Lecture
DISPUTE OF TRUTH THOUGHT
It would be a mistake to think that it is enough to meet any “controversial thought” to immediately make it a “dispute thesis”. It always requires some preliminary research and processing before making this thesis from it. In other words, it is necessary to find out exactly what we disagree with, that is, to establish "points of disagreement." To find and precisely indicate in which particular clause we disagree with this idea means “to establish a point of disagreement”. This should be the starting point of every correct dispute.
Take an example. Suppose someone says: “these accused have committed a crime under such-and-such article of the Criminal Code”. This thought seemed to us controversial. Expressing disagreement with her, we can, of course, limit ourselves to saying: “I completely disagree with your opinion”. But, having heard this, the enemy will certainly ask: what? With this question, he will require the “installation of the point of disagreement”. You will have to explain exactly what you do not agree with the opinion of your opponent, and establish the points of disagreement. There are several moments that could be the source of these items. In this thought, we can disagree: 1) the fact that all the accused committed this crime; 2) with the fact that in general one of them committed it; 3) the fact that this offense is a crime; 4) due to the fact that he is a crime envisaged by such and such an article, and so on. It is very important for the practicing orator, and even more so for the missionary, to acquire the skill quickly, sometimes instantly, to find and revise all the places where disagreement with a given thought is possible. This skill is especially necessary in some circumstances that are not quite comfortable for a missionary, for example, in disputes with Protestants and sectarians.
After reviewing all the places of possible disagreement with a thought, we note that we disagree with it and that, that is, there is such a point of disagreement or such a two, three, etc. points. For example, we found two points of disagreement: 1) that all the accused committed this act and 2) that this act is a crime indicated by such and such an article of the law. In a similar case, either each of these points becomes a source of a particular dispute, or we choose one of them for the dispute, which is the most profitable for us, leaving aside the other points. Usually it is better, after all, in this case to specify all found points of disagreement, although we argue only about one thing. Otherwise, the enemy will be silent for a sign of consent.
The installation of points of disagreement is usually done in the way that we, in contrast to the opponent’s wrong view at this point, put forward our own, incompatible with him, view as true. For example, the above two points of disagreement in the thought we have taken can be established as follows: “I completely disagree with you. First, not all defendants committed this act; secondly, this act does not fit this article. ” Thus, each point of disagreement acquired the form of two opposite and incompatible thoughts: 1) all the accused committed this act - some defendants did not commit it; 2) this act fits this article - it does not fit this article. These two incompatible and fighting one another thoughts are called thesis and antithesis of the dispute. A thesis is a thought that is singled out from a controversial thought, and an antithesis is a thought put forward in opposition to the thesis and which establishes the point of disagreement. The struggle between these two thoughts is the essence of the right controversy. In our example, the thesis will be - all the accused have committed this offense, and the antithesis - some of the accused have not committed it. Thesis - this offense is suitable for such and such an article; antithesis - it does not fit her.
We must do our best to make the antithesis (and therefore the thesis) as simple as possible and expressed as short as possible. In any case, a slip is a composite antithesis consisting of two or more thoughts at once. In such antitheses, two or more points of disagreement are outlined, respectively, and this complicates the task of the dispute, since if we start with the proof of the first thought, we will need additional proof for the second, etc. In general, the composite antitheses (as well as theses ) entail a lot of inconvenience, bring to the dispute extreme confusion, confusion and uncertainty. Therefore, having met with them, it is necessary to immediately dismember them into composite elementary judgments and consider each point of disagreement separately.
Setting up and selecting points of disagreement is an extremely important part in a dispute. In important disputes, they must be carried out especially carefully and with full awareness of what we are doing. Their importance increases with the importance of the dispute.
If a disagreement point is not set or if it is set, but complex and complex, the dispute is often “blind”. In the same way, in the case of a dispute over the truth of thought, it is also important to remember quite accurately and clearly not only the thesis of the dispute, but also its antithesis, and never lose sight of the fact that such exists. This not only helps to clarify the dispute, but also makes it possible to easily repel some erroneous attacks on the thesis and, when the opponent of the thesis misses the initiative, go on to the counterattack.
