Lecture
1. The concept of international cooperation.
2. The concept of international integration and its levels.
3. The main approaches to examining integration processes in IR theory research. Functionalism, federalism, the communications approach.
4. Forms of integration. A typology of integration processes by type and level of interaction among subjects. The problem of the relationship between economic, political, cultural, and other forms of integration. The state of integration processes in the contemporary world.
5. A comparative analysis of the dynamics of integration and disintegration processes at the regional and subregional level.
The origins of international cooperation are linked to the end of the religious wars in
Europe and the establishment of the Peace of Westphalia. One of the most important achievements
of the Treaty of Westphalia was the formation of the foundation of legal relations between states,
which created the conditions for the emergence and further development of international cooperation.
The formation of the European system of international relations (whose basic parameters, and,
above all, its main element — the state as a form of the political organization of people —
gradually spread across the entire world) not only gave impetus to interstate
cooperation, but also determined its basic orientation. The starting points for
cooperation among states as political units became mutual respect for sovereignty and
non-interference in one another's internal affairs, while its central goals became the conscious
aspiration of governments to further strengthen national security and independence. In turn,
concern for their own sovereignty led states to accept the law of
coexistence and its fundamental principle — legal equality. The law of
coexistence imposed on states primarily negative obligations: not to interfere in
one another's internal affairs, not to violate treaties, not to wage unjust wars, not to
create obstacles to the diplomatic activity of official representatives of other countries
on their territory, and so forth. Consequently, the theoretical status of the problem of cooperation in international-political science turned out to be inextricably linked with the analysis of confrontation and conflicts between
independent states. However, the further development of the discipline led to an expansion of the content
of the concept of international cooperation and its types.
The concept of «international cooperation» reflects a process of interaction between two
or more actors, in which the use of armed force is excluded,
and the joint search for ways to realize common interests predominates. Contrary to the common
understanding, cooperation is not the absence of conflict, but rather «deliverance» from its extreme,
crisis forms. The illusion of the "transparency" of this concept's content is, perhaps, the reason
why attempts to define it are fairly rare. One such attempt was made by J.-P.
Deriennic, according to whom «two actors are in a state of cooperation when each of them
can be satisfied only if the other partner is also satisfied.
The result of a purely cooperative relationship can be a situation in which either both
actors are satisfied, or neither of them is». Traditionally, cooperative
relations include bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, and the conclusion
of various kinds of alliances and agreements providing for the mutual coordination of policy courses
(for example, with the aim of jointly settling conflicts, ensuring common security,
or resolving other issues of mutual interest to all the participating
parties).
The development of cooperation between states and other international actors
in relations has given rise to an entire system of interstate and non-state organizations
of global and regional significance. The growth of the world's interdependence, and the emergence and
intensification of global problems, have enormously increased the objective need for the expansion of
multilateral cooperation and have contributed to its spread into other spheres of life.
Today, cooperation encompasses not only issues of trade, customs regulations, border
settlement, or military-political alliances, but also the task of finding adequate
responses to environmental challenges, space exploration, the shared use of resources
of general purpose, the development of communication networks, arms control, and so on.
Noting the significant progress made over the past decade in theoretical research on
international cooperation, specialists particularly highlight two major achievements
of the theory.
First, despite the fact that discussions continue to this day, the scholarly
community has reached agreement on the concept of «interstate cooperation». Following R.
Keohane, many scholars today understand cooperation as a situation «in which actors
adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences
of others, through a process of policy coordination».
In other words, interstate cooperation presupposes the presence of three
elements: the specific goals of the partner states, their expectation of benefits from the situation, and the mutual
character of these benefits. «Each actor does not necessarily help the other,» notes H. Milner,
— but, in doing so, it expects to improve its own situation, which leads to mutual
coordination of state policies». Such an understanding is important because it allows one not merely to find
the boundaries between cooperation and rivalry — boundaries within which activity is carried out with the
purpose of diminishing others' benefit, or activity aimed at preventing the realization of
their interests. In addition, such an understanding of «interstate cooperation» makes it
possible to distinguish cooperation from non-cooperation, that is, from behavior
in which actors do not take into account the consequences of their actions for others, as well as from inaction, that is,
from behavior of IR subjects that fails to prevent negative consequences for the policies of other parties.
The existence of consensus regarding the content of the concept of «interstate cooperation» makes possible
the creation of a primary classification of cooperative situations. From this point of view, one can
distinguish the following types of interstate cooperation:
— negotiations, the subject of which is the division of the benefits states derive from their interaction (this is simultaneously
both a path to cooperation and an indicator of its existence);
— deliberate policy coordination, achieved as a result of discussion (formal
treaties and agreements on activity);
— implicit cooperation, carried out without direct ties and/or formal
deals, and not presupposing the conclusion of treaties (such cooperation arises from the overlapping
expectations of actors);
— imposed cooperation: the stronger party forces the other to adjust its policy,
but at the same time also adjusts its own;
— the creation of specialized institutions (for example, UN institutions), which carry out
regulation, expert assessment, and subsidies that promote the development of cooperation.
