Money Laundering and the Legalization of Criminal Proceeds

Lecture 29 min.



Money laundering — giving a lawful appearance to the possession, use or disposal of funds or other property obtained as a result of committing a crime[1], that is, moving them from the shadow, informal economy into the official economy so as to be able to use these funds openly and publicly. In official documents this is referred to as "legalization (laundering) of monetary funds or other property obtained by criminal means."

In the process, the form of the funds may change either from cash to cashless (for example, through instant-payment terminals) or the other way around (for example, by winning a lottery or buying a winning lottery ticket from its lawful owner, including for an amount exceeding the winnings).

Money laundering is the process of substituting fictitious lawful sources for real but illegal sources of funds.

You may not have known that:

  • money laundering happens every day all over the world;
  • billions of dollars are laundered through financial institutions every year;
  • money laundering involves the illegal activity of criminals using financial transactions to disguise the true owner of the money, making it appear as if the money came from a legitimate source;
  • banks and legal structures become suspicious if people constantly deposit large sums in cash;
  • transactions must look legitimate, or legal structures will trace the money and freeze it.

Plan

  • Definition
  • Stages of money laundering
  • Combating money laundering
  • Money laundering in the USSR and the Russian Federation
  • State financial monitoring services
  • Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering – FATF
  • FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs)
  • Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)
  • Money laundering typologies
  • FATF typology reports
  • EAG typology research topics
  • Other typology reports
  • Liability for money laundering

Definition

Laundering involves concealing the true source of income,[2] substituting real transactions with formal ones, and distorting their economic substance; at the initial stage of laundering, documents may be forged or the documents of third parties used, while for the final legalization of the funds the rules on bona fide purchasers and many others are relied upon.

It is often claimed that the term appeared in the United States in the 1920s, when the American mafia began buying up and opening large numbers of coin laundries to legalize cash obtained through crime. In a broad network of small, low-priced establishments with machines and a large number of customers, it is very difficult to control revenue, which makes it possible to add large volumes of illegally obtained cash to the real takings[3].

However, the American author Jeffrey Robinson points out that this is not so. He says that the term "money laundering" was first used by the British newspaper The Guardian during the Watergate scandal, in connection with the illegal financing of Richard Nixon's election campaign.

According to other accounts, the concept of "money laundering" comes from the well-known Italian gangster Al Capone. In the 1930s, the mafia under his leadership set up laundries where several criminal dollars were added to every legal one. However, the illegal proceeds were so large that they did not manage to launder all of them, which is why, as is well known, Capone was sent to prison for tax evasion.

Amid globalization, offshore jurisdictions — "tax haven" countries whose banking systems provide anonymity and confidentiality to beneficiaries — are often used for money laundering.

Stages of money laundering

Money laundering comprises three stages:

  1. "placement" — introducing funds into the financial system by some means;
  2. "layering" — carrying out complex financial transactions to disguise the illegal source of the funds;
  3. "integration" — acquiring wealth derived from transactions involving illegal funds.

Some of these steps may be omitted, depending on the circumstances. For example, there is no need to place funds that are already in the financial system.

1 Committing the crime whose proceeds need to be concealed (corruption, drug trafficking, fraud, terrorism, etc.).

2 Placement. Illegal proceeds are introduced into the financial system, placed with a bank or fund, or used to buy company shares or real estate. Criminals place dirty money into legitimate financial institutions in the form of cash bank deposits.

3 The laundering itself. Various operations are carried out with the criminal money. Dishonestly acquired capital is transferred to "clean" accounts, converted into another currency, and used to buy expensive items (cars, gold, real estate) or other assets. This is done to cover the tracks of the "dirty" money and prevent its true source from being established. Many schemes have been devised that involve several chains of transactions, which are hard to untangle. Through electronic transactions the money is moved between various accounts and converted into another currency, which is then used to buy expensive goods in order to change the money's form.

