Lecture
1. The concept of the subject of international relations. The main approaches to establishing
the concept of a subject in the theory of international relations. Individuals, social formations, nations,
ethnic groups in IR. States, intergovernmental and non-governmental international
organizations, and other social institutions playing the role of subjects of IR.
2. Criteria for the typology of subjects of international relations.
3. Resources, interests, and goals of the activity of participants in international relations.
4. The role of interstate relations in the IR system. The political character of international
relations. The system of interstate relations and its place in the functioning of the global
IR system. The concept of "national subjects".
5. The structure of state interest. The hierarchy of subjects' interests. The concept of sphere
of interests. Interaction and the process of forming unions and blocs. Types of unions.
National roles. Typology. National orientations, national goals and values.
A separate place in the study of international relations is occupied by the analysis of international
relations from the standpoint of the functioning and activity of subjects (actors, participants)
in international relations, their interactions and activities. In the theory of international relations, the concept
of «actor» (from the Latin – acting) is often used. J. Dougherty understands by the term
«actor» a social unit characterized by a sufficient level of organization and
independence of action. For J. Rosenau, an actor is an entity influencing world processes.
F. Braillard and M.-R. Djalili define as an actor any entity that takes an active part,
plays a significant role in the sphere of international relations. Often an actor is understood as any authority, any organization, any group, and even any individual capable of
playing a certain role, exerting influence on international relations.
In the theory of international relations there exist different approaches to classifying
international actors. The most general classification divides them into two main groups:
state and non-state. State actors include sovereign states, as well as
international, intergovernmental, and interparliamentary organizations created by sovereign states,
including supranational ones (of which the European Union serves as an example). To this group are also
added federal subjects, bodies of regional government and local self-government, and
national-liberation and separatist movements.
Non-state international actors include non-governmental international organizations,
transnational corporations, political parties and their associations, social, religious, and other
organizations, social groups, and world clans. Interests and goals of the activity of participants
in international relations.
States are the main international actors – the acting subjects of
international relations, the basic elements of the system of international relations. Owing to their
activity, states influence international systems, changing them to a certain degree. Every
state, in order to optimally carry out its functions, must pursue a certain policy beyond
its national borders. This objectively gives rise to the state's ties, the existence,
functioning, and development of the sphere of interstate relations.
The main subject of international relations is the "nation-state". In
international politics this term denotes a geographically limited, legally recognized
entity, governed by a single government, whose population considers itself a single nation. This
area of activity of modern states is called foreign policy.
Foreign policy is a set of actions by a state aimed at protecting its
state interest and extending its influence over other subjects of international relations.
The concept of "national interest" remains a fairly abstract quantity.
Therefore, in revealing the content of a subject's participation in this sphere, political scientists distinguish the concept of “types
of states' foreign policy”, as well as the “goal of the system of interstate relations”. In the context
of the systemic method, the following types of states' foreign policy are distinguished:
aggressive policy (characterized by a state's striving to achieve
expansionist goals, attempts to solve internal problems by means of foreign
policy);
active policy (built on the search for balance between the domestic and
foreign activity of a state, on its successful fulfillment of the role of a subject of international
politics);
passive policy (characteristic of states weak economically, politically, and
militarily, which try to adapt to the international environment
by shifting their foreign policy to the positions of other states. In fact, such a policy is
a renunciation of one's own sovereignty, or part of it);
conservative policy (associated with the desire of former "great" powers
to preserve their influence on the international stage and the balance previously achieved between domestic and
foreign policy).
The goal of the system of interstate relations is to preserve the balance of power
and to prevent the development of conflicts. This has historically been ensured by one of three types of
control:
imperial (a single state shapes all the others);
bipolar (two superpowers control and regulate relations within
their spheres of influence);
balance of power (three or more states control each other's actions through
diplomatic maneuvering, changing alliances, and open conflicts).
At the present stage, states remain the main and decisive subjects of
international relations, but the absolutization of their significance in our time, when
other players are coming onto the scene, is ceasing to dominate.
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According to one acceptable definition, the sovereignty of a state has two main aspects:
the ability of a state to independently exercise its power over the territory that the state
controls;
the ability to make its own decisions in international relations, i.e.
to act without formal subordination to another state.
Consequently, under current conditions of world development, state sovereignty is one of
its inalienable attributes and one of the defining features of statehood. The principle of the sovereign equality of
states is enshrined in the UN Charter, in paragraph 1 of Article 2 of which it is stated that the
United Nations «is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members». The reach
of international law traditionally stopped at the borders of a sovereign state, within
which everything was subject to its jurisdiction. From the supreme principle of sovereignty followed also the principle
of non-interference, as an obligation of other subjects not to interfere in a state's internal affairs without
its consent. Thus, respect for sovereignty and non-interference have long
remained central principles of international life, contributing to the peaceful
coexistence of the world's various states.