Second, another important achievement of research in the field of interstate
cooperation has been the development of hypotheses about the conditions under which cooperation between
states becomes most likely. These hypotheses formed a comprehensive theory of interstate
cooperation. They merely proposed a series of variables, each of which makes
cooperation more likely. The analysis and empirical testing of these hypotheses are capable of
advancing the creation of a comprehensive theory, and thus the development of the theory
of international relations as a whole. H. Milner identifies and analyzes the following six hypotheses:
— the «reciprocity hypothesis», whose main content is states' expectation of benefits from
cooperation and their fear of losses or even penalties in case of avoiding it;
— the «number-of-actors hypothesis», according to which the prospects for cooperation increase as
the number of interacting countries decreases;
— the «iteration hypothesis», according to which states' opportunities for cooperation are related to
the length of their prior interaction;
– the «international regimes hypothesis», that is, concerning the norms, principles, and procedures for
decision-making, the totality of which represents the centers of interstate cooperation;
– the «epistemic communities hypothesis», describing the role played in the development of
interstate cooperation by professional experts who share a common understanding of a problem
and produce common ways of solving it;
— the «power asymmetry hypothesis», which resembles the so-called hegemonic
stability theory and from whose standpoint cooperation is more likely if there is a strong
and interested hegemon state present. H. Milner sees the main shortcoming of these hypotheses in
the fact that they pay no attention to the internal sources of interstate cooperation.
The concept of international integration and its levels.
International economic integration is a process of economic-political
unification of countries based on the development of deep, stable interconnections and the division of labor between
national economies, and the interaction of their productive structures at various levels and in various
forms. At the microlevel, this process takes place through the interaction of the capital of individual economic
entities (enterprises, firms) of individual countries, by forming a system of economic agreements
between them, and by establishing branches abroad. At the international level, integration takes place
on the basis of the formation of economic unions of states and the coordination of national policies.
The rapid development of inter-firm ties creates the need for interstate (and,
in some cases, supranational) regulation, aimed at ensuring the free
movement of goods, services, capital, and labor between countries within a given
region, and at the coordination and pursuit of joint economic, scientific-technical, financial,
monetary, social, foreign, and defense policy. As a result, integrated
regional economic complexes are created, with a unified monetary infrastructure, common
economic proportions, common financial funds, and supranational or
interstate governing bodies
Consequently, international economic integration means cooperation between
the national economies of different countries with their partial or complete unification,
the elimination of barriers to trade between countries, and the convergence of the markets of each of the countries with the goal of
creating one larger, that is, common, market. The factors determining
integration processes in the world are the deepening of the international division of labor, the development of
productive forces under the influence of scientific-technical progress that is global in nature, the rapid
development of communication capabilities, and the objective need for the joint resolution of
global problems facing humanity's existence, and so on.
The forms of international economic integration are:
1. Free trade area — a preferential zone of a regional type, within which
international trade among the countries belonging to the zone is maintained free of customs and quantitative
restrictions. Free trade areas promote the growth of domestic, and on this basis
also mutual, trade among member countries. The most developed of such zones is the Free Trade Area
for industrial goods in Europe.
2. Customs union — a common customs territory of two or more countries, with the complete elimination of
duties in their mutual relations and a unified customs tariff with respect to third countries. The purpose
of creating a customs union is to facilitate trade among member countries while, at the same time, not creating
additional obstacles to trade with third countries. The WTO monitors very closely
the observance of this provision among its own members.
3. Common market — the unification of the national markets of several countries into a single
large market with the free movement, within it, of capital, goods, services, and
labor.
4. Economic union — the unification of the national economies of several countries on the basis of
a customs union, a common market, the unification of financial systems, and the pursuit of joint
monetary policy.
5. Political union — the unification of countries on the basis of a general treaty, with the
goal of pursuing a common policy in all spheres of public life. 6. International
organizations, groupings, complexes – the unification of countries or other subjects around particular
interests (or a group of specific interests) for the joint implementation of various measures
aimed at satisfying them.
Its first aspect is caused by the globalization of international life, and the growth of the
universality, interdependence, and interconditionality of contemporary international
processes. In fact, the most important essential characteristic of globalization has become the reality
of a new quality of «all-encompassing commonality» of human existence, one that no longer fits within the customary framework
of national-state formations and, accordingly, of the state-centric paradigm. That is, we are
speaking of the creation of a global («worldwide») community, within which existing
national-state formations act as more or less independent structural
units. At the same time, globalization processes lead to a growth in conflict potential, since
behind them stand colossal interests (economic, political, informational, military, and so on),
fundamental differences between the potential and capabilities of different countries of the world, cultural-civilizational disagreements and challenges, as well as the emergence of new and the intensification of many
old global problems.
The second aspect characterizes the essence of the fragmentation of international relations. J. Lolan
speaks of the «Balkanization of the planet». By this he means the irreversible process of the disintegration
of relations of solidarity and interdependence that gradually took hold in the postwar world.
