Lecture
Objectives: to examine the classification of international relations by type. To determine the levels of the structure of IR. The criteria for their definition, the patterns of their functioning and development. The criteria for classifying forms of IR. To determine the reasons for the formation of the Westphalian system of international relations. To master the characteristics of the essence and components of the system, to analyze issues related to the objective necessity of the formation of the Westphalian system. The foundations and sources of the Westphalian system of international relations. The reasons that necessitated the renewal of the Westphalian system of international relations and the emergence of the Versailles–Washington system of international relations. The ideological foundations that conditioned the formation of the Versailles–Washington system of international relations. To clarify the process of the formation of the bipolar system of international relations. The formation and development of the bipolar system of international relations. Two worlds – two ideologies. The principles behind the formation of two opposing camps. Theories justifying the bipolarity of the world. The theory of building socialism. The collapse of the USSR, the end of the bipolar system. Mono- or multipolar formation. The main trends in the development of the contemporary world process of relations.
1. Components of the content of the concept of international order.
2. The Westphalian system of international relations
3. The Concert of Europe as a system
4. The Versailles–Washington system of international relations
5. The Yalta–Potsdam system of international relations
6. The Caribbean crisis
Public order is a specific organization of the life of society, its regulation
on the basis of certain norms and shared values. The concept of «international order» as a special
variety of public order concerns the global social community – the world
community formed by the totality of various acting social subjects (actors)
interacting on the world stage. This community is regulated by certain (for example, state-legal, international, moral, legal) norms and shared
(national, cultural, moral-ethical, etc.) values. Consequently, international
order is interpreted as an ordering of international relations intended to
secure the basic needs of states and other international institutions, to create and
maintain the conditions for their existence, preservation, and development.
International order is often considered a set of legal norms, identifying
it with legal order, with lawfulness. Some researchers link international order
with the preservation of stability, of a certain status quo in relations between
states.
Thus, international order (the international system) is an organization
of international and interstate relations that is opposed to anarchy and presupposes
the existence of common institutions, norms, and values that create the conditions for the existence,
security, and development of states, and for their interaction on the international stage.
The theory of international relations also uses the concept of «world order», which
reflects the growing awareness among peoples and nations of their shared responsibility for the condition of
our planet. S. Hoffmann proposed distinguishing between international order, which can
exist without a world order, and world order, which cannot be
established without international order. In this researcher's view, international
order, as a greater or lesser ordering of international relations, has always existed at all
stages of the history of interstate relations, while world order is still only taking shape.
The systemic approach to the analysis of international relations has led to the existence of various
approaches to the study of international systems, among which one can conditionally distinguish the traditional-historical, historical-sociological, heuristic, mixed, and empirical approaches, as well as
an understanding of the possible existence of different types of international systems with their own structures
and criteria for their classification.
It should be noted that today there is no single generally accepted typology
of international systems. At the same time, depending on the criteria and their own understanding of
the quintessence of the systemic approach, scholars identify a number of types of international systems. For example, depending
on spatial-geographic characteristics, F. Braillard and M.-R. Djalili, in their work
"International Relations" (Paris, 1990), identified a planetary-wide international system
and its regional component subsystems, the elements of which, in turn, are
subregional subsystems. The authors of the Russian book «The System, Structure, and Process of Development
of Contemporary International Relations» consider regional, as well as group and bilateral
aspects of the interaction of states as structural levels of the interstate system. On the basis of the research
objective, stable and unstable, conflictual and cooperative,
open and closed types of international systems are distinguished. But we would especially like to draw attention to
the typologies that are considered generally accepted from the standpoint of the origin and historical
evolution of systems of international relations, or of the geopolitical epochs of the modern and contemporary eras.
On the basis of this approach, the following international systems are distinguished: the Westphalian, the Vienna,
the Versailles–Washington, the Yalta–Potsdam, and the post–Cold War world.
The basic principles of contemporary world politics were laid down by the Westphalian
system of international relations (1648) after the end of the Thirty Years' War (the first
world international system). By that time nation-states had largely formed in
Europe, and European history began to turn into world history. The main centers of power in
Europe were Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands; then England and France entered
the struggle for the division of the world. Nation-states established their borders taking into account
linguistic characteristics and natural-geographic boundaries. This world order lasted almost 150
years – until the French Revolution and the reign of Napoleon. At the end of the 17th – beginning of the 18th
century, the former greatness of Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the Netherlands faded, and by the end of the 18th century –
Poland. In turn, the positions of France and England grew stronger, and Prussia gained strength. At the beginning of the
19th century, the Russian Empire became an influential world power.
The Vienna era brought a new arrangement of geopolitical forces, secured by the Congress of Vienna (1814 –
1815). This was based on the imperial principle of controlling
geographic space. The world centers of power became the Russian and Austro-Hungarian
empires, the British colonial empire, the German Empire (from 1871), the French
colonial empire (from the mid-19th century), and the Ottoman Empire (from 1877). Russia, by the mid-19th
century, dominated Europe and actively opposed England, France, Austria, and Turkey. But
after the Crimean War (1853 – 1856), the holy alliance of monarchs collapsed, and with its collapse
the era of Russian dominance in Europe ended. By the end of the 19th century, thanks to the successful
application of the achievements of the industrial revolution, the United States and Germany grew especially strong.
