Lecture
In cognitive science, cognitive biases are understood as systematic errors in thinking, or patterned deviations, that arise from dysfunctional beliefs embedded in cognitive schemas and are readily detected through the analysis of automatic thoughts . The existence of most cognitive biases has been described by researchers, and many have been demonstrated in psychological experiments .A cognitive bias is a systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment.
Cognitive biases are an example of evolutionarily developed behavior. Some of them serve an adaptive function, since they promote more effective actions or faster decision-making. Others appear to arise from a lack of appropriate thinking skills, or from the inappropriate application of skills that were adaptive in other conditions.
The development and application of methods for correcting cognitive biases that cause problems of an emotional, personal or social nature is the subject of various fields of psychotherapy, in particular cognitive psychotherapy.
People create their own “subjective reality” based on their perception of input. A person’s construction of reality, rather than objective input, may dictate their behavior in the world. Thus, cognitive biases can sometimes lead to distorted perception, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, or what is broadly called irrationality .
Although such misconceptions might seem to be aberrations, biases can help people find commonalities and shortcuts that aid in navigating common life situations.
Some cognitive biases are presumably adaptive. Cognitive biases may lead to more effective actions in a given context. In addition, admitting cognitive biases allows for faster decisions, which may be desirable when timeliness is more important than accuracy, as shown in heuristics . Other cognitive biases are a “by-product” of the limitations of human processing arising from the lack of appropriate mental mechanisms ( bounded rationality ), the influence of a person’s constitution and biological state (see embodied cognition ), or simply from the limited capacity to process information .
A constantly growing list of cognitive biases has been identified over the past six decades of research into human judgment and decision-making in cognitive science, social psychology and behavioral economics . Daniel Kahneman and Tversky (1996) argue that cognitive biases have effective practical significance for such fields as clinical judgment, entrepreneurship, finance and management.
The concept of cognitive biases was introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in 1972 and grew out of their experience with people’s innumeracy , or their inability to reason intuitively with large orders of magnitude . Tversky, Kahneman and their colleagues demonstrated several reproducible ways in which human judgments and decisions differ from rational choice theory . Tversky and Kahneman explained differences in human judgment and decision-making in terms of heuristics. Heuristics involve mental shortcuts that allow for a quick estimate of the probability of uncertain events. Heuristics are easy for the brain to compute, but they sometimes lead to “severe and systematic errors”.
For example, the representativeness heuristic is defined as the “tendency to assess the frequency or probability” of an event by the degree to which the event “resembles a typical case”.
The “Linda problem” illustrates the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Participants were given a description of “Linda” that suggests Linda may well be a feminist (for example, she is concerned about discrimination and social justice issues). They were then asked whether they thought Linda was more likely to be (a) “a bank teller” or (b) “a bank teller and active in the feminist movement”. Most chose answer (b). This error (mathematically, answer (b) cannot be more probable than answer (a)) is an example of the “ conjunction fallacy ”; Tversky and Kahneman argued that respondents chose option (b) because it seemed more “representative”, or typical, of people who might fit Linda’s description. The representativeness heuristic can lead to errors such as stereotype activation and inaccurate judgments of others (Haselton et al., 2005, p. 726).
Critics of Kahneman and Tversky, such as Gerd Gigerenzer , have also argued that heuristics should not lead us to think that human reasoning is riddled with irrational cognitive biases. Rather, they should regard rationality as an adaptive tool, not identical to the rules of formal logic or the probability calculus . Nevertheless, experiments such as the “Linda problem” grew into research programs on heuristics and biases that spread beyond academic psychology into other disciplines, including medicine and political science.
Cognitive biases are systematic patterns of deviation from norm and / or rationality of judgment. They are often studied in psychology and behavioral economics .
Although the reality of most of these biases is confirmed by reproducible research, there is often debate about how to classify these biases or how to explain them. Several theoretical causes are known for some cognitive biases , which makes it possible to classify biases by their common generative mechanism (e.g., noisy information processing). Gerd Gigerenzer criticized the notion of cognitive biases as errors in judgment and supports interpreting them as the result of rational deviations from logical reasoning.
Explanations include information-processing rules (i.e. mental shortcuts), called heuristics , that the brain uses to produce decisions or judgments. Biases take many forms and manifest as cognitive (“cold”) biases, such as mental noise, or motivational (“hot”) biases, for example when beliefs are distorted by wishful thinking . Both effects can be present at the same time.
