Lie Detection Technique

A lot of deceptions are getting away from liars only because no one takes the trouble to catch them. But when too much is at stake (when the victim of fraud fears the harsh consequences of his naivety or when the deceiver himself hopes to gain more benefits due to his lies), it makes sense to do this hard work. Detecting is a difficult and slow task. To see if the opponent makes mistakes, and to assess what they are, which can or should appear, and how to detect them on certain behavioral traits, you have to ask a lot of questions. And these questions should be related both to the nature of the lie in itself, and to the personal characteristics of each specific liar and concrete verifier. No one person can be absolutely sure of whether a liar will give himself away or not, or whether a person telling the truth is justified or not. Detecting lies is just a guess based on information. But this conjecture nevertheless significantly reduces the possibility of making mistakes of the faith of lies and disbelief of truth. And finally, it gives both the verifier and the liar the full difficulty of predicting the success or failure of the disclosure process.
The technique of detecting lies will allow a person suspecting to cheat to assess how thorough or unfounded his suspicions are. Sometimes all that he manages to learn is that he cannot learn anything, as was the case with Othello. And sometimes he can reveal all the mistakes and find out what is better to pay attention to, what exactly to listen to and what to look at. This technique may be useful for the liar himself; point out to him that this time the circumstances are against him, and prevent him from embarking on all the grave ones, to keep him from further lies. Or vice versa - a liar can be inspired by the ease with which he dodges traps, and focus all his attention on how to avoid them in the future. But in the next chapter I will explain why the content of this book is still more useful for verifiers, rather than liars.
To discover a lie, you need to answer 38 questions. Most of them have already been mentioned in previous chapters, but now I’ll just bring them into a single questionnaire and add some more of those that until now there was no point in considering. Based on this questionnaire, I will analyze various types of lies to show why some people lie easily, and others - with great difficulty. (The questionnaire is placed in Table 4. "A complete list of questions for the verifier.")
A man who lies easily makes few mistakes; thus, it is difficult for the verifier to detect it, while lying about it is difficult to detect easily. With the ease of performing a lie, a person does not need to hide or falsify his emotions, he has enough opportunities to lie about specific things and rich experience in such a matter; in addition, the victim (that is, the potential verifier) ​​is usually not even suspicious. A newspaper article entitled “How bounty hunters track down their victims in the corporate jungle” ^[174] describes many of these easily deceived ones.
These hunters lure workers from one company to another, usually competing. And since no company wants to lose capable workers, bounty hunters do not act in the forehead. Sarah Jones, for example, a bounty hunter from a certain New York-based company, said that she received all the information she needed, asking a simple, initially allegedly relating to completely general and abstract research, question: “We study the impact of education on career. Can I ask you a couple of questions? I do not need to know your name, I am only interested in statistics relating to your education and work. ” And then I ask the candidate all I need: and how much money he gets, and what is his marital status, age, and how many children he has ... So bounty hunters force a person to give all the information they need about themselves - and not getting off the ground as required. ” ^[175] Another hunter describes his work in the following way: “When people sometimes ask me what I do, I answer that I lie, cheat and steal, and I live” ^[176] .
An example of a difficult lie may be the lie of the patient of the psychiatric clinic Mary, which I described in the introduction.

Doctor Well, Mary, how are you feeling today? Mary Great, doctor. I would like to spend the weekend ... uh ... at home, with my family, you know. After all, it's been ... uh ... five weeks already, like I'm here in the hospital. Doctor And no feeling of depression, Mary? No thoughts of suicide? Did you get rid of them? Mary I, however, so uncomfortable for the whole story. And now ... Now I’m not exactly thinking about it. I just want to go home to my husband.

Both Mary and Sarah succeeded in their lies. They did not catch either one, despite the fact that it was very easy to catch Mary. All the advantages were on the side of Sarah, but Mary lied hard, was a less experienced cheater, and the doctor, on the contrary, had all the advantages of a verifier. But let's not touch the characteristics of liars and verifiers, first consider what is a lie in itself.
Mary had to lie about feelings, but Sarah did not. Mary hid the suffering that motivated her plans for suicide; such feelings are generally difficult to hide, and besides, the efforts to conceal can also distort the portrayed positive emotions. Mary had to lie not only about her feelings, but, unlike Sarah, to worry a lot about her lies and to hide this emotion as well. Deception Sarah, as part of her work, is fully authorized, and therefore she does not have to feel guilty for him. Mary’s unauthorized lie generated guilt because it is usually assumed that the patient must be honest with the doctor trying to help him, and Mary also sympathized with her doctor. She was ashamed of both her lies and her plans. The greatest difficulties in deceiving arise from the emotions that a person feels at the moment of lying; the stronger the emotions that need to be hidden, and the more of them, the harder it is to lie. That is why, in addition to suffering, Mary felt shame and guilt. And now, when we move from considering a lie to analyzing a liar, we will see that Mary also experienced a certain fourth emotion, which she was also forced to hide.