DISPUTE FOR THE EVIDENCE
However, not every dispute is a dispute due to the truth of thought. Very often, we do not at all touch directly on the question of the truth or falsity of thought, but we are interested in how it is substantiated or refuted by its opponent, that is, how correct are its proofs. In other words, often the task of a dispute is not to refute or justify any thought, but only to show that it has not been proved by the opponent — not justified or not refuted by it. Therefore, if as a result of a successful dispute over the truth of a thought, we come to the conclusion: this thought is true or this thought is erroneous, as a result of a successful dispute due to the proof of thought we get the conclusion: this thought is not justified by our opponents or this thought is not refuted by ours opponents. The difference in the tasks of the dispute is huge.
After all, if the enemy refuted our proof of the thesis, this alone does not mean at all that our thesis is false. We just may not have been able to prove it. This happens in disputes and, in general, with evidence often. The teacher can easily crush the evidence of the Pythagorean theorem, invented by a high school student "from the wind of his head" in the severe hour of coming at the blackboard, but the Pythagorean theorem itself will not be shaken at all. In this case, the teacher will put an unsatisfactory mark for failing to prove it, and the student, perhaps, will get acquainted with the “real” proof and only. Similarly, if the adversary refutes our thought, but fails, and we have smashed his refutation to smithereens, this alone does not mean that our thesis is true. Perhaps our thesis is completely erroneous, but the enemy does not know how to refute it (the principle of sophism). Such cases are not uncommon. Therefore, an unsuccessful proof, taken by itself, means only that the person has failed to justify or refute the thesis, and the truth or falsity of the thesis does not concern at all. In order to justify or disprove the thesis, there is always a need for a special, special proof of its truth or fallacy.
Violation of this rule occurs, however, in disputes at every turn. Denied the evidence and think that this one has already broken the thesis; smashed the opponent's refutation against his thesis, and they think that they have proved the truth of the thesis, etc. For example, the defense counsel breaks up the arguments of the prosecution in court. There is one direct and correct conclusion from this - “the accusation is not proven”, and there is a great temptation to draw one more conclusion: the thesis of the accusation (“the defendant is guilty”) is erroneous. In other words, the defendant is not guilty. In practice, of course, it does not matter much, because the defendant must be acquitted in both cases, because of the failure to prove the accusation, and because of the acknowledged innocence. But logically, this is a very gross blunder, because even if the accusation is not proven, and the guilt is not recognized, this does not mean that the defendant is actually innocent.
The argument is due to the evidence and begins in a different way than the argument due to the truth of the thought. If the evidence has already been given by the adversary, we directly attack the evidence without touching on the thesis. If the enemy only expressed a thought without proving it, and for some reason we do not want to attack this thought itself, but prefer to check its foundations, then we demand proof of it. For example, someone said: "this patient will not survive." If we do not want to indulge in sometimes difficult refutation of this thought, then we ask the interlocutor: “Why do you think so?”. He usually gives his evidence. We refute them and, if we succeed, we conclude that this thought has not been proven, and we are satisfied.
In the dispute over the proof, the antithesis in most cases (when it comes to the validity of the thesis) plays absolutely no role. Therefore, it usually does not emit and do not mean. For example, given the thesis: "God does not exist." We choose a dispute because of the evidence and ask: “why do you think so?”. The adversary cites evidence, and then we are dealing with this evidence and the question whether the thesis follows from them or not. It may rarely be necessary to take into account the antithesis.
In such cases, we usually undertake the antithesis only when, having finished the argument about the proof of the thesis, for example, having found out that the proof is erroneous, we turn to the dispute about the truth of the thesis. The combination of both these types of dispute is practiced often and is very desirable if it is possible; only both parts of such a composite dispute must be conducted, sharply distinguishing one from the other, sharply separating their tasks. For example, having broken the evidence in favor of the thesis of “God does not exist” given by the adversary, we can say this: “You see that the proof is unsuitable. Moreover, it is possible to prove that your thesis itself does not hold water. ” This will be a transition from a dispute about evidence to a dispute about a thesis, and then you have to come across the need for an antithesis: “God exists.”