There is also disagreement about some of these biases as to whether they are considered useless or irrational , or whether they lead to useful attitudes or behavior. For example, when getting to know other people, people tend to ask leading questions that seem biased toward confirming their assumptions about the person. However, this kind of confirmation bias is also considered an example of a social skill ; a way of connecting with another person.
Although this research mainly involves humans, some findings demonstrating bias have also been found in non-human animals. For example, loss aversion has been demonstrated in monkeys, and hyperbolic discounting in rats, pigeons and monkeys.
Biases can be distinguished along a number of dimensions. For a more complete list, see the list of cognitive biases . Examples of cognitive biases include:
Other biases arise from how the brain perceives, forms memories and makes judgments. This distinction is sometimes described as “hot cognition” versus “cold cognition”, since motivated reasoning can involve a state of arousal . Among the “cold” biases
The fact that some biases reflect motivation, in particular the motivation to hold a positive attitude toward oneself, accounts for the fact that many biases are self-serving or self-directed (e.g. the illusion of asymmetric insight , self-serving bias ). There are also biases in how subjects evaluate their own or other groups; evaluating in-groups as more diverse and “better” in many respects, even when these groups are arbitrarily defined ( in-group bias , out-group homogeneity bias ).
Some cognitive biases belong to the subgroup of attentional biases , which involve paying increased attention to certain stimuli. For example, it has been shown that people dependent on alcohol and other drugs pay more attention to drug-related stimuli. Common psychological tests for measuring these biases are the Stroop task and the dot-probe task .
People’s susceptibility to some types of cognitive biases can be measured using the cognitive reflection test (CRT), developed by Shane Frederick (2005).



Methods for defending one’s opinion under such biases are usually:


A large group of biases related to behavior and decision-making. Most of them are related to attribution errors.
Many of these cognitive biases are often studied in connection with how they affect business and how they affect experimental research.


These biases affect the formation of beliefs, thought processes, business and economic decisions, and human behaviour in general.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Agent detection | False priors | The tendency to assume purposeful intervention by an intelligent or rational agent. |
| Ambiguity effect | Prospect theory | The tendency to avoid options for which the probability of a favourable outcome is unknown. |
| Anchoring or focalism | Anchoring bias | The tendency to rely too heavily, or “anchor”, on one trait or piece of information when making decisions (usually the first piece of information received on the subject). |
| Anthropocentric thinking | Availability bias | The tendency to use human analogies as a basis for reasoning about other, less familiar biological phenomena. |
| Anthropomorphism or personification |
Availability bias | The tendency to characterize animals, objects and abstract concepts as possessing human traits, emotions and intentions. The opposite bias — not attributing feelings or thoughts to another person — is dehumanized perception, a kind of objectification. |
| Attentional bias | Availability bias | The tendency toward perception through recurring thoughts. |
| Attribute substitution | Occurs when a judgement (about a target attribute) needs to be made that is computationally difficult, and a more easily computed heuristic attribute is substituted for it instead. This substitution is believed to take place in the automatic, intuitive system of judgement rather than in the reflective system with greater self-awareness. | |
| Automation bias | False priors | The tendency to depend excessively on automated systems, which can lead to erroneous automated information overriding correct decisions. |
| Availability heuristic | Availability bias | The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater “availability” in memory, which may depend on how recent the memories are or how unusual or emotionally charged they may be. |
| Backfire effect | Confirmation bias | Reacting to disconfirming evidence by strengthening one’s prior beliefs. Note: the existence of this systematic error as a widespread phenomenon is disputed in empirical studies. |
| Base rate fallacy or base rate neglect |
Extension neglect | The tendency to ignore general information and focus on information relating only to the specific case, even when the general information is more important. |
| Belief bias | Believability | An effect whereby someone’s assessment of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion. |
| Berkson’s paradox | Logical fallacy | The tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional probabilities. |
| Clustering illusion | Apophenia | The tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks or clusters in large samples of random data (that is, seeing phantom patterns). |
| Compassion fade | Extension neglect | A predisposition to treat a small number of identifiable victims more compassionately than a large number of anonymous ones. |
| Confirmation bias | Confirmation bias | The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way that confirms one’s prior beliefs. |
| Congruence bias | Confirmation bias | The tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing possible alternative hypotheses. |
| Conjunction fallacy | Extension neglect | The tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than a more general version of the same conditions. For example, participants in one experiment judged the probability that a woman would be simultaneously a bank teller and a feminist as more probable than the probability that she would be a bank teller. |