Of course, absolute sovereignty never existed. States, by concluding treaties
or creating relevant laws, could renounce part of their sovereignty even
at the bilateral level. At present, confirmation of this can be found in the principle
of extraterritoriality of foreign states' diplomatic missions; in the obligation of a number of
states to comply with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on complaints from their own
citizens; and in global radio, television, and the Internet, which intervene in state affairs virtually without
permission – a sign of ever-increasing overall globalization.
The principle of sovereign equality was placed at the foundation of the Charter of the
United Nations, whose creation marked the world community's transition to
limiting the possibilities of using force against states. According to the UN Charter, every
state has the right to defend its territorial sovereignty, and no other state may
violate it. But, on the other hand, the UN Charter also contains a provision stating that
by decision of the Security Council such sovereignty may be disregarded if a state's position
is deemed to violate international peace and cause harm to other states
(i.e., to commit aggression against another). It might seem that in such a case sanctions of this kind would be justified.
There have been cases when sanctions (including armed intervention) were applied without any legal
justification. For example, the US operation in Iraq, where intervention was carried out without
formal grounds, which should have been the expert findings of the commission led by H. Blix, operating under
UN auspices, tasked with searching for prohibited weapons. Sovereignty was restricted without
UN authorization in 1978 by Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, in 1979 by Tanzania's invasion of
Uganda, in 1999 by NATO's action in Kosovo, and so on.
To this we should add that states which signed UN documents on the observance of
human rights thereby committed themselves to ensuring them. But how is this to be carried out
if a state in reality does not observe human rights, or if rights are violated as a result
of military conflicts?
Problematic issues connected with the non-observance of human rights, their gross
violation in a number of countries (Rwanda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, etc.),
force one to consider whether a state can be considered sovereign when its government not
only fails to carry out its function of protecting its own people but is incapable of doing so. In such a
case, humanitarian law comes to the fore – the right of intervention for the sake of protecting
the human being as a citizen. That is, the idea arises of intervention by other parties against the will of the
state itself.
Two means of restricting sovereignty are distinguished: voluntary and coercive.
Voluntary restriction of sovereignty occurs when several countries create
a new political community or unite in a union, renouncing certain rights in
favor of supranational bodies of authority. The countries of Europe have gone furthest in this
respect, forming a system of mutual interference in one another's internal affairs. The European Union
has abandoned the distinction between spheres of domestic and foreign policy; relations among its
members rest on voluntary, limited sovereignty and the admission of outside intervention
in the event of a breach of agreements.
Coercive restriction of sovereignty occurs in cases where a state,
using force, intervenes in another's affairs with the aim of settling its internal
conflicts. The intervention takes place without the consent of the state and without the sanction of the international
community. Coercive restriction of sovereignty is temporary in nature and continues until
internal conflicts are settled, or until foreign troops leave
the state's territory for other reasons. Thus, in the application of the principles of coercive
restriction of sovereignty one can notice elements of supranationality, which are also present in
the operating mechanism of certain specialized UN agencies. The functioning of such a UN structure
as ECOSOC (the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations), which received a mandate to coordinate interstate activity in
relevant areas, approaches this same character of activity.
The question of the use of force is one of the most complex in international politics.
There are more and more supporters demanding a revision of the provisions of Article 2 of the UN Charter,
which does not permit interference in a state's internal affairs, except in cases where events
within a state threaten international peace and security. Leading powers of the world have begun to
«pull» regional crises under this principle where they had direct strategic
interests. Interpretations of threats are gradually being broadened, and there is a revision of the criteria for
intervention. The provision on the humanitarian right of intervention is gaining significance: intervention in
the internal affairs of another state in the event of a violation of its citizens' rights, the powerlessness of the authorities,
the conduct of civil war, the perpetration of genocide, etc. The right of intervention was applied
during the Czechoslovak events (the «Brezhnev Doctrine»), the Afghan war (the doctrines of
Brezhnev and Reagan), and the Lebanese and Iraqi operations by the US, and so on.
Although the principle of sovereignty is built into the system of international security, its content
still cannot be called transparent today. The vagueness of the concept gives certain states the opportunity
for abuse, above all in the sphere of citizens' rights. Sovereignty in such situations
is used as a legal cover that shields a state from intervention in its affairs
for humanitarian reasons.
International practice shows that most states whose sovereignty was de facto
restricted during UN peacekeeping or humanitarian operations (Somalia, Afghanistan,
etc.) were, at the time of intervention, states generally considered incapable or
disintegrating (failed states). They were in a state of, or on the brink of, civil
war, whose causes lay in religious (Sudan and Lebanon), interethnic (Congo, Rwanda,
Burundi, and Uganda), or political (most states) confrontation among the components of society.