Mary is much less experienced and tempted in lies than Sarah; so far she has not tried to hide either her suffering or suicidal thoughts, and besides, she never lied to psychiatrists. Due to lack of experience, she was afraid that she would be caught, and thus, this fear was also added to the load of hidden feelings, which also, no doubt, betrayed her. The very nature of the disease made Mary especially vulnerable to precisely fear, guilt, and shame; moreover, she seemed to be unable to conceal these feelings well.
Mary did not foresee all questions of the doctor and was forced to go on about him. With Sarah, the situation is exactly the opposite; she had a lot of experience in this kind of deception, was confident in her abilities and had a well-developed solid line of conduct. In addition, Sarah had the advantage of an active position, the ability to play a role so convincingly that sometimes she herself did not doubt her absolute veracity.
However, the doctor acting as a verifier had three more advantages. He had met the patient for the first time, and his previous knowledge of the specific features of her behavior gave him a good chance to avoid the Brocaw trap. Then, he, like most psychiatrists, perfectly knew how to detect hidden emotions. Finally, he was cautious, waited for deception, well knowing that suicidal patients even after several weeks in the clinic can hide their plans, break free, and try again.
Mary's mistakes were clearly visible in speech, voice, body movements, and facial expressions. She is not a skilled liar, not a lively talker, and therefore signs of deception were manifested in the selection of words and in the voice itself: speech reservations, inconsistency, verbosity and pauses. In addition, the strong negative emotions experienced by her gave another sign - an increase in tone. Signs of the four emotions (suffering, fear, guilt, and shame) manifested in emblems (shrug), manipulations, suspended illustrations, and micro-expressions. They were also visible in the corresponding movements of the facial muscles, despite Meri’s attempts to control her facial expressions. And since Mary knew the doctor a long time ago, he had to interpret her movements and manipulations much more thoroughly, while in fact he did not find any signs of deception on her part at all. However, I am sure that if he knew all the positions I had just stated, he would have discovered the deception of his patient without difficulty.
Sarah is in an almost perfect position for lying: she does not need to hide her emotions, she has experience in this kind of deceptions, she has time to rehearse her role, she has (thanks to past successes) confidence, she has a natural gift, honed practice, lies she is allowed, her victim does not suspect anything, sees her for the first time and, moreover, is not particularly sophisticated in assessing people. Of course, in the case of Sarah, unlike Mary, I did not have the ability to view signs of fraud to view the videotape or record, and I have to rely only on a newspaper article. Therefore, we can assume that in her case, neither I nor anybody else could have noticed any signs of deception. Sarah lied easily, and she had no reason to commit blunders.
But neither Sarah nor Mary had that advantage, which is in a kind of aiding the victim, in the desire of the victim (for whatever reasons) to be deceived. But Ruth (from Update Let's Come in Marry) had such an advantage. She lied hard, having made many blunders, but her victim herself did not want to notice them. Let me remind you that Jerry, Ruth's husband, heard her telephone conversation with her lover and, noticing some unusual notes in his wife’s voice, asked who she was talking to. Caught off-guard, Ruth began to babble something about a Sunday school woman, which he hardly believed, but refused to ask any further questions. The implication is that Jerry was unable to detect his wife’s deception precisely because he had some reason not to reveal her adultery - he himself had a mistress, and as it turned out later, the wife of Ruth's lover!
Let us now compare the lies of Ruth, difficult, but never revealed, with a simple lie, also remaining undisclosed, but for a completely different reason. This is an example from a recent analysis of the deception technique used by virtuoso rogues.
"In this" mirror game "... a rogue pretends that he does not even suspect what his victim can think of, disarming her with an unexpected open expression of her thoughts, it would seem, completely to the detriment of his own intentions. Here is John Hamrak, one of the most inventive crooks of this kind, the beginning of our century, dressed as a technician, enters the office of a member of the city council in the City Hall, in Hungary. Hamrak states that he has come for the watch to be fixed. Olderman, probably because of the great value of hours, does not want to give them away. And Hamrak, instead of insisting on his own, begins to praise the watch, drawing the official’s attention to their tremendous value and, as if in passing, noticing that it was for this reason that he came after the watch himself. Such virtuosos achieve their goal, drawing the victim’s attention to the most subtle aspects of the situation and thus, as if certifying the authenticity of their role as a seeming violation of their own benefit ” ^[177] .
And the first questions that we need to consider in this regard are the following: are there any signs of cheating in such situations or are they not at all, and such a liar is experiencing any emotions at the time of cheating or not. As I explained in Chapter 2, “Why lies sometimes fail” and illustrated in the analysis of Mary’s lies, the main difficulties with deception arise from experiencing emotions at the very moment of lies. True, the matter is of course not only in emotions, however, it’s best to begin consideration from them.