| Conservatism bias (belief revision) |
Anchoring bias | The tendency to insufficiently revise one’s belief when presented with new evidence. |
| Continued influence effect | Confirmation bias | The tendency to believe previously received misinformation even after it has been corrected. The misinformation can still affect conclusions drawn after the correction. cf. Backfire effect |
| Contrast effect | Framing effect | The strengthening or weakening of the perception of a given stimulus compared to a recently observed contrasting object. |
| Curse of knowledge | When more informed people find it extremely difficult to think about problems from the point of view of less informed people. | |
| Declinism | The tendency to view the past positively (rosy retrospection) and to view the future negatively. | |
| Decoy effect | Framing effect | Preferences for option A or B shift in favour of option B when option C is presented, which is completely dominated by option B (inferior in every respect) and partially dominated by option A. |
| Default effect | Framing effect | When given a choice among several options, the tendency to favour the default option. |
| Denomination effect | Framing effect | The tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (for example, coins) rather than large ones (for example, banknotes). |
| Disposition effect | Prospect theory | The tendency to sell an asset that has increased in value, and reluctance to sell an asset that has fallen in value. |
| Distinction bias | Framing effect | The tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately. |
| Dread aversion | Prospect theory | Just as losses carry twice the emotional impact of gains, dread carries twice the emotional impact of enjoyment. |
| Dunning – Kruger effect | The tendency of unskilled people to overestimate their abilities and the tendency of experts to underestimate their abilities. | |
| Duration neglect | Extension neglect | Neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value. |
| Empathy gap | The tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings, either in oneself or in others. | |
| End-of-history illusion | The age-independent belief that one will change less in the future than one has in the past. | |
| Endowment effect | Prospect theory | The tendency of people to demand much more for an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it. |
| Exaggerated expectation | The tendency to expect or predict more extreme outcomes than those that actually occur. | |
| Experimenter’s or expectation bias |
Confirmation bias | The tendency of experimenters to believe, confirm and publish data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, reject or downgrade the corresponding weight for data that appear to contradict those expectations. |
| Forer effect or Barnum effect |
Egocentric bias | The observation that people will rate the accuracy of descriptions of their personality highly, as though the descriptions were created specifically for them, when in fact they are vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. This effect may partly explain the widespread acceptance of certain beliefs and practices, such as astrology, fortune-telling, graphology and certain types of personality tests. |
| Form function attribution bias | In human–robot interaction — the tendency of people to make systematic errors when interacting with a robot. People may base their expectations and perception of a robot on its appearance (form) and attribute functions to it that do not necessarily reflect the robot’s true functions. | |
| Framing effect | Framing effect | Drawing different conclusions from the same information depending on how that information is presented. |
| Frequency illusion or Baader – Meinhof phenomenon |
Availability bias | The frequency illusion consists in the fact that once something has been noticed, every instance of that phenomenon is noticed, leading to the belief that the phenomenon occurs very often (a form of selection bias). The Baader-Meinhof phenomenon is an illusion in which something that has recently caught one’s attention suddenly appears again shortly afterward with improbable frequency. It was named after an instance of the frequency illusion that referenced the Baader – Meinhof group. |
| Functional fixedness | Anchoring bias | Limits a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used. |
| Gambler’s fallacy | Logical fallacy | The tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, although in reality they are not changed. The fallacy arises from a mistaken conception of the law of large numbers. For example, “I have flipped heads on this coin five times in a row, so the probability of getting tails on the sixth flip is much higher than heads.” |
| Gender bias | False priors | A widespread set of implicit prejudices that discriminate on the basis of sex. For example, the assumption that women are less suited to work requiring high intellectual ability. Or the assumption that people or animals are male in the absence of any indication of sex. Or the assumption that academia discriminates against women, even though in US colleges and graduate schools there are more women than men, and they receive the majority of bachelor’s and master’s degrees. |
| Hard – easy effect | The tendency to overestimate one’s ability to perform difficult tasks and underestimate one’s ability to perform easy tasks. | |
| Hindsight bias | Sometimes called the “knew-it-all-along” effect, the tendency to view past events as predictable at the time they occurred. | |
| Hot-hand fallacy | Logical fallacy | The “hot-hand fallacy” (also known as the “hot-hand phenomenon” or “hot hand”) is the belief that a person who has succeeded as a result of a random event has a greater chance of further success in additional attempts. |
