4. TYPE 3: DOMESTIC COMPLEX AND EXTERNAL EASY LIFE WORLD

Description of the world
Value experience
Prototype

Compared with the first, the initial type, in the third there was a change in only one categorical dimension - the simplicity of the inner world was replaced by its complexity, which, however, leads to a radical transformation of the entire vital world.

Let us dwell on the concept of complexity. We have already said that even if a subject has many life relations, his inner world can remain simple. More precisely, it is necessary to distinguish the objective and subjective complexity of the world. The first is generated by the fact that whatever the intentions of the subject, his external behavior always gives rise to all sorts of social, biological and physical processes that may affect one or another of his life relation. In other words, any action of the subject, "realizing one of his activities, one relation, objectively turns out to be realizing, and some other relation of him" (89, p.211). However, we are fully thinking of such a psychological world, which, despite the fact that its relations objectively intersect with each other in the field of real action, remains internally, subjectively simple. At the same time, the subject at any given moment is psychologically only in one life relation, his consciousness is never “between” relations, at the point where both “that” and “other” are visible, and their interdependence, and the behavior is carried out as if there were no other relationship besides the one being realized, not because the subject decided not to pay attention to them, neglect or sacrifice them, but simply because he is not able to psychologically hold more than one relationship at the same time. In a word, the objective overlap of relations, i.e. The objective complexity of the life-world in itself does not yet create its internal, subjective complexity. The latter is the result of a special internal activity in linking and harmonizing relations.

The complexity of the inner world is the "conjugacy" of its individual units (life relations) in the inner space and time. On the spatial side, "conjugation" appears as a simultaneous connectedness of relations, i.e. the ability to hold in the field of inner vision simultaneously two or more relationships, which is phenomenologically expressed as "this and that." In the temporal aspect, “contingency” means the presence of a “first-then” sequence of relations between relations. In a simultaneous section, many life relationships (“this and that”) subjectively coexist, which develop in succession in a certain order — first one thing, then the other.

What is the livelihood of a creature living in such a world?

The external world is absolutely "easily permeable for action, and this makes any finite action impossible, just as a finite movement is impossible in absolute emptiness, it is either absent or infinite due to the absence of resistance forces. And the action is only meaningful as a final goal , i.e., the lightness of the world abolishes actions (and, naturally, their operational composition), and equally the non-psychological “distance” that in real conditions usually separates the direct result of an action from its significant last directly affecting the motives (needs) of the subject. [ 46 ]

Thus, the ease of the external world eliminates all the processes that take place between the initiative of the subject and the implementation of the motive. The whole internal structure of activity and its corporeality, as it were, fall out, each separate activity, once it starts, is carried out instantly ("here and now").

This life is devoid of situationalism. In the psychological world, there are no situations with their "turned up cases", favorable (or unfavorable) circumstances, with their time constraints, generating "worries", i.e. actions that must be carried out within a certain period, with the possibility of compromises between substantively irreconcilable tendencies, with their unexpected “suddenly” and “just”, etc. And since there are no situations, it means that there is no seemingly superficial and accidental one — but nonetheless actively participating in the most intimate (including motivational) processes of a particular, mobile, not amenable to full rational accounting and calculation of the materiality constituting the body itself. everyday life.

The existence of an initiative subject in the easy life world is as full of “magical” possibilities as it is dangerous; it is naked being, it is devoid of shells of difficulty and the damping viscosity of the outside world. In this world, you can not "think again" and "come to your senses," because any initiative instantly reaches its most remote consequences.

Now let us ask ourselves, what restrictions does the lightness of the world impose on the whole variety of concrete forms of the complexity of life? It is clear that in the light vital world there are no empirical, situational, "bodily" intersections between separate relationships. However, further, there are two theoretical possibilities, unequal for the further course of our mental experimentation.