Hiding emotions can be the ultimate goal of the one who is lying (as was the case with Mary). But even if this is not the case, even if they are not lying about feelings, feelings when lying are inevitably present. In the case of Ruth, she spoke a great deal for the fact that she felt remorse and fear of exposure. She was clearly afraid of the consequences of disclosing her deception: she would not only be able to continue the novel, but she would also be punished. Jerry could have left her if he knew about the betrayal, and in the event of a divorce, the fact of her adultery would worsen her financial situation. (Roman Updike was written before divorce was canceled on the basis of guilt.) Children could also be taken away from her. But even if the marriage was preserved, Ruth's family life would still have significantly deteriorated.
Of course, not every detected liar is punished; in case of failure, neither Sarah nor Mary would have been punished. Nevertheless, Hamrak was afraid of exposure to a much lesser extent than Ruth. He is experienced in this kind of affairs and knows the value of what makes him lie. But Ruth, though she succeeded in her deception, knows little how to behave in such situations. Not sure she is in her abilities liars.
The only source of fear of exposure is for Ruth the punishment to which she will inevitably be subjected. She is afraid of punishment and for the lie itself. If Jerry finds out that she is deceiving him, his distrust of her will become a source of anxiety and in addition to her treason. Sometimes cuckolds are afraid not even so much of infidelity, as the loss of trust - they can not forgive. In addition, once again, we note that not everyone who lies is punished for the fact of lying; this happens only when the deceiver and the victim intend to be together and in the future, what unbelief is really a real threat. If a lie is revealed, Sarah, as a bounty hunter, will lose only the opportunity to get some specific information; Hamrak will be punished not for reincarnation in technology, but for theft (or attempted theft) of hours. Even Mary will not be punished properly for lying; finding her cheating will only make the doctor behave more cautiously with her. And the belief that a person will always be truthful is not supposed (and cannot be claimed) for any long-term relationship, not even marriage.
Fear of being exposed in the case of Ruth is aggravated by the fact that she knows about her husband's suspicions. Hamrak's victim, Oldermen, also suspects anyone who wants to take valuable watches. And the whole beauty of the “mirror game” is that a direct appeal to the victim’s secret fears greatly reduces their suspicions. The victim believes that a real thief will never be so impudent as to say out loud exactly what makes her be more careful. The logic sometimes makes the verifier not to believe the most obvious signs of deception, because it is very difficult to believe that the cheater makes such obvious blunders. In their study of the so-called military tricks, Donald Daniel and Catherine Herbig remarked that “the greater the blunder, the harder it is to take it as evidence of deception, because it seems too great a gift to be real (and indeed the military in many cases of obvious information leaks prefer not to believe her) ... and too shameless to be anything other than a trick ” ^[178] .
Ruth, like Mary, adheres to the same social values ​​as the victim of her deception, and therefore may feel guilty about her lies. But Ruth feels this feeling to a much lesser extent than Mary, because she understands that hiding treason is not a crime. Even people condemning adultery sometimes believe that it is better for an unfaithful spouse not to admit to infidelity. In the case of Hamrak, the matter is even clearer. Like Sarah's bounty hunter, he feels no guilt behind him: a lie is what allows him to exist. Perhaps Hamrak is just a born liar or a psychopath, which also reduces the possibility of his remorse. His lie, like Sarah's lie, can be called sanctioned.
The lie of Ruth and Hamrak allows us to note two more points. Ruth is unable to foresee exactly when she will have to lie, and therefore does not work out and rehearse her line of conduct. This increases her fear of exposure because she knows that she does not have the ability to cover herself with pre-prepared answers. In the case of the conviction of Hamrak (which, however, rarely happens with professional cheaters), he always has improvisation talent in his supply, which Ruth lacks. But she has another great advantage over Hamrak, the one I have already mentioned — her victim herself wants to be deceived, not wanting to expose the liar for reasons of her own benefit. Sometimes such victims themselves are not aware that they contribute to deception. Updike just left unexplained, whether Jerry was aware of his unwitting assistance to deception or not, and what Ruth thought about it. Voluntary victims facilitate the task of liars, as a rule, in two ways. If the deceiver knows that the victim does not seem to notice his mistakes, he is less afraid of exposing. And if he is also convinced that he is doing exactly what is expected of him, then he practically does not feel behind himself any guilt.
So, we analyzed four different examples of lies and understood why in the cases of Mary and Ruth one could and should have noticed the signs of deception and why it was impossible in the cases of Sarah and Hamrak. Now let's look at another example in which a person who spoke the truth was found to be a liar and see how a cheat detection technique can help prevent such errors.