Violence in these states took on a permanent character: the scale of human losses reached
140,000 people in Lebanon and more than a million residents in Rwanda, which forced the international
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community to intervene in their internal affairs. The borders of such states remain open,
since the central authority is unable to control them, and the tension spreads to neighboring
countries. Indeed, the Afghan crisis still threatens Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; it became
the foundation for the extremist group «al-Qaeda», and the resulting spread of tension
to nuclear powers (Pakistan) increased the danger in the region.
At present, under conditions of growing global interdependence of humanity, the category
of "interest" plays an important role in understanding the essence of the events, phenomena, and processes
occurring in the sphere of international relations. The entire foreign policy activity of states
is expressed above all in the striving to defend their real or imagined national
interests. In this context, national interest represents the awareness and reflection of state
needs, upheld by the leaders of the given state. Therefore, in fact, by national
interest one should understand national-state interest. Traditionally, the main
national-state interest includes three main elements:
military security;
economic prosperity and development;
state sovereignty as the basis for control over a given territory and population.
This interpretation does not contradict H. Morgenthau's assertion that "the theory of world
politics must be built around the concept of "national interest". H. Morgenthau and
other political realists provided a classification of state interests. Here they distinguish
the following interests:
permanent or fundamental (protection of territory, population, and state institutions
from external danger; development of foreign trade and growth of investment, protection of
the interests of national capital abroad; relations with allies and the choice of
foreign policy course);
transient or intermediate (victory in an armed conflict, formation of an alliance to
achieve a specific goal at a given stage of the development of international relations, entry into
an international organization);
survival interests (elimination of a threat to the very existence of the state);
vital interests (protection of the security and welfare of the nation from serious upheavals);
peripheral or minor interests (interests of a local character).
It should be noted that without a precise understanding of national interest it is impossible
to develop a correct political course, or to determine appropriate orientations in the sphere of both
domestic and foreign policy. Proceeding from this, the Ukrainian researcher V.
Kyrychenko proposed the following definition of the concept: "... National interest is
the integral expression of the interests of all members of society, realized through the political
system. These interests combine the interests of every individual with those of society as a whole».
Thus, since the highest national interest of any country is the preservation of
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the correct determination of the national interest is a
necessary condition for ensuring national security.
States differ from one another in various parameters: size, age
(historical and new states), population, economic potential, degree of
political influence. By economic criterion, three groups of countries are distinguished.
The first group consists of rich states, understood as industrially
developed states with market economies and a high standard of living. These are, first and foremost, the countries
of the Group of Seven: the US, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan. Also counted among the
rich are the major oil exporters of the Persian Gulf – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,
etc.
The second group consists of newly industrialized countries, which in the 1970s–1980s made a
sharp leap in their economic development but have not yet managed to catch up
in living standards with the states of the first group: China, India, the so-called "Asian tigers" (Singapore,
South Korea, Malaysia), and the countries of Latin America (Mexico, Brazil). This group also
includes the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.
The third group consists of poor countries of Latin America, Africa, and some former
republics of the USSR.
The political influence of countries on the international stage is largely determined by their
economic and military power. In the modern world, the very functioning of the economy
directly determines both a state's international status and the combat capability of its armed forces.
For countries possessing strong military and economic potential and
diplomatic influence, the term "great power" is used. In the world
community, a distinction is drawn between superpowers proper and great powers. Beginning in 1945 and
for the following four decades, the USSR together with the US were defined as the two
superpowers. Three criteria distinguish a superpower from other countries:
the capacity for mass and total destruction, the ability to influence the development of all
other countries, and the impossibility for any coalition to defeat one superpower unless
that coalition is backed by another superpower.
Equilibrium in the international environment, achieved through a scheme of confrontation
between two states and the coalitions of countries supporting them, is defined as a bipolar model of the world.
After the collapse of the USSR, a unipolar model of international relations formed, with a single
superpower – the US. Although political scientists forecast the future possibility of
multipolarity and the emergence of other states equal to the US in power, they are nevertheless forced to
acknowledge that today the US holds a universal advantage.
Great powers, according to H. Morgenthau, include countries possessing military
strength and the ability to defend their independence, economic potential, and
diplomatic influence. To this he adds the geopolitical factor (a country's space and location).
As a rule, great powers include countries possessing a nuclear arsenal and
modern means of its delivery, as well as those that are permanent members of the UN
Security Council (the US, Russia, Great Britain, France, China).
By economic and political influence, Germany and Japan are also counted among the great powers.
As for Russia, since it is considered the successor of the former USSR, it
to a certain degree occupies today the status of a certain element of the world
economic order.
A key role in their respective regional spaces is played by middle powers, for example,
India in Southeast Asia, Mexico in Central America, and Turkey, which is trying
to consolidate its influence among the new states of Central Asia.
Small states and microstates are also distinguished. They are marked by a small population
(one to two million) and the inability to independently defend their sovereignty.
Criteria for the typology of subjects of international relations.
By the mid-20th century, world politics was built on the calculation of a state-centric model of international relations. Its main subjects were states.
