Thus, the proposition ‘he arrived’ in the context I am glad that he arrived has the status of a presupposition and the same real objective modality as in the context He arrived. The status of a presupposition can also be held by a proposition expressed by a non-finite verb or a verbal noun: I am glad to see you, I am glad of your arrival.
It is a different matter with I think that he arrived, where the proposition ‘he arrived’ does not have the status of a presupposition: here zero illocutionary force neutralizes indicativity; the proposition has not real but neutral objective modality.
Suspended assertion is an important modal characteristic of a proposition. For example, suspended assertion determines the set of admissible contexts for pronouns with -nibud’. Take the sentence Someone came, with the illocutionary force of an assertion, and it sounds odd – it requires the addition of some subjective modality (for example: Probably, someone came). But in the context of a question or an imperative, i.e., contexts of suspended assertion, the pronoun with -nibud’ is normal: Did someone come? Sing something! The admissibility of the pronoun with -nibud’ allows us to assign the future tense of the indicative as well to the contexts of suspended assertion: Someone will let you in.
The subjunctive mood, otherwise called the conjunctive, is most often used in a syntactically subordinate position: in conditional, purpose, and, less often, relative clauses, as well as in sentential complements (see item 2.4.1) – that is, in a context with zero illocutionary force, and it expresses neutral or, less often, counterfactual objective modality, see examples (2), (4) in item 2.1. As noted in [Palmer 1986: 185], in all languages the choice of indicative or subjunctive in sentential complements often depends on the governing predicate. Cf. in Russian I am glad that he agreed (indicative) and It is doubtful that he agreed (subjunctive).
When used in a syntactically independent position, the subjunctive mood expresses desirability (like the optative in those languages where this mood is separate from the subjunctive) or conditionality (like the conditional mood in languages where it is distinct from the subjunctive, as in Italian).
The main function of the subjunctive mood in a syntactically subordinate position is to express unreal objective modality, i.e., neutral or counterfactual, and it is not always clear which of the two. The subjunctive expresses neutral objective modality in a complex sentence with a sentential complement (introduced by the conjunction chtoby):
(18) I am glad that they did not notice me – indicative, real modality
(19) I tried to make sure that they would not notice me; It cannot be that he was mistaken – subjunctive, neutral modality
The same type of modality is expressed by the subjunctive in purpose clauses introduced by the same conjunction: He hid so that they would not notice him.
In a conditional clause the subjunctive expresses an unfulfillable condition (for example, one that pertains to the past) and, correspondingly, counterfactual modality (on modality in the main clause of a conditional sentence, see item 2.4.2):
(20) If you had called then, I would have helped you.
The Russian subjunctive does not distinguish tense, and if the time of the action is not expressed in the context, then the fulfillability / unfulfillability of the condition may be unclear, and then it is unclear whether the subjunctive expresses neutral or counterfactual objective modality – whether in the subordinate clause or in the main clause, see example (7) in item 2.1 (on the main clause also in more detail in item 2.4.2).
The subjunctive can also be used in a relative clause. In the context of a non-referential noun phrase in the main clause, when the relative clause describes properties of an object that must come into existence or come into view, the subjunctive expresses neutral modality (the verbs that generate non-referentiality of the head noun are underlined):
(21) I tried to create a fund that would support intelligent people. [«Russian Reporter» (2011)]
(22) Valka immediately looked for a reason that would make the praise undeserved. [A. Aleksin. Signalmen and Buglers (1985)]
The context of non-referentiality of the noun in the main clause, which licenses the subjunctive in the relative clause, can be created by negation:
(23) a. Facts turned up that confirmed he was right. – b. No facts turned up that would have confirmed he was right.
Indeed, if the negation is removed from the main clause in (23b), the subjunctive in the relative clause becomes inappropriate:
(24) *Facts turned up that would have confirmed he was right.
Similarly, in example (25) – with negation present, as in (25a), both the indicative and the subjunctive are possible, but without negation, in (25b), the subjunctive is inappropriate:
(25) a. There were no photographers who refrained / would have refrained from touching up photos when putting the cards into an album. – b. There were photographers who refrained / *would have refrained from touching up photos when putting the cards into an album.
The subjunctive in a relative clause becomes possible, however, if the sentence is placed in a conditional context – in this case the subjunctive expresses not neutral objective modality but subjective conditionality modality, cf. the impossible (24) and the well-formed (26):
(26) Facts turned up that would have confirmed he was right, if they had been presented on time.
The condition can be trivial, for example in (27) – ‘if she had been here’:
(27) It's a pity Masha left, she would have helped us a great deal right now.
The conditionality meaning arises for the subjunctive mood in (27) within a relative clause, i.e. in a syntactically subordinate position; in section 2.4.2 we will examine the same meaning in a syntactically independent position.
In an independent sentence, the subjunctive mood can express an optative meaning (which belongs to the domain of subjective modality, see also section 4.2. Subjective modality expressed by mood), namely, it can mean that the situation is presented by the speaker as desirable:
(28) If only he had known how heavy my heart was! [Yu. Trifonov. The House on the Embankment (1976)] = ‘I wish he had known’
(29) If only it were summer now!
In examples (30), (31) the speaker presents the situation not so much as desirable, but as constituting the main (or sole) condition for achieving some natural, desired goal:
(30) There's plenty of it there. If only there were money! = ‘the main thing is to have money’
(31) Maybe it isn't so hard to start making changes after all? If only there were real desire. [S. Shargunov. A Worn-Out Country (2011)]
This meaning often arises in a context that rejects a non-essential condition:
(32) She'll leave the cabbage soup – sometimes I heat it up, sometimes I eat it cold, without appetite. – Come on, what's the big deal about heating it up! If only there were cabbage soup. [I. Grekova. On Trial (1967)]
The meaning of the subjunctive in (30)–(32) can also be characterized as optative.
The second meaning expressed by the subjunctive in an independent sentence is the meaning of conditionality: the speaker makes the possibility of the situation occurring dependent on some condition. The condition can be expressed in a wide variety of ways. It is important that the subjunctive of conditionality, like that of desirability, is possible in a syntactically independent sentence, moreover in the context of assertive illocutionary modality. For example, in the main clause of a complex sentence with a conditional clause. In the examples below the condition is underlined, and the subjunctive of conditionality is italicized.
(33) He would have shown himself better, if he had been in my place.
(34) You would not have gotten upset in a situation like that.
Thus, in (34) in a situation like that = ‘if a situation like that had arisen’.
In (35) the subjunctive of the verb expresses conditionality, and the condition is denoted by an infinitive:
(35) It would be wrong to directly link the level of advertising spending with the level of sales. [«Advertising World» (2003)] = ‘if we linked them, it would be wrong’
The condition can be implied, and it is not always clear which one exactly.
(36) There were so many gifts that there would have been enough for you too.
(37) Father would have been pleased with your achievements.
The meaning of objective modality in the context of conditionality and in the optative context is unreal. It can be either neutral modality or counterfactual modality. Cf. examples (38) (as well as (7) in section 2.1) for conditionality and examples (39) for desirability.
(38) a. If you had come earlier tomorrow, we would have had time to talk – conditionality + neutral modality
b. If you had come earlier yesterday, we would have had time to talk – conditionality + counterfactual modality
(39) a. Why don't you call her! – desirability + neutral modality
b. Why didn't you call her yesterday! – desirability + counterfactual modality
In example (40) the modality expressed by the subjunctive is ambiguous:
(40) If only you had made friends with them, then you wouldn't have had to be bored.
It is interesting that for a situation referring to the future, the modality can be not only neutral, which is natural for a future situation, see (41a), but also counterfactual, see (41b).
(41) a. If you had warned me in advance, I would have come to see you tomorrow. – b. If they hadn't warned me that you were leaving, I would have come to see you tomorrow.
Phrase (41a) is compatible with the continuation But as it stands, I'm not sure: evidently, it concerns the speaker's intention; whereas in (41b) the situation ‘I will come to see you tomorrow’ is counterfactual: since I was warned, I won't come.
The same two possibilities occur in example (42) – if she doesn't let me, then the situation ‘I will come to see you’ remains an intention, but if she didn't let me, then it is counterfactual:
(42) I would have come to see you, but Mom won't let me / didn't let me.
In (43) the objective modality of the condition-situation can be either neutral or counterfactual, while in the main clause it is unambiguously neutral, since it is interrogative:
(43) So what would you have done if you had won? [A. P. Chekhov. Ivanov (1887)]
A special meaning is carried by the subjunctive in the context of the verb to be able to – it expresses conditionality without presupposing any non-trivial condition, and can be represented as the result of the erosion of the meaning of conditionality:
(44) I could help you » I would help you <if needed> » I can help you.
