8 Types of dispute (end)

Considering the disputes on their goals, we can distinguish 5 of the most important types of dispute.

Dispute to test the truth

Dispute can serve as a means to clarify the truth, to test any thought in the form of a test of its validity. For example, we are defending an idea from an opponent’s attacks, wanting to see what objections can be made against it and how strong these objections are. According to the words of the English philosopher and sociologist G. Spencer (2nd half of the XIX century), "the more we love the truth and the less we value victory, the more fervently we want to know why our opponents think differently than we do." Or vice versa, we attack the opponent’s idea with the aim of finding out what can be said in her favor. Moreover, in both cases, in the truth of the thought (whether it’s your own or the opponent’s) or falsity, we, as a rule, are not initially sure at all.

This type of dispute in mixed forms is quite common. People begin to argue with each other in order to listen to what can be said against such and such thought or in its favor. But in its pure form, such a dispute is rarely maintained to the end. Usually in the heat of a dispute, for example, after an adversary’s well-aimed objection, we continue the dispute no longer to investigate the truth, but to defend ourselves. In its pure form, this type of dispute is rare, only between very intelligent and calm people. If two such people come together in a dispute, and for both of them this idea does not seem to be true, cast in finished form, and both of them look at the dispute as a means of verification, then the dispute sometimes gets the special character of some special beauty. It delivers, in addition to the undoubted benefits, true pleasure and satisfaction, being a truly “mental feast” ( pluses : broadening the horizon on the subject under discussion, the consciousness that truth clarification has moved forward, subtle, calm excitement of mental struggle, aesthetic and intellectual pleasure. After such a dispute you feel tuned higher and better than before. Even if we have to “surrender the position”, give up the protected idea, some unpleasant consciousness of this can completely recede into the background compared with other impressions. Such a dispute is essentially a joint investigation of truth . This is the highest form of the dispute, the most noble and the most beautiful. Of course, all the features of such a dispute correspond to this definition: 1) the thesis is taken from the field of interest to both parties to the dispute; 2) the methods of such a “test dispute” are clean and immaculate, because once the case is about the study of truth, the very need for unclean methods, of course, disappears; 3) the arguments are taken the strongest in terms of their truth, and each new objection causes only a new interest; 4) finally, an adversary who is stronger in this matter than ourselves is desirable, or approximately equal in strength or, in any case, not too weak. The weakness of the enemy deprives the dispute of all the charm and a significant share of benefit.

“Verification disputes”, especially mixed ones, are often used by the authors of certain thoughts in order, before putting the thought that came to them into the press, to check it first in the oral exchange of thoughts. This is quite a reasonable technique. The person who wants to hold an event, subjects it to preliminary discussion and disputes, so that after this, weighing all the pros and cons, or abandon it, or modify it in some way, or implement it without any changes. .

Dispute for persuasion

A dispute may have a task not to verify the truth (truth in this case is implied to be already known to us), but to convince the adversary in it. This kind of dispute is relatively lower compared to the form of dispute just discussed above. In turn, it is possible to distinguish two most important shades, different in value: 1) the disputant can convince the opponent of something he is deeply convinced of (in this case, the task is the most disinterested - to argue only in order to make his opponent "An accomplice of truth"); 2) the disputant can convince and not at all because he is convinced of the truth of what he is protecting, or of the falsity of what he is attacking - he is convincing because “so necessary”, “so useful” for some purpose. Sometimes this is a good goal, sometimes deeply selfish, but in any case “outsider”.

Whatever the shade of a controversy controversy, this dispute is always different from a pure type 1 dispute. First of all, a reasonable person begins to argue in this case only about such a thesis, the truth of which can be persuaded by the enemy. Otherwise - a waste of time. Here, it’s not the thesis itself that is interesting to the persuader, but the adversary - whether he accepts this thesis or not. The enemy is usually not generally strong, it is annoying as an extra obstacle in achieving the goal. A new objection in a pure dispute of this type does not cause either pleasure or interest, while also being an unnecessary hindrance.

Techniques in this type of argument are quite often far from clean. Even in the higher shades of such a dispute, when it comes to convincing a person of the truth of what we consider true, the purity of methods is not always respected. When an adversary does not want to “be convinced”, not everyone will think: “you are not convinced of the truth - well, okay. You are harming yourself ”or“ it means there’s nothing to talk to you about ”- more often you can observe the continuation of the dispute in such cases. The reasons for this may be very different: others are not so easy to try on with failure; because of their pride, others love their neighbor too much to deprive them of the truth, and therefore they would like to use some tricks for the glory of the truth. For example, why not embellish one fact or another, not give it any details that were not given to it originally? Why not soften or thicken the paint? And is it really harmful small sophisms, if the goal is good and good? Similarly, lovers of the neighbor and the truth argue this way: “Here is a good man in front of me who does not want to accept the truth and resists when I want to impose this truth on him. How to leave the poor in error? I will take a sin for my soul, but delusion will break it. ” But these are benefactors of a soft nature - there were and there are more severe and decisive people, like the famous governors Dobrynia and Putyaty, who baptized the Novgorod land in their time: "Dobrynya baptize with fire, and Putiata with the sword."