P. A. Tsygankov also believes that the phenomena of «fragmentation», «Balkanization», and «splintering»
reflect real trends that also affect political decisions. This concerns the fact that
the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern bloc, and the dissolution of the bipolar system, weakened the «internal
discipline» of Western states and revealed previously hidden contradictions. A once single
arrangement is being replaced by separate centers of power, as evidenced by the formation of the EU and NAFTA. In this
respect, the viewpoint of Academician Y. M. Primakov deserves attention. In his book «The Minefield of
Politics», he noted: «It is natural that the end of the «Cold War» became the starting
point for progress toward establishing a stable and predictable world at the global
level. But at the same time, the zone of regional conflicts sharply expanded, and a widespread shock
triggered a surge in waves of terrorism. The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction persists».
The third aspect consists in identifying the phenomenon of economic, social, and political
integration and disintegration, observed today in virtually every region of the world.
Examples include, on the one hand, the processes of the «unification of Europe», and, on the other,
the processes of disintegration across the territory of the former USSR and the socialist world in general. Theorists and
analysts of international relations rightly draw attention to the fact that
the formation of an integrated world is accompanied not only by integration processes, but also
creates conditions for the exclusion, the marginalization, of all who are unable to join
in international interconnections and to influence their development. It is no accident that, based on
the main trends of world development, sociologist J. Groom believes that the modern «calling
of the science of international relations lies in creating a political sociology of global
society».
The fourth aspect is manifested in the persisting influence of economic-financial,
demographic, and environmental factors on international relations. At the same time, some of them,
for example, financial factors, the role of transnational corporations (TNCs), and so on, are even growing
in influence. This was demonstrated by the manifestations and consequences of the global financial-economic
crisis of 2008–2009.
Its first aspect comes down to the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and
foreign policy. The conclusion regarding the transparency of the boundaries between them, together with the conclusion regarding
the loss by states of their monopoly on the role of arbiter of international politics, played
a decisive role in the emergence of transnationalism as a theoretical direction in the study of
international relations. This aspect, it is true, at the current stage of the development of international
life, still does not negate the determining role of state-centric approaches to analyzing the state
and prospects for the evolution of the entire system of contemporary international relations.
The second aspect consists in imbuing both international relations and domestic
political processes with democratic content. It is observed in all countries
regardless of the prevailing type of political regime in them. A worldwide phenomenon is
the progressive politicization of the masses, who everywhere demand access to
information, participation in political decision-making, and the improvement of their material
well-being and quality of life.
The third aspect is related to the expansion in the composition and growth in the diversity of
political actors. In just the last 50 years, the number of UN member states has grown from 60
to 195. Along with states, the number and heterogeneity of other actors is
growing on the international stage. Among them are regional administrations, separatist forces, religious
movements, independent trade unions, environmental parties, transnational corporations, political
associations, and, finally, international organizations. As a result, as J. Rosenau emphasizes,
the contours of a new, «post-international politics» are emerging. At the same time, given the growth in the
number and diversity of players on the international stage, the main task consists
in preventing the «forces of global growth» from turning into «forces of global
disorder and disintegration».
Its first aspect is caused by the strengthening role of the bifurcation factor in
international relations. J. Rosenau notes that the world of «post-international politics»
is characterized by chaos and unpredictability, by the distortion of identity,
reorientation of traditional bonds of authority and loyalty. In other words, the growth in the number of
participants introduces greater uncertainty into the system of international relations. Therefore
ensuring the military security of states remains a pressing task.
Moreover, it is accompanied by challenges linked to the growing influence of integration and
globalization processes, the stakes in economic competition, the problems
of international terrorism, and so on.
The second aspect of the transformational plan: special attention should be paid to the
fact that in the modern world there is a transformation of currently operating concepts and structures
of confrontational-type security into concepts and structures of security based on
cooperation. This aspect characterizes the mutual influence and interdependence of the national and
international dimensions of security. A new understanding and interest of every actor arises
in ensuring national security through the strengthening of international security.
The third aspect is connected with the consolidation of new elements in the rules of conduct
between states within the framework of the modern international order, which is above all
characterized by the growing determining influence of two cardinal postulates – the right
of humanitarian intervention and the illegitimacy of authoritarian regimes (the 1999 NATO
intervention in Kosovo, pressure on S. Milosevic in Serbia, the 2003 war in Iraq, threats to North Korea
and Iran from the United States, etc.). The novelty of the situation is that the US and NATO states have
persistently sought to legitimize the practice of humanitarian intervention and to establish in
international relations a new principle of the selective legitimacy of sovereign states' governments
– a trend that runs counter to the fundamental principle of non-interference,
enshrined as early as the Peace of Westphalia of 1648.
The fourth aspect stems from the establishment of the newest modern mechanisms for
regulating the international order. In fact, a reorganization of the global
structures of world governance has been carried out, such that alongside the universal in scope and
official in status UN mechanisms, a semi-closed and informal
(in terms of membership and decision-making type) mechanism of the «Group of Eight» with the NATO bloc has taken shape.
