Lecture
Among the most common and favorite tricks are the so-called sophisms or deliberate mistakes in the proof. One must constantly bear in mind that sophism and error do not differ in substance, not logically, but only psychologically: they differ only in that the error is not intentional, sophism is intended. If, for example, during the dispute, we unwittingly retreated from the thesis, it would be a mistake. If, having noticed that such a retreat can be profitable for us, we will repeat it consciously, deliberately, in the hope that the enemy will not notice, it will be sophistry.
There are an infinite number of sophisms in the retreat from the task of the dispute and in the retreat from the thesis .
You can start a dispute with this sophism or error, immediately taking, for example, the wrong thesis, which is necessary; you can do it in the middle of a dispute You can completely discard the old thesis, you can only more or less change it, etc., etc. But the logical essence will be one - a departure from the task of the dispute, a departure from the thesis.
First of all, it is necessary to mention the frequent and very important substitution of a dispute over a thesis by a dispute over a proof. The sophist must prove that the thesis is false. Instead, he examines those proofs of the thesis that are given by the adversary, and confines himself to breaking them, if possible. Most often, however, the case is not limited to this. If you managed to break the evidence of the enemy, the correct conclusion from here is one: "the thesis of the enemy is not proven." But the sophist pretends that the conclusion is different: that the thesis is refuted. This is one of the most frequent tricks, and, due to the usual inability to distinguish a dispute due to thesis and a dispute due to evidence, also due to the usual lack of clarity in the opponent’s thinking and the inability to embrace the dispute, it usually succeeds. For example, at the trial, a lawyer smashes all evidence of the guilt of the accused, cited by the prosecutor. Hence the direct conclusion - guilt is not proven, but the lawyer sometimes makes another conclusion: “the defendant is not guilty.” The conclusion can go even further: "justified, then not guilty."
To this kind of sophism refers the translation of a dispute into contradictions. It is often very important and necessary to indicate that an adversary contradicts himself. But not to prove the falsity of his thesis. Often with their help you can break or weaken the evidence of the enemy. But it is impossible to refute his thesis by merely pointing out the contradictory thinking of the opponent. For example, someone expressed the thesis: "Education at the department of missiology is useful, but little is spent on classes for the people." There is a contradiction - if the study at the department of missiology is useful, why then few people go to classes in such a case? But an indication of this apparent inconsistency does not mean that the main thesis is refuted - “teaching at the department of missiology is useful.” Meanwhile, often the dispute, whose task is to show the truth or falsity of the thesis, is translated into contradictions in the mindset of the adversary. At the same time, having shown that there are contradictions, they often pretend that the enemy is completely defeated, and his thesis is false. A trick that often passes with impunity.
This also includes the translation of the dispute to the contradictions between word and deed; between the views of the enemy and his actions, life, etc. Sometimes it takes the form: “doctor, heal yourself!”. This is one of the favorite and common forms of "mouth clamping."
It is clear that such objections are sophistries, if a person knows what he is saying. Therefore, if the question of truth or falsity, the morality or immorality of any thought is considered in essence, any reference to the personality of the adversary is the essence of deviation from the task of the dispute. This is one of the types of "pinching the mouth" of the enemy and has nothing to do with a fair fight in a dispute over the truth. As a method of conviction, it may be appropriate, and often necessary. But reproof and an honest argument for truth as the struggle of one thought with another thought are two incompatible things.
However, this trick has an extremely strong effect on the adversary (he often pinches his mouth) and on the listeners. Even if there is no contradiction between our principle and behavior, it is sometimes difficult to prove it, it requires subtle distinctions, lengthy reasoning, which the listeners do not delve into and which are not particularly loved. Meanwhile, the sophistic argument is simple and vital.
When we bring in proof of a thesis not one argument, but several, the sophist often resorts to an “incomplete refutation”. He tries to refute one, two arguments, the weakest or most effectively refutable, leaving the rest, often the most significant and only important, without attention. At the same time, he pretends that he has refuted all the evidence and that the enemy is “broken along the whole front”. If the dispute over these one or two arguments was long and bitter, then the listeners, and often not very able to argue, may not remember the most important. Thus, the trick is often possible. It is especially used in written disputes, on the pages of various books, newspapers, etc. There, the reader often cannot verify whether all the arguments are answered.