4 Final "integration". The illegal funds are irrevocably legalized – criminals sell the shares or real estate they acquired and invest the proceeds in fully legal assets, add them to "clean" bank accounts, or spend them. This is the final stage, at which the laundered money is introduced into the economy as legitimate, either through a bank transfer to the accounts of companies used for laundering, or through the sale of expensive goods that were purchased at the second stage.

Combating money laundering

(English: anti-money laundering, abbreviated AML)

Building an effective system for combating money laundering requires cooperation among the following bodies:

  • legislative authorities;
  • executive authorities or ministries;
  • judicial authorities;
  • law enforcement agencies, including the police, customs service, etc.;
  • financial intelligence units;
  • supervisory and oversight bodies, including the central bank, other financial institutions, certain designated non-financial businesses, and professions.

In addition, cooperation is needed between private institutions, in particular banks and other financial institutions[5].

To coordinate international efforts to combat money laundering, the international Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) was created in 1989 at the G7 summit in Paris.

After Russia was placed on the FATF "blacklist" in June 2000[6], a bill strengthening anti-laundering measures in the country's financial system was finalized, and in 2001 a dedicated body — the Committee of the Russian Federation for Financial Monitoring (KFM) — was created within the Ministry of Finance, headed by Viktor Zubkov. As a result, Russia was removed from the "blacklist" in October 2002, and in June 2003 was itself admitted to FATF.[7]

In 2004 the KFM was reorganized into the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (FSFM).

The Egmont Group is an informal association of the world's financial intelligence units (FIUs), which is involved, among other things, in combating money laundering.

In 2006 the authorities explained the need for citizens crossing the borders of the European Union and the United States to declare cash holdings as part of the fight against terrorism and money laundering[8].

On May 7, 2012, Vladimir Putin signed Decree No. 596 "On the Long-Term State Economic Policy"[9], which called for the drafting of a bill aimed at de-offshorizing the Russian economy. Drafting the bill was assigned to Rosfinmonitoring.

Many banks, including Russian ones, actively apply the Know Your Customer principle. This allows a bank to reduce the risk of its clients being involved in transactions related to the legalization (laundering) of proceeds or the financing of terrorism, which would threaten the bank's reputation. The bank inquires into the origin of a client's funds to make sure that the capital is not of criminal origin and is not being used for criminal purposes[10].

Money laundering in the USSR and the Russian Federation

Since the late 1980s, in the USSR and later in the Russian Federation, "money laundering" schemes as such have been considerably less popular than so-called "cashing out"; banking specialists attribute this to the fact that the origin of illegally obtained capital has drawn little interest from the state, from Russian law enforcement agencies, or from citizens, so that legalization (laundering) of the capital is not required either.[11]

The main financial instrument for countering the legalization of funds is financial monitoring. Financial monitoring involves mandatory internal control procedures regarding the legality of financial transactions, as well as the activity of organizations carrying out transactions with property or funds in identifying transactions subject to mandatory control and other transactions with funds or property connected with countering the laundering of money and the financing of terrorism.

State financial monitoring services

The State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine (Financial Intelligence Unit, FIU) is the central executive authority implementing state policy in the field of preventing and countering the legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained proceeds, the financing of terrorism, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whose activity is directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the Minister of Finance.

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering – FATF

The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)[1] is an intergovernmental organization engaged in developing global standards for combating the laundering of criminal proceeds and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), and in assessing the compliance of national AML/CFT systems with these standards. FATF's main instrument for carrying out its mandate is the 40 Recommendations in the field of AML/CFT, which are revised on average once every five years, and the 9 Special Recommendations on combating the financing of terrorism, developed after September 11, 2001. In 2012 FATF amended and revised the 40+9 Recommendations, creating 40 new Recommendations governing the AML/CFT/CPF process.

The President of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is Marshall Billingslea.