At the beginning of the 21st century this informal coalition, in terms of its practical influence on world
politics, not only came level with the UN but also clearly signaled a tendency to further increase
its influence going forward. At the same time, alongside the two branches of the mechanism regulating
international relations – the universal (UN) and the institutional-group (G-8 +
the North Atlantic Alliance) – the contours of a third branch began to emerge in the world. This refers to
the trend toward growing individual-group influence over the entire system of the international
world order on the part of the United States (as a kind of «world policeman») and, when necessary,
coalitions of states selected by it to achieve a specific goal (for example, the coalition of the US,
Great Britain, and Russia in the second Afghan war of 2001–2002, or the American-British
military coalition against Iraq in 2003).
The trend toward changes in the nature of relations between telluric and thalassocratic powers
in the world after the end of the "Cold War."
It consists in the evolution of the current geohistorical phase of planetary dualism, as
«a particular way of realizing the fundamental contradiction between the forces of Land and Sea». What matters most
here are the features of the structure and configuration of centers-of-power relations. At the same time
two dimensions exist and develop simultaneously: the integration of the thalasso- and telluro-cratic hemispheres under
the authority of the dominant center of power – the United States; and the formation of polycentricity to prevent
globalist encroachment (alongside the US – the EU, Russia, China). This is a situation in which
hegemony in one hemisphere correlates with polycentrism, which is quite dangerous for
international peace. It is precisely under current conditions of intensifying international tension and
confrontation, particularly along the US – Russia axis, that we observe a threatening disruption of the
balance between telluro- and thalassocracy at the global level.
Finally, another cardinally fundamental and defining trend in the evolution of
contemporary international relations is the tendency toward the transformation of the world
international order into a «post-American world» (as defined by F. Zakaria). In
his book of the same name, which has already become a bestseller, he gives such an accurate characterization of the new
international system: «In this evolving system, the United States occupies the
central place, but it is precisely to it that the new order poses the greatest challenges. Most other
great powers have yet to determine their role – and this process is in full swing.
China and India are becoming increasingly serious players in their own and neighboring regions. Russia
has completed its adjustment to post-Soviet conditions and is becoming ever more influential, as well
as more aggressive. Japan, though a developed state, is speaking to its neighbors more and more freely about its
views. Europe (meaning the European Union – A.K., S.T.) is acting in the trade and
economic arenas with growing power and determination. In
Latin American affairs, the voices of Brazil and Mexico are sounding ever louder. South
Africa is positioning itself as the leader of the entire African continent (indeed, it is in South Africa
that the final stage of the 2010 World Cup will be held – A.K., S.T.). And other
countries are occupying an ever greater space on the international stage».
In general, this means nothing other than the gradual displacement of the United States of America from its dominant positions
by new, increasingly powerful state international actors
in the new system of international relations. Its formation is subject to the trends of evolution
discussed above, which have a universal, planet-wide character. Under
conditions of the international order, genuine progress means compromise. No country can
or should insist on its own interests without regard for the interests of others. We
live in a world where joint action is not merely possible – it is necessary. The creation of
a genuinely new global order must be based on governance from many centers
and by many people. At the same time, the main task of the international architecture of the world «after the
Cold War» is to ensure peace, tranquility, development, and freedom for the entire world
community.
Pax Americana («American Peace») – a stylistic term used to designate
a period of economic and socio-political stability that first formed in the Western
Hemisphere, and after the end of the Second World War spread across the entire world, characterized by
American political, cultural, and economic dominance.
In the maelstrom of the Cold War, the essence of which was confrontation and rivalry between the US and
the USSR, a special role belonged to the doctrinal target-setting concepts – "Pax Americana"
(Pax Americana) – peace the American way, and "Pax Sovietica" (Pax Sovietica) – peace the Soviet way.
They reflected the content of the domestic development and foreign policy strategy of the
superpowers.
In the maelstrom of the Cold War, the essence of which was confrontation and rivalry between the US
and the USSR, a special role belonged to the doctrinal target-setting concepts – "Pax
Americana" (Pax Americana) – peace the American way, and "Pax Sovietica" (Pax Sovietica) –
peace the Soviet way. They reflected the content of domestic development and the
foreign policy strategy of the superpowers. Short-term doctrines, which changed in relation to
tasks of a stage-by-stage nature, were the tactical expression of both
strategies.
Like democracy and totalitarianism, "Pax Americana" and "Pax Sovietica" were, in their
purpose and orientation, directly opposite and confrontational. The quintessence of the first became the
postulate that American society is the pinnacle of modern civilization. And
the worldwide mission of the US – to help the peoples of the world rise to an equally democratic and
prosperous society. At the same time, the doctrine assumes that there is no country in the world that
could threaten the US. But the US cannot renounce the role of world leader, which is
needed to establish a world order in the style of "Pax Americana". In the USSR the doctrine
was falsified, presented as an American attempt to establish domination over the world, and
was used for the agitprop needs of rabid anti-Americanism.