From all this, it follows that the choice between a dispute due to the truth of a thought and a dispute due to a proof usually belongs to the assailant, the opponent. By establishing an antithesis or arguing against a thesis, he disputes a dispute because of a thesis; attacking the proof of the thesis, if it is given, and demanding it, if it is not given, he proposes these disputes because of the evidence. The defender of the thesis usually has one thing: to accept the proposed dispute or refuse, evading it.
This ability to "attack" in some cases gives a particularly skillful orator some advantage. The attacker can choose the form of the dispute, which is easier and more profitable in this case for him and more difficult for the enemy. Very often, when the debater is not fully convinced of her, he prefers to set the task of the dispute to the failure to prove the thesis. He chooses a dispute because of the proof and demands that we prove our thesis. It is well known that often we are completely and with full right of confidence in the truth of the thesis, but we cannot prove it, at least now to prove it right away. For example, the proof is forgotten by us, which happens very often. Then we have to either take the risk of trying to prove or reject the dispute. Both are often unprofitable. Meanwhile, if the enemy began to argue about the thesis and began to bring his own evidence (namely, to prove the thesis falsehood), then his case could have been lost.
TYPES OF DISPUTE
In addition to the dispute over the thesis and because of the proof, there are various other types of dispute, distinguished from various other points of view. They are also very important to remember.
There is a dispute focused and shapeless. A focused dispute is when those who argue all the time have in mind the controversial thesis, and everything that they say or that they give as evidence serves to refute or defend this thesis. In short, the dispute revolves around one center, one focus, without departing from it to the sides. The formless dispute does not have such a focus. It began because of one thesis. When exchanging objections, the disputants seized upon some argument or private thought and began to argue because of it, forgetting about the first thesis. Then they moved to the third thought, to the fourth, without completing the syllable anywhere, but turning it into a series of separate fights. By the end of the dispute, they ask: “why, in fact, did we begin our dispute,” and they cannot always remember it. A formless dispute is the lowest of these kinds of dispute. Of course, concentrated disputes are of the greatest importance in solving any issue. They, in turn, can be conducted randomly or in a known order, according to a known plan. Formless dispute is always messy.
You can argue together, one by one. It will be a simple, single dispute. But often a dispute takes place between several persons, each of whom enters into a dispute either from the defense of the thesis or from the attack. It will be a tough argument. Difficult dispute to conduct in the order and correctly more difficult, than simple dispute. This is self-evident. Often, such disputes turn into something completely unimaginable (example: various modern television talk shows). Meanwhile, a complex dispute, by and large, can be of enormous, exceptional importance, especially in those cases where people think, by means of a dispute, to come closer to the truth. It is best given the opportunity to listen to and weigh all or many of the arguments in favor of the thesis or against it and better evaluate their relative strength. Of course, in order to properly make such an assessment, in order to take all possible benefits out of a dispute, a good, healthy and clear mind is needed in itself, along with knowledge of the subject under discussion. But without a complicated dispute and such a mind it would be extremely rarely possible to quite correctly and confidently evaluate a thesis. And so it is everywhere: in science, and in public, and in private life. The more prominent in mind and knowledge of people involved in a complex dispute, the more persistent a dispute, the more important the thesis of a dispute, the better the results can be obtained, all other things being equal.
However, as noted above, it is difficult to conduct an arduous dispute in order, and the more participants in it, the more often it is more difficult. A dispute with many participants can, by itself, “settle down” well (especially an oral dispute) only in those cases when all the participants have a good discipline of mind, the ability to grasp the essence of what is being said, and an understanding of the essence, the task of the dispute. In other cases, a dispute manager is needed - “the chairman of the meeting” (example: the talk show “Gordon Quixote on the 1st channel of Russian television). And, I must say, skillful dispute leaders are quite rare. But often a complex dispute is conducted so illiterate that it disgusts the joint discussion of issues. Unfortunately, this happens during scientific disputes in scientific societies. And there are not uncommon "illiterate" in a logical sense disputes.
