“A certain sergeant, who had access to secret ciphers, was hired for a civilian position (with intelligence activities). In the course of his tests on the detector, a constant reaction to relevant questions was noted, and in a further conversation he admitted to various minor offenses and illegal actions. However, the constant specific reaction when answering relevant questions was very interesting for the detector operator, and after a few weeks the sergeant was asked to pass the test again. The situation repeated. He was deprived of access to secret documents, and the investigation began. After some time, he was found dead in his car. It was subsequently established that he was engaged in espionage activities in favor of the Soviet Union "
[163] .
Such examples of detecting spies on the detector when applying for a job in the report of the National Security Agency on the use of a lie detector are given a lot. It must be assumed that such a test could not pass not only to spies, but also to some honest and decent people. However, the NSA does not provide any information about how many spies were found at all and how many of them were subsequently tested on the detector. Nevertheless, it is reported how many people were not hired because of various kinds of confessions, such as drug use, subversive activities, criminal past, etc. The case in point is the testing of 2,902 candidates for employment with secret information. 43% of them were identified as telling the truth; Later it turned out that 17 of these 2,902 people concealed discrediting their information. Thus, the known part of the errors of the faith of lies was less than 1% (17 of 2902). Those who admitted guilt accounted for 21% of failed tests. The misconducts that 24% of those who failed the tests admitted were not enough to refuse to accept a job, and 8% of those who failed in tests did not make any confessions at all.
These 8% can be considered an indicator of the error of disbelief of truth. (The NSA does not mention them in its report, however, based on the data in this report, this percentage can be calculated.) However, the NSA stresses that the lie detector is not the final judge; it only helps to determine who to hire and who not. Those who did not pass the detector test are interviewed, in which attempts are made to understand the reasons that contributed to their failure. Gordon Barland told me that the agency does not take people if it is not possible to find explanations for failing to be tested.
Again, we need to remember that this only shows utility, not accuracy. Without accuracy data it is impossible to answer the following questions.
How many successful liars are currently at work at the NSA? The agency itself is convinced that there are no more than 1% of them, but no studies have been conducted to confirm this. Of course, we can assume that the detector does not miss a single liar, but you can not be sure of this. The BTO report notes that “the people who the Federal Government would most like to identify are also the most trained in ways to avoid such detection”
[164] .
Without special studies aimed at studying the accuracy of the detector, one cannot be completely confident in knowing the number of possible errors of the faith of lies. Such a study, of course, very difficult to conduct but not impossible. Hybrid studies, such as the Israeli police experiment I have already mentioned, are quite possible.
Can the countermeasure detector fool? By countermeasures, I mean physical activities such as biting the tongue, using medications, using hypnosis and managing biological responses. Studies have been conducted confirming that such countermeasures work to some extent. However, considering how much damage national security may suffer if at least one spy is not detected (that is, an error of faith lies), more research should certainly be considered necessary. The object of these studies should be certain conditional agents, fully owning the entire arsenal of technical and scientific means to deceive the lie detector, that is, possessing the capabilities and capabilities of real spies. Dr. John Biri III, who once worked as an assistant secretary in an organization to protect the health of citizens, “warned Pentagon employees that, relying on a lie detector, they do not protect national security, but rather, on the contrary, put it at risk. I have already said that the Soviets have excellent schools in which they teach their agents to deceive the detector. Since many of the managers of the Ministry of Defense rely on the infallibility of the detector, they have a false sense of security because such hope of the detector greatly simplifies the penetration of the Soviet moth into the Pentagon ”
[165] . Considering all the above, it is impossible not to be surprised at how little the NSA conducts experiments to detect countermeasures. How many of these 8%, identified as lying, but denying it (245 people, according to my calculations), were really liars and how many of them actually told the truth? Again, the answer can be given only after special studies to assess the accuracy of the results.
In accordance with the findings of the BTO and the NSA, only one study was made on this subject - a study by analogy with the use of students, which, however, firstly had doubts about the truth criterion, and secondly, the questions asked had nothing to do with the national security. And once again it remains only to wonder why so few relevant studies are being conducted in the matter of such importance. Even if we leave aside the mistakes of disbelief of truth, it would still be necessary, especially at such high stakes, to fully focus on the mistakes of the faith of lies.
Without any doubt, even without having data on the accuracy of the results obtained, the use of a lie detector is of great help in selecting people seeking work with access to secret information, the leakage of which also threatens national security. Assistant Attorney General, General Richard C. Willard, briefly expressed it in the following words: “Even if the use of a detector can discard those candidates who are really worthy of work, it is still more important to avoid hiring those who may pose a threat to national security”
[166] .
Likken, objecting to the use of the detector, commented on a recent UK decision to use such tests in secret-related organizations, “Notwithstanding the damage to the career and reputation of innocent people, the result of this decision seems to be the loss of some of the most conscientious civil officials. And since there is a tendency to avoid more expensive (and more efficient) methods of ensuring security, as the lie detector is being introduced everywhere, this British decision will only open the door for foreign agents, well trained to deceive the lie detector, to penetrate the secret services more easily ”
[167] .
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Psychology of lies
Terms: Psychology of lies