The term "Pax Sovietica" usually denoted the region of the countries of the socialist
commonwealth, organizationally embodied by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact Organization. However, in terms of the scope of functions, tasks, and
plans contained in the design of the world communist revolution, the content of the doctrine of the same name
was broader than a mere politico-geographic term. Above all, it was the idea of
creating a Third Rome in its communist incarnation, in the realization of which were intertwined a policy of
glorifying the Soviet way of life and transferring it to countries where
socialism was imposed; recognition of the USSR as an elder brother standing at the vanguard of paving the way
to a bright future and waging a struggle against world imperialism. The shadow side of
"Pax Sovietica" was the Kremlin's real policy toward the countries of people's democracy, which
manifested itself in Soviet-centrism, tight control of political and economic life
(the appointment of top-tier officials had to be agreed with Moscow, the stationing on
their territory of KGB residencies and Soviet troops to "defend socialism," the demonstration
of loyalty to Moscow at the UN, Soviet ambassadors acting as "overseers," etc.).
Their limited sovereignty was camouflaged by ideologemes of brotherhood, mutual respect,
and cooperation. The problem of shortages was masked by propaganda about
asceticism and so-called reasonable human needs. But one thing could not be hidden.
the destruction (through the alienation of millions of individuals) of property, the spirit of competitiveness,
competition, and freedom of enterprise. As a result – the complete doom to failure of all
plans of the command-administrative system. And the leaders' calls for higher
labor productivity and intensified production spun like lightning without any nourishing
rain. With the destruction of private property, competition as the spring of movement, search, and development
disappeared. Extensive production, technological stagnation, absence of innovation – all belong to the
same series. And "Pax Sovietica" became the protective charter of a kind of matryoshka-empire, the first ring
of which was made up of the union republics, the second – the countries of the socialist camp, the third – the countries
of the third world oriented toward Moscow.
Both doctrines collided sharply after 1945. The philosophy of confrontation and
rivalry, characteristic of the bipolar Yalta system, proved to be the most
suitable framework for testing both doctrines' right to live and to win the favor of states and
peoples. The situation itself contributed to this. Western Europe, frightened by communism, invited
the US into the role of leader of the democratic world. Both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan,
proclaimed in 1947, not only served US national interests but also the main
principle of "Pax Americana". Europe would hardly have emerged so quickly from postwar ruin
had it not been for the American Marshall Plan and the shield created to defend against a communist attack
– NATO.
To ascend to the West's captain's bridge, the US Congress on June 11, 1948, adopted
the Vandenberg Resolution, which permitted peacetime pacts for the defense of the Free
World, and thus emerged from isolationism. And the USSR, as victor and pioneer of communist practice,
declared itself the helmsman of the socialist camp. Any attempts by others to lay a hand on the
wheel were ruthlessly punished. Thus in 1948, with Josip Broz Tito, when he took it upon
himself to build plans for a Balkan Federation (Greater Yugoslavia), which was to
include Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Greece on condition that communists came to power there.
Moscow's reaction was not long in coming: Stalin organized five failed attempts on his life.
The last, sixth attempt, carefully prepared, was never carried out: he died. No satellite was allowed
to diminish the role of the USSR as the sole and mighty center of communism in the world.
Something similar happened in the late 1950s with Mao Zedong, when he wished to share with
the Kremlin – leadership of the international communist movement. This led to a deterioration of
Soviet-Chinese relations and even to border clashes.
Stalin's successors sacredly adhered to Stalinist methods of the indivisibility of power
within the socialist camp. Encroachments on this function of "Pax Sovietica" were ruthlessly punished. Any attempt at
independent decision-making – likewise. Already in the 1960s, standing guard over "Pax Sovietica" came
the Brezhnev Doctrine, which legitimized the collective responsibility of the entire communist
world for the inviolability of the idea.
Both doctrines – each on its own territory – became a general guide to action in
all spheres of life. However, the way these doctrines manifested themselves everywhere was dictated by their
nature: "Pax Americana" was democratic in content, "Pax Sovietica" was
totalitarian. This was their fundamental difference. The historical foundation of "Pax
Americana" is the first and, to this day, the only constitution of the US, while "Pax Sovietica"
traces its imperial roots back to the era of Ivan III and further grows from the postulates of "Eurasianism" and
the "Russian world".
The founding fathers of the US, on the basis of the Declaration of Independence of 1776, laid into the still
operative "eternal" constitution the ideas of guaranteeing civil rights and political freedom in
the spirit of strict legality. A US citizen has for hundreds of years had the right to a lawful judicial
review of acts or omissions committed by him. Constitutional freedoms and human rights became
the foundation for the formation of civil society and a stimulus for US success in the socio-economic sphere. No one can be deprived of life, liberty, or property without trial.
The Constitution was drafted over four years (1787–1791). Rights and freedoms for
US citizens have long been a genetic trait. In 1943, at the Tehran Conference, when Stalin said that
the leadership of Nazi Germany should be shot without trial or investigation, Churchill declared
that he insisted on judicial procedure, and to President Roosevelt Stalin's opinion seemed
outright wild.