History of FATF

FATF was created in 1989 by decision of the G7 countries and is the leading international institution engaged in developing and implementing international AML/CFT standards. As of 2019, FATF has 37 member countries and two international organizations, with 23 organizations and one state (Indonesia) as observers.

Activities and structure of FATF

FATF's main decision-making body is the Plenary session, which meets three times a year, along with FATF working groups:

  • on evaluations and implementation;
  • on typologies;
  • on countering the financing of terrorism and money laundering;
  • on the review of international cooperation.

FATF pays significant attention to cooperation with international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. These structures carry out their own programs aimed at countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism. One of the main tools for implementing FATF recommendations at the national level is the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), which are responsible for collecting and analyzing financial information within each individual country in order to identify flows of funds obtained by illegal means.

FATF members

States:

  1. Australia,
  2. Austria,
  3. Argentina,
  4. Belgium,
  5. Brazil,
  6. United Kingdom,
  7. Germany,
  8. Hong Kong (China),
  9. Greece,
  10. Denmark,
  11. Israel,
  12. India,
  13. Ireland,
  14. Iceland,
  15. Spain,
  16. Italy,
  17. Canada,
  18. China,
  19. Luxembourg,
  20. Malaysia,
  21. Mexico,
  22. Netherlands,
  23. New Zealand,
  24. Norway,
  25. Portugal,
  26. Russian Federation (since June 19, 2003),
  27. Republic of Korea,
  28. Saudi Arabia,
  29. Singapore,
  30. United States,
  31. Turkey,
  32. Finland,
  33. France,
  34. Switzerland,
  35. Sweden,
  36. South Africa,
  37. Japan.

International organizations:

  1. the European Commission,
  2. the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.

Since 2004, the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Rosfinmonitoring) has represented the Russian Federation in FATF activities.

FATF Recommendations

FATF documents, in particular the 40 Recommendations, constitute a comprehensive set of organizational and legal measures for establishing an effective regime in each country to counter the legalization of criminal proceeds and the financing of terrorism; their comprehensiveness and universality are expressed in:

  • the broadest possible coverage of issues related to organizing the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism at the national and international levels;
  • close interconnection with international conventions, UN Security Council resolutions, and acts of specialized international organizations devoted to AML/CFT issues;
  • giving countries a degree of flexibility in implementing the FATF's 40 Recommendations, taking into account national specifics and features of the legal system.

The FATF Recommendations do not duplicate or replace the corresponding provisions of other international instruments; rather, where necessary, they supplement them and bring them together into a single system of organizational principles and legal norms, thereby playing an important role in the process of codifying norms and rules in the AML/CFT sphere. Under UN Security Council Resolution No. 1617 (2005), the FATF's 40 Recommendations are binding international standards to be implemented by UN member states.

The first Forty Recommendations of the FATF were developed in 1990 as an initiative to protect financial systems from persons laundering funds obtained from drug sales. In 1996, the Recommendations were revised for the first time to take into account emerging trends and methods of money laundering and to extend their scope far beyond the laundering of proceeds from drug sales. In October 2001, the FATF expanded its mandate to include the problems of financing terrorist acts and terrorist organizations, and adopted Eight (later expanded to nine) Special Recommendations on combating the financing of terrorism.

The FATF Recommendations were revised for the second time in 2003 and, together with the Special Recommendations, have been endorsed by more than 180 countries and constitute the international standard for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Following the completion of the third round of mutual evaluations of its members in 2012, the FATF, in close cooperation with the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) and observer organizations, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the UN, revised and updated the FATF Recommendations. The changes take into account new and emerging threats, and clarify and strengthen many of the existing obligations, while preserving the necessary continuity and rigor of the Recommendations.

The FATF Recommendations are divided into the following main groups

A. AML/CFT policies and coordination

B. Money laundering and confiscation

C. Terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of WMD

D. Preventive measures

E. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements

F. Powers and responsibilities of competent authorities and other institutional measures

G. International cooperation

FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs)

An important role in the global dissemination of international standards for combating the laundering of criminal proceeds and the financing of terrorism is played by groups formed on the FATF model in various regions of the world.