Under Germany's leadership the Triple Alliance was created. The second powerful military
bloc, the Entente, was created by France, England, and Russia over the course of 1891–1894 – 1904–1907.
The purpose of the blocs was to redistribute spheres of influence and prevent that redistribution in favor of the young,
aggressive European states.
The Versailles era began after the defeat of the Triple Alliance in the First
World War of 1914 – 1918. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and
Ottoman empires ceased to exist. On the ruins of these mighty states a number of new state
formations appeared, which were meant to fall within the sphere of influence of the authors of the Versailles system.
The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 handed the palm of continental power to France,
and that of maritime power to England. Russia was not meant to exist as a mighty state and there were attempts to partition it.
The greatest number of advantages from this treaty went to the United States, which secured its
power at the Washington Conference of 1921 – 1922. The victorious countries created
between Germany and Soviet Russia a «cordon sanitaire» of states oriented
toward France and England. The established world order was directed against Soviet
Russia, Germany, and China. The Second World War of 1939 – 1945 buried the Versailles peace.
The USSR emerged from the war militarily, strategically, and geopolitically stronger than it had been before
the war. For the first time in its history the Soviet Union had created around itself a powerful
geopolitical bloc.
The Yalta–Potsdam era began in 1945. This system determined
new borders and a new arrangement of geopolitical forces. In essence, at Yalta (4 – 11 February 1945
) and Potsdam (16 July – 2 August 1945) it was established that the world had gone from multipolar
to bipolar: the USSR and its allies, embodying continental power,
stood opposed to the United States and its allies, which mostly represented maritime power.
The confrontation between these two poles defined the content of the Yalta–Potsdam geopolitical era.
Its distinguishing feature was that the standoff between the two powerful blocs went to the very limits
of the balance between cold war and nuclear war. The Yalta–Potsdam world order
was destroyed in 1989 – 1991 with the collapse of the USSR and the world system of socialism.
The Belovezha (Maastricht, or «post–Cold War») era is characterized by
the emergence of new states: first around the USSR – through «velvet» and forceful
revolutions, and later within the territory of the former Soviet Union itself. The processes
tied to the interdependence of the world at all levels grew even stronger.
In the course of the development of the system of international relations, several stages can be distinguished,
differing in content, structure, and the nature of the relationships between its component
parts. Each of these stages consistently went through phases of formation, consolidation,
stable development, crisis, and disintegration. These stages represent types of structural organization
of the system, developing according to their own algorithm characteristic of the given historical era.
The Westphalian system of international relations was established at the conclusion of
the Thirty Years' War in Europe (1618–1648) between the German Protestant princes
on one side, and the Catholic princes and the emperor on the other, a war that grew from an
intra-German conflict into a pan-European one. Against the Habsburg alliance (the Spanish and
Austrian Habsburgs, the Catholic princes of Germany, assisted by the Pope and Poland)
stood a coalition: the German Protestant princes, France, Sweden, and Denmark, supported by
Holland, Great Britain, and Russia.
The formation of the Westphalian system began with the Peace of Westphalia,
concluded on 24 October 1648 in the form of two treaties drawn up at two congresses that
took place in the Westphalian cities of Munster and Osnabruck.
The articles of the Peace of Westphalia recorded the new balance of power that had taken shape in
Europe. The Peace of Westphalia effectively sanctioned the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire
of the German nation into 355 independent states. From then on, the fundamental form of political
organization of society has been the "nation-state", and the dominant principle of international
relations became the foundations of national sovereignty.
The Westphalian system established a balance of power among the great powers, above all
the Kingdoms of France, Great Britain, and Sweden, as well as Austria and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. This
system pushed Spain and Portugal into the background.
After the Peace of Westphalia, the balance of power between the European
countries and the Ottoman Empire shifted in favor of the former. This system did not fully
take into account the interests of the Tsardom of Russia and excluded China.
The main characteristics of the Westphalian system of international relations:
- the nation-state – the basic form of the political organization of society;
- national (state) sovereignty – the main principle of international relations;
- a hierarchy of states (weaker/stronger);
- geopolitical inequality and a system of political equilibrium;
– the establishment of clear, stable borders between European states;
– the formation of a Eurocentric world. The Westphalian system initially was not
global in character, covering only Western and Central Europe. Later it
integrated Eastern Europe, Russia, the Mediterranean, and North
America into its sphere of action. European history began to turn into world history;
- the main power centers of Europe launched a struggle for the division of the world;
- the end of the global isolation of civilizations and cultures as a result of the Great
Geographic Discoveries;
– the development of capitalist relations.