Gerald Anderson was charged with the rape and murder of Nancy Johnson, his neighbor's wife. Nancy's husband returned home from work in the middle of the night, found her dead, and ran to the Anderson neighbors, where he said that his wife was killed and her son was gone. He then asked Mr. Anderson to call the police.
Many minor accidents made the police suspect that it was Anderson. (The day after the murder, he did not go to work, got drunk at a local bar, talked a lot about the victim, and when he was dragged home, he burst into tears and told his wife: “I didn’t want to do this, but I did.” Subsequently, he claimed that he had referring to his drunkenness, not murder, but they did not believe him.) When the police asked him about the origin of the stain on the upholstery of his car, he said that it had been there since it was purchased. Later, during the investigation, he admitted that he had lied about the spot, because he was ashamed, as the spot appeared when he had once struck his wife, and her nose began to bleed. The investigator has repeatedly told Anderson, constantly referring to this case, that he is a person prone to violence, and could have committed a murder, and besides, a liar, since he denies it. Anderson further admitted that, being a twelve-year-old, he participated in an attempt at seduction, which, however, did not cause the girl any harm and was never repeated afterwards. Then it turned out that at that time he was not twelve, but already fifteen. And this, as the investigator insisted, was the strongest evidence of his deceit, as well as the existence of sexual problems - and, therefore, he was accused of rape and murder of her neighbor Nancy.
Joe Townsend, a professional lie detector operator, whom investigators considered to be infallible in exposing criminals, was brought to the case.
First, Townsend conducted a test consisting of two long series of questions, and received several confusing and contradictory results. When asked about the murder, Anderson’s response elicited the impulse that usually indicates deception when denying guilt. But when the question concerned the type of murder weapon and the method of its commission, the detector did not record any pulses. In short, Anderson showed guilt when it came to murder, and innocence when it came to weapons that were terribly exhausted and streaked by Nancy. On the question of where he took the knife, what kind of knife it was and where he got rid of it, Anderson kept saying the same thing - “I don’t know”, and there were no impulses ... Three times he drove the suspect to the murder weapon - results remained unchanged. At the end of the test, Joe Townsend told Anderson that he had not passed the test ^[179] . The opinion of the detector operator suited the investigators, who were convinced that they had a true criminal in their hands. They totally interrogated Anderson for another six days (video records show how he was broken and eventually forced to confess to a crime that the poor fellow did not commit). However, almost to the very end, he claimed that he was innocent, that he could not rape and kill Nancy, if only because he does not even have any memories of it. In response, the investigators said that, as a rule, an eclipse is placed on the killers, and the fact that he does not remember anything of this does not prove that he really did not kill or rape. Anderson broke down after being told that his wife was accusing him of killing a neighbor (the latter categorically denied it later). However, a few days later, Anderson withdrew his confession, and seven months later, after another rape and murder, the real killer Nek Johnson was caught, who himself admitted this during the investigation.
Based on my analysis, I assume that Anderson's emotional response to the questions about the murder during the tests on the detector was caused by factors having the least relation to lies. Recall that the detector in fact itself reveals not a lie, but only emotional arousal.And here it was imperative to find out if Anderson could experience emotional arousal only if he really killed her neighbor, or he could have other reasons for such arousal. And if so, the test results should have been recognized as inaccurate.
But usually so much is at stake, and the punishment is so severe that the majority ^[180]the suspects who are guilty of committing such a crime are still really afraid; but they are also afraid of some innocent people. Detector operators are trying to reduce the fear of undeserved accusations among innocent subjects (as well as increase the fear of exposure of the guilty), telling them about the infallibility of technology. One of the reasons why Anderson was afraid that they would not believe him was the very nature of the investigation, conducted before the detector was used. Specialists ^[181]there are interrogations conducted for the purpose of obtaining information, and investigative actions of an accusatory nature and carried out with the purpose of obtaining a confession from the alleged perpetrator. And the investigators, as happened in the case of Anderson, often use the power of their conviction regarding the guilt of the suspect in order to force the latter to renounce the allegations of his innocence. Not only does this make it difficult to recognize the truly guilty, it also intimidates innocent people who understand that investigators are biased towards them. A detector test was proposed to Anderson after 24 hours of such non-stop intimidation.
Anderson's emotional arousal, marked by a detector, could occur not only because of the fear of not being believed, but also because of feelings of shame and guilt. Being innocent of the murder, he was nevertheless ashamed of his two other bad deeds. And the investigators knew that he was ashamed of the fact that he had hit his wife and participated in the attempt to seduce the girl; moreover, they also knew that he was guilty of his attempts to hide it - and they stubbornly played on it to convince the suspect of his ability to rape and kill. And this, in turn, only strengthened Anderson’s feelings of guilt and shame, and he also increasingly associated with the crime he was accused of committing.