Among the frequent deviations from the problem of a dispute is the substitution of a point of disagreement in a complex controversial thought, the so-called refutation is not substantive . The sophist does not refute the very essence of complex controversial thought. He takes some unimportant particulars of hers and refutes them, and pretends to refute the thesis. This trick is also more common in written disputes. These disputes are “for the reader”: the reader probably did not remember the thesis, and if he remembers, he will not understand the trick. For example, suppose that a note appeared in the newspaper “Chersonese Messenger”, in which the thought was expressed: “The Sevastopol Orthodox People’s University, organized in the mid-2000s by the teacher of the rhetoric of this educational institution, still exists.” The sophist declares: “This is not true” - and refutes this complex judgment. But he refutes in him not the essence, not that which should have been refuted, not the idea that “SPNU exists still”, but the detail: “SPNU is organized by the teacher of the rhetoric of this educational institution” (the teacher of rhetoric in the mid-2000s still was not in Sevastopol). In this case, you can, of course, say that there is an error in the thesis (without mentioning that this error is in not such an important detail). But the essence is not in it.
It is clear that this kind of sophistry is "a substitute for the point of disagreement"; more precisely, the substitution of a substantial point of disagreement for an insignificant, unimportant.
It is perfectly to leave the former task of the dispute, an unsuccessful thesis or argument during a dispute, and go on to the others - this means "to make a diversion." Diversion is done in various ways. The crudest way is that arguing frankly leaves the argument or thesis and grabs at the other. This happens extremely often. Often, sabotage consists of a "transition to personal ground." For example, a young idealist proves to an experienced, elderly person that such and such an act is weak-minded and dishonest. He first began to argue, but, seeing that his business was bad, he made a diversion: “You are still very young and inexperienced. Live, learn life and you will agree with me. ” The young man began to argue that youth is nothing to do with it, that "he knows life." Diversion failed. Sometimes for sabotage, they deliberately find and put forward some kind of paradox or an opinion on which the adversary will certainly not fail to “pounce”. This is a kind of "bait for sabotage." Often sabotage is done very subtly and unnoticed, with gradual transitions, etc.
If the dispute is not about the thesis, but because of the proof, then the diversion is that the defender of the thesis leaves to prove his thesis, and begins to refute ours or demands that we prove our thesis. Here is an example. Someone started a dispute with somebody about the evidence. After many labors, one of the disputants, seeing that his business was not moving forward, turned to the enemy with a claim: “Why, I’m proving my opinion, and you only criticize. Criticize easily. Prove that your opinion is better? Why are you so convinced of him? ” The one to whom it was said is little versed in the technique of a dispute and begins to be ashamed: how this, in fact, my opponent proves and works, and I only criticize! Diversion failed. He began to prove his thesis and "lost the attack."
It is not useless in conclusion to note that any sabotage, if we “leave” the previous thesis, turns the concentrated dispute into the formless. When sabotage from argument or evidence, the dispute, of course, may remain concentrated.
It is necessary to distinguish another kind of sophistry from sabotage associated with a departure from a thesis or argument — a change in the thesis or argument . Among the various types of such a substitution is primarily the expansion or contraction of the thesis (or argument). For example, at first, the disputant put the thesis: “all people are egoists,” but, seeing that it cannot be proved, and the opponent’s objections are strong, he begins to assert that the thesis was simply “people are egoists” (“And you had to understand him so widely! I meant, of course, not all, but only the majority ”). If, on the contrary, the enemy put the thesis “people are egoists”, the sophist tries to interpret him in a more advantageous sense: in the sense that “all people are egoists”, since in this form it is easier to refute the thesis. In general, the sophist usually tries to narrow down his thesis, if the matter is bad, then it is easier to defend him. He tries to expand the thesis of the opponent, because then it is easier to refute him. Often he resorts to various tricks to force the enemy himself to rashly expand his thesis. This is sometimes not difficult, prompting a “spirit of contradiction” in the heated head.
More examples of another kind of expansion and contraction of the thesis. Thesis: "Someone is well acquainted with Russian literature." The attacker expands it: “Someone is a connoisseur of literature in general,” the defender narrows down: “Someone is well acquainted with modern Russian literature.”
Related to the expansion and contraction of the thesis, strengthening and softening it. They lead to a distortion of the thesis and are found, perhaps, more often. The thesis was given, for example, this: "our ministers are mediocre." The enemy distorts him, reinforcing: “you say that our ministers are idiots?”. The defender of the thesis, if the matter is bad, tries to soften the thesis: “no, I just said that our ministers are not at the height of their vocation”. Or another example. Thesis: "The source of this money is very suspicious." The enemy reinforces the thesis: “you say that this money is stolen?”. The defender, if he finds it necessary, softens the thesis: "I said only that the source of this money is unknown." Strengthening the thesis is usually advantageous for the attacker and is often made extremely unceremoniously and brazenly. Softening a thesis is usually done by a defender of it, since it helps the defense. In softening the thesis, they often do not particularly stand on ceremony either.