After the French Revolution of 1789–1794, the system of nation-states
was finally consolidated, which continued and reinforced the Westphalian system. At that stage,
the state proclaimed itself the guarantor of the security of its citizens, and at the same time developed
nationalism as a factor affirming the need for the coincidence of national unity
with the political one. The theory of "political legitimacy" was affirmed, according to which a national
state has the right to exist only when the borders of the country coincide with ethnic
boundaries.
Alongside the nation-state and the consolidation of national sovereignty, international
relations also saw the consolidation of a system of political equilibrium – a compromise between the principles of
sovereignty and the common interest. In the course of its functioning, the Westphalian system
forced each of its participants to restrain their expansionist ambitions. One of the
main means of maintaining the equilibrium was various types of coalitions.
With the establishment of the Westphalian system, relations between the countries of the West received
systematization for the first time. With certain modifications it lasted until 1939, i.e.
the beginning of the Second World War. Some elements of this system continued to operate even during the period of
the Yalta–Potsdam system of international relations. The Westphalian system
of international relations is divided into several stages (or subsystems), united by common
patterns but differing in the features characteristic of a particular period
of relations between states. Most often several Westphalian subsystems
of the system are distinguished, which are treated as if they were self-contained: the system of Anglo-French
rivalry and the struggle for colonies in the 17th–18th centuries; the system of the "Concert of
Europe" or the Congress of Vienna in the 19th century; and the more globally scoped
Versailles–Washington system between the two world wars, and the Yalta–Potsdam system.
It is emphasized that the starting point for the development of international relations is considered to be the time
of the origin and formation of nation-states in the fairly amorphous space of the Roman
Empire, and the end of the "Thirty Years' War" in Europe and the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia
in 1648, which laid the foundation for the formation of the Westphalian system of international
relations.
In fact, under the Peace of Westphalia, which comprises two treaties – the Treaty of Osnabruck and
the Treaty of Munster – a number of powerful state entities agreed on a system of future,
still nascent, international relations, recognizing the emergence of the newest sovereign countries.
The subsequent historical period of international interaction is regarded by many researchers
as the history of a single Westphalian system of international relations, whose dominant subjects
are sovereign states. There is no supreme arbiter in the system, so states are
independent in conducting domestic policy within their national borders and are in
principle equal. Sovereignty presupposes non-interference in one another's affairs. Over
time, states, relying on these principles, developed a number of rules regulating
international relations.
The driving force of the Westphalian system of international relations was rivalry
between states for dominance over others. The outcome of such rivalry was determined
by the balance of power between states or alliances of states.
The establishment of equilibrium, or the balance of power, meant a period of stable, peaceful
relations; a disruption of the balance led to conflict, the highest degree of which was
war. In this system of clashes, contradictions, and confrontations, the current system of
international relations developed, in which the main criterion was strength, and the most important principle
was self-interest.
The Westphalian system of international relations is divided into several stages:
the Washington–Versailles system of 1919—1939, which collapsed with the outbreak of the Second World War;
the Yalta–Potsdam system of 1945–1989 — bipolar, which ended its
existence with the elimination of the socialist system and the collapse of the USSR; and the post-bipolar system since 1990.
The latest period in the development of the system of international relations, also called
the post–Cold War period, differs radically from the previous ones in the absence of
political-ideological confrontation between two poles, and in the winding down of the military
confrontation between the blocs grouped around Washington and Moscow.
Thus, the seemingly more or less stable bipolar system of international
existence gave way to a unipolar one. It is assumed that it too will not last long, since
new centers of power are forming and gaining strength, which will lead the world to a multipolar system
of international relations. The determination of the further development of the international system of relations
is also hindered by the fact that virtually the entire science of international relations, which relied on
clear criteria and regularities, proved unable to predict the collapse of communism and
the end of the Cold War. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the change of systems occurs
rather slowly, gradually, amid a fierce struggle between the new and the outdated, and thus the
sense of instability and danger intensifies. Thus, the contemporary system of international relations
is at a transitional stage, which complicates forecasting and the course of its further
development.
The first stable international system became the so-called "Concert of Europe", which
formed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and effectively left the historical stage only
after the world wars of the twentieth century. This is the most important stage in the history of international
relations, one that had the strongest effect on the modern world. The main features of the system
that formed were the following.
1. The development of international relations depended on a very narrow circle – the five major
European countries. The relations between Great Britain, France, Prussia (Germany), Russia,
and Austria (Austria-Hungary) determined the state of affairs on the world stage. Non-European
states, as well as small European states, had by this time turned from subjects into
objects of an unequivocally Eurocentric system of international relations.
2. The interests of all the major European states, with the exception of Great Britain and Russia,
were concentrated almost exclusively on Europe, although at that time the intensive
colonization of the world was taking place.
3. One of the foundations of the "Concert of Europe" was the principle of maintaining a balance of power.
Responsibility for maintaining the intra-European balance rested on the large
states.
4. The 19th century – the century of the "Concert of Europe" – was the golden age of classical
diplomacy. "Nineteenth-century governments sought their salvation in diplomacy", since
the system of the "Concert of Europe", covering mainly the political sphere
by means of which international relations were shaped, possessed a considerable degree of autonomy. This
provided freedom of maneuver in making foreign-policy decisions, not rigidly
determined by circumstances of a domestic political nature."