"Pax Americana" was finally formed at the end of the 19th century, when the US came
to first place in GDP output (1894). Over time it took the form of
guiding principles for Washington's conduct on the international stage in the sphere of adopting and implementing
decisions that formed the basis for the fundamental principles of the modern world and of
international law.
Under the framework of "Pax Americana" the well-known "Fourteen Points" of Woodrow Wilson were formulated, which
promised great prospects for the development of the world community, an everywhere-present spirit
of competitiveness for everyone: "dare". Aimed at this were the slogans "freedom of the seas", "freedom of the
oceans", "freedom of trade". Is not the modern world moving in this very direction, "through thorns
to the stars"? In this same context one should view the Yalta-Potsdam agreements, which
called for the thorough implementation, in the life of the Germans, of the program of the "four D's": demilitarization,
denazification, decartelization, and, in particular, the democratization of defeated Germany. By 1966
sentences had been passed on 86,000 Nazis. As a result – in the three western zones in 1945–
1948, gigantic work was carried out, after which in 1949 the FRG arose, an entirely
new, democratic state compared to the Nazi Reich. Here the Yalta-Potsdam agreements
were fully implemented. But in Moscow this was seen only as the treacherous
schemes of imperialism. The Soviet Union was the only one that failed to fulfill most points of the
"four D's" program and its final stated goal – the unification of Germany at that time, in the late
1940s. At the same time, in East Germany everything came down to replacing Nazi totalitarianism
with a communist one. The GDR, created in 1949, was, in the imagination of the Soviet leaders, and in fact generally, simply a
province of the USSR. Is that not why, in response to the Germans' negative reaction to the annexation of Crimea,
one hears: "But we gave you the GDR".
"Pax Sovietica" is not simply a sphere of influence created by the USSR after the Second World War,
but a camp constructed according to Stalinist blueprints – communized and
sovietized. It became the embodiment of Stalin's social creed: "Everyone imposes
their own system wherever their army can reach". And indeed, everywhere the Soviet Union's army
reached during World War II became a zone of its influence and control. The zone rested on two
shaky foundations: the military might of the USSR and the supply of cheap raw materials within the CMEA system.
The US pursued the achievement of its stated goal in the sense of "Pax Americana" through
humanistic and economic evolution based on high labor productivity, the scientific-technical and information revolution, and production innovation; the USSR – through communization and
sovietization of the space it controlled. The Cold War, with its toolkit (the arms
race, local conflicts, economic embargo, ideological and psychological warfare,
sabotage, espionage, terrorism), was the format of the bipolar world's existence and at the same time
a competition between two diametrically opposed world doctrines, which in the end was decisively
lost by "Pax Sovietica", which, it seemed, finally left the world stage of struggle. The reasons
are on the surface: in "Pax Americana", US national interests converged with the interests of
many countries of the world, materially and politically interested in its realization. "Pax
Sovietica" found not the slightest support among the countries enslaved by Soviet socialism.
The result – the US gained dozens of allies and friends, while the Soviet Union gained only
opponents and adversaries.
"Pax Sovietica" lost the competition to its counterpart on all fronts of the Cold War battle
between the giant superpowers: in economics, politics, the social sphere, science, labor productivity,
and philosophy of life, and capitulated. Its "descent" toward collapse occurred not only because of
disillusionment and rejection of the utopia in view of the consequences of its "creativity," but also because of the pressure of the achievements
of the Western world in its open democratic model of development.
The end of the bipolar world in 1991 and of the Cold War was thought to put a final period on the
history of "Pax Sovietica," which had demonstrated its complete failure. However, today
it would be premature to say that this page of history has been turned. "Pax Sovietica" in
a modified form is seeking revenge.
The supranational mechanism of the European Union is a unique phenomenon of the modern
system of international political and economic regulation. Although the EU's activity –
as the world's leading integration grouping – has features and specifics of its own
functioning.
For a deeper understanding of the specifics of European integration it is necessary to
analyze current trends in world development, determine the EU's place on the agenda
of international relations, provide an appropriate characterization of other integration
groupings and leading world countries whose power might compete with the EU, and
also compare the development parameters of the EU – the US – Japan – China, as the largest world
powers of the 21st century. The author has not dwelt on those aspects of the problem already sufficiently
researched by Ukrainian and foreign authors, but has tried to focus on the main
question: what is the essence of the EU phenomenon?
To find an answer, let us turn to the EU's external creators, in particular the US. The US
made efforts to create a European ally. The Second World War exhausted
Europe, causing a deep economic crisis. It was the US that provided it with the necessary resources:
it formed the European Payments Union, the European Organization for Economic
Cooperation, later transformed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Eventually, at US initiative, the implementation of the
Marshall Plan began, the lion's share of whose $17 billion in aid was received by the leading European
states – Great Britain, Germany, and France. In parallel with the formation across Europe
of a security structure – the Western European Union – the US, together with its
European partners, created NATO, which was a conceptually new formula for resolving
the security problem of Western Europe. Thus, the European structures simultaneously
came to cover economic, security, and political schemes of interaction. This gave
Europeans the opportunity to consider a separate political integration formation within the Communities
(the idea and Plan of L. Tindemans, which was not implemented) and a defense union (the concept and Plan
of P. Spaak, which likewise could not be implemented). The US took on the role of observer,
or rather patron, of Western Europe, gradually pulling it toward American standards,
while at the same time restraining any European ambitions that might interfere with American
dominance on the European continent. The US still pursues this same political
concept of playing on opposition today.