The lie detection technique explains why any signs of fear, shame, or guilt (which Anderson could manifest in facial expressions, gestures, voice, speech, VNS activity recorded by the detector) appear somewhat ambiguous as signs of deception. Emotions could reflect equally the innocence and the guilt of the suspect. There was one more circumstance unknown to the investigators that prevented them from correctly evaluating Anderson's emotional reactions. After Anderson was already released, James Filan, a journalist whose article helped liberate an innocent, asked what “prevented” him from passing the detector test. And Anderson discovered another source of his emotional arousal about the crime he was accused of: on the night of the murder, coming to Nancy’s house with the police,several times he looked at the naked body of the murdered one, feeling at the same time that he was doing something terrible and that it should not have been done in any way. In his mind, this was postponed as a crime, of course, less than murder, but still causing guilt and shame. He lied, hiding this shameful behavior from the investigation, that the detector operator did not fail to notice - indeed, Anderson felt guilty for lying. Investigators in the Anderson case made the classic Othello mistake. Like the unfortunate Moor, they correctly determined that the suspect was emotionally agitated, but they did not correctly identify the cause of this arousal, and besides did not understand that a person could feel all these feelings so correctly noticed by them, regardless of whether he was guilty or not. Like Desdemona’s sufferings, it’s not her loss of her lover,so shame, guilt and fear of Anderson did not at all refer to the murder of her neighbor, but to completely different misconduct. And, like Othello, the investigators became victims of their own prejudice against the suspect; They also could not stand their uncertainty as to whether the suspect was lying or not. However, the investigators had information about the crime weapon that only a real killer could have and no one else. And the fact that Anderson did not respond to questions about the knife should have forced the detector operator to conclude that the suspect was innocent - however, instead of consistently conducting a test for the culprit’s knowledge, Townsend for some reason repeated the test three times in its usual manner.investigators became victims of their own prejudice against the suspect; They also could not stand their uncertainty as to whether the suspect was lying or not. However, the investigators had information about the crime weapon that only a real killer could have and no one else. And the fact that Anderson did not respond to questions about the knife should have forced the detector operator to conclude that the suspect was innocent - however, instead of consistently conducting a test for the culprit’s knowledge, Townsend for some reason repeated the test three times in its usual manner.investigators became victims of their own prejudice against the suspect; They also could not stand their uncertainty as to whether the suspect was lying or not. However, the investigators had information about the crime weapon that only a real killer could have and no one else. And the fact that Anderson did not respond to questions about the knife should have forced the detector operator to conclude that the suspect was innocent - however, instead of consistently conducting a test for the culprit’s knowledge, Townsend for some reason repeated the test three times in its usual manner.And the fact that Anderson did not respond to questions about the knife should have forced the detector operator to conclude that the suspect was innocent - however, instead of consistently conducting a test for the culprit’s knowledge, Townsend for some reason repeated the test three times in its usual manner.And the fact that Anderson did not respond to questions about the knife should have forced the detector operator to conclude that the suspect was innocent - however, instead of consistently conducting a test for the culprit’s knowledge, Townsend for some reason repeated the test three times in its usual manner.
Hamrak, the crook, and Anderson, accused of murder, are two types of errors, like a plague affecting all attempts to detect liars in criminal investigations. If we assume that Hamrak would be checked on the detector, he most likely would show complete emotional calm and would be declared innocent. The technique of detecting lies and clarifies why experienced professionals, natural deceivers or psychopaths so rarely make mistakes. Hamrak is a vivid example of a person whose lies, as a rule, are believed; Anderson is the opposite phenomenon. He, innocent, was found guilty - there is an error of unbelief in truth.
The purpose of my analysis of these two cases is not to call for the prohibition of the use of a lie detector and the interpretation of behavioral signs in the investigation of criminal cases. On the contrary, if it helps even in at least one percent of cases, it is necessary to apply both. In the end, any one of our impressions about other people is somehow made on the basis of their behavior, but this behavior speaks not only of their truthfulness or deceit, but much more. Behavior is the main source of information about friendliness, attractiveness and charm, intelligence, sociability, comprehension and so on. Usually, such impressions are created unconsciously, the person does not even think about what he considers and analyzes the behavioral signs. In Chapter 5, “Major Errors and Precautions,” I explained,why the probability of errors becomes less when judgments are tried to be made more carefully and carefully. If one is clearly aware of the source of impressions, if one knows the rules for interpreting behavior, the possibility of making the right judgment increases noticeably. In addition, such a judgment and more accessible assessment of others, colleagues and even the person about whom it is made, it is easier to correct and easier to clarify. Most policemen are accustomed to not paying particular attention to the behavioral signs of deception, and I assume that detectives, as a rule, do not know at all the exact basis of their intuitive conclusions about whether the suspect is guilty or not. While detector operators are still taught to pay attention to the non-verbal signs of deception, they have virtually no information on behavioral signs; Besides,due attention is not paid to how and when such signs can be useless and even dangerous.