The caste of European diplomats belonged to a single culture. "For a century
after the Congress of Vienna, the foreign policy of the great powers was formulated and
carried out by a very limited circle of people. And this circle shared the ethical and moral norms
of a single European civilization."
5. The undeniable merit of the "Concert of Europe" is that during the
existence of this system, normative acts on the peaceful resolution of international disputes and on the laws and customs of war were formulated and adopted by all civilized countries, such
as the Geneva Convention of 1864, the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, the Declaration
of the Brussels Conference of 1874. And it was precisely during the period of the "Concert of Europe" that
negotiations on the limitation and reduction of armaments entered the practice of
international relations.
The Versailles–Washington system of international relations
The Versailles–Washington system of international relations was
established after the end of the First World War and the regrouping of forces on the international
stage. The system of international treaties created at the Paris (1919–1920) and Washington (1921–1922) peace
conferences laid the foundations of the Versailles–Washington system of international relations, which recorded and formalized the results
of the First World War and determined a new balance of power on the world stage.
On 28 June 1919, in the Grand Palace of Versailles, a peace treaty
was signed with Germany (the Treaty of Versailles). Peace treaties with Germany's allies were
concluded on the model of the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Saint-Germain with
Austria was signed on 10 September 1919, the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria – on 27 November 1919,
the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary – on 4 June 1920, and the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey – on 10 August 1920.
The Versailles system of peace treaties fixed the territorial changes that
occurred as a result of the First World War and the disintegration of the German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires.
After the Paris Peace Conference, the main task became the settlement of
contradictions in the Far East and the Pacific basin. To resolve
Far Eastern problems, a conference was convened in Washington from 12 November 1921
to 6 February 1922. It was attended by nine states – the United States, Great Britain, Japan,
France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Holland, and China.
As a result of the conference's work, a number of treaties were concluded:
the "Four-Power Treaty" (Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan), concluded on
13 December 1921, concerned mutual guarantees of the inviolability of the island possessions of its
signatories in the Pacific basin;
the "Five-Power Treaty" (Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy),
signed on 6 February 1922, prohibited the construction of warships with a
tonnage exceeding 35,000 tons, and established the ratio between the fleets of these countries in the
battleship class in the proportion of 10:10:6:3.5:3.5.
the "Nine-Power Treaty" (the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium,
Holland, Portugal, and China), signed on 6 February 1922, proclaimed
the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity of China.
It obliged all signatories to adhere to the principles of the "open door" and "equal
opportunities" in trade and industrial development throughout the territory of China. Formally,
the states renounced the policy of dividing China into "spheres of influence." Nevertheless, it did not
abolish the system of unequal agreements between these countries and China.
The treaties concluded at the Washington Conference supplemented the system of
treaties signed in 1919–1920 between the victorious countries and the countries that
had lost the world war.
The resulting system of international treaties laid the foundations of the Versailles–Washington system of international relations, which recorded and formalized the results of
the First World War and determined a new balance of power on the world stage. It became
an attempt to resolve countless problems, to unite and harmonize the conflicting interests
of peoples and countries.
The Versailles–Washington system, like any system, went through several stages
of its existence. Among them, five main ones can be conditionally distinguished:
- the establishment of the Versailles–Washington system – 1919–1922;
- the relative stabilization of the Versailles–Washington system – 1922–1929;
- the crisis of the Washington order – 1929–1933;
- the crisis of the Versailles order – 1933–1937;
- the liquidation of the Versailles order and the establishment of German hegemony in Europe –
1938–1939.
The Versailles–Washington system of the postwar world order had a number of significant
shortcomings:
- it did not resolve the contradictions between the victorious states and the states that had suffered
defeat;
- it did not eliminate the contradictions between large and small countries;
- it did not prevent the possibility of the emergence of revanchism, above all owing to the
absence of effective control over the fulfillment of the agreements concluded;
- it caused significant territorial changes in Europe, a second "great migration of peoples",
and laid the groundwork for national conflicts.
The Versailles–Washington system fixed a new distribution of power in the postwar
world, but owing to its shortcomings it could not be stable or lasting.
The final formation of the new configuration of postwar international relations
was completed at the Potsdam Conference of the leaders of the great powers, held from 17
July to 2 August 1945. The main sphere of discussion was European affairs,
above all everything related to a comprehensive resolution of the «German question». On this latter aspect largely depended both the contours and the very essence of the postwar
European order, which was, in fact, confirmed by the course of events over the following few
decades.
Features:
• a bipolar system of control;
• the distribution of spheres of influence and the tendency to violate it;
• the decentralization of violence – stability at the central and global levels,
maintained by states, and instability at the regional and subregional levels;
• the orientation of the global international system and regional subsystems, at the level of which
the resolution of conflicts depends above all on the balance of power in the region and on purely internal
factors;
• the impossibility of armed clashes between the superpowers;
• the disintegration of colonial empires;
• the world ceases to be predominantly Eurocentric;
•the acceleration of socio-historical processes as a result of modernization;
• the formation of a unified information-technological space.