The role of a kind of center for the realization of American strategy in Europe has been assigned to
Germany and France – eternal allies and eternal rivals. By playing on their mutual
contradictions, pitting the weaker against the stronger, the Americans manage to maintain
constant control over this continent. Great Britain, a reliable, proven (eternal) ally of the US, has been
enlisted to monitor the European area.
This US strategy has proved its worth, as demonstrated by practice.
Among the scenarios for future world development, the following options are most popular.
According to the first scenario, called the «Davos World», globalization continues to surge forward.
India and China join in, the growth rates of their economies having far
outpaced Europe's and catching up with America's.
The second scenario is called "Pax Americana", according to which America holds the world's
palm of supremacy. At the same time, it separates from Europe on political questions and
finds itself in economic confrontation with China.
The third scenario, called the "New Caliphate", envisions an intensified movement of
Muslim countries creating a global transnational theocratic society.
And finally, the fourth scenario, called «The Contour of Fear». Conflicts,
wars, clashes of various scales occur across the entire globe (although the US does not mention itself here).
All countries suffer from theocratic regimes. Leading countries close their borders,
carry out a series of preemptive interventions. This halts globalization. It leads to
chaos and stagnation (perhaps a collapse of the world?). Since the aforementioned scenarios were written several years
ago, having analyzed other countries' reaction to them, American analysts now propose
new options for preserving American dominance. And they call this concept Chimerica. Under
the new president, the American establishment began a certain tilt toward the Far East,
although the previous axes – the Atlantic and the Far Eastern – had been balanced.
As we can see, in none of the American scenarios is a place reserved for the European Union
as leader of the international community.
The next aspect of its phenomenal nature, one might suppose, lies in the system of
unification among EU countries. (1) It is only under conditions of deepened integration that one observes
the lightning-fast development of leading states and the catching-up of weaker ones to the average
level. (2) Particular successes have been achieved in the most difficult tasks to solve:
finding alternative energy sources, successes in the fight for human health,
the fight against natural disasters (including climate problems), and technical achievements
(aircraft construction, the collider, etc.).
The European Union as a driving force of worldwide processes.
The civilizational phenomenon of Europe was well understood by our ancestors, is positively
perceived by our contemporaries, and, we hope, will continue to be pursued by
our descendants.
What is the phenomenon of Europe? Probably in the vitality of the states it has created,
in the talent and inventiveness of the peoples inhabiting it; in the creation of the phenomenon of the modern
era – integration. Indeed, countries in different parts of the globe have tried to reproduce
the integration process both before the EU's appearance and alongside its development. But this
experiment outside Europe, by similar criteria and on a similar scale, has not succeeded. European-style integration truly represents the crown of the preceding political, economic, and
social development of Western Europe. It is specifically the western part of the European continent, and
not the eastern, and it was precisely from Western Europe that the integration movement spread across the entire continent.
One can seek an explanation for this phenomenon in economic origins – the internationalization
of production. One can also agree that the material component of the integration process
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. There are many examples of the internationalization
of society and production, expressed in the creation of international financial-industrial groups, TNCs, etc.,
yet integration does not occur.
The main sources of European-style integration lie in the ordered
individualism formed by Roman law and the Protestant ethic; in personal
freedom, or the freedom of the individual; in the specific character of economic activity (individualism under
conditions of high population density), shaped by the intensive character of
production; and in the contradictions between private property and particularism, which led to
two world catastrophes and, in the end, forced Western Europeans to find a cure for
recovery. And that cure turned out to be integration.
Questions of European unity troubled politicians precisely during periods of confrontation
between states, when the threat of the destruction of democracy's shoots intensified. During the Second World War,
during the dominance of Nazism, the number of supporters, among the populations of European countries, of the
idea of sacrificing state sovereignty for the sake of a European
federation as a guarantor of peace and security steadily grew. After the Second World War, the countries of Europe came
close to developing integration concepts, considering integration
the most effective path toward creating a federalist union. Proponents of
the other path for Europe's development – the path of confederation – preferred a lower
level of localization of international legal personality. The main guarantor of the integrity
of state sovereignty in that case was to be the right of veto, which provided
the ability to block a decision by central bodies if such a decision did not meet
the national interests of a member of the confederation. Returning to the federalist
structure, let us note that sovereignty in such a state is not divided between the federation and its
subjects. A federation is a single state, not a union of states "giving up" part of their
sovereignty in favor of the federal authority. In a federal state it is not sovereignty that is divided, but
competence, and it is divided in such a way that sovereignty belongs to the federation,
not to its subjects. The European Union, which substantially limits the
sovereignty of the united countries, is built on the same principle. At the same time, the practical application of
functionalist provisions in international integration practice revealed its flaws. The emergence of cumbersome and
numerous technical organizations led to new coordination problems.