It is impossible to cancel the analysis of the behavioral signs of fraud in criminal investigations; I just can’t imagine how our justice would function in this case. Indeed, in especially difficult cases, when the innocent person is threatened with prison or execution, and the real killer remains at large, having avoided punishment, any means sanctioned by law are good for disclosing the truth. And therefore I am only talking about how to make the process of interpreting such signs more cautious and more prudent, and thus more accurate. I have already spoken about the possibility of errors and how the verifier, applying the questions of my questionnaire (see Table 4 “The complete list of questions of the verifier”), will be able to assess the chances of detecting lies and truth. And I believe that training in detecting signs of deception, studying hazards and precautions,that is, honing the technique of detecting lies, will make the police more attentive and reduce the risk of errors of disbelief of truth and faith of lies. But in order to confirm my correctness, field studies and behavioral analysis of investigators and suspects are required. Such work has already begun, and its results are about to manifest, but, alas, the final conclusions are still far^[182] .
Meanwhile, there are cases when deception is much more dangerous than in the investigation of criminal cases, and its detection is even more difficult - I mean the meetings of national leaders of opposing countries during international crises. Here the stakes are higher than in the most terrible and despicable criminal case. However, only a few political analysts wrote about the importance of finding fraud in the face-to-face meetings of heads of state or high-ranking officials. Alexander Gros argues that "the matter of guessing the true intentions and determining the degree of sincerity of the opposite side is decisive in evaluating any policy" ^[183]. Sometimes, if a national leader does not want to acquire a reputation as a cold-blooded liar, the state can get very expensive, says Robert Jervis, “especially when a successful deception can change the basic balance of forces in the global system. After all, if a lie can help a country take a leading position in the world, then who will dare to condemn it ” ^[184] .
Henry Kissinger seems to be arguing with him, stressing that lies and fraud are unwise policies: “Only romantics think that negotiations can be won by fraud ... no, this is not the path of wisdom for a diplomat, but rather trouble. If you have to deal with the same person all the time, then deception can only be done once, and then it will only serve as a (permanent) stumbling block. ” ^[185]. However, diplomats seem to be taking such a seriousness to the problem of lies only at the end of their careers, and even then not as radically as Kissinger. In any case, the description of his own diplomatic efforts is full of examples of how he himself participated in hidden and half-hidden frauds, and how he wondered if his opponents were doing the same thing.
Stalin formulated it most harshly: “The words of a diplomat should not have anything to do with his affairs — otherwise what kind of diplomacy is this? .. There are bad deeds behind good words. Diplomacy as genuine goods are not as dry water or wooden iron " ^[186] .
Of course, this is an extreme statement. Sometimes diplomats tell the truth, and their truthfulness does not always seriously harm the national interests of the country. When there is no doubt that only one political line can serve national interests, and other nations are aware of this, the question of lies does not arise, for any other line would be frankly false. But most often things are quite ambiguous. One nation believes that the thoughts of the other can be found out only by secret actions, trickery, and false statements, regardless of the fact that later on their unworthy actions will be exposed. And at the same time, the deceiving nation claims to be honest in the same way as it would have done really honest. Jervis remarks: “RegardlessRussians are going to cheat (regarding nuclear test ban) or not, they always try to create an impression of complete honesty. After all, an honest person and a liar will always answer in the affirmative to the question whether they are going to tell the truth. ”^[187] .
And therefore there is nothing surprising in the fact that every government is always looking for opportunities to detect the lies of its rivals. International frauds can occur in a wide variety of contexts and serve a variety of purposes. One of these contexts, as I said, is the meeting of leaders (or their high-ranking representatives) to resolve the international crisis. Here, each party can begin to bluff, formally finish off not what it really wants, and have secret intentions. And from time to time each side will try to make sure that the opponent believes in their statements, which are in fact only a bluff, and continue to assert that their conditions are final and their intentions are clear.
Skills in a lie or in detecting lies are also very important for hiding and detecting unexpected attacks. Political analyst Mike Handel describes one recent case in this way: “By June 2 (1967) it became clear to the Israeli government that war was inevitable. The problem now was to manage to attack suddenly, for both sides had already mobilized and were in a state of full combat readiness. Realizing part of the deception that hid Israel’s intention to enter the war, Dayan (Israel’s defense minister) told a British journalist on June 2 that it was too late for Israel to start a war, and too early for the other. He repeated the same thing at the June 3 press conference. ” ^[188]. At the same time, Israel did a few more tricks to fool its opponents, and as a result, Diane’s ability to lie led to the success of their surprise attack on 5 June.
Another goal of deception is the attempt to mislead the enemy regarding its military power. The analysis of the secret arms buildup in Germany, which took place in the period from 1919 to 1939, made by Burton Weili, gives many examples of how cleverly this is sometimes done.