In evaluating the agreements reached at Potsdam, on the one hand, it is necessary
to take into account that they fixed the objective balance of power and interests,
above all of the major states — at the moment the corresponding agreements were concluded; on the other hand, it is not
entirely correct to assert that over the decades they have completely lost their meaning.
After all, the territorial arrangement in most parts of Europe remains largely what
it was established to be at Potsdam.
The Yalta–Potsdam system of international relations – the term accepted in geopolitics for the system of international relations fixed
by the treaties and agreements of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
The question of postwar settlement was first raised at the highest level
during the Tehran Conference of 1943, where the strengthening of the
position of two states – the USSR and the United States, to which the decisive role in
determining the parameters of the postwar world increasingly passed – was already fairly clearly apparent. That is, even during the war the preconditions for
the formation of the foundations of the coming bipolar world were emerging. This tendency became fully
apparent at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, where the main role in resolving the key
problems related to the formation of a new model of international relations was played by the two, now already superpowers, the USSR
and the United States.
The Potsdam era became a historical precedent, since never before had the entire world
been artificially divided into spheres of influence between two states. The bipolar
distribution of forces quickly led to the beginning of the standoff between the capitalist and socialist
camps, known in history as the Cold War.
The Potsdam era was characterized by an extreme ideologization of international
relations, as well as a constant threat of direct military confrontation between the USSR and
the United States.
The end of the Potsdam era was marked by the collapse of the world socialist
camp, which followed the failed attempt to reform the economy of the Soviet Union,
and was sealed by the Belovezha Accords of 1991.
Features:
1. The multipolar organization of the structure of international relations was eliminated,
and a bipolar structure of postwar international relations arose, in which the leading role was
played by the two superpowers – the USSR and the United States. The significant gap between the military-power, political,
economic, and cultural-ideological capabilities of these two states and the rest of the
world's countries led to the formation of two main, dominant "centers of power", which exerted a
system-forming influence on the structure and character of the entire international system.
2. The postwar system was confrontational in nature. This was a matter of systemic,
comprehensive opposition in the economic, political, military, ideological, and other
spheres – a confrontation that from time to time took on the character of acute conflict and crisis
interaction. This form of standoff, in a format of mutual threats of the use of force,
balancing on the brink of real, "hot" war, came to be called the "Cold War".
3. Postwar bipolarity took shape in the era of nuclear weapons, which led to a
revolution in both military and political strategy. This revolution contributed to the gradual
transformation of strategies and doctrines of nuclear intimidation, nuclear blackmail, and
ultimatums (mid-1950s – early 1960s) into a special mechanism for preventing
world nuclear war (a model of confrontational stability) based on the doctrine of mutual
nuclear deterrence built on nuclear parity and the "balance of fear" (late 1960s – the 1970s),
and later into the exclusion of nuclear war as a means of pursuing policy, and into concepts of
equal security, reasonable sufficiency, and restraint in the nuclear sphere (the second half of the 1980s
– early 1990s).
4. The division of the world into spheres of influence of the two superpowers, both in Europe and on the periphery,
the emergence of "divided" countries (Germany, Korea, Vietnam, China), and the formation of
military-political blocs under the leadership of the USSR and the United States led to the globalization and
deepening geopolitical structuring of the systemic confrontation and rivalry.
At the same time, the unconditional hegemony of the USSR and the United States made it possible, through the mechanisms of bloc
"discipline", to achieve a fairly high degree of "manageability" of international processes,
in particular in the military-political sphere, in arms-control negotiations,
and in the settlement of conflict situations, etc.
5. Postwar bipolarity took the form of a political-ideological confrontation,
an ideological confrontation between the "free world" of the Western democracies led by the United States
and the "socialist world" led by the USSR. On the one hand, the ideological antagonism
reflected the messianic character of the foreign-policy orientations of the West and the East:
the United States sought to establish American hegemony in the world under the slogan of "Pax Americana",
while the USSR insisted on the inevitability of the victory of socialism on a world scale. Ideological
confrontation, the "battle of ideas", led to mutual demonization of the opposing side and
remained an important feature of the postwar system of international relations. The Soviet-American standoff looked, above all, like a rivalry between systems of political and
ethical ideals, of social and moral principles. On the other hand, the ideological
antagonism largely masked the deeper geopolitical intentions of the opposing sides:
the achievement of world leadership and hegemony by Washington (the globalization of the "Monroe
Doctrine") and by Moscow (dominance over the Eurasian continent).
6. The postwar world was not predominantly Eurocentric; the international system
became global, worldwide. The destruction of colonial systems and the formation of
regional and subregional systems took place under the dominant influence of
the horizontal spread of the systemic bipolar confrontation and of the trends of
economic and political globalization. Confrontational stability at the global level
contributed to the decentralization of violence and increased conflict potential at the regional and
subregional levels, multiplying regional conflicts.