Threats of military conflicts, economic crises, the Cold War, and in particular the Soviet threat
already in the 20th century forced Europe to return to its own origins – the unifying
European idea from the dawn of human civilization – and to begin practical unification.
In answering the question of whether these sources of European integration have run dry, one can
with some caution suggest that they still retain a certain reserve of effectiveness, and this is
confirmed by objective realities.
It should not be forgotten that practically all participants in the EU's political process bear
several different identities and can play different roles. Researchers have shown that in
the fields of agriculture, fisheries, and especially trade, neither commissioners nor
Commission staff fully abandon their national ties and
loyalties when shaping policy. Indeed, at one point British leaders managed, after
several years of difficult negotiations on the budget and on fisheries and social
policy, to impose their priorities. Gradually, through intensive
interaction of transnational and intergovernmental networks, the EU system turned into a collective government resting
on elites who mutually overlap or substitute for one another.
At the same time, the making of policy within a stable system of state governance
outside the structure of the state negates the classical dichotomy between domestic
policy of sovereign countries and international relations between countries. Within the EU, as
research has shown, power, political responsibility, and budgetary and administrative
capacities remain largely in the hands of the member states. However, across a wide range of
policy spheres, these member states jointly apply the power and
administrative capacities they possess. Persistent contradictions between national and more-than-
national interests significantly slow down the integration process: state governance
systems act slowly owing to considerable diversity of interests and the inflexibility of
administrative structures.
The EU government faces a broad range of interests, whose holders must be
persuaded, overcoming their resistance. At the same time, the EU government is forced, in implementing
policy, to take into account the peculiarities and established traditions of various national
administrations. Despite the difficulties, the EU's experience has proven that the system works, although not
as quickly and painlessly as some would like. And among most politicians and the public
of the member states there is no desire to leave it. At the same time, small, weak states have
gained disproportionately large benefits from the creation of strong institutions compared with their
stronger neighbors, because their voice has become more noticeable and their international authority
has been strengthened.
The EU remains a firmly supported system of collective governance among
its participants, since it protects the interests of all its members – both large and small
states. Multilevel and multifaceted policy-making is, without doubt, a complex kind of
activity. States and federations, as well as non-state governance systems, are not always
able to ensure the achievement of strategic goals, since they must balance amid
conflicting influences and priorities.
Consequently, the way policy is shaped in the EU can be characterized as post-sovereign.
It crosses state borders, penetrating deep into those aspects of national policy and
administration previously considered internal. This method embodies the principle of mutual
interference in the internal affairs of different countries, now extending even to mutual
checks on judicial procedures in different countries. The application of this principle rests on
mutual trust and collective agreement aimed at implementing European laws and
regulations through national administrations.
At the same time, states, represented by national governments, continue to occupy the
central place in the political process. Nevertheless, they are no longer the only important participants, and
not always the primary ones. Their actions are constrained by institutional structures and held in check by
the interventions of institutionally autonomous participants (the Commission, Parliament, the Court, etc.). Although
some believe that the density of networks and the intensity of activity within them lead to
an effective merging of national administrations into a single collective EU system, practice
shows that today no government of the European Union – and even outside the integration
grouping (given the right of humanitarian intervention) – can be considered sovereign
in the sense in which that word was used fifty years ago. Thus the notion of
collective governance implies a certain degree of shared responsibility for a common
cause, ongoing cooperation within a system of shared experience.
At the same time, let us note that the EU remains an incomplete state formation: it
lacks many features found in a developed democratic political system. F.
Scharpf characterizes the EU as a formation resting on «output-oriented
legitimacy». He argues that the EU is a government for the people, but not a government formed
by the people.
One of the sources of EU power is the unifying factor of European identity.
Europe's national governments, after the Second World War, revived and continue to support a sense
of
collective identity through a series of large-scale spending programs in the sphere of
economic development and growing prosperity. However, this factor does not yet play
the consolidating role it could play, since applying this approach on the scale of
the entire EU is not possible given the too-small size of its budget. Moreover, the formation of
European policy is a process controlled by an elite, in fact, without drawing the attention of
the broader public to the consideration of most political issues. R. Dahrendorf
characterizes the EU's political system as a «cartel of elites», through which the opinion of the people is
represented indirectly (through the intervention of parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations,
etc.), meaning that collective governance rests on such a weak foundation of legitimacy,
as a post-sovereign political system.
Sovereignty and superpower status. At the beginning of the
21st century, the states of the European community faced a range of problems of a global nature. A challenge to the national
identity of
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Часть 1 13. The Specifics of European Integration. The Essence of the Concept and the Practical Implementation
Часть 2 - 13. The Specifics of European Integration. The Essence of
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