“In August 1938, when the Czechoslovak crisis was about to break out under the pressure of Hitler, Hermann Goering (Marshal of the German Air Force) invited the leaders of the French air force fleet to an inspection tour to inspect the Luftwaffe ^[189] .
General Joseph Vuillan, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force of France, accepted this invitation ... (German General Hermann Udet) took him aboard his personal escort plane ... While driving his low-power car at extremely low speed, he anticipated the impression that he would make on the guest thought out plan. A few minutes before them at full speed with a roar and whistle swept "Heinkel-100". Both planes landed at the same time, and the Germans led the amazed Frenchman to inspect the novelty ... "Tell me, Udet," another German general, Milch, turned to him with feigned nonchalance, how are we doing with the mass production of these machines? Udet, as it was agreed in advance, replied: "The second line is already ready, and the third will be operational within two weeks."Depressed, Vuuyeman blurted out that he was completely "shocked" ... As a result, the French air force delegation returned to Paris with a defeatist mood, confident that the Luftwaffe was invincible "^[190] .
The famous “Heinkel”, the speed limit of which seemed much greater against the background of a barely trailing escort plane, was then only one of the three cars built. And this kind of deception, aimed at creating an impression of the invincibility of German aviation, "became the most important part of Hitler's diplomatic negotiations, which ended in a series of brilliant victories based in large part on the fear of the Luftwaffe" ^[191] .
And although international frauds do not always require direct personal contact between the liar and his victim (they can be expressed in disguise, false statements, etc.), the above examples show that sometimes a lie is told directly to the person. However, in this kind of relationship it is impossible to use a detector or any other method openly aimed at ascertaining the veracity or deceit of the opposing party. Therefore, in the last ten years, interest in this area has turned in the direction of whether it is possible or impossible to use any scientific methods of detecting fraud in such cases. In the preface, I explained that when I met with officials at various levels of government, my warnings about the dangers did not make a special impression on them,therefore, one of the motives for writing this book was the desire to once again make such a warning, but more cautiously and more convincingly, and besides, to provide the necessary information to a much wider circle of officials. Here, as in the case of criminal fraud, the choice is not easy. Sometimes the behavioral signs of deception can help determine whether a national leader is lying or not, and sometimes they cannot. The problem is to learn to accurately determine when lies are possible, and when not, and when and how leaders of states can be misled by their (or their specialists) interpretation of signs of deception.Sometimes the behavioral signs of deception can help determine whether a national leader is lying or not, and sometimes they cannot. The problem is to learn to accurately determine when lies are possible, and when not, and when and how leaders of states can be misled by their (or their specialists) interpretation of signs of deception.Sometimes the behavioral signs of deception can help determine whether a national leader is lying or not, and sometimes they cannot. The problem is to learn to accurately determine when lies are possible, and when not, and when and how leaders of states can be misled by their (or their specialists) interpretation of signs of deception.
Let's go back to the example I gave on the first pages of this book - the first meeting of Chamberlain and Hitler in Berchtesgaden on September 15, 1938, fifteen days before the Munich Conference ^[192] .
Hitler sought to convince Chamberlain that he did not intend to start a war against the whole of Europe, but only wanted to solve the problem of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. And if Britain agrees to this plan (in areas of Czechoslovakia where the Sudeten Germans prevailed, it was supposed to hold a plebiscite and, in the event of a positive result, give up these areas of Germany), then Hitler would in no way start a war. In fact, Hitler had already mobilized his army and pulled it to the borders of Czechoslovakia on October 1, not at all intending to stop joining the Sudetenland. Remember Chamberlain’s letter to my sister already cited after his first meeting with Hitler: “Despite the harshness and cruelty of his face that I noticed, I got the impression that he was a person you can rely on if he gave the word” ^[193]. In response to criticism from the leaders of the opposition Labor Party, Chamberlain wrote that Hitler is “an extraordinary creation” and “a man who is much better than his words” ^[194] .
A week later, Chamberlain met Hitler for the second time in Godsberg. At this time, the Fuhrer put forward new requirements: German troops immediately occupy the areas inhabited by the Sudeten Germans, a plebiscite will be held after, and not before the occupation, and the territory occupied will exceed the previously agreed. Forcing his cabinet to accept these demands, Chamberlain said: “In order to understand a person’s actions, you must first evaluate his motives and see what he thinks about ... Mr. Hitler is limited and strongly prejudiced about certain things, but deceive a person whom he respects and which is negotiating, will not. And he definitely respects me. In addition, if Mr. Hitler declares that he intends to do this and that, then that is exactly what he will do. ” ^[195]. After quoting this passage, Telford Taylor asks: “Has Hitler really been deceiving the British prime minister so completely? Or did Chamberlain himself deceive his colleagues in order to extract consent from Germany for their demands? ” ^[196]
Let's assume, as Taylor does, that Chamberlain did believe in Hitler, at least after that first meeting in Berchtesgaden ^{[197 ]} .