7. The Yalta–Potsdam order did not have a solid treaty-legal basis. The initial
agreements underlying the postwar order were either oral, not officially
recorded, or were fixed mainly in declarative form, or their full
implementation was blocked as a result of the sharpness of the contradictions and confrontation between the main
actors of postwar international relations.
Indeed, the UN, one of the central elements of the Yalta–Potsdam system, was meant to
become the main mechanism for coordinating efforts aimed at excluding
wars and conflicts from international life by harmonizing relations between states and creating a global
system of collective security. Postwar realities, the irreconcilability of the confrontational relations
between the USSR and the United States, significantly limited the UN's ability to realize its charter
functions and goals. The UN's main task was focused mainly on preventing an
armed clash between the USSR and the United States, both at the global and, mostly, at the
regional levels – that is, on maintaining the stability of Soviet-American
relations as a fundamental precondition for international security and peace in the postwar era.
International relations in the 1950s and 1960s were largely determined by the state of Soviet-American relations. Conflict and
hostility dominated the international atmosphere. In the second half of the 1950s, following the denunciation of the cult of personality, certain positive changes occurred in the policy of the USSR,
both domestic and foreign, which went down in history as
the «Khrushchev thaw». Reforms were begun in the country, an initiative for a summit meeting
with the United States was put forward, and a conversion of military production and personnel was carried out. Nevertheless,
a number of serious international incidents disrupted these initiatives.
In November 1960, the Democratic Party won the U.S. elections
and J. Kennedy became president. In 1961 the so-called Caribbean crisis began, which
resulted from the landing of Cuban counterrevolutionaries in Cuba, which
was supported by the U.S. Navy and Air Force. The landing force was destroyed by the Castro government. Under
a secret agreement between the USSR and Cuba, Soviet medium-range nuclear
missiles were deployed on Cuban territory. This move by the Soviet Union was not so much
mistaken as adventurist, and it nearly led to an international catastrophe.
In response, the United States declared a blockade of Cuba. The danger of a clash between the USSR and the United States
became more than real. Only thanks to a series of compromises reached during negotiations between the
American and Soviet leaders was the threat of military conflict eliminated.
In fulfillment of the agreement reached, the USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba, and the United States – from
Turkey. The United States promised to respect the inviolability of Cuba going forward. The peaceful
resolution of this conflict became a turning point in Soviet-American
relations in the 1960s.
After a series of dangerous international crises, the United States and the USSR arrived at a still
somewhat shaky recognition of the need to ease international tension. After the Caribbean crisis ended, a number of important documents were adopted, marking a transition
from confrontation to negotiations and the conclusion of the first agreements that eased international
tension. Thus, in August 1963 the Moscow Treaty of the three states was concluded, banning
nuclear tests in three environments (the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater). In
1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed.
The government of Egypt had planned the construction of the Aswan Dam for the purpose of irrigating
arid lands and building a powerful energy base for industry. In February
1956 an agreement was reached to provide Egypt with a loan of 200 million dollars from the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, on condition that 70 million would be provided in the form of
«aid» from the United States and Great Britain. But already on 9 July 1956, U.S. Secretary of State
J. F. Dulles announced the refusal to provide the loan.
The Egyptian government found itself facing the threat of disruption to the construction of a project vital to
the country. A serious blow was dealt to the prestige of Egyptian President G. A. Nasser.
G. A. Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, whose concession
was due to expire in 1969. The governments of France, which held a significant share of the company's stock, and
Great Britain, the main user of the canal, began military preparations aimed at
exerting forceful pressure on Egypt.
by the Arab oil-exporting countries, took a more restrained position.
The issues of the Suez Canal were discussed at an international conference in London
from August 1—23, 1956, with the participation of 18 countries that accounted for 95% of shipping through the canal.
According to a decision adopted in July 1956, Great Britain and France began
preparations for intervention. Great Britain called up 20,000 reservists, France sent
its troops to Cyprus. Both countries began negotiations with Israel to work out joint
plans for intervention.
On October 30, 1956, Israeli armed forces, under the pretext of fighting Palestinian
guerrillas, launched a sudden strike against Egypt.
an ultimatum was issued to Egypt and Israel demanding the withdrawal of troops 16 km from the Suez Canal.
Egypt rejected the ultimatum.
The government of the USA regarded the aggression against Egypt in the world as undermining the Atlantic front.
On October 30, 1956, the UN Security Council discussed an American draft resolution that
called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the demarcation line and the non-use of force
by the Franco-British side. However, Great Britain and France vetoed this
resolution.
On October 31 the Anglo-French forces began military operations. On November 2, 1956, at an
emergency session of the UN General Assembly 64 countries voted for a ceasefire, while
5 voted against (France, Great Britain, Israel, New Zealand, and Australia).
Great Britain, France, and Israel continued to expand military operations.
Aviation carried out massive bombardments of Cairo, Alexandria, and cities in the canal zone. On November 5
England and France began the occupation of the Suez Canal zone, launching an airborne landing
in the area of Port Said. On the same day the Soviet government appealed to England, France, and Israel
with an ultimatum demanding the immediate cessation of military operations and warned of dangerous consequences.
On November 6 US President D. Eisenhower also came out with a demand for the cessation
of military operations.
On December 22, 1956, the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces was completed.
For almost three months it had occupied part of Egyptian territory, but under international pressure
in March 1957 it was obliged to withdraw its troops.
In the course of the war the Arab countries supported Egypt
against Great Britain and France.
China had enough troubles with the damage caused by the civil war, which
only ended in 1949, as well as due to its involvement in Korean affairs.
China received from Soviet Russia assurances of technical assistance in creating
a nuclear arsenal. But this assistance was unexpectedly refused in 1959, though in 1958
China was still confident in it. And on the night of August 22-23, 1958, the artillery of communist
China resumed shelling the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, where nationalist forces were stationed.
The decision to resume hostilities was a consequence of an agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the
American government of May 7, 1957, on the placement in Taiwan of nuclear warheads
whose range reached China. It is quite possible that during his visit to Beijing in July
1958, Khrushchev sharply criticized the initiatives of the then Chinese domestic policy,
known under the names of the "people's communes" and the "great leap forward".
the former being a form of collectivization of agriculture, the latter – an attempt, regarded by Leninists as
"adventurist", to move from the phase of people's democracy directly to the phase of
"communism" without a transitional socialist regime, in which equality exists according to the formula –
to each according to their labor.
considered the Chinese intention unfeasible.
it could probably be regarded as a Chinese initiative aimed at proving its independence in
relations with the USSR. And yet the USSR, after several days of hesitation, supported the actions
of communist China and even pushed it to advance claims not only to
the coastal islands, but to Taiwan and the Pescadores archipelago. On September 19 Khrushchev declared
that in the event of a nuclear attack on the PRC, the aggressor would be met with the same means.
The conflict immediately eased. China stopped the shelling, and later, in October 1958,
decided to shell the islands only on odd-numbered days.
of a total war. Foster Dulles inclined toward such an assessment.
“balancing on the brink of war”.
It should be noted that the end of the confrontation between the two worlds turned out to weaken,
and later end, the support for authoritarian regimes that had been maintained during the
Cold War by the two opposing blocs in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
In the second half of the 1980s a fairly large-scale process of democratization began on all
continents. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile made the transition from military-authoritarian to civilian rule.
Later these processes spread to Central America.
Similar transformations were taking place at this time in the Asia-Pacific region – in
the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea. A significant shift on the African continent
was the rejection by the Republic of South Africa of the policy of apartheid. However, in
other regions of Africa the retreat from authoritarianism proceeded at a slower pace.
Particular attention is drawn to the problems of interdependence and globalization of the world,
and the formation of a common denominator of the national components of world politics. An analysis
of the indicated transcendent universal tendencies will make it possible more
reliably to represent the direction of changes in world politics and international relations. The disappearance
of the ideological phantom of world politics in the form of confrontation.
anticommunism" should contribute to a return to the traditional, natural structure of relations between
national states, which presupposes the formation of a multipolar world.
Two concepts of the future world order have come onto the agenda:
the concept of unipolarity and that of polypolarity. The international relations formed after the Cold
War increasingly resemble European politics of the 19th century, when
traditional national interests and variable balances of power determined the diplomatic
game, the formation and dissolution of alliances, and the changing of spheres of influence. A particular emphasis on the necessity
of developing polypolar relations is made by Ukrainian and Russian scholars. The number of
adherents of the idea of polypolarity is growing: it has become one of the central ideas in state and party
documents of China, India, and other countries. Ukraine, too, gravitates toward a polypolar picture of the world.
At the same time, in contrast to this, in Western literature, in particular American literature, there is talk of the
irreversibility of the formation of a unipolar world and the sole leadership of the USA.
In the early 1990s the map of the world underwent serious changes. The dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance of the socialist countries put an
end to the dependence of the states of Central and Eastern Europe on Moscow, turning each of them
into an active unit of European and world politics. The collapse of the USSR changed
the geopolitical situation in the Eurasian space. The newly formed post-Soviet states
are steadily filling their sovereignty with real content, forming their own complexes of
national interests and foreign-policy preferences, and becoming independent subjects of
international relations. The fragmentation of the post-Soviet territory into fifteen sovereign
states also changed the geopolitical situation for neighboring countries whose system of external relations
had included only the USSR — China, Turkey, and the countries of Central-Eastern and Western
Europe. Consequently, not only did the world balance of power change, but the
multivariance of relations grew rapidly.
Geopolitical changes on the European continent were reflected in the unification
of Germany, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and the pro-Western orientation
of the CEE countries, including the Baltic states. This leads to a strengthening of Eurocentrism,
the independence of Western integration structures, and the vivid manifestation in a number of European countries
of sentiments not always coinciding with the strategic line of the USA. Shifts are also occurring
in the geopolitical situation of the Asia-Pacific region, caused by the dynamics
of the economic strengthening of China and the increase in its foreign-policy activity;
by Japan's search for a more significant place in world politics. At the same time, the objective
increase in the relative weight of the USA after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR is somewhat
offset by the increased independence of other poles and a certain strengthening of
isolationist sentiments in American society. With the end of the confrontation
between the two Cold War camps, the coordinates of the foreign-policy orientation of the states of the
so-called Third World changed. New meaning was acquired by certain political movements, in particular the Non-Aligned
Movement, and a number of anti-globalist structures; the differentiation between the South and
certain states of the North intensified. In all directions there is a stratification of states
and a deepening of centrifugal and centripetal processes.
One of the fairly significant signs of deep changes in world politics is the strengthening and
deepening of regionalism. Moreover, it is not cultural-civilizational
blocs that are strengthening in regionalism, as the well-known American scholar S. Huntington insists, but economic
formations. Above all, this concerns the highly integrated European Union, and such
integrational formations as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the North American Free Trade Area, and certain
structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States. "Triangles" and
multilateral alliances are intensifying: North America - Western Europe - Japan, the "Group of Seven", which
increasingly appears as the "Group of Eight".
Multipolarity has apparently already acquired a certain significance in the world system, but it
clarifies the form rather than the essence of the new system of international interaction. Contemporary
multipolarity does not yet mean, in full measure, the operation of the traditional driving forces of world
politics and the motivations of the behavior of its subjects on the international arena, which were to a greater degree inherent
in all stages of the Westphalian system. The current situation does not put forward new dividing lines
of confrontation between North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region. On the contrary, integrated Europe
is seeking points of contact with China and other leading countries of that region. For all the
apparent sharpness of the polemic between the USA and Russia, these countries, guided by
fundamental interests in resolving it, are moving toward each other.
The diverse interests of the countries of the "Group of Seven" do not push them toward separation, because the spheres
of disagreement are considerably narrower than the spheres of coinciding interests.
Thus, the term «international order» has much in common with and differs
from the concept of «world order». In the opinion of S. Hoffmann, an international (interstate)
order can well exist without the presence of a world order. As an example one can cite
states between which relations of mutual respect exist, along with complete indifference to
each other's internal affairs, which makes possible, within any given state, the existence of
genocide, violations of freedom of speech or conscience, and the economic exploitation of the bulk of the
population. As for world order, it is impossible without the creation of effective
procedures of interstate cooperation, providing for a special international
order that meets the common basic goals and values of their citizens. In the language
of legal terms, one must speak of the distinction between the rights of states (mutual respect
for sovereignty) and the rights of man. Consequently, international order is an important constituent
part of world order, which shares with it common international economic, scientific-technical,
political, and sociocultural foundations. On the other hand, neither international nor world order,
by their essential characteristics, though global in nature, can exist
without order at the regional levels. As an example – the disruption of the balance of power and stability at the
planetary scale under the influence of profound transformational changes in the countries
of the Central-Eastern European region, the collapse of the socialist system and the Soviet Union
at the turn of the 1980s-1990s of the 20th century.
Specialists distinguish three dimensions of international order:
- horizontal – relations between the main actors of international relations;
- vertical – relations between strong and weak actors;
- functional – the role played in stabilizing international life by various
spheres of international relations – the diplomacy and strategy of the actors' behavior, the economic exchanges
between them, the moral values and political ambitions of leaders, and the activity of transnational
corporations, various associations and non-political organizations, etc.
However, the main thing is that in all dimensions of international order the primary means
of maintaining it, at various stages of the historical development of international relations, has remained
force, and above all military force.
Thus, a bipolar system reigned in world space: two alliances of forces and
interests, conventionally called capitalist and communist. At present a mono- or unipolar system with elements of polypolarity has formed, on which, one might assume,
– the future development of relations between states depends. It is precisely in this complex period of the breakdown of the stable
world development of the system of international relations that a renewed state came into the world,
sovereign Ukraine. The Ukrainian state develops its foreign policy in accordance with the accepted
norms and foundations of international law.
The priorities of foreign policy are:
· the protection of state sovereignty;
· the protection of territorial integrity and the inviolability of state borders;
· the prevention of interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine;
· ensuring the development of the economic potential of Ukraine and securing for it a high
place in the international division of labor;
· the protection of Ukrainian citizens abroad;
· the formation of a positive informational image of the Ukrainian state.
The Law of Ukraine "On the Fundamentals of the National Security of Ukraine" of June 19, 2003,
in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine (Art. 92, para. 19), defines the basic principles of national security
as the protection of the vital interests of the individual and citizen, of society, and of
the state, under which the sustainable development of society and the timely detection,
prevention, and neutralization of real and potential threats to national interests are ensured, and
defines the priorities of national interests as guaranteeing the constitutional rights and freedoms
of man and citizen; creating a competitive, socially oriented market
продолжение следует...
Часть 1 10. The Essence and Components of International Relations Systems
Часть 2 - 10. The Essence and Components of International Relations Systems
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