One of the most frequent substitution of the thesis (and argument) is that an idea that is cited with a known reservation, with known conditions under which it is true, is replaced by the same thought, but already expressed “in general”, without any conditions and reservations. This trick is most often encountered with refutations and has the most success with underdeveloped mentally listeners. The underdeveloped mind tends to understand everything unpretentiously; he does not know how to note subtle differences in thoughts - he does not understand them, he does not love them directly, and sometimes he simply does not tolerate. They are too hard for him. Therefore, subtle distinctions seem to such a person either “tricks”, “intricacies”, “sophisms”, or (if he is somewhat educated) “unnecessary scholasticism.” This partly implies the difficulty of a dispute about complex issues that require accurate and subtle analysis and distinction, with an undeveloped adversary or, especially, with undeveloped listeners. And such issues include, for example, most of the political, state and public and similar issues. On this basis, the sophist, all other things being equal, has a great advantage. An honest participant in the dispute will make the correct argument, with the necessary reservations, expressed quite accurately. But an undeveloped listener usually does not catch, does not remember these reservations and conditions, and does not appreciate their importance at all. Taking advantage of this, the sophist deliberately omits reservations and conditions in the opponent's argument or thesis and refutes the thesis or argument as if the thought was expressed without them. The strengthening of a thesis often comes to the rescue here, oratorical techniques - “indignation” and the like. All this affects the undeveloped listener very strongly, and a lot of composure, resourcefulness and wit are needed to repel such an attack, especially if the public sympathizes with the views of the sophist. Here is an example: someone argues that "the death penalty is necessary under certain circumstances and conditions." The enemy refutes him in front of the audience as if someone claimed that the death penalty is generally necessary, and calls him "an ardent defender of the death penalty", while throwing at it the thunder of indignation and indignation. Undeveloped and sympathizing with the sophist, the listeners, too, are beginning to be outraged - “as was required to prove.
The reverse trick is when what was claimed without a reservation, without conditions, then approved with reservation and condition. It is more common in the defending side. For example, at first a person claimed that “he should not go to war” in general, under any circumstances. Squeezed to the wall, he replaces this statement: "Of course, I did not mean cases when the enemy attacks and ruins the country." Then he can enter some more reservation.
These tricks (especially the latter) are greatly contributed by the incompleteness and inaccuracy of ordinary speech. We very often express a thought only with the implied reservations. These reservations are self-evident because, if we express them, the speech becomes a sort of clutter of reservations - unusually heavy and inconvenient.
Thus, reservations are implied at every step, and this leads to the possibility of countless mistakes and sophisms. Someone says: "arsenic is poison." This implies the clause "if you take it more well-known number." Another puts down this reservation and says: “The doctor prescribed arsenic for me, which means he is poisoning me.” In Shakespeare in “The Merchant of Venice”, Shylock concludes a condition with merchant Antonio: if Antonio delays a bill, then he, Shylock, has the right to cut out “a pound of meat as close as possible to his heart”. The transaction is framed completely legitimate. - The bill is overdue, and Shylock requires an agreed penalty. A wise judge (Portia) makes Antonio like that. “On this receipt,” she says, “
"You have the right to take
Only pound meat; it is exactly a pound of meat
Written; but does not give the right
She you on one blot.
So take what follows you - a pound of meat, but, cutting the meat,
Kohl a drop of blood Christian you
Shed - your belongings and land
Take the country of the republic itself.
That is the law of Venice.
Lawyers in the last century argued that Portia’s decision was correct from a legal point of view. Opinions were very different. But from the point of view of logic, the decision is undoubtedly a sophism. When someone says that it is necessary to cut a piece of meat from a living body, he inevitably implies that blood is shed, and who agrees to such a meat tenderloin, he agrees to the implied inevitable condition of this meathole - blood shedding. So Portia deliberately changed the condition of the contract, taking advantage of the fact that it was expressed usually, without exhaustive accuracy and completeness.
Other forms of substitution of thesis and arguments are quite numerous and varied. Let us briefly list the most common and important ones.
The same word can mean different thoughts. Therefore, it is often easy, keeping the same words of thesis (or argument), to first give them one meaning, then another (one of the most common sophisms). We often do not even notice how many different meanings have the same word. Therefore, it is easy to defeat us to a sophist who perfectly distinguishes all these meanings. Take the word "people". Rarely did anyone try to understand its meanings, and nevertheless there are many of them: a) people means the same as the little-used word “nationality” (“peoples of Europe”; “studying peoples”; “ethnology”); b) people - all citizens of the same state, united by citizenship to him. So they say about the "Russian people" as opposed to the "Austrian", about the "English people", etc .; c) the people - the lower classes of the population, opposed by the intelligentsia, to the "ruling classes", etc. Hence the terms: "go to the people", "populists", the expression "he left the people", etc .; d) people - generally means a collection of people, without distinction of classes, nationality, etc., or rather, a group of people who are in one place (“there are many people on the street”). It goes without saying how easy it was to “play” with such a word in sophisms, for example, the same revolutionaries. When a handful of “people” (workers, peasants, etc.) gather on the streets and declare “the will of the people”, there is an unconscious substitution of thought;and when an orator, an experienced sophist and demagogue, said to this crowd: “you are a people, the people's will must be fulfilled,” he, changing the meaning of the word, often deliberately changed the argument or thesis. And there are a lot of such “polysemantic words” as “people”.
Очень часто пользуются свойствами так называемых синонимов - слов и выражений, различных по звукам, но обозначающих разные оттенки одного и того же понятия. Если эти различия в оттенках не существенны для данного вопроса, то синонимы можно употреблять один вместо другого безразлично. Если же они существенны, то получается более или менее важное изменение тезиса. Особенно в этом отношении важна разница, если она сопровождается различием и в оценке, оттенком похвалы или порицания. Например, далеко не всё равно сказать «некто благочестив» и «некто - ханжа», «ревность в вере» и «фанатизм», «протест» и «возмущение» и т. д. Если мы высказали тезис: «ревность к вере - обязанность каждого религиозного человека», а противник мой изменил его: «вот вы утверждаете, что каждый религиозный человек должен быть фанатиком», то он исказил мой тезис. Он внёс в него оттенок, благоприятный для опровержения, вложил признаки, которые делают тезис незащитимым. Конечно, сказать, что фанатизм – это обязанность каждого христианина – просто нелепо. Или, скажем, мы утверждаем, что «священники должны получить такие-то и такие-то преимущества». Мой противник излагает этот тезис так: «этот человек думает, что попы должны обладать какими-то преимуществами». Название «поп» в данном случае имеет некоторый пренебрежительный оттенок, и, внося его в тезис, противник тем самым вносит понижение устойчивости тезиса. Вообще эта уловка, вероятно, самая употребительная. Люди прибегают к ней как бы инстинктивно, стараясь обозначить понятие названием, наиболее благоприятным для себя и наиболее неблагоприятным для противника. И чем грубее ум, тем грубее и примитивнее выходят и подобные софизмы.
Огромное значение имеет «перевод вопроса на точку зрения пользы или вреда». Надо доказать, что мысль истинна или ложна; доказывают, что она полезна для нас или вредна. Надо доказать, что поступок нравственен или безнравственен; доказывают, что он выгоден или невыгоден для нас и т. д. Например, нужно доказать, что «Бог существует»; доказывают, что Он и вера в Его бытие приносит утешение и счастье. Часто нет убедительнее доводов для среднего человека, чем те выводы, которые затрагивают насущные интересы его. Даже самые простые доводы, чисто «карманного свойства» (argumenta ad bursam), имеют волшебное действие. Один довод, действующий на волю, живо и ярко рисующий выгоду или невыгоду чего-нибудь, иногда сильнее сотни доводов, действующих на разум. Если же мы имеем дело со слушателями невежественными, тёмными, не умеющими тщательно вникать в вопрос и обсуждать его, то на них ловкий довод «от выгоды», живо и понятно рисующий, какую ближайшую пользу или вред человек может получить от мероприятия и т. д., действует часто совершенно безотказно. Они «зачарованы» предвкушением будущей выгоды, они даже не желают слушать доводы против. От рассуждений о неосуществимости того или иного, о вредных последствиях, которые могут наступить потом, они сознательно отмахиваются. Само собой ясно, какая в этом благодарная почва для софистов; как пышно растёт на ней всякая демагогия. Это отлично знает и каждый «мошенник слова». Поэтому данная уловка — любимое орудие подобных мошенников.
Остроумную заметку об этой уловке высказал философ Артур Шопенгауэр: «Там, где применима эта уловка, остальные можно и не применять. Действуйте не на разум, с помощью доводов, а на волю, с помощью мотивов; тогда и противник и слушатели, если у них такие же интересы, как у него, сейчас же согласятся с вашим мнением, хотя бы оно было заимствовано из дома сумасшедших. Ведь лот воли весит по большей части тяжелее, чем центнер рассуждения и убеждения… Когда мы сумеем осязательно доказать противнику, что мнение его, если бы оно приобрело значение, нанесёт существенный вред его интересам, он также поспешно отшвырнёт это мнение, как раскалённое железо, которое нечаянно схватил в руку».
Comments
To leave a comment
Rhetoric
Terms: Rhetoric