Such a scheme of international relations was laid down by the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which
concluded the Thirty Years' War in Europe and defined borders between states. Modern
world politics takes into account the fact that there currently exist more than one hundred and ninety
states in the world. But geopoliticians predict that processes of ethnic separatism could
lead to the creation of approximately four hundred states.
Subjects of world-scale politics are international organizations, blocs, and
unions, which cooperate with or oppose one another. They are created on the
basis of shared interests among member countries in order to achieve certain economic and
military-political goals. The first organizations of this type appeared at the beginning of the 20th
century, and today there are more than four hundred of them. Various typologies of international
organizations exist. One of the most widespread classifications identifies different types according to
territorial scope and area of activity.
Depending on the first criterion, one distinguishes:
universal international organizations. Such is the United Nations
(UN);
interregional organizations, for example the Organization of the Islamic Conference;
regional organizations and blocs. There are sixty organizations
of this type in the world, for example, the European Union, the CIS, the Organization
of African Unity, the Southern African Development Community,
the Latin American Regional Economic Community, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);
subregional organizations, for example, Benelux, uniting Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg. Depending on their area of activity, one distinguishes:
general-purpose organizations. Such an organization is the UN, coordinating
the cooperation of member states in various spheres. One of its most important functions is
ensuring international security and settling conflicts. Since 1948 the UN has carried out more than
fifty peacekeeping missions in various regions of the world;
specialized organizations. For example, the UN includes within its structure international
organizations created to coordinate countries' efforts in particular sectors – the World Health
Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNESCO (an organization
dealing with matters of culture, education, and science), the International Court of Justice, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Various
forms of cooperation take place within the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Finally, it should be recalled that for several decades in the second half of the 20th century
world politics was defined by the confrontation between two military-political blocs:
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact Organization.
A specific international organization possessing attributes of political
power is the European alliance. In existence since 1979, the European Parliament is endowed with
legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions, but this does not mean a restriction of the
sovereignty of the states belonging to the alliance.
Thus, among the non-state participants in international relations one distinguishes
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, and other social
forces and movements acting on the world stage. The growth of their role and influence has become a relatively
new phenomenon in international relations, characteristic of the postwar period.
Specialists identify three main features of international organizations:
political will for cooperation, fixed in founding documents;
the existence of a permanent administrative apparatus;
autonomy of competencies and decisions. These features fully meet the criteria
for international, interstate, and intergovernmental organizations; they can be defined as unions of
sovereign states which, on the basis of an international treaty or charter, pursue a common
goal. Therefore, in the words of B. Jacquier, "an international organization possesses international
legal personality and its own will".
The first international organizations appeared at the beginning of the 19th century, when, by decision
of the Congress of Vienna, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine was created in 1815. Since
that time, one can distinguish three different types. Organizations of the first type belonged to the
19th century and were created above all to solve economic and technical problems, such as
the Danube European Commission of 1856 and the International Telegraph Union of 1865.
The second generation corresponds to the period 1919–1939. Organizations of this type sought above
all to ensure international security, which is especially characteristic of the League of Nations.
The third generation is marked by a trend of rapid quantitative growth: by the end of the 20th century
there were more than 400 international organizations, among which the UN stands out in particular.
Such rapid growth can be explained simultaneously by the world's growing political division,
interdependence, and complementarity among states and the awareness of this solidarity, as
well as by the increasing complexity and detail of the system of international relations.
It is worthwhile to identify three criteria for classifying international organizations:
a quantitative one, based on the number of states in the organization;
a qualitative one, arising from the sphere of activity of international organizations;
a criterion based on the nature of the relations between the organization and its member states.
On the basis of the quantitative criterion, worldwide-scale organizations are contrasted
with regional-scale organizations. An international organization
has a worldwide scope if it invites into its ranks all states that
meet the given definition according to the norms of international law. Examples of such
organizations are (or were) the League of Nations, the UN, the International Labour Organization, etc. The term
"regional" makes it possible to designate a group of states whose relations with one another are
close enough to distinguish them from the entire system: the European Economic Community (the Common
Market), the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States,
the Organization of African Unity, and so on. To the term "regional" one can add the concept
of "subregional". This applies to several states linked by close proximity and
by the resolution of common problems (for example, Benelux, created in 1944, comprising Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Regional organizations are largely based on the notion of
kinship: continental (the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe),
ethnic (the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council), religious
(the Organization of the Islamic Conference), economic (the Common Market, the North American
Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA), and military (NATO, the Warsaw Pact).
By the qualitative criterion, one must distinguish general-type organizations from
special ones. The goal of general-type organizations (the UN, the Council of Europe, the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe) is the totality of peaceful relations and the resolution of
all international conflicts. That is why they are also called multifunctional
international organizations. The activity of special organizations is limited to
solving one type of problem or another, either at the regional level or at the international
level. Examples of such single-function specialized organizations include,
for instance, the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development), the Universal Postal Union, the World Meteorological Organization, UNESCO
(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency).