The first of these is to accept the statement about the material non-intersectability of relations as an objective one. In this case, since each life relation has an instant free implementation and since it does not threaten to face a different relationship in the field of material action, none of these relations will be denied implementation. The world is completely transparent to the subject, the result is always the same goal, the embodiment - the plan. Life is devoid of any internal alternativeness and tension, the only thing that is required of a subject for the realization of life is to assign a priority for the execution of his activities. Moreover, the implementation of such work on the assignment of priority has to be attributed to the subject only because it is a matter of the intrinsically difficult life world, and, therefore, his relationship must occur at least somewhere - if not during implementation, then at least at the decision point. There is no internal need for such a meeting in their minds and in prioritizing their execution in such a vital world, since with absolute lightness of the world, its “carrying capacity” is not limited and allows all life relationships to be realized at the same objective moment, only subjectively fragmented by the number of these relationships. So, we see that the abstractions consisting in the first of the possibilities being sorted out are so strong that they cease to be fruitful.

The second theoretical possibility is to assume that the external world, despite its lightness, retains the connections of the ordinary world, and therefore, although it executes instantly every initiative of the subject, it submits not only to it alone, but also to objective connections and regularities so that the result is never equal to the plan and goes beyond the limits of one relationship within which the initiative originated. In other words, in the depths of the light world, all those bodily, material life connections that would take place in the dense, difficult life world are made, but (and this is very important for the specification of a complex and light world) all these real intersections in the temporal-spatial extent its implementation are absent in the activities and minds of the subject of an easy and complex life.

So, situational-empirical, objective connections and intersections of relations occur, as it were, behind the curtain of a given vital world, outside of it, delivering inward only the results of such collisions. On the stage of this psychological world, individual life relationships collide only in their purity of values, in their most acute essential form, they collide, figuratively speaking, not with the bodies of the respective activities, but with their souls - with the values-motives.

The indifferent relations with each other, their connectedness and interdependence create the need for special internal activities to compare them, compare, weigh their values, subordination, etc. This inner activity is nothing but consciousness.

Just as the difficulty of the world engenders a need for the psyche, so its complexity requires the appearance of consciousness. The psyche is the “organ” called to participate in the solution of external problems, and in a difficult and easy world the main problematicity of life is internal. The psyche serves the external objective situational action, and in this world, by virtue of lightness, such is absent. In it, the main acts of vital activity are those that in the ordinary world are carried out before a concrete situational action and after it. What are these acts?

The first one is a choice. If all vital activity in an easy and complex world is essentially reduced to consciousness, then consciousness, in turn, is half reduced to choice. Every choice here is tragic because it solves the dilemma between motives. The tragedy is that the subject is facing a task, on the one hand, vital, and on the other - logically insoluble. Once the task of choice has come before him, it cannot be solved, and it cannot be solved. Why? Firstly, because each alternative is in this case a life attitude or a motive, in a word, a fact that it is not by chance that it is possible organically and necessarily to a given form of life and from a positive realization of which, therefore , refuse only at the price of disintegration or even complete disintegration of this form; [ 47 ] and secondly, because there is not and cannot be a rationally convincing basis for preference of one attitude (or motive) to another. The latter is possible only where there is a common measure of things, and yet the individual life relationships and motives are fundamentally heterogeneous, they have nothing in common, besides the fact that they belong to the same subject, external to their content. Consciousness, therefore, is forced to solve paradoxical from a logical point of view of the problem, to compare incomparable, to measure not having a common measure.

A genuine choice, a pure culture of choice is an act without a foothold that is not rational enough, risky, not arising from the past and present.

Of course, this is only the ultimate expression of choice. In concrete reality, the psychological situation of choice is always saturated with numerous “arguments” for “for” and “against”. These are situational temptations, temptations, current concepts of morality and normal behavior, and universal imperatives, and "historical" patterns and social norms of behavior. But the choice is all the more close to its essence, the less a person shifts the burden of responsibility for it on all these “hints” or ready-made solutions. All of them in a genuine choice should be nothing more than the answer at the end of the problem book, which cannot be taken ready - it must be reached by solving the problem itself.

The main problematic and aspiration of an intrinsically complex life is to get rid of the painful need for constant elections, to develop a psychological “organ” of mastering complexity that would have a measure of the significance of motives and the ability to hold together vital relationships in the integrity of an individual life. This "body" is nothing more than a value consciousness, for value is the only measure of comparing motives. The principle of value is, therefore, the highest principle of a complex and easy living world.

Valuable consciousness is connected with the choice difficult and ambiguous. However, as a starting point for discussing this issue, we can take the simplest rationalistic view: a consciousness with a certain value system, in a situation of choice, brings alternatives to one value basis, as a result, each alternative gets its own assessment, and one of them, which is rated higher, is chosen by consciousness . That is, it would seem, and should be in reality. But we know very well that the reality of real elections is very often at odds with this scheme. One of the reasons for this discrepancy is the absence in the subject of a clear conscious idea of ​​their competing motives. However, experience shows that even if there is one, the fact that the subject in a situation of choice was recognized as the value advantage of one of the motives does not necessarily mean that he will be really chosen. How can one explain this absurd from a rational point of view, the absence of an unambiguous relationship between assessment and choice?

First of all, by the fact that values ​​themselves do not possess motivating energy and force and therefore are not able to directly make motives obey.

However, on the other hand, value has the ability to generate emotions, for example, in the case when one or another choice clearly contradicts it. This means that value (within the framework of the activity-theoretic approach) must be categorized as a motive, because emotions are relevant to a separate activity, reflecting the course of the realization of a certain motive (86; 87; 88).

It turns out that, on the one hand, values ​​do not have a motivation, and on the other, they must be recognized as motives. The matter is explained by the fact that in the theory of activity different types of motives are distinguished. It can be assumed that in the course of personal development, values ​​undergo a certain evolution, changing not only in content, but also in their motivational status, place and role in the structure of life activity. At first, values ​​exist only in the form of the emotional consequences of their behavioral disturbance or, on the contrary, assertions (first feelings of guilt and pride). Then values ​​take the form of "known" motives, then motives of sense-forming and, finally, motives of both sense-making and real acting. At the same time, the value at each stage is enriched with new motivational quality, without losing the previous ones.

It should not be understood in the way that values ​​are, strictly speaking, motives or some kind of motives and nothing more. Fully identifying values ​​and motives would mean knowingly abandoning the possible enrichment of the scheme of the theory of activity in another category. The characteristic of the evolution of values ​​in the language of motives is simply a means to show how their (values) relationships with behavior can change. In other words, the content of consciousness (and life), which is of value, can serve as motive, i.e. to sense, direct and induce imaginary [ 48 ] or real behavior, but from this, of course, it does not follow that in the framework of psychology, value should be reduced to a motive. Unlike the motive, which always, being mine, yours or its motive, isolates the individual life-world, value is that, on the contrary, attaches the individual to a certain supra-individual community and integrity. [ 49 ]

Although value as a kind of content of consciousness does not initially have energy, as the personality develops internally, it can borrow it from actual motives, so in the end it becomes the content of life from the content of consciousness and itself receives the power of a real motive. Value is not any known content that can become a motive, but only one that, having become a real motive, leads to the growth and improvement of the personality. At the same time, the transformation of value from a motive-task into a real, available motivational force results in difficult to explain energy metamorphosis. Becoming a real motive, value suddenly turns out to be the owner of such a powerful energy potential, [ 50 ] which cannot be attributed to all the borrowings that could have taken place during its evolution. One of the alleged explanations for this fact is that in the true life-giving of value, the energies are connected to the supra-individual entity with which this value relates the individual.

But whatever the real reasons for such energy enrichment, what is important for us here is that when this psychological state is achieved, the original rationalistic model of the relationship between value and choice that was cited above becomes fully consistent with reality. Choice loses its tragic tension, because all life energy and all life meaning are fixed in value, and in its light the true direction of one or another intention becomes clearly visible, its “price” is easily defined, and the power of value can be relatively easily rejected by improper intent. . For a person imbued with the highest spiritual value, the choice ceases to be a burning problem, [ 51 ] since he, so to speak, once and for all chose his life path, found himself, his main aspiration, discovered the source of the meaningfulness of being and some kind of life truth and as if it were a predetermined (not in detail, but in principle, not from the external, but from the internal value-semantic side) all possible subsequent elections.Value internally illuminates a person’s entire life, filling it with simplicity [ 52 ] and genuine freedom — freedom from hesitation and fear, [ 53 ] freedom of creative possibilities.

If the first source of discrepancies in real cases of choice with the original rationalistic model of the relationship between value and choice was, as we have seen, that value does not always have sufficient motivational status, then the second source of these discrepancies is that value can also vary in parameter fame subject, clarity of expression in her mind.

If we again resort to the genetic perspective, it turns out that the process in this dimension is almost parallel to the previously drawn line of motivational transformations of value, coinciding with it at extreme points.

The first coincidence occurs at a time when value manifests itself only in an emotional form and only after the behavior chosen by the child directly confronts with social evaluation by adults (recall the phenomenon of "bitter candy"). As a matter of fact, there is no value at this time yet, it is only in its infancy and for the first time begins to be recognized in a form that is not specific to it, in the form of a rule of conduct in such situations (for example: “I will never again lie”). But the rules are different. In this kind of rules in question, it overlooks the possibility of future value, the key to which is that it is formulated independently, based on our own, sometimes bitter, life experience, the experience of a collision with the value consciousness of people meaningful to a child. These are the first rules in ontogenesis, coming not from the outside, but from the inside,and psychologically fixed not in the form of promises addressed to the Other, but in the form of vows addressed to oneself.

This is a very delicate moment in the development (and upbringing) of the child's personality: it can go along the path of positive value improvement, and it can go along the line of immediate social adjustment. After all, the same rule, “not to lie,” for example, can contain a spark of future value and cultivate a love for the Truth in a person, and can be motivated by fear of exposure and punishment.

In a word, in the first phase of its psychological development, value as such is unknown to consciousness, it is replaced here by two interconnected forms — emotion (caused by violation of a certain rule of conduct behind which value lies) and a rule (put forward on the basis of emotional experience of contact with value consciousness significant Other).

The second coincidence of the above-mentioned genetic lines falls on the point at which value acquires its maximum energy power. With the degree of awareness of value at this point, metamorphosis occurs, akin to those that occur here within the framework of the motivational dimension of value evolution. Achieving a higher phase of psychological development of value is not associated with a gradual increase in the clarity and clarity of awareness of its content and value, but with a kind of "leap, as a result of which value from the" visible ", from the object turns into what makes everything else look inner semantic light.

Между этими двумя крайними точками происходит долгое развитие ценностей, которое особенно интенсивно протекает в периоды значимых для личности выборов и решений. Когда внутренняя ценностная система еще не утвердилась и не прояснилась, каждый выбор – это одновременно существенный момент во внутреннем ценностном строительстве.

Если в начальной точке ценностного развития сознания ценности, как мы видели, появляются на сцене после уже произведенных действий, во время их оценки, а в конечной точке этого развития они предшествуют выбору, сразу определяя его, то понятно, что общее направление изменений, происходящих в ходе этого развития, состоит в том, что ценности вступают в игру все раньше и раньше, сначала вклиниваясь между уже сделанным выбором, но еще не начавшимся действием, а затем, входя в саму "кухню" осуществляющегося выбора.

Until now, when discussing the vital activity corresponding to the light and complex psychological world, we have talked mainly about activity before external action. Now we turn to the activity, which in the ordinary life of the world is carried out after the action.

According to the conditions of an easy and complex life world, only the subject had time to begin some activity, as it has already been completed, its results and direct empirical effects that it had on other spheres of life activity have already become a fact. The subject is facing the real changes of his being.

Если бы все эти изменения были предучтены им в акте выбора, входили бы в его замысел, то они не представляли бы для него никакой проблемы. Но в том-то и дело, что выбор всегда сомнителен, всегда отчасти рискован, и не только потому, что невозможно заранее учесть всех связей и зависимостей внешней реальности, а и потому, что, по крайней мере до достижения высших ступеней ценностного совершенствования, всегда остается не вполне понятной (а то и вообще непонятной) собственная становящаяся мотивационно-ценностная система и, стало быть, невозможно наперед внутренне прочувствовать подлинное жизненное значение для своей личности даже предвосхищаемых событий до тех пор, пока они реально не войдут в бытие, не столкнутся с мотивами и не вызовут изменения жизненных отношений. Причем в легком жизненном мире речь может идти только о необратимых событиях и последствиях, ибо обратимые изменения жизненных отношений всегда связаны с временными затруднениями, которые здесь устранены предположением легкости внешнего мира. А необратимые изменения не могут быть исправлены даже в легком мире, ибо легкий мир хотя и. берет на себя все трудности осуществления деятельности, как бы велики они ни были, но против невозможности он бессилен: эти изменения должны быть пережиты.

Value experience

What are the specific types of events to be experienced in an easy and complex world? This is, firstly, an internal conflict. We consider the conflict not only as a contradiction of motives, but as a contradiction, insoluble in this form. In a conflict situation, it is impossible neither to abandon the realization of conflicting life relations, nor to choose one of them. The second type of critical situation, conceivable in the life world under discussion, appears to resemble frustration, but more precisely to call it an external conflict. This situation is caused, for example, by the disappearance of the subject of one of the vital relations of the subject. Of course, it frustrates the corresponding need, but frustration as such implies subjective certainty of striving and ongoing activity that runs into obstacles and reveals the impossibility of realizing this striving.and for the subject of the light and complex world, the critical point of the situation of the disappearance of the subject will be the impossibility to choose the activity associated with it. This is a conflict between consciousness, for which the corresponding semantic setting (14) is still relevant, and being, in which its realization is no longer possible.

Критическая ситуация, каков бы ни был ее конкретный характер, делая невозможным выбор, "повреждает" психологическое будущее или даже уничтожает его. А будущее – это, так сказать, "дом" смысла, ибо смысл хотя и вне-временен сам по себе, все же "не индифферентен ко времени" (23, с.107), воплощается во временной форме, а именно как "смысловое будущее". Смысл, вообще говоря, пограничное образование, в нем сходятся сознание и бытие, идеальное и реальное, жизненные ценности и бытийные возможности их реализации. В отношении к действительности, к реальному смысл воплощается в различных формах смыслового будущего, в отношении же к идеальному, к вневременному он отражает в себе ценностную целостность индивидуальной жизни. [ 54 ]

In a critical situation, the psychological future, the meaning, and the integrity of life are violated simultaneously. There are no causal relations between these violations, these are different dimensions of the same - the most critical situation. The disorder of the whole system of life arises, systems "consciousness - being"; consciousness cannot accept being in its form and loses the ability to comprehend and direct it; being, unable to realize the aspirations of consciousness and not finding adequate forms in consciousness, gets out of control of consciousness, develops spontaneous connections and dependencies that further violate the semantic correspondence between it and consciousness. All this is phenomenologically expressed in the loss of meaning.

Overcoming this discord of life, i.e. experience in the light and complex world, is carried out at the expense of value-motivational rearrangements. This does not mean that the system of values ​​itself is inevitably rebuilt, in general, there is a restructuring of the relationship between it and the being part of life.

There are two main subtypes of value experience. The first of these is realized when the subject has not yet reached the highest stages of value improvement, and is accompanied by a greater or lesser change in his value-motivational system.

Several variants of this subtype of experience can be distinguished depending on the scale of these changes and on whether a substantive restructuring of the subject’s values ​​occurs along with motivational transformations or not.

Первые два из этих вариантов имеют место, когда стала нереализуемой или вступила в конфликт с доминирующими мотивами или ценностями деятельность, хотя и обладающая, быть может, большой привлекательностью для субъекта, но не вносящая значительного вклада в смысл его существования. Ценностное переживание осуществляется за счет "вертикального" (89, с.212) движения сознания, иерархизирующего сложившуюся ценностно-мотивационную систему: сознание проясняет собственные ценности, отделяет подлинное и главное от содержаний и мотивов, "нелегально", в обход сознательного санкционирования занявших в жизни человека место, не соответствующее их ценностным достоинствам и смыслообразующим потенциям. Далее процесс может идти двояким образом. В одном случае эти содержания и мотивы ценностно дискредитируются, отвергаются сознанием принципиально. В другом, когда сознание не усматривает в них содержательного, идейного противоречия своим основным устремленностям и принципам, эти мотивы просто снижаются по иерархическому рангу, лишаясь своей значимости, что может сознательно выражаться в форме жертвы чем-то менее существенным ради более существенного и ценного. В проекции на временную ось это иерархическое снижение предстает как откладывание (на какой-то срок или навсегда) психологически невозможной в данный момент деятельности.

Of course, in real life conditions, conscious decisions about the value rejection of a given motive or the need to sacrifice it in order to enter into force must be confirmed practically and put into practice by real actions that overcome the inertia of this motive and reinforce the hierarchical and hierarchical restructuring. However, in the hypothetical life world that is being discussed now, the practical embodiment of the results of the work of consciousness is automatically provided with the ease of this world, does not constitute a separate problem in it.

The following two versions of the first subtype of value experience imply a radical restructuring of the value-motivational system, because the events experienced make it impossible to realize the most important life relations, which mainly focus on the meaning of the whole human life.

If this impossibility is the result of purely existential changes that do not depend on the subject, and its values ​​are not touched as such (for example, the death of a loved one, a disease that impedes the realization of life plans), the task of value experience is to save relations to choose and approve such a value that, in its content, is in principle capable of becoming a new motivational and semantic center of life. However, the main part of the work of value experience consists, perhaps, in the special transformations of the affected life relation.

The transformations that occur to him in the process of value experience are radically different from what we observed in a realistic experience and in a hedonistic experience.

P. Janet (207) described a case of a girl’s painful reaction to her mother’s death: she continued to care for her mother, generally behaved as if nothing had happened. It is an experience on the principle of pleasure, preserving the desired subjective and denying objective, reality.

Directly opposite is the end result of the Chekhovian experience of the death of her first, ardent and ardent beloved husband. The feeling for him, his image, everything connected with him is completely obscured by a new reality, more precisely, it evaporates altogether from the life and memory of the heroine. [ 55 ]

Another thing is value experience. Here, the life relation that has become impossible is not preserved unchanged in consciousness, as in a hedonistic experience, and is not completely banished from it, as in a realistic experience. In the value experience, the reality of the death of a loved one is not ignored, but is not taken in his bare factuality, his image is preserved in contrast to the realistic experience, but persists in contrast to the hedonistic, not hallucinatory, not eidetic, not naturally-mentally, but artificially conscious (cf. : 101, p. 135), not by memory-habit, but by memory-story (207). The image of the deceased, permeated earlier, during his life by my motivations, worries, hopes, fears, etc., generally practical and substantially temporary relationships, translates as if into another plane of being, is shaped out ideally, timelessly, to the limit - eternally. This translation and this design are of an aesthetic and productive nature: the work of experience cannot be done by any pragmatic replacement for me who died by someone else, and not, of course, because no one can take on the “functions” that he performed in my life , but because it was necessary for me and important, and besides these functions, in itself, c. his "qualitative definiteness of a single personality", in his value uniqueness, and the latter is, even during his lifetime, the product of my aesthetic activity (see: 23, pp.38-39). “My activity continues even after the death of the other,” writes M. M. Bakhtin, “and the aesthetic moments begin to prevail in it (relative to moral and practical): the whole of his life, freed from the moments of a temporary future, goals and responsibilities. burial and memorial memory should I have all the life of another is himself, and here begins the aestheticization of his personality:. consolidation and completion of it in an aesthetically meaningful images from the emotional and volitional installation commemoration departed significantly born es. ethical categories of the internal person (and external), because only this installation in relation to another has a value approach to the temporary and already complete whole of external and internal human life ... Memory is an approach from the point of view of value completeness; in a certain sense, memory is hopeless but, on the other hand, in addition to the goal and the meaning, it can already appreciate the already complete life "(23, p. 94-95).

The last version of the first subtype of value experience is similar to the one just considered in that it requires large motivational changes that rearrange the person’s entire life, but differs from it in that it also implies a radical transformation of the value content of his life, alteration or even replacement of all its value building. This variant of experience is required when the whole system of values ​​accepted by a person discredits itself by the experience of its own incarnation. Life comes to a meaningless deadlock, depreciates, loses its internal integrity and begins to decompose psychologically. The task of experience is to find a new value system, through which one could impart inner wholeness and meaning to being, highlight it, open new semantic perspectives. We will confine ourselves for now to these general statements, because in the next chapter we will have the opportunity to concretize them by analyzing the experience of Rodion Raskolnikov. Here we only indicate that the result of this experience is the creation of a psychologically new life. However, unlike the realistic experience, the transition to a new life consists not in a “leap” from one content of life to another, leaving the first unchanged, but in value overcoming and transforming the old life: the new life refers to the old as forgiveness to offense.

The value experience of the second subtype is possible only at the highest levels of the development of value consciousness. If, before reaching these levels, the value belonged to the person, was part, even if the most important and integral, but still part of her life, and the person could say: "my value", now this relationship is wrapped up - the person is already part of the value that surrounds her , belongs to her and precisely in this communion of value, in serving her, she finds meaning and justification for her life.

The experience of events undermining such a value relationship is partly reminiscent of the most primitive forms of experience, when, for the sake of the pleasure principle, reality is ignored, when it is fenced off from it with all sorts of psychological tricks, trying to keep at least temporarily an illusory feeling of well-being. Valuable experience is also not at odds with reality, since its events and circumstances, conditions and conventions destroy the embodiment of the highest values, in which "the whole meaning and source of their permeated existence. But if in the protective process a person seeks to turn away from reality and, hiding his head in the sand, “to destroy” it, the value experience looks reality into the eyes, sees it clearly and distinctly, avoiding the slightest self-deception and underestimation of the forces and stubbornness of reality, but at the same time it looks through reality as I would like to ask: "But is reality really so real? Is this visible, audible, felt given really the being, and the truth? Does this cash, indifferent to human values, really give the last, irresistible law of life, with which it remains only to unconditionally accept? "

But if the very content of the question expresses "distrust" of reality, then it is absolutely impossible to turn to reason for the answer to this question, to knowledge in general, because knowledge is subject to this reality and seeks to fully comply with it. What is the ability of comprehension that can solve the question asked by the value experience, can distinguish the true life from the false? This ability, which, according to S. L. Rubinshtein, is, is to "comprehend life in a big way and recognize what is truly significant in it ... is something infinitely superior to all scholarship ... it is a precious and rare property - wisdom "(123, p. 682).

It is wisdom that enables the value experience to solve its main task, which is to ensure that a person remains true to value despite the “obvious” absurdity and hopelessness of resistance to reality. In what way? The fact is that wisdom is fundamentally internally oriented towards self-deepening and self-knowledge, [ 56 ] and therefore, by just this orientation it allows value experience to create a state of consciousness in which the unreasonableness of external reality claims to be considered the only and true reality. But this is not enough. By self-deepening in value experience, a person achieves not only a “weakening” of external reality, but also the strengthening of his value position. Namely, in the face of reality, contradicting the value or seeking to destroy it, self-deepening is aimed at mobilizing the entire motivational system, at putting a person in a state of readiness to sacrifice for the sake of value any of his motives, life itself.

Whatever the specific forms of the implementation of this kind of value experience, they all imply a complete rejection of the egocentric attitude, overcoming the rational view of the world, the ideal character of motivation and in their internal psychological content are a feat (cf. 89, p.209).

Prototype

It remains for us to point out real prototypes of an internally complex and externally easy existence. We find them in the sphere of moral behavior. No matter how different moral positions (or ethical concepts) differ from each other in terms of content, from a formal psychological point of view, they all agree on one thing: there can be no reference to circumstances, to inconvenience, difficulty and moral intentions. From the difficulties of the world, from the "matter" of the forthcoming act it is necessary to distract, not to take it into account. And this distraction is precisely the operation that, in our typological analysis, sets one slice of the vital world now being discussed - ease.

In other words, there is such a layer, a slice or dimension of human existence, the sphere of moral behavior, in which life is reduced to consciousness, the matter of life activity - the difficulty of the world - is bracketed and a person acts in a kind of light world. It is this plane that was identified and considered from a psychological point of view in the third type of our typology.