| Hyperbolic discounting | Extension neglect | Discounting is the tendency of people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs compared with later payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting leads to choices that become inconsistent over time — people today make choices that their future selves would prefer not to have made, despite the same reasoning. Also known as present-moment bias, present bias, and related to dynamic inconsistency. A good example of this: a study found that when choosing food for the coming week, 74% of participants chose fruit, whereas when the food choice was for the current day, 70% chose chocolate. |
| IKEA effect | The tendency of people to place a disproportionately high value on items they partially assembled themselves, such as IKEA furniture, regardless of the quality of the finished product. | |
| Illicit transference | Logical fallacy | Occurs when a term in the distributive (referring to each member of a class) and collective (referring to the class itself as a whole) sense is treated as equivalent. Two variants of this fallacy are the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division. |
| Illusion of control | Egocentric bias | The tendency to overestimate one's influence over other external events. |
| Illusion of validity | Egocentric bias | Overestimating the accuracy of one's own judgements, especially when available information is consistent or interrelated. |
| Illusory correlation | Apophenia | Inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two unrelated events. |
| Illusory truth effect | Truthiness | A tendency to believe that a statement is true if it is easier to process, or if it has been stated multiple times, regardless of its actual veracity. These are specific cases of truthiness. |
| Impact bias | The tendency to overestimate the duration or intensity of the impact of future feeling states. | |
| Implicit association | Availability bias | The speed with which people can match words depends on how closely associated they are. |
| Information bias | The tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action. | |
| Insensitivity to sample size | Extension neglect | The tendency to underestimate variation in small samples. |
| Interoceptive bias | The tendency for sensory input about the body itself to influence judgement about external, unrelated circumstances. (Such as, for example, parole judges who are more lenient when they are fed and rested.) | |
| Irrational escalation or escalation of commitment |
Logical fallacy | The phenomenon whereby people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong. Also known as the sunk cost fallacy. |
| Law of the instrument | Anchoring bias | Excessive reliance on a familiar tool or methods, ignoring or underestimating alternative approaches. “If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” |
| Less-is-better effect | Extension neglect | The tendency to prefer a smaller set to a larger set that is evaluated separately, but not jointly. |
| Loss aversion | Prospect theory | The perceived disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it. (sunk cost effects and the endowment effect). |
| Mere-exposure effect | Familiarity principle | The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them. |
| Money illusion | The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value (face value) of money rather than its value in terms of purchasing power. | |
| Moral credential effect | Occurs when someone who does something good allows himself to be less good in the future. | |
| Neglect of probability | Extension neglect | The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty. |
| Non-adaptive choice switching | After an unfavourable outcome of a decision problem, the tendency to avoid the choice made earlier when faced with the same decision problem again, even if that choice was optimal. Also known as “once bitten, twice shy” or the “hot-stove effect”. | |
| Normalcy bias | Cognitive dissonance | The refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster which has never happened before. |
| Observer-expectancy effect | Confirmation bias | When a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (subject-expectancy effect). |
| Omission bias | The tendency to judge harmful actions (commissions) as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful omissions (inactions). | |
| Optimism bias | The tendency to be over-optimistic, underestimating the likelihood of undesirable outcomes and overestimating favourable and pleasing outcomes (wishful thinking, valence effect, positive outcome bias). | |
| Ostrich effect | Ignoring an obvious (negative) situation. | |
| Outcome bias | The tendency to judge a decision by its final outcome instead of by the quality of the decision at the time it was made. | |
| Overconfidence effect | Egocentric bias | Excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as “99% certain” turn out to be wrong 40% of the time. |
| Pareidolia | Apophenia | A vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant, e.g. seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing hidden messages in music played in reverse. |
| Pessimism bias | The tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of bad things happening to them. | |
| Plan continuation bias | Logical fallacy | Failure to recognize that the original plan of action is no longer suitable for a changing situation, or for a situation that is different from the one anticipated. |
| Planning fallacy | Egocentric bias | The tendency to underestimate the time it will take to complete one's own task. |
| Present bias | The tendency of people to give stronger weight to payoffs that are closer to the present time when considering trade-offs between two future moments. | |
| Plant blindness | The tendency to ignore plant species in the surrounding environment, and the inability to recognize and appreciate the importance of plants to life on Earth. | |
| Probability matching | Suboptimal matching of the probability of choices with the probability of reward in a stochastic context. | |
| Pro-innovation bias | The tendency to |
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Часть 1 Examples of Cognitive Biases and Cognitive Prejudices
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