The final criterion, based on the nature of the relations between an organization and its
member countries, makes it possible to distinguish international intergovernmental organizations
of cooperation (or coordination-based) from supranational (or subordination-based)
organizations. Cooperation-based organizations fully preserve the sovereignty
of the states that are members of them. The bodies of these institutions, with minor exceptions, do not have
decision-making authority. The best example of this type of organization is
the UN, with the special powers of the Security Council.
A supranational or subordination-based organization makes use of powers transferred
to it, thanks to which it can address, in addition to the member states themselves,
individuals from those states directly. Organizations of this type are very few compared with
cooperation-based organizations. An example of such an organization is the European
Union, within which decision-making powers belong to the Council of Ministers of the Community,
the European Parliament, etc.
Among nontraditional international actors, the role of international non-governmental
organizations has been growing steadily in recent times. The first such organizations appeared as early as the 19th century
(the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 1823), and by the end of the 20th century
there were already more than 4,000 of them. Non-governmental organizations differ in size,
structure, focus of activity, and objectives. Unlike states and
intergovernmental organizations, their decisions have no legal force for states. The primary
"weapon" of non-governmental organizations in the sphere of international politics is the mobilization of international
public opinion, while their method of achieving goals is pressure on intergovernmental organizations
(above all on the UN) and directly on this or that state. Greenpeace, for instance, acts in this way, as do
Amnesty International and the International Federation for Human Rights. That is why such international
actors are also called "international pressure groups".
A significant influence on the essence and direction of changes in the character of international
relations is exerted by such specific non-governmental organizations as transnational
corporations. They, figuratively speaking, "erode" the national sovereignty of states in such an
important sphere of social relations as the economy. This refers to enterprises, establishments, and
organizations whose purpose is profit and which operate through their branches simultaneously in
several states. At the same time, the center of management and decision-making of a given
transnational corporation is located in one of these states. The largest
transnational corporations possess enormous resources, which allows them to produce
a substantial, and sometimes decisive, influence on both the policies of individual countries and
international relations as a whole, in pursuit of their own interests. A characteristic example in this respect is the role of
American campaigns in overthrowing the government of Salvador Allende in Chile in September 1973. The
growing role and influence of transnational corporations is also evidenced by the fact that in
today's world there are more than 7,000 of these international actors, with 26,000 subsidiaries
in various countries on every continent. Economic processes are controlled
by transnational corporations, which account for the bulk of world trade,
monetary exchange, and the transfer of advanced technology.
The globalization processes of the modern world have significantly expanded the circle of international
relations. For example, transnational corporations (TNCs) pose serious competition to
national states in the conduct of policy. They have become independent subjects not
only of economic but also of political relations. Today there are thirty-
five thousand transnational entities in the world. The core of the world economic system consists of
five hundred TNCs possessing unlimited economic power. TNCs control
more than half of world industrial output, 63% of foreign
trade, and four-fifths of the patents and licenses for new technology and "know-how."
Researchers, in assessing the role of TNCs in the modern world, draw mixed conclusions about
the prospects for statehood.
According to one approach, TNCs have significantly undermined the sovereignty of the nation-state.
It is pointed out that the economic potential of the largest TNCs can be compared
with the gross domestic product of leading mid-sized states. With respect to developed countries
one can still speak of a duality of power: the state protects the interests of its own TNCs in various
regions of the world, while the TNCs, in turn, provide tax revenue from their international
activity. As for the other group of developing states, their economies are sometimes entirely
dependent on TNCs. The latter have various means of influencing the governments of these countries and
can compel them to pursue policies that contradict their own national
interests. Other instruments of influence over national governments are international
banks and monetary and trust companies. They generally tie the provision of aid
to countries' compliance with certain rules of the game and extend credit only to those
that demonstrate a willingness to follow a particular economic and political course.
The weakening of certain state functions does not at all mean that the state has ceased to be
an institution of policy-making. It seems, rather, that the state's monopoly has been substantially undermined
in the regulation of the national economy, financial flows, environmental,
legal, and social issues. The growing role of non-state
actors in world politics is also evidenced by the activities of non-governmental organizations – "Doctors Without Borders," "Amnesty
International," the "International Red Cross," and others. One cannot ignore the contacts between
political parties and the ethnic and religious diasporas of different countries. Non-governmental
organizations can appeal directly, bypassing the governing authorities, to the public opinion
of other countries in cases where the rights of certain population groups are violated. Finally,
even individual persons can acquire international significance.
Finally, another non-traditional actor of contemporary international relations
is the individual. According to the concept of the French jurist J. Selya, the state is, in
essence, a fictitious entity that depends on legal technique, and all of its acts
are carried out by individuals in order to protect collective interests. The individual is in fact
becoming, at least partly or additionally, a subject of international relations alongside
states, international organizations, and private associations of international
scope. Therefore, in terms of international relations and under international law, one should distinguish between:
a) the individual who is to be persuaded, and
b) the individual who is to be punished.