If some debaters of the 1st shade are not shy in receptions, then debaters of the 2nd shade completely reject any constraint, who want to convince of the truth or falsity of thought, not because they themselves believe in them, but because they must be convinced. for example, preachers of various false doctrines and sects, simply obliged to convince, including through disputes). A strong adversary with this tinge of controversy is often a subject of fear and hatred, his every new strong objection is a wound in the very heart of a persuader. Subtleties such as honesty reception or dishonesty are not taken into account in this type of dispute.

Dispute over victory

Even lower should be considered a dispute when its purpose is not research, not conviction, but simply victory. There are various types of seekers of victory. Some are looking for victories because the laurels of verbal battles are dear to them; they are seduced by the glory of the “invincible dialectic”. Others are looking for victories because they just need to win the dispute - that’s what they are called upon to win (for example, a missionary in interviews with a sectarian must win. Or a party representative in a rally contest. He must, if not convince, then win). Laurels — whatever you like — but they must crown their heads: failure is simply unacceptable. It goes without saying that in such disputes often in receptions they do not limit themselves and are not shy in receptions - if only victory would be more effective. By the way, only in such disputes it is often necessary to have such a rather pitiful reception as “keep the last word”. Who is a sincere lover of verbal battles and laurels, he is looking for "worthy opponents", as the knights once used to look for worthy opponents in tournaments - the laurels over "trifles" do not seduce them. The disputant prefers a cheap but sure victory over weak opponents to a difficult and dubious victory over strong opponents. But if anyone has to win "ex officio," "in duty," he most often rests with his soul and is filled with cheerful vigor when meeting a weak opponent, in every way escaping the honor of meeting a strong adversary. With arguments in such a dispute, it is usually even less so. Often, they do not consider it necessary to disassemble the “subtleties”: does it matter how you hit the enemy with a sword, according to all the rules, or a shaft against any rules. The essence is the same. As for the theses, there are more “grateful” theses that differ from anywhere else, for example, you can “show dialectics”, and “ungrateful theses”, which require a very serious attitude and painstaking evidence. Whether the disputants believe in the truth of the thesis or not believe it is a completely secondary matter.

It goes without saying that disputes of this type are most often conducted before the listeners. If such a dispute happens without a listener, and it passes “brilliantly” for the debater, then another debater, long reliving the memory of the “brilliant moves” he made in the argument, will longingly have no decent listener with them: half the fun has been spoiled victory How much art "wasted for nothing"!

It goes without saying that in both of the last types of dispute - and in a dispute for persuasion and a dispute for victory - debaters often use not so much logic and not so much arguments of reason as means of oratory persuasiveness: impressive tone, sharp words, beauty of expression, arousal of the necessary feelings and the like by countless means of oratory. Of course, truth and logic are less cared for than it would be necessary.

Dispute-sport

The fourth, not so bright and certain type of dispute, but meeting quite often is a dispute for the sake of a dispute, a kind of sport. There are lovers of the dispute, the process of the dispute itself. They are not striving, definitely or consciously, to win without fail, although, of course, they hope so. Rather, they are forced to enter into a dispute with some "attraction," itch to an argument. They are similar to a certain Alexei Mikhailovich Pushkin, which can be read in Moscow’s Griboedovskaya, M.O. Gershenzon: “in the morning he was looking for someone to argue, and argued with surprising eloquence that white is black, black is white.” And others are directly similar to the ruff from "The Humpback Horse" ("Be merciful, brothers, give a little fight").

Such an “athlete” doesn’t make out often, because of which one can argue, and because of what one shouldn’t - he is ready to argue about everything and everyone, and the more paradoxical the more difficult it is to defend a thought, the more attractive it is for him. For others, there is no paradox at all that they would not undertake to defend, it is only for the opponent to say "no." At the same time, they often become in the most risky positions in a dispute and, in order to at least maintain balance and twist, they paralyze the paradox of paradox and resort to the most various sophisms and tricks. Today, such an athlete proves that A is B, and so hot, as if nothing more important and more serious than this question in the world exists. Tomorrow, he will prove that A is not B, but B, and with the same force he is excited. Watch this type of debaters can often, especially among young people.

Dispute game

The 5th type of dispute is not found now in its pure form: dispute-game, dispute-exercise. The essence of this type is expressed in its name. He flourished in the ancient world, especially in ancient Greece. Here's how this game is described by William Minto, a professor of logic at the University of Aberdeen (Scotland) (late 19th century) in his book “Deductive and Inductive Logic”: “Two argue; but they do not set out in turn their views in whole speeches, as is done in the current debate. The ancient Greeks, one of the interlocutors only offered questions, the other only gave answers. The respondent could say only “yes” or “no”, sometimes only with a little explanation; the questioner, for his part, should have offered only such questions that allow only a simple answer: “yes”, “no”. The purpose of the questioner is to force the interlocutor to agree with a statement that contradicts the thesis that he undertook to defend, that is, to lead him to a contradiction with himself. But since only a very stupid interlocutor could immediately fall on this bait, the questioner offered him general provisions, analogies, examples from everyday life, led him from one assumption to another, and finally comparing them all together, forced him to admit inconsistency.