One of the most intractable obstacles to the good conduct of the dispute is the usual lack of knowledge in people to listen to another person. About this we have to talk now in more detail.
Both simple and complex disputes can occur with and without listeners. Sometimes this distinction has a huge, decisive influence not only on the nature of the dispute, but also on its outcome. The presence of listeners, even if they are completely silent and do not express any other approval or disapproval, usually affects those who argue, especially those who are selfish, impressionable and nervous. The victory at listeners flatters more vanity, the defeat becomes more annoying and unpleasant. From here there is greater persistence in opinions, a greater fervor in others, a greater inclination to resort to different dodge and evasions. Worse, if the audience, as often happens, somehow express their sympathies or antipathies, approval or disapproval. Some express them with a smile, a nod of their heads, a loud laugh, or other means. Some put in their approving or disapproving remarks: “Weak!”, “True!”, Etc., or meet, in their opinion, a good place with applause or shouting. Others are buzzing, mooing, roaring, cackling, whistling, etc., to the extent of their lack of culture. One step lower - and the fist comes into action, the strongest argument of ignorance and stupidity. You need an exceptional character or a long skill in order to completely ignore the listeners and argue as if one-on-one. You need to “harden yourself in battles” to achieve this goal. A person who is nervous and unlearned sympathy or lack of sympathy for the listeners always acts either in an exciting or depressing way.
In a dispute with listeners, if we, of course, care about their opinion, we have to apply not only to the enemy, but also to the listeners. Иной довод, например, годился бы без слушателей, при слушателях же мы его по той или иной причине не пустим в ход и должны будем искать другого довода. От таких случаев один только шаг до особого типа спора - спора для слушателей. Этот тип споров встречается очень часто, особенно в общественной жизни. Тут люди спорят не для приближения к истине, не для того, чтобы убедить друг друга, а исключительно для того, чтобы убедить слушателей или произвести на них то или иное впечатление. Например, предвыборное собрание. Члены двух партий сражаются друг друга. Только очень наивный человек может подумать, что они желают убедить друг друга. Они желают убедить «почтеннейшую публику» и потому подбирают по мере разумения такие доводы, которые понятны слушателям и сильнее всего могут на них подействовать. В серьёзном споре без слушателей эти доводы, может быть, отошли бы совершенно на второй план. Или возьмём собеседования с сектантами. Ни опытный миссионер, ни опытный сектантский начётчик обыкновенно нисколько и не помышляют убеждать друг друга. Это было бы несбыточным желанием. Оба пастыря заботятся только о «стаде», хотят убедить слушателей или, по крайней мере, произвести на них то или иное впечатление.