The rights of the individual on the international scale are protected by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, the norms of international humanitarian law based on the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, the covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, cultural,
and social rights (both ratified by almost a hundred states in 1990), and others. Respect for
human rights has become a kind of international criterion for evaluating state policy.
The question of the relationship between law and morality always arises most acutely in
periods of intensifying crisis, when society undergoes a serious transformation
in virtually every area of social life. The turbulent end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries,
accompanied by violations of international law, de facto inequality,
military conflicts and the use of force, and demographic and environmental
problems, have become years of substantial challenges for international law. In 2014, Russia's
aggression against Ukraine became one such challenge. A resonant event of recent days has been
the coronavirus pandemic, overcoming which has brought the world to the brink of a severe economic and
political crisis (intensifying confrontation between the US and China). The modern world order
is dynamically transforming along a complex trajectory: the role of states, intergovernmental, and
non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, and other actors on the international
stage is undergoing substantial change. Therefore, assessing the modern world order from an ethical standpoint and
identifying the prospects for its future development requires scholars to seek new
methods and approaches in the study of international legal reality.
Every society has a certain system of social norms, which includes law,
morality, custom, and religious and corporate norms. In general, social norms arise as
a system of social orientation that every person receives from birth, ready-
made, and adapts to it, or tries to change it in a certain way.
Social norms are a fundamental part of the spiritual world of society, of its being.
They become institutionalized, shaped by social relations that have taken hold, and changes in them
require a rethinking of the role of these social regulators. This applies above all to
those value-based forms of human existence that have always had a significant influence on the
development of society. The state of law and order in a state, and the level of legal
awareness of citizens, and so on, depend on their interaction.
Studying the interaction between law and morality in social regulation will always be
important, since without accounting for their multifaceted connection the
legislative system is ineffective.
Building a stable economic and political system and forming a
civil society and a rule-of-law state requires overcoming the collisions and contradictions between
law and morality, and achieving a deep and flexible interaction between them.
Studying the relationship between law and morality is important for optimizing
the processes of social regulation, which can become an important foundation for the social and
spiritual revival of Ukraine.
The theme of the relationship between law and morality has always interested researchers. However,
scholars have mostly focused on the legal or socio-philosophical analysis of the interaction
between law and morality. This topic can therefore be considered relevant for writing monographic
studies devoted to the philosophical-legal analysis and clarification of the essential principles
of the relationship between law and morality as social regulators. Throughout the entire history of the development
of philosophical-legal thought, questions of the correlation, the relationship between law and morality
have been the subject of scholarly discussion. In every society, law plays the role of the backbone
of the public order.
Law and morality have interacted as social regulators in every historical era.
Historically, the specific features of their interaction are determined by the concrete conditions of existence
of society, that is, by the state of development of the economy, politics, culture, and social structure
of society, and so on. Law and morality develop together with society as social
institutions. And although the interaction and mutual influence between them have historically taken various forms,
content, and meaning, they retain an unbreakable inner connection. Indeed, in the past
religious persecution and interference by the authorities in people's private lives were based on
the identification of law with morality.
Thus, legislation extended its influence to the inner world of the individual,
regulating the moral worth of human actions. A sharp separation of law from morality,
conversely, led to law's indifference to moral problems. Then the task of law
narrowed to demarcating people's external freedom. And exactly how people would use
their freedom (in accordance with moral requirements or not) – that was considered their personal
affair, not regulated by legislation.
World experience confirms that the interaction between law and morality intensifies at the turning
points of a society's history, when not only the economic,
political, and social order is transformed, but the entire way of life. As social processes
develop and become more complex, the problem of the interaction between law and morality becomes ever more significant. In
modern society, its structure and processes are becoming more complex, and it no longer
holds a single system of moral values for all. The pluralism of morality gives rise to
a pluralism of legal understanding, which leads to disagreements in understanding the relationship between law
and morality.
Thus, one must strive to ensure that different approaches to solving this
problem do not oppose one another but coexist and interact. Law and morality are elements
of a general cultural normative system that is organically part of the social context,
while at the same time remaining autonomous and independent. However, the question of determining
the relationship between these social regulators remains open to this day. In general,
philosophical-legal studies are dominated by the principle of the moralization of law, according to which
law depends on morality.
The moralization of law is inherent in natural-law theories, in which the natural and
moral order are interconnected, and positive law must conform to the "natural"
laws of nature. Such theories focus attention on fundamental legal ideas –
freedom, equality, humanism, and justice.