Very high stakes in the game could make Hitler feel some fear of exposure, but probably this did not happen. He dealt with a voluntary sacrifice. The Nazi leader understood perfectly well: as soon as Chamberlain reveals deception, he will immediately see that all his attempts to solve the problem by meeting Hitler’s demands are untenable. But this policy of the British prime minister was by no means shameful at that time, but on the contrary, it was admirable; everything changed a few weeks later, when a surprise German attack showed that Chamberlain was simply fooled. It is now known that Hitler had the intention to seize the whole of Europe by force. But if Hitler could be trusted, if he had fulfilled all the conditions of the agreements, Chamberlain would have received world praises for saving Europe. Therefore, the English Prime Minister really wanted to believe Hitler,and he knew that very well. Another factor that caused Chamberlain to lose his vigilance was that Hitler knew very well when and what to say, and therefore could prepare well and rehearse his behavior. But he had no reason to feel guilty for his deception, to be ashamed of him, because he considered deception of the British a noble deed, a deed required by his role and his perception of history as a whole. Deceiving their opponents, they usually feel neither guilt nor shame, and not so despicable leaders as Adolf Hitler. Many political scientists believe that the lie is provided for by international diplomacy itself and is called into question only when it does not serve the national interests. The only emotion that could give Hitler, it is perhaps the delight of cheating. There is informationthat he enjoyed his ability to deceive the English, and the presence in the negotiations of other Germans who are able to understand well what was happening could only increase his excitement and joy of fooling Chamberlain. However, Hitler was a very experienced liar and clearly took all measures to ensure that he did not even show these feelings.
In addition, the detection of fraud in this case was made more difficult by the fact that the liar and the victim belonged to different cultures and spoke different languages ^[198] .
So even if Hitler made mistakes, and Chamberlain was not a voluntary victim, it would still be difficult for the latter to notice the mistakes made by his interlocutor. First, the negotiations went through translators, which gives the liar two advantages at once. When making verbal mistakes (reservations, prolonged pauses or speech failures), the translator covers them, and the process of simultaneous translation allows the speaker, while another phrase is translated, it is better to think about how to present the next portion of lies. And even if the listener knows the language in which his opponent speaks, this language is still not native to him, and there is always an opportunity to overlook subtle differences and hints that could serve as signs of deception.
Differences in national and cultural traditions can also impede the interpretation of voice, facial and body signs of deception; however, it happens in a more subtle and complex form. Each culture has its own preferences, which to some extent determine the pace, tone and loudness of speech, as well as hand movements and facial expressions that illustrate this speech. Mimic and vocal signs of emotions, in turn, are governed by the rules of the face described by me in Chapter 4 "Mimic signs of deception" that are firmly connected with the national cultural tradition. If the verifier does not know these differences or he does not take them into account, he becomes more vulnerable to errors of unbelief of truth and faith of lies.
Intelligence officials may ask me in this regard if I could analyze Hitler and Chamberlain's meetings at that time, just as I am doing now. For if this can be done only after so many years, then such a technique of detecting lies can not be of practical use. Having carefully studied all the available materials, I would venture to suggest that most of my conclusions were obvious even then, at least in 1938. Wanting to believe Hitler, Chamberlain put too much on the map, and the rest (if not himself!) Should have realized that, believing him about Hitler's truthfulness, we should not forget about caution. But, they say, Chamberlain considered himself the most capable of all his colleagues and only condescended to them ^[199], and therefore could not take into account any warnings.
The desire of Hitler to deceive England at the time of the meeting in Berchtesgaden was also well known to all. Chamberlain didn't even have to read Mein Kampf or hear anything about her in order to know what was being said. In addition, at that time there were already many examples of the lies of the German Chancellor, such as the secret termination of the Anglo-German naval pact or its false promises regarding Austria. Before a personal meeting with Hitler, Chamberlain publicly expressed his fears that he was lying about Czechoslovakia, hiding behind the accession of the Sudetenland region a plan to conquer the whole of Europe ^[200]. It was also known that Hitler is capable of lying not only in diplomatic relations and in military maneuvers, but also in face-to-face communication. He could instantly go from anger to charm and with great skill hid and distort his feelings and thoughts.
Political scientists and historians specializing in Anglo-German relations of 1938 will be able to assess how right I am, assuming that even at that time such information was already sufficient. Of course, I am not convinced that at that time anyone could argue about Hitler’s lies with complete confidence, but it was entirely possible to predict that if Hitler went into a fraud, Chamberlain would hardly catch him at that. Some more lessons can be drawn from the meeting between the chancellor and the prime minister, but it will be better to consider them after analyzing another example of how the lie of the state leader was not detected, even despite the obