Technique of experience

If, until now, we were mostly occupied by the characteristics of the functional "place" of experience, i.e. its causes, goals, functions and results, it is now necessary to turn to the analysis of the content of this place, to the very “body” of the process, to the study of how “technology” or “engineering” of experience is depicted in the psychological literature. This problem falls into three parts: first we will touch on the issue of carriers of the experiencing processes, on what can perform its functions, then we will discuss the various technological dimensions of this process and the elementary operations carried out within each of these dimensions, and, finally, we will touch on inner structure of experience.

a) "MEDIA" EXPERIENCES

b) "Technological" measurements and elementary experiencing operations
c) The problem of the inner structure of experience
The problem of classifying the processes of experiencing

We have already seen that any mental function, “any psychological process or quality can - acquire, under certain conditions, a compensatory meaning” (130, p.100), i.e. do the work of experiencing.

Psychological literature is replete with research that discusses the protective and compensatory functions of a wide variety of behaviors - from artistic creativity and work activity [ 20 ] to theft (169) and an offense in general. Such seemingly peripheral processes, such as the violation of constancy of perception, can perform the same role. [ 21 ] E. Menaker (224) considers image-I as a protective formation, and G. Lowwenfeld (218) claims that shame is also a protection in its genesis. Humor, sarcasm, irony, foolishness (122; 227) can take on the experience of experiencing a situation.

This enumeration, which could continue indefinitely, shows that the range of possible carriers of experience includes absolutely all forms and levels of behavioral and mental processes.

b) "TECHNOLOGICAL" MEASUREMENTS AND ELEMENTARY OPERATIONS OF EXPERIENCE

Energy paradigm
Spatial paradigm
Time paradigm
Genetic paradigm
Information-cognitive paradigm

Any carrier of the experience leads to the desired effect because it produces some changes in the psychological world of the person. To describe them, one has to create a special language, moreover, the concept of the psychological world, and each researcher studying the processes of experiencing, voluntarily or unwittingly, relies on the existing one or creates a new such concept. Can not get around this problem and the theory of activity. Its conscious and purposeful resolution, however, is so difficult that not using all the benefits of the historical and scientific position arising from the lagging theory of activity in this area and consisting in the possibility of using the positive mental experience accumulated in psychological science to develop this problem would be completely unforgivable.

But even in such conditions, the task is not at all simple. In the following pages, we have to take only the first step towards its solution - to try to systematize the main transformations of the psychological world, which, according to descriptions in the literature, lead a person to a critical situation. Two methods of such systematization are possible. One of them is to search for the simplest mechanisms that are "elementary components from which I build more complexly organized formations" (245; p. 37). The approach tested by Yu. S. Savenko (130) seems to be more productive: as units of systematization, within this approach, it is not elementary mechanisms that are taken, but “dimensions” of personality, each of which corresponds to a whole cycle of transformations of the psychological world.

Our attempt to systematize will follow a similar path, with the only difference that we do not proceed from a certain concept of the personality structure that sets these dimensions, and, solving review tasks, we single out for the first time these measurements for ourselves, following the descriptions in the psychological literature various processes and mechanisms of experiencing. Since the materials of our analysis are precisely descriptions (although the subject of it, of course, remains the reality of the experience), we will talk about the different paradigms of analyzing the technology of experiencing.

Energy paradigm

The use of energy concepts, on the one hand, is very common in psychology, but on the other, it is extremely poorly methodologically developed. It is not clear to what extent these representations are merely models of our understanding, and to what extent they can be given ontological status. No less problematic are conceptual links between energy and motivation, energy and meaning, energy and value, although some actual connections are obvious: we know how a person can act “energetically” if he is positively motivated, we know that meaningfulness gives people a kind of additional forces, but we are very poorly aware of how to link together the physiological theory of activation, the psychology of motivation and the energy concepts that have been worked out mainly in physics.

Of the more specific theoretical problems, it is necessary to point out, first of all, the antinomicity inherent in the psychological idea of ​​energy: on the one hand, it is believed that there is no "non-objective" energy, mental energy by itself, and on the other hand, there is an existence of excess energy that requires exit. This problem is connected with the opposition of the concepts of energy and power. Although J. Nutten (107, p. 20) writes that “psychology is often; they do not distinguish between the concepts of“ force ”and“ energy ”at all, it should be mentioned that such a distinction is still being made. D. Rapoport and M. Gill , for example, argue that psychology requires both that and the other concept, since the concept of force cannot be explained by such phenomena as "replacement" and "transformation", and "energies that by definition are non-directional quantities cannot be explained by directed phenomena" ( 234, p. 156).

However, we cannot go into these problems here. Our task is to isolate from the existing descriptions of the experiential processes those suggested or clearly behind them transformations that relate to energy concepts, and to illustrate them.

About t of n of t and e e n erg and . The most common of the operations of experience is the "taking energy" from some content of consciousness. An example is the well-known interpretation of the work of grief by Freud as the gradual weaning of a libido associated with the image of a beloved and now lost object (155, p. 175). Separation from the object or idea of ​​the corresponding “amount of arousal” is one of the most important hypotheses of the psychoanalytic theory of defense processes (241). On the purely formal side, the same operation of “taking energy away” lies at the basis of the mechanism of “intrapsychic adaptation” highlighted by F. V. Berezin (25, pp.287-288), which he called the “decrease in the level of motivation”. Its meaning is to eliminate anxiety caused by a threat (real or only apparent) to the essential aspirations of a person by reducing the level of motivation of these aspirations.

P a zr y d ka e ne er g and i . The illustrations of this operation can serve such mechanisms as response and catharsis (in its psychoanalytic understanding of it), which were practically identified by S. Freud and meant the release of the energy of repressed affects through recall and verbalization of repressed content.

PROPOSITION OF THE ENERGY . Let us call, as an illustration, the mechanism of "cathexing" - giving psychic energy to actions, objects and ideas (72, p.166-168; 184). The process of mastering this operation appears as the development of the art of self-motivation. The already mentioned example of the “psychological exit” found by the prisoners of the Schlusselburg fortress (86) should be interpreted from an energetic point of view as giving prisoners the energy of the activity imposed by the administration.

Per e o d e n erg i . This operation is not always the sum of the operations of taking and giving energy, as it may seem at first glance, since the law of conservation of energy, apparently, does not apply to the psychological category of energy. The transfer of energy from one mental content to another is not necessarily associated with a decrease in the "charge" of the first. Say, in the example that was just mentioned, the main motive of the revolutionaries (the motive of the struggle against autocracy), from which energy was drawn for the execution of the prison task, ultimately did not weaken, but, on the contrary, only strengthened. This "violation" of the law of conservation of energy is associated with the greening of its generation .

Energy transfer has two main types - transferring it from one content (motive, action, idea) to another and transition from one form to another.

An illustration of the first kind can be the mechanism of “impulse transformation” - “the ability to translate the impulse energy, masking it through symbolization, in its opposite” (213, p. 188). In the protective function, this mechanism is a “reactive formation” (reaction formation) - the transformation of a pulse in its opposite with a possible breakthrough of the primary pulse, which, as is usually considered, does not transform (188, p. 9, 46, 51, 190; 213, p. 188; 235, p. 136-137). [ 22 ] The mechanism of "shifting motive to a target" can also be attributed to the energy transfer operation (87; 89).

It is extremely important to distinguish between two possible outcomes of energy transfer. In one case (as is the case with reactive formation), the content that received energy is not organically linked to it, it becomes strong enough to determine the corresponding actions, but it is not strong by its strength, but by the borrowed energy of the donor motive, The motive does not change, but more often it serves him, although it may appear to be the opposite of it. In another case, the energy is fixed in the new content, it grows together with it, and, therefore, a motivational genesis occurs — a new motive is born, a new activity that is genetically related to the donor motive, and in the functional plan received autonomy (170 ). Fixing energy is different from imparting energy and can be considered as a separate operation of the energy paradigm. An illustration of energy transfer with fixation can be a process, a "shift of motive to a target" (when it acts as a development mechanism), as well as sublimation, understood not as finding socially acceptable channels to satisfy primitive impulses, but as a real transformation of these impulses.

The second type of energy transfer is associated with the transformation of its form. Examples of this operation are the mechanism of conversion [ 23 ] and one of the phases of catharsis (psychoanalytically understood) associated with the somatopsychic transition. “The action of Breuer's cathartic method,” writes Freud (189, p. 50), “is based on the gradual return of arousal ... from the somatic sphere to the psychic, followed by a feasible reconciliation of opposites through mental activity ...”

PRIORITY AND ENERGY . This operation almost does not appear in the descriptions of the processes of experience, and meanwhile it should be given a great theoretical value. Just as the generation of energy should be understood from a formal energy point of view, the result (more precisely, one of the results) of aesthetic catharsis: “The viewer leaves not“ discharged ”, but“ filled ”and“ inspired ”(149, p.568). achievement, luck, as it were, increases the energy potential of a person, which is expressed in setting higher goals (107) and in the ability to overcome great difficulties and obstacles.

Spatial paradigm

Within this paradigm, those "spatial" dimensions are considered, which describe the processes of experiencing. There are two classes of such measurements - content-psychological and formal topical. The first includes such specific psychological oppositions as conscious - unconscious, intrapsychic - interpsychic, to the second - such non-specific for psychology, but nevertheless important spatial dimensions for it, such as distance - approximation, expansion - narrowing, etc. Consider them.

Substantial psychological measurements

The psychosomatic measurement can be illustrated by the above mentioned mechanisms of conversion and catharsis.

S oznatln about ebse ssoznatl . This dimension is the most fundamental to the psychoanalytic theory of defense mechanisms. A whole series of defensive processes, and first of all repression, presupposes the existence of two "spatial" areas - consciousness and unconscious, the transitions of contents between which are psychologically significant events. Freud (154) said that repression is a topically dynamic concept.

And the ne p p ix and x and c k o e - and the n t p and p i i x i c e c to e . The transitions of the interpsychic (or rather, the interpersonal) to the intrapsychic and vice versa are especially characteristic of projection mechanisms, defined as “the process of attributing personal traits, characteristics and motivations to other people, depending on their own traits, characteristics and motivations” (204, p. 677) [ 24 ], and introjection. Introjection is “the process by which the functions of an external object are adopted by its representatives in the psyche and relations with an external object are replaced by relations with an imaginary internal object. The resulting mental structure is called introject, introjected object or internal object ..." In particular, "above “I am formed by introjecting the figures of the parents” (235, pp.77-78). The function of introjection as a defense mechanism, according to psychoanalytic concepts, is to reduce the anxiety of separation from parents. This mechanism is known not only to psychoanalytic thinking. Its action is clearly traced in the work of grief, interestingly described by E. Lindemann (217). In Y. Trifonov's “The Old Man” we read: “The wife of Pavel Yevgrafovich died, but her conscience is alive.”

The intrapsychic “space” itself can serve as an arena for the processes of experience. This includes most of the mechanisms that we will discuss in the framework of the information-cognitive paradigm. Let us call, for example, the mechanism of "isolation", which, by definition, A. Freud, consists in "removing instinctive impulses from their context while keeping them in consciousness" (188, p.37-38). The experience processes can also unfold in the interpsychic space , in the communication space (see below).

PROBLEM OF THE PROBLEM . Experience processes are often described as transforming or replacing the structural components of an activity, otherwise. speaking as a substitution . The basis of the concept of substitution is the idea of ​​such a connection between two time-consuming and at least somewhat different activities, when the next one at least partially solves the problems faced by the previous one, but not resolved by it. Substitution activity may differ from the initial transition of activity to another plan (for example, from object-practical implementation to the plane of fantasy), changes in the form of activity (please may be replaced by a requirement, requirement - a threat), a shift to genetically earlier behaviors . In addition to changes in the activity itself, we also point out changes in the immediate goal or object of the action. The listed set of "substitution parameters" is not the only one possible. D. Miller and G. Swanson, for example, believe that the substitution parameters are the source of the action, the action itself, the corresponding emotion and the object (225).

K. Levin brings the substitution closer to the “gun” activity in the sense that the substituting activity acts as an instrument for satisfying the “primary internal goal” (215). This is true, but only under certain conditions. Substitution, in our opinion, can act in two functions in relation to the initial activity, in the function of an “instrument”, or a means, and in the function of experiencing, depending on the psychological content of the intermediate situation that occurred between the initial and replacement activities. If it was just a situation of difficulty, then the substituting activity psychologically acts as a “tool” function, as a means of achieving the same goal: it was not possible to make a phone call, you can send a telegram. If there is no “can” and the person falls into a state of frustration, the substitute activity acts as an experience. Such, for example, is the value of the action of a single subject T. Dembo, who, after long failures in solving an experimental task consisting in throwing rings on bottles, went out crying out of the door and hooked "rings on a hanger" in hearts (215, p. 181).

We emphasize that we are talking about the psychological meaning of the substituting activity for the subject himself, and it can vary throughout its implementation depending on the objective course of events and changes in the subjective state of a person, so that the same substitutive activity can realize both selected functions.

Многие авторы вслед за З. Фрейдом считают замещение не частным защитным или компенсаторным механизмом, а "базовым способом функционирования бессознательного" (246, с.631). Д. Миллер н Г. Свэнсон (225; 226) используют понятие замещения как центральную категорию своей теории психологической защиты, истолковывая каждую защиту как тот или иной вид замещения.

Формально-топические измерения

"Н а п р а в л е н и е" . Ю. С. Савенко относит к этому измерению механизм отреагирования, который понимается им как "исчерпывающий единовременный ответ на свою причину, но ориентированный не на нее, а в сторону, на посторонний объект" (130, с.103), и механизм переключения. "Смещенная агрессия" (199), когда злость срывается не на виновнике неприятностей, а на ком-нибудь другом, – один из самых показательных примеров изменения "направления" деятельности. Ясно, что изменение "направления" имеет место также в механизмах замещения объекта, сублимации, реактивного образования, о которых мы уже говорили.

Р а с ш и р е н и е — с у ж е н и е психологического пространства личности . Это измерение очень обширно по числу относящихся к нему механизмов. Ю. С. Савенко определяет сужение поля личности как "отказ" самоактуализации от ряда уже, осуществленных реализации, что выражается в разного рода уступках, отступлениях, ограничениях, торможениях и т.д. (130).

А. Фрейд (188) посвящает защитному механизму "ограничения Я" целую главу. В одном из ее описаний маленький мальчик бросает минуту назад доставлявшее ему огромное удовольствие занятие – раскрашивание "волшебных картинок", увидев, как то же самое получается у сидящей рядом самой А. Фрейд. Очевидно, объясняет она, его неприятно поразила разница в качестве исполнения, и он решил ограничить себя, лишь бы избежать неприятного сравнения (188, с.101). Различные процессы самоограничения очень важны при совладании с соматическим заболеванием, когда интересы здоровья требуют или сама болезнь вынуждает отказаться от многих привычных и привлекательных действий, от ставших невыполнимыми планов, от переставшего отвечать реальным возможностям уровня притязаний (26; 182; 195 и др.).

Точное функционирование механизмов "расширения" психологического пространства особенно существенно для адекватного переживания положительных с точки зрения личности событий – успеха, социального признания, выздоровления, неожиданной удачи и т.д., поскольку такие события, так же как и отрицательные, представляют собой для личности проблему, которая может решаться неудачно (200).

Р а з м ы к а н и е — з а м ы к а н и е психологического пространства . Размыкание и замыкание – это операции, связанные с предыдущими, но не совпадающие с ними. Они состоят в отгораживании, отделении, возведении барьеров в межличностном общении или наоборот в преодолении этих барьеров, раскрытии себя и т.д. (иллюстрации см. в гл. III).

"Р а с с т о я н и е" . Изменение психологического "расстояния" (119) часто служит целям переживания. Сюда относятся механизмы, действующие как в интерпсихической плоскости – отдаление от ранее близких людей, ценностей или, наоборот, сближение с ними, так и в интрапсихической – механизмы изоляции, вытеснения, "дискриминации" ("способность отделять идею от чувства, идею от идеи, чувство от чувства") (213, с.185-186). Механизм "дискриминации", по Т. Крёберу, в защитной функции предстает как изоляция, а в функции совладания – как объективация – "отделение идеи от чувства для рациональной оценки или суждения, где это необходимо" (там же).

В е р х — н и з . Это пространственное измерение всегда символически насыщено и сопряжено с оценочной шкалой. Многие процессы, реализующие переживание, имеют явно выраженное "вертикальное" направление, которое содержательно связано с их характером. Так, вытеснение ориентировано "вниз", а катарсис – "вверх". Ясно, что низ и верх не должны пониматься здесь натуралистически. Позже в гл. III нам представится возможность показать на конкретном примере существенность "вертикальных" психологических движений в осуществлении переживания.

Time paradigm

Эта парадигма используется при описаниях процессов переживания гораздо реже, чем предыдущие. К ней можно отнести следующие операции:

" В р е м е н н о е к о н т р а с т и р о в а н и е " (130) – соотнесение переживаемых событий с действительными или возможными событиями, прошлыми, настоящими или будущими. Например, успокаивание себя: "хорошо хоть так, могло быть хуже", "сейчас все-таки лучше, чем было раньше (будет потом)" и т.п.

Помещение события в д о л г о в р е м е н н у ю п е р с п е к т и в у (228) – операция, отличающаяся от предыдущей тем, что переживаемое событие рассматривается субъектом не в сравнении с другим событием, а на фоне некоторой длительной перспективы, в пределе всей жизни человека или даже жизни человечества. [ 25 ]

В ходе переживания может осуществляться ф и к с а ц и я на каком-либо временном моменте. "Образцовый пример фиксации на прошлом представляет из себя печаль, которая приводит к полному безразличию к настоящему и будущему" (154, с.66).

Genetic Paradigm

В рамках этой, связанной с предыдущей, парадигмы временная ось жизни поляризуется идеей развития. К ней могут быть причислены следующие механизмы:

Р е г р е с с и я . В психоанализе регрессией называется "защитный механизм, посредством которого субъект стремится избежать тревоги... возвращаясь на более ранние стадии либидиозного развития или развития Я" (235, с.138-139).

К а т а р с и с – этот уже не раз упомянутый механизм в том значении, которое ему придает Т. А. Флоренская (149), является процессом, выполняющим работу переживания и одновременно развивающим личность.

И н т р о е к ц и я также выступает и как механизм психологической защиты, и в то же время как механизм развития, повышая автономию Я(235, с.77-78).

С у б л и м а ц и я . Если считать, что в процессе сублимации примитивные импульсы не просто камуфлируются, а действительно трансформируются, то эта трансформация должна быть признана развивающей.

Information-cognitive paradigm

Все когнитивные процессы, коль скоро они служат переживанию, носят пристрастный, "идеологический" характер, т.е. доминирующим для них является интерес, мотивированность субъекта, а не объективность отражения. Это значит, что все они являются в каком-то смысле оценочными операциями. Однако среди них можно выделить такие процессы, которые непосредственно строятся на операциях оценивания реальности, и такие, в которых оценивание не является собственно методом решения задач переживания.

По этому основанию мы различаем в пределах информационно-когнитивной парадигмы два измерения – "оценки" и "интерпретации" (ср.: 130). Интерпретационные механизмы отличаются от оценочных тем, что хотя бы по видимости имеют форму объективного, беспристрастного отражения.

Evaluation

Интрапсихические оценивающие механизмы можно проиллюстрировать процессами, снижающими "когнитивный диссонанс", вызванный принятием решения. Как показали эксперименты, проведенные Л. Фестингером с сотрудниками, после выбора одной из двух почти равных по привлекательности альтернатив у испытуемых наблюдалась систематическая переоценка их, завышающая оценку избранной, снижающая оценку отвергнутой альтернативы и уменьшающая таким образом когнитивный диссонанс, феноменально ощущавшийся как чувство сожаления (181). [ 26 ]

Интерперсональные оценивающие механизмы составляют многочисленные приемы, направленные на поддержание или повышение своей самооценки, оценки в глазах окружающих, чувства самоценности и собственного достоинства и т.д. В монологической форме, предполагающей только наличие слушателя или зрителя, но не равноправного "Ты", это различные "демонстративные" акты – хвастовство, бравада, прямое или косвенное подчеркивание своих достоинств и преимуществ (физических, интеллектуальных, экономических, владения информацией и пр.). В диалогической форме – это непосредственно в общении протекающая борьба с явными и скрытыми оценками партнера по общению. Предметом оценки и оценочной борьбы может быть все, что человек относит к себе – от собственных поступков, мотивов, черт до принадлежащих ему вещей и учреждения, в котором он работает. Борьба против отрицательной оценки может быть пассивной, избегающей (когда субъект разотождествляет себя с какой-либо категорией людей, отрицательно охарактеризованных в раз говоре) и активной, контратакующей (в этом случае дискредитируются оценивающий субъект, мотивы его оценки или ставятся под сомнение ценности, из которых он исходил, производя оценку и т.д.). Диалогическая оценочная борьба часто принимает формы сарказма, ехидства, иронии (122).

Interpretation

The mechanisms of this dimension can be an intellectual and perceptual form.

And netelktu u and l and n and I f o rma a . Among the various intellectual operations (comparisons, generalizations, conclusions, etc.) involved in the realization of experience, we must especially note the causal interpretation of events. Explaining or finding the causes (sources, reasons, reasons, motives, perpetrators, etc.) of the event being experienced (which may be an external incident, your own behavior, intention or feeling) is a very important element of the experience process, which depends all its content. This operation is most clearly manifested in the well-known mechanism of rationalization. Rationalization is defined as the attribution of logical reasons or plausible bases to behavior whose motives are unacceptable or unknown (199; 213), or as an excuse for their insolvency before others or by themselves (210). [ 27 ]

Percepta n and I f o rma a . Perceptual forms of "interpretation" manifest themselves in the perception of events (external and internal), other people and oneself. These three cases are well represented by the defensive mechanisms of negation, projection, and identification, of which we will look at the first and the last, since they have not yet been mentioned in our review.

Treatment is usually defined as the process of eliminating the traumatic perceptions of external reality. On this basis, it is opposed to repression as a defense against the heartache caused by inner instinctive demands (188). However, this term is sometimes used to describe the defensive distortion of the "perception of internal states" (25, p. 284). T. Kröber writes that the basic formula of negation is “no pain, no danger” (213), which, however, should not be misleading with respect to the simplicity of those real processes, the result of which is the denial of any facts of reality. R. Stolorov and F. Lachman (247) describe a case of experiencing a patient who, at the age of four, lost her father, indicating that there was a whole protective system in her mind designed to deny the fact of this loss. It was a complex construct that developed in the course of personal development, reinterpreting the changing circumstances of the patient’s life (for example, the second marriage of the mother, indicating the death of the father) so as to preserve the belief that the father is alive.

And de Nt and f and to and c and I. If, when projected, the subject sees himself in another, then when he identifies, he identifies himself in another. “In identification, an individual overcomes his feelings of loneliness, inferiority or inadequacy by accepting the characteristics of another, more successful person. Sometimes identification may not be with a person, but with an organization, institution” (210). A. Freud describes cases of overcoming fear or anxiety through voluntary or involuntary "identification with the aggressor." A girl who was afraid to pass through a dark hall once overcame her fear and then shared the secret of victory over herself with her younger brother: “In the hall it’s not at all scary,” she said, “you just have to pretend that you are the very ghost you’re afraid to meet "(188, p.119). By intensity, identification can reach a degree when "a person begins to live the life of another" (ibid., P. 135). Such cases are not uncommon when experiencing the loss of a loved one (210; 217; 250).

Concluding on this discussion of the issue of "technological" dimensions of experience, let us say that it would be possible to single out dynamic and axiological paradigms, which we found to be dissolved in other paradigms. However, the dynamic paradigm can be represented as the result of the "multiplication" of purely energy representations, which set the intensity, by meaningful spatial representations, introducing directionality in the description of mental processes. As for the value paradigm, it in its pure form, and not in the form of an estimated dimension, is practically not presented in the descriptions of the processes of experiencing.

c) THE PROBLEM OF THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE

Usually not one mechanism participates in the experience, but a whole system of such mechanisms is created. “Clinical experience shows,” writes D. Rapoport, “that defensive motives themselves become the subject of defensive formations, so in order to explain the most common clinical phenomena, it is necessary to postulate whole hierarchies of such defenses and derived motivations that are built on top of each other” (cit. to: 241, p.28). However, the recognition of protective and compensatory systems and hierarchies in itself does not exempt many authors from the atomistic presumptions and related illusory hopes, sooner or later, to find a comprehensive set of protective or compensatory "primary elements" that make up these systems; hopes so closely related to the methodological dream of Watson and many reflexologists to discover the innate repertoire of atomic reactions — the bricks of any possible behavior — that there is every reason to believe that theoretical thinking in the field of studying experiential processes will make the same evolution that in the physiological study of behavior was marked by a transition from reflexological ideas on the movement to the physiology of the activity of N. A. Bernshtein. It is easier to “predict” this evolution, because it is already being carried out both at the level of empirical studies of overcoming by a person critical life situations in which clinical experience literally imposes on specialists the idea of ​​the uniqueness of each experience process, and at the level of theoretical reflection: “An approach to compensatory mechanisms as heuristics, writes Yu. S. Savenko, —that is, as a system of techniques that are being shaped specifically for the situation and are not devoid of creativity, do not limit by the usual patterns "(129, p.71).

Focusing on this kind of methodology does not mean denying the existence of more or less stable mechanisms of experiencing, it means understanding such mechanisms as special “functional organs” (69; 84; 91; 92), i.e. certain organizations shaping up to realize the goals of a particular experiencing process (197).

Such a “functional organ”, or mechanism of experience, once folded, can become one of the usual means of solving life problems and be launched by the subject even in the absence of an impossibility situation, i.e. to remain an experience only in its origin, but not in function.

In a long experience, one can observe the use of a large number of means and strategies that gradually replace each other. Despite the large variations in this shift, special patterns are observed. D. Hamburg and J. Adams, analyzing coping with a somatic disease, revealed the following pattern of changing the phases of experience: "At first it is an attempt to reduce the significance of the event. During this acute phase there are tendencies to negate the nature of the disease, its severity and likely consequences. On the phase change "protective avoidance" sooner or later comes another, when patients do not turn away from the actual conditions of the disease, look for information about the factors contributing to cure, accept the likelihood of long-term limitations niy ... This transition from denial to recognition usually takes place not at once, but at the expense of a number of approximations, as a result of which the patient comes to a full understanding of his situation "(195, p.278). But denial can also be the second phase of the process, meaning the pathological development of the experience (247, pp.598-599).

The problem of classifying the processes of experiencing

The previous paragraphs have shown how vast and diverse is the empirical domain that falls under the concept of experience. It is quite clear that perhaps the most important theoretical problem is the ordering of all this diversity.

There are a number of interesting attempts to classify protective, compensatory, and coincident mechanisms, however, in general, the atmosphere around this problem is riddled with disappointment. G. Sjobak described numerous difficulties that arise when trying to make a classification of protective mechanisms. The main one is that the theory of psychological defense "does not contain any assumptions, explicit or implicit, which would limit the class of defense mechanisms" (241, p. 181). "The classification of individual mechanisms is arbitrary, and there are no clear and clear boundaries between them," states E. Hilgard and R. Atkinson (199, p.515), and R. Schäfer pessimistically asserts that "there can be no" genuine "and “a complete list of protections, but there can only be lists of more or less incomplete, theoretically inconsistent and useless in streamlining clinical observations and experimental data" (238, p. 162).

To some extent R. Schaefer is right, but from his correctness does not follow that the task of streamlining facts in the field of studying the processes of experience is generally unsolvable, but that it is unsolvable in the existing formulation. Looking for a "genuine" and "full" list of experiential processes is a wrong task setting. Behind such a statement is an inadequate assumption about processes and mechanisms of experiencing, as natural self-sufficient substantial essences, as things, as facts, not acts, an assumption whose naturalistic essence does not change the widespread notion that protective and compensatory mechanisms are theoretical constructions. , since they themselves are not directly observed (130; 188; 241). [ 28 ]

Considerably coarsening the matter, we can say that there are two opposing, but complementary, methods of cognitive systematization. The first method is empirical, with which all scientific research begins. Its goal is to describe the objects to be systematized and their primary division into groups, which most often takes the form of a species-specific classification. This method prevails now in the study of the processes of experience. It is necessary at the initial stages of the study of any complex reality. However, the real goal of science is not to obtain more and more abstract generalizations, to which the empirical method leads, but to reproduce the concrete in thinking (1). "The theoretical reproduction of the real concrete as the unity of the diverse is carried out by the only possible and scientifically correct way of ascent from the abstract to the concrete " (56, p. 296).

The next chapter is an attempt to apply this theoretical method of "climbing" to the study of experience.