The authority of positive law within this approach depends on its ability
to ensure justice, since unjust law is not law at all. Positive law
is subject not only to instrumental but also to moral evaluation. The values of natural law do not
disappear even after being absorbed by positive law, but move into the category
of the legally sanctioned, while partly remaining within the sphere of properly moral values. From this standpoint,
law is not entirely identified with morality; it is understood as its "minimum," an important
part of it, protected by the state. Thus, S. V. Dzholos notes that "the idealistic character
of natural-law conceptions orients society toward natural law as the model and measure
of positive law." The moralization of law has a number of shortcomings; in particular, it disregards
the essential differences between these social regulators.
Thus, the complete subordination of law to morality is just as much a distortion as their
complete separation. The purpose of both moral and legal norms is to regulate
social relations and to affirm universal human values,
the principles of freedom and justice, in the life of society. Moral influence on the individual and society is
necessary, but it cannot guarantee well-being and a sense of security.
Nor is law an absolute guarantor of a prosperous life in society, but without
it such a prosperous life would be impossible. The relationship between law and morality is quite
ambiguous, but there is no doubt that these social norms are the highest values for
the individual and society. The relationship between law and morality has a complex, mutually conditioning
character. Law creates the conditions for the well-being of society, containing requirements for equality
of all before the law and a reasonable degree of freedom. Lawlessness and permissiveness lead to
moral decline, while law and legality can foster the moral
standards and habits of people. However, the legal regulation of human life must
be combined with moral regulation and conviction.
Law and morality are dialectically interconnected and mutually conditioned. Under the influence
of highly moral norms and values, law is constantly being improved, and it in turn exerts a reciprocal
influence on the morality, behavior, and traditions of people. However, this interaction is complex and
ambiguous.
Morality and law have different criteria and social dimensions: morality affects a person's internal
motivations, conscience, and sense of duty; law focuses on the subjective
rights of individuals, determines and secures their status and legal capacities,
and evaluates the conduct of individuals in terms of lawful and unlawful, legal and
illegal. These social norms "attempt in different ways to socialize the individual,
suppressing natural aggressiveness, restraining natural instincts and passions that
drive people to acts that are dangerous and harmful to those around them and to society."
Law defines, maintains, and regulates the external order, while morality shapes
the social qualities of the individual. Law must protect society from the dangerous
acts of persons who disregard the rights and interests of others and of society as a whole.
The difference between law and morality is also evident in the fact that, given identical
situations and premises, they may develop entirely different, sometimes even diametrically
opposite, ways of resolving them.
Law can condemn and even punish various forms of immoral behavior, but
it can also refrain from prosecuting a whole range of unethical phenomena. A moral
obligation to save and preserve human life may, in many cases, not be
a civic duty.
There are many examples where considerations of a higher moral order are not
reflected in public consciousness, so the legislator is then compelled to create a norm
that would allow acting in accordance with those considerations.
Law may reflect a morality that, although it exists in society, is gradually
being replaced by a more humanistic approach. In such situations, much usually
depends on influential citizens capable of turning public opinion toward the necessary
legal reforms. However, there are spheres of human activity in which the legislator deliberately
refrains from upholding moral norms, since the machinery of justice lacks the
flexibility to resolve specific problems, and moreover, intervention in this sphere is more likely
to cause greater social harm than it would prevent through existing
laws. The inevitable competition between moral and legal judgments has often led to
social conflicts, the only resolution to which has been the amendment and clarification of
legal norms, or the forcible suppression of discontent (debt forgiveness,
easing of overly strict laws, suppression of protests, establishment of dictatorial
regimes, and so on).
Ukrainian researchers believe that in contemporary jurisprudence, in particular
domestic jurisprudence, the prevailing view is that "there is no insurmountable barrier between law and morality,
although they do not coincide," and that "the dominant position belongs to the legal type of
legal understanding, rooted in the ideas of natural law, and therefore inevitably viewing
law through the lens of morality and ethics."
Unlike natural-law theory, in which these two types of social norms
were identified with one another, and legal positivism, in which they were separated and contrasted,
the contemporary approach focuses on their synthesis. The spheres of action of legal and moral norms
often do not coincide. Indeed, entirely outside the sphere of law lie moral precepts and
rules of propriety, which rest on the moral consciousness of society.
Law cannot be immoral, but not every legal norm requires moral
justification or moral content. Moreover, granting moral norms
the force of law would strip morality of its fundamental characteristic – freedom of choice. Law,
by its very nature, is a requirement of proper conduct toward other people and presupposes coercion.
As G. Yu. Semigin notes, "where there is no encroachment on the sphere of another's freedom, another's
rights and interests, there are no grounds for legal intervention." However, coercion exists in morality as well.
According to I. Kant's deontological ethics, moral convictions are perceived, to a certain extent,
as an internal system of compulsion: performing moral acts should not depend on
one's own inclinations and desires.
I. Kant believes that morality is a form of compulsion, and the moral law is a categorical
imperative, since this law is absolute. Kant sees the difference between moral and legal
compulsion in the fact that in morality the individual compels himself, whereas in law the monopoly
on coercion belongs to the state.