The main task of such structures is to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism in their respective regions, in particular by conducting mutual evaluations of the national systems of their members for compliance with international anti-money-laundering standards (in particular, the FATF's 40+9 Recommendations) and by researching the trends and methods (typologies) of money laundering and terrorist financing characteristic of the given region.

The FATF and the FATF-style regional bodies together form a single international system (network) for disseminating and implementing international standards for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and for monitoring their implementation at the national level.

There are currently 8 FATF-style regional bodies in the world:

  • the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG);
  • the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG);
  • the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD);
  • the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG);
  • the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF);
  • the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL);
  • the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF);
  • the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA).

The Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) performs functions similar to those of the FSRBs, which also allows it to be classed among the FATF-style regional bodies.

Another regional group — the Central Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (GABAC), which has goals and objectives similar to those of the FSRBs — has not yet been recognized by the FATF as a FATF-style regional body.

Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)

The EAG conducts research into typologies (the most common schemes) of the laundering of criminal proceeds and the financing of terrorism characteristic of the Eurasian region. The results of these typological studies make it possible to identify the highest-risk zones and sectors and to build an effective risk-management methodology.

The typology-research topics given priority for the region are determined by participants at the EAG's Plenary meetings.

The Eurasian Group disseminates the results of its research to law-enforcement and supervisory authorities, as well as to private-sector institutions.

In addition to its research work, the EAG holds typology seminars, regional forums, training sessions, and joint typology events with the FATF and other FSRBs.

Money-laundering typologies

One effective way of responding to the challenges posed by the criminal milieu is to conduct research into, and to identify and publicize, the schemes used to give a legal appearance to criminally obtained proceeds and to finance terrorism. Accordingly, the State Financial Monitoring Service carries out so-called typological studies of money-laundering and terrorist-financing schemes every year. For example, in 2017 the State Financial Monitoring Service, together with entities subject to state financial monitoring and with public authorities, including law-enforcement agencies, prepared two typological studies, "Risks of Cash Use" and "Risks of Terrorism and Separatism." In addition, in 2018 a compendium of the State Financial Monitoring Service's typological studies went to print. These publications examine the most common trends and schemes of money laundering and terrorist financing. In particular, they give examples of real cases involving money laundering and the financing of terrorism relating to corruption, and of the most relevant current money-laundering and terrorist-financing schemes.

These typological studies by the State Financial Monitoring Service indicate that criminals use a considerable number of methods to launder their criminal wealth, which are primarily associated with:

  • — the theft and misappropriation of budget funds and other state assets;
  • — the theft of funds from banking institutions and fraud in the insurance sector;
  • — the activity of "conversion" centers and enterprises showing signs of being fictitious, involved in the legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained proceeds;
  • — the illegal transfer and movement of funds abroad (the illegal outflow of financial capital from Ukraine);
  • — securities and debt obligations, and cybercrime.

The most popular scheme for legalizing proceeds is the transfer of funds abroad and their subsequent return in the form of investment from offshore jurisdictions. Even today the largest volume of foreign direct investment still comes from Cyprus, which has always been the favorite offshore jurisdiction of Ukrainian oligarchs. In such cases the money is usually taken out in cash by special couriers because of the currency restrictions imposed by the National Bank or the central bank. Import-export operations are also used to move funds out: for example, a Ukrainian company supplies an actual product to a foreign company, but payment for it never reaches the country, remaining abroad instead.

Laundering may also make use of insurance and reinsurance transactions involving false or lost documents, large money transfers through payment terminals, and contracts for the supply of nonexistent goods concluded with fictitious companies.

In addition, transactions by non-residents on the stock market involving shares of fictitious joint-stock companies were used very actively. Such transactions are carried out using securities dealers under common control, moving between "friendly" insurance companies, investment venture funds and companies from the real sector, in order to inflate the price of the shares; however, so-called junk securities will remain part of the historical record.

Schemes related to the legalization of proceeds through public debt using a "Group Report": a "Group Report" is the conclusion of stock-market deals secured by rights to receive money or securities on the basis of counter-obligations. In other words, for example, you buy an OVGZ (domestic government bond) of issue No. X without having money in your account, but you do have in your account an OVGZ of issue No. Y, which someone has undertaken to buy from you for an amount sufficient to purchase the OVGZ of issue No. X, and such a chain can be very long.

A great many schemes have been devised for laundering financial resources. In order to legalize illegally acquired money or money concealed from the tax authorities, criminals, corrupt officials and shadow businessmen:

  • conclude various fictitious contracts with "friendly" firms for the provision of nonexistent services;
  • make use of illegal banking systems. This practice is especially widespread in China and India;
  • use corporate and individual accounts that are normally used for various business transactions to hold dirty capital;
  • actively make use of so-called current deposits, from which a certain amount may be withdrawn without declaration (usually up to around 10,000 USD);
  • set up nominee shell companies in other countries in order to "whiten" their "dirty" money through their accounts;
  • invest illegal capital in the economies of offshore countries;
  • launder money through casinos, brokerage firms and bars. A great deal of cash passes through such establishments, and it is practically impossible for law-enforcement agencies to trace their owners.

Method. The Digital Laundromat

The National Police Agency (NPA) of Japan announced that between January and October 2018 it detected around 6,000 cases of money laundering through cryptocurrencies, according to the Japan Times. This is eight times more than the number of cases Japanese police recorded between April and December 2017. The statistics have been kept since April 2017, because the law on cryptocurrencies took effect on April 1, 2017.

Method. The Colombian Market

On the Colombian black market, currency is exchanged: money obtained from drug sales is exchanged for Colombian pesos. The pesos are then used to purchase various expensive goods, which are ultimately sold for cash dollars.

This is one of the most well-established mechanisms for laundering money obtained from drug sales in the Western Hemisphere.

Method. Structured Deposits

Large sums are broken down into smaller amounts (under $10,000) and deposited in different banks at different times. In the United States, a cash deposit of no more than $10,000 can be made at a bank in a single transaction; otherwise the bank is required to report the transaction to the federal government.

Method. Foreign Banks

This method uses the shadow (underground) banking system. Illegal sums of money are transferred to offshore accounts in countries where bank secrecy laws are in force - in other words, where it is permitted to deposit money in a bank anonymously. Banks in the Cayman Islands, Panama, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Singapore and Hong Kong are mainly used for this purpose.

In Asia there are banks offering a legal alternative system that allows clients to deposit, withdraw and transfer money without any accompanying documentation, leaving no possibility of tracing it.

Method. Shell Companies

A cash deposit is made in the name of a front company and then withdrawn for investment in a legitimate business using fake invoices and balance sheets.

Such companies are set up by criminals solely for laundering money, but sometimes they can also be legitimate businesses into which "investments" are made, for example, brokerage firms, casinos, bars, strip clubs.

All these types of activity involve large amounts of cash, which helps illegal funds simply "dissolve".

FATF Typology Reports

Currently, the FATF website has more than 60 different typology publications freely available in English. English-language versions of the publications are available at the link.

Russian-language translations of the typology reports:

  • FATF Report - Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (February 2015)
  • FATF Report: Virtual Currencies – Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks (June 2014)
  • FATF Report: "Financial Flows Linked to the Illicit Trafficking of Afghan Opiates" (June 2014)
  • Risk of Misuse of Non-Profit Organizations for Terrorist Purposes (June 2014)
  • FATF Report: The Role of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (October 2013)
  • FATF Report: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals (June 2013)
  • Illicit Tobacco Trade (June 2012)
  • Specific Risk Factors in the Laundering of Proceeds of Corruption (June 2012)
  • Organized Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping for Ransom (July 2011)
  • Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants (July 2011)
  • Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption (June 2011)
  • Money Laundering Using Trust and Company Service Providers (October 2010)
  • New Payment Methods (September 2010)
  • Money Laundering Vulnerabilities of Free Trade Zones (March 2010)
  • Combating Proliferation Financing: A Status Report on Policy Development and Consultation (February 2010)
  • Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Securities Sector (October 2009)
  • Money Laundering Through the Football Sector (July 2009)
  • Vulnerabilities of Casinos and the Gaming Sector (March 2009) - version available in English only
  • Report on Proliferation Financing (June 2008)
  • Vulnerabilities of Commercial Websites and Internet Payment Systems to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (June 2008)
  • Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Strategies (June 2008)
  • Terrorist Financing (February 2008)
  • Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Through the Real Estate Sector (June 2007)
  • Money Laundering Using VAT Carousel Fraud Schemes (February 2007)
  • Complex Methods of Laundering Criminally Obtained Funds: A Regional Study (February 2007)
  • The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles, Including Trust and Company Service Providers (October 2006)
  • Report on New Payment Methods (October 2006)
  • Trade-Based Money Laundering (June 2006)

EAG Typology Research Topics:

2019:

  • "Financing of Terrorism Using Criminally Obtained Proceeds, Including Proceeds from Organized Criminal Activity" (Bangladesh, India, Russia)
  • "Features of Cross-Border Drug Settlement Schemes and Laundering of Drug Proceeds Using Modern Payment Instruments" (Russia)

2018:

  • "Money Laundering Through Insurance Organizations" (China, Russia)
  • "Identifying Persons Who Assist Terrorist Organizations by Purchasing Tickets for Terrorist Fighters" (Russia)

2017:

  • "Structural Analysis of Cash-Out-Related Financial Flows Used to Commit Offenses and Launder Criminal Proceeds" (Kazakhstan)
  • "A Unified Financial Profile Model for IBT Across the EAG" (Russia)
  • "List of Information of Interest to Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and Law Enforcement Agencies in Conducting Joint (International) Investigations" (Russia)

2016:

  • "Laundering of Criminal Proceeds from Ponzi Schemes" (Tajikistan)
  • "Typologies of Corruption Offenses and Laundering of Criminal Proceeds" (Russia)
  • "Typologies of Unlawful Asset Stripping from Credit Institutions" (Russia)
  • "Methodological Recommendations on Mechanisms for Adding Persons to, and Removing Them from, the List of Terrorists and Extremists, and for Freezing (Blocking) the Assets of Such Persons" (Russia)
  • "The Link Between Counterfeiting and Terrorist Financing" (India)
  • "Use of Companies Registered in Offshore Jurisdictions to Redistribute and Launder Criminal Proceeds" (Russia)
  • "Possible Ways to Improve the Mechanism for Adding Persons to, and Removing Them from, the List of Terrorists and Extremists, and the Mechanism for Freezing (Blocking) the Assets of Persons for the Purpose of Countering the Financing of Terrorist and Extremist Activity" (Russia)
  • "Challenges in Uncovering the Financial Component of the Drug Business" (Russia)

2014:

  • "Cybercrime and Money Laundering" (Ukraine)

2013:

  • "Tax Crimes and Money Laundering" (Russia, Ukraine)
  • "Money Laundering Through the Securities Market" (India)

2012:

  • "Vulnerabilities in Transactions Involving Intangible Assets (in Particular, Intellectual Property) That Allow Their Use for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing" (Ukraine)
  • "Money Laundering Using Non-Profit Organizations" (Kazakhstan)
  • "Laundering of Criminal Proceeds and Financing of Terrorist Activity Using Cash and Monetary Instruments" (Belarus)
  • "A Study of Possible Ways to Improve Cooperation Between the Financial Intelligence Units of EAG Member States in Combating Terrorist Organizations Operating in the Eurasian Region That Are Not on the International List of Terrorist Organizations" (Russia)

2011:

  • "Organized Criminal Groups (Including Those Formed Along Ethnic Lines) in Cash and Cashless Transactions and Operations" (Kyrgyzstan – Russia).
  • "Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Using Alternative Remittance Systems" (USA)
  • "Countering Offenses in the Field of Public Procurement" (Russia)

2010:

  • "Risks of Using Electronic Money for Laundering Criminal Proceeds and Financing Terrorism" (Russia)
  • "Risks of Using Non-Traditional Financial Institutions in Schemes for Laundering Criminally Obtained Income" (Russia)

2009:

  • "Legalization (Laundering) of Income from the Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Their Precursors"
  • "Legalization (Laundering) of Income Obtained Through the Embezzlement of Budget Funds and the Abuse of Official Authority by the Heads of Organizations with State Participation"
  • "Use of Foreign Trade Operations for the Legalization of Criminal Proceeds"

2008:

  • "Cross-Border Transfers of Funds Involving Individuals"

2007:

  • "Typologies of Terrorist Financing"
  • "Legalization of Income from the Drug Business"
  • "Use of Cash in Schemes for the Legalization of Criminal Proceeds"

2006:

  • "Legalization of Income from the Drug Business". The report was approved at the plenary sessions of the EAG and FATF and published for further use
  • "Use of Offshore Companies and Offshore Jurisdictions for Laundering Capital"
  • "Use of Non-Profit Organizations for the Purpose of Financing Terrorism"

2005:

  • "Use of Non-Resident Organizations to Reinvest Criminally Obtained Income into the Economy (Through Offshore Companies)"
  • "Use of Fraudulent Schemes for the Unlawful Refund of VAT from the Budget on the Export of Goods (Works, Services) to Obtain Criminal Proceeds and Subsequently Legalize Them"
  • "A Study of Alternative Remittance Systems in the Eurasian Region

Other Typology Reports

Catalog of MONEYVAL Typology Reports https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/activities/typologies

  • Criminal Money Flows on the Internet: Methods, Trends and Interaction Between Key Actors (March 2012)
  • Money Laundering Through Non-State Pension Funds and the Insurance Sector: "Red Flags" and Risk Indicators (March 2010)
  • Money Laundering and Counterfeit Goods (July 2008)

Catalog of APG Typology Reports http://www.apgml.org/methods-and-trends/documents/default.aspx

Russian-language translations of the reports:

  • APG Typology Report 2008
  • APG Typology Report 2010

Catalog of GIABA Typology Reports https://www.giaba.org/reports/typologies/reports.html

Catalog of MENAFATF Typology Reports http://www.menafatf.org/methods-trends/typologies-reports

Catalog of ESAAMLG Typology Reports https://www.esaamlg.org/index.php/methods_trends

Liability for Money Laundering

There are two main methods used by the government to detect and combat money laundering: legislation and the law.

The main obstacle for law enforcement is the so-called "bank secrecy law".

In the United States, penalties are provided for money laundering. In Russia, the punishment for this is imprisonment for up to seven years, together with a fine.

The main article governing liability in the sphere of laundering dirty money is Article 327 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

Article 198 or 199, depending on the specific situation, provides for punishment of those involved in schemes for the criminal laundering of illegal income. As a rule, however, these articles are more often applied to those who engage not in laundering but in cashing out money.

Shell companies will be punished under the provisions of Articles 170 and 171 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. If the head or a member of a bank's management organized a criminal scheme, this falls under Article 173 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

If the investigation identifies criminal groups that organized and carried out the scheme, the case may be classified under Article 210 of the Criminal Code.

See also

​

  • Fake avizos
  • The Russian Laundromat
  • Shadow economy
  • Black cash
  • Black market
  • Tsekhovik
  • Garage economy
  • Fartsovshchik
  • Speculation
  • Cashing out

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