Кому приходится часто спорить при слушателях, тот должен ознакомиться на практике с «психологией слушателя» - предметом вообще небезынтересным. Прежде всего надо помнить, что большинство людей очень плохо умеют «слушать» чужие слова, особенно если речь не задевает их насущных, наиболее живых и реальных интересов. Часто можно заметить, что даже и противник в споре в буквальном смысле слова нас не слушает: взор его рассеянно блуждает или устремлен рассеянно вперёд, или же по лицу его видно, что он думает о чём-то своём. Но это не значит, что он нам не будет возражать. Он выхватит из наших слов какую-нибудь случайно задевшую его мысль, которую одну только, может быть, и слышал, и идёт в нападение. Но если человек даже старается внимательно слушать, это ещё не значит, что он «слышит», то есть понимает сущность того, что мы говорим. Если дело не касается предмета, который он знает как «дважды два четыре», и если он при этом не заинтересован живейшим образом в теме наших слов, он может совершенно не уловить сущности даже очень короткой реплики, в несколько фраз, не говоря уже о речах. Из-за этого пресловутого «неуменья слушать» друг друга многие споры обращаются в нечто невообразимо нелепое, в какой-то ужасающий сумбур. Что касается простого слушателя, не участвующего в споре, его положение обыкновенно ещё хуже. Исключая знатоков данного вопроса, живо заинтересованных спором, большинство часто поистине «хлопает ушами». Среди этого большинства можно выделить два главных типа слушателей. Одни явились с предвзятым мнением, симпатиями, антипатиями. Другие - не имеют никакого мнения по данному вопросу или не имеют твёрдого мнения. Первые будут поддерживать «своего», ему сочувствовать, ловить его мысли - какие в силах уловить - и не слушать или явно пристрастно слушать его противника. Вторые - будут судить о ходе спора главным образом по внешние признакам: по авторитету, по уверенному тону одного, по робости возражений другого, по отношению к спору «знатоков предмета» и т. д., и т. п. И у первых, и у вторых мысль работает очень мало. Эта пассивность мышления у большинства слушателей устного спора наблюдается всюду, от митинговых споров до споров в учёных сообществах. Она делает часто аудиторию действительно похожей на стадо. С этой особенностью приходится считаться каждому, кто спорит при слушателях. Она же является необычайно благоприятной почвой для воздействия всевозможных софистов. То же, хотя и в меньшей степени, можно сказать и о большинстве читателей. Умение читать - далеко не частая вещь. Иной читает очень много и усердно, а выносит очень мало, да ещё и превратно понятое.
Спор устный и спор письменный также сильно отличаются во многих отношениях. В устном споре, особенно если он ведётся при слушателях, часто очень важную роль играют «внешние» и психологические условия. Тут огромное значение имеют, например, внушительная манера держаться и говорить, самоуверенность, апломб и тому подобное. Робкий, застенчивый человек, особенно не привыкший спорить при многочисленных посторонних слушателях всегда проигрывает по сравнению с самоуверенным или даже иногда наглым. Затем огромное преимущество в устном споре получает быстрота мышления. Кто скорее мыслит, «за словом в карман не лезет», находчив, тот при одинаковом уме и запасе знаний всегда одолеет противника в устном споре. Большое преимущество в устном споре при слушателях имеет также уменье говорить метко и остроумно. Все эти внешние преимущества или совсем уничтожаются в письменном споре, или сглаживаются, и более может выступить на первый план внутренняя, логическая сторона спора.
Письменный спор гораздо более пригоден для выяснения истины, чем устный. Поэтому научные устные споры например, в научных сообществах, довольно редко имеют большую научную ценность. Тут тоже обычное неуменье слушать, как и во всех сложных спорах. Но зато письменный спор имеет другие недостатки. Он тянется слишком долго, иногда несколько лет. Читатели (занимающие здесь место слушателей) успевают забыть его отдельные звенья и не всегда имеют время и возможность восстановить их в памяти. Этим иногда широко пользуются спорящие для безнаказанного искажения мыслей противника, для ответов не по существу. Ещё хуже, когда спор ведётся не на страницах одного издания, а в двух или нескольких различных изданиях. Во многих случаях нам доступно только одно издание и поэтому поневоле приходится судить о ходе спора по ответам одной только стороны. Тут злоупотреблений – огромный простор. Особенно любопытны в этом отношении некоторые газетные споры. Иногда прочтёшь одну газету: из неё видно вполне ясно, что в споре некто А поразил некоего Б насмерть. Кто читает другую газету, тот вынесет впечатление, что, несомненно, наоборот Б «раздавил» А, как букашку. Читатели каждой из газет верят «своему» автору «своей» газеты. Но кто потрудится как следует прочесть спор в обеих газетах и сравнить доводы, тот иногда поразится «мастерством» обоих спорщиков. Оба пропускают мимо самые существенные доводы противника и цепляются за мелочи - искажают мысли противника, опровергают возражения, которых он не делал и так далее - и всё это говорится не иначе, как тоном победителя.
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Rhetoric
Terms: Rhetoric