Similarly, in the context of verbs of wishing and performative verbs the subjunctive simply expresses softened categoricalness:
(45) ...I would like to start, of course, with the economy. [«Diplomatic Herald» (2004)]
(46) Are you feeling unwell, my dear? I would advise you to lie down, really… [I. S. Turgenev. A Month in the Country (1850)]
In the context of a predicate of deontic necessity (on necessity see section 4.1.1), the subjunctive mood also softens the necessity, or even cancels it altogether. The conjunctions but, yet and the equivalent asyndetic construction introduce an argument that justifies the violation of the obligation:
(47) ...one should not write, but I write anyway, because I am thinking this right now (L. N. Tolstoy)
(48) ...it would be necessary to report it, but such times have come that one does not know where to report [I. Muravyova. Filemon and Baucis (1995)]
(49) One would need to hang up a light bulb – we never manage to save up the money (B. Okudzhava)
In example (50) the verb should is used in the subjunctive mood, although the stated justification for the necessity of declaring the elections invalid (numerous violations) rather requires the indicative. The but, which should have introduced the argument mitigating the necessity, is omitted. The sentence is syntactically flawless only because would occurs with a verb of modal semantics:
(50) <…> owing to the numerous violations in the mayoral election in Zhukovsky, they should be declared invalid. (ria.ru/politics)
[hide note]
Condition, unlike conditionality, is not expressed in Russian by the subjunctive mood: condition is expressed by a conditional conjunction – or by asyndeton. The mood in the conditional clause expresses (and not unambiguously at that) only the possibility or unreality of the situation that constitutes the condition:
(51) Finished the job – go; If you finished the job, you may go – real condition
(52) Had he finished the job – he would have left – unreal condition
(53) If you had finished the job, you could leave – ambiguity
In example (54) the subjunctive mood expresses possibility (the sphere of stance modality). This meaning arises in the context of a specific construction – the first person is essential, as is the lexical class of the verb (verbs of speech and opinion) and the presence of negation:
(54) I wouldn't say she is beautiful = ‘I cannot say that she is beautiful’
Another constructionally conditioned meaning of the subjunctive mood is prompting, from the sphere of illocutionary modality, see section 3.3:
(55) Would you not get in the way, Fedya! [P. P. Bazhov. Broad Shoulder (1948)]
On independent sentences with the subjunctive mood see also Subjunctive Mood / section 3.4.5.
The table below demonstrates the compatibility of modal meanings of different types. The columns correspond to objective modality – the values reality, neutrality, counterfactuality (= unreality). The rows correspond to illocutionary modality – assertive modality is opposed to non-assertive modality, i.e. the modality of question and prompting, and to zero modality: a syntactically subordinate proposition has no illocutionary force of its own (see section 3). In addition, a proposition may or may not contain a marker of subjective modality (abbreviated as S-modality, see section 4).
Table 1. Possibilities for combining modalities of different types
|
Reality |
Neutrality |
Counterfactuality |
|
|
I. Assertive illocutionary modality (the modality of a proposition with a verb in the indicative or in the subjunctive mood in the main clause) |
a) No S-modality He solved the problem b) S-modality He, fortunately, solved the problem |
a) No S-modality ––– b) S-modality If only he had solved even one problem! He may have solved the problem. He hardly solved the problem. A good dinner wouldn't hurt us. At another time he would have solved this problem |
a) No S-modality ––– b) S-modality {If he had solved this problem back then,} he would be studying at the university now. |
|
II. Non-assertive illocutionary modality II.1. Question II.2. Prompting |
––– |
a) No S-modality Did he solve even one problem? b) S-modality Maybe he solved the problem? Would you solve such a problem? |
––– |
|
––– |
a) No S-modality Solve even one problem! b) S-modality Help him, if he asks! |
––– |
|
|
III. Zero illocutionary modality (for a syntactically subordinate proposition that has no separate illocutionary force of its own) |
a) No S-modality I am glad that he solved this problem. b) S-modality They still do not understand that the game, unfortunately, is lost. |
a) No S-modality I think that he solved this problem. I do not think that he solved this problem. If he solved this problem, he is a fine fellow They are looking for a person who could solve this problem. b) S-modality People came who would have solved this problem, if they had been given time. |
a) No S-modality If he had solved this problem back then, {he would be studying at the university now}. {No genius was found} who would have solved this problem back then. b) S-modality ___ |
Assertive illocutionary force is compatible with real modality both in the presence and in the absence of S-modality (cf. He, fortunately, solved the problem and He solved the problem), whereas with the neutral modality of its main predicate assertiveness is compatible only in the presence in the proposition of one or another marker of subjective modality – the optative (If only he had solved even one problem!), a marker of conditionality (At another time he would have solved this problem), possibility (He may have solved the problem), and the like. By contrast, the illocutionary force of a question and of prompting is compatible only with neutral objective modality, and is indifferent to the presence / absence of S-modality. Assertive illocutionary force is incompatible with counterfactual modality.
In the position of syntactic subordination, i.e. with zero illocutionary force, all three variants of objective modality are possible. First, in the context of a factive verb, zero illocutionary modality is compatible with real objective modality. Second, neutrality and counterfactuality are distinguished, cf. (56) and (57):
(56) If the sun were out tomorrow, {we would go swimming} – the subjunctive expresses the neutral modality of a condition
(57) If he had solved this problem back then, {he would be studying at the university now} – the subjunctive expresses a counterfactual condition
From Table 1 it is evident that a proposition must necessarily have one objective and one illocutionary modality, and only one, whereas the presence of subjective modality is optional.
Modalities that can be expressed by a finite verb or a predicative, such as possibility and necessity, occupy a special place among modal markers (see section 4.1). For example, they themselves can occur in the subjunctive mood (cf. can and could; must and would have had to; it seems and it would seem) – though in a special sense, see section 2.4.2.
Comments