Attention is often drawn to yet another difference between law and morality, which lies in
the fact that in the state, the use of force is carried out by special law-enforcement bodies, while
morality has no such centralized system of coercion. This distinction is also quite
blurred: in international law there is no centralized law-enforcement body. The UN's
peacekeeping forces, its police and troops, are formed from the armies of individual countries, meaning that in UN
peacekeeping missions some states act against others.
Thus, it must be stated: if law is a system of coercion, then international
law does not differ from what is sometimes called international morality. In secular and
religious morality, too, there is the application of coercion (for example, the prohibition on believers
watching certain films or television programs, seeking medical care, and so on).
The opposition of law and morality has certain negative consequences. Law's indifference to morality
inevitably leads to the recognition of a person's right to immoral acts, provided that he
does not formally go beyond the limits of freedom established by law. That is precisely why, when as a result of
the sharp opposition of law and morality the freedom of the individual gained universally recognized
status, a desire arose to bring them together again. These social norms cannot exist
and develop in isolation. As O. K. Abrosimova points out, «this follows from the very unity of
social life.
Law and morality, in their interaction – a force that directs and corrects human actions,
ensures order in relations among people. They largely coincide, and therefore
the effectiveness of law depends on how fully it reflects and safeguards
the moral foundations of social life». With this approach, a legal norm cannot be morally
neutral, since it contains an axiological aspect. The moral value of law consists in
the fact that it upholds the principle of the norm. It is precisely thanks to this value aspect that one can determine
the effectiveness of a legal norm in social regulation
Law based on moral principles is more readily accepted by people and does not
provoke rejection. The means of ensuring it will be not only state coercion, but also
public opinion. If law contradicts the moral convictions of society, then its
norms will be ignored and violated. Where law does not protect its citizens,
an «amputation» of morality occurs, which leads to lawlessness and injustice. The history
of civilization shows that morality is also impossible without law, since there is no morality without
freedom, and freedom – without legal guarantees.
The common sphere uniting law and morality is the striving to establish certain
standards of behavior. In most of these fundamental standards, law and morality
complement and reinforce each other. The vitality, security, and prosperity of the human
community are possible only under conditions of restraint from violence and infringement upon others' property.
Codes of moral norms, requiring the rejection of such actions, reinforce the force
of the law, which also prohibits them, while moral condemnation of such actions is reinforced
by legal sanctions.
Indeed, the well-known English philosopher D. Lloyd argued that «legal systems
exist to uphold moral principles in society, and the moral obligation to obey
the law plays an important role in establishing the authority of law and ensuring its
observance predominantly without the use of coercion». The interaction of morality and law is not
a one-sided influence of one social norm on another. It is a process of mutual influence, promoting
the progress of both moral and legal relations. By influencing morality, law contributes to a
deeper rooting of it in society, and under the influence of morality it also constantly
becomes enriched, its authority and role as a social regulator of public relations growing.
As the most important means of social regulation, law and morality govern
human actions, shaping a model of human behavior oriented toward the priority
of justice, the common good, humanity, legality, equality, and other
essential principles and rules of human coexistence. O. M. Elmanova rightly
notes that: «the objective conditionality of the interaction between law and morality in modern legal
life is determined by the fact that legal laws embody the principles of humanism, justice,
and equality of people, that is, the laws of a state governed by law implement the highest moral requirements of modern
democratic society».
Consequently, the interaction of law and morality consists in their mutual support in respect of
the ordering of social relations. The requirements of moral and legal norms coincide in
many directions. Indeed, morality unequivocally condemns the commission of offenses
(especially crimes), and unlawful behavior is also usually immoral. The requirements
of law and morality do not always coincide, and sometimes contradict one another. This can be explained
by the diversity of social relations, interconnections, and life situations, which cannot always
be assessed unambiguously.
Contradictions between them may be caused by both objective and
subjective factors in the development of society. Morality, unlike the slow and
complex process of lawmaking, is more flexible and can change quite quickly.
Therefore law often lags behind the development of moral norms, or simply does not correspond to them. Morality
orients toward a certain model of behavior, a moral ideal. Law, on the other hand, establishes permissible
norms of behavior, which may be immoral or even amoral, but not
unlawful.
Thus, despite a certain separateness and different ways of developing, law
and morality interact rather closely in the process of social-normative regulation. In those cases
where law does not provide the possibility of regulating social relations with existing
norms, this problem can be solved by using moral norms, and vice versa. There
is an objective necessity of adjusting both social life itself as a whole and social
regulators through the process of their improvement and subordination to democratic and legal
standards. It is necessary to develop such legal norms that encompass as much as possible
of moral principles and express the freedom not only of the legislator, but
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Часть 1 14. Subjects of International Relations and the Process of Interaction Between Their Interests
Часть 2 - 14. Subjects of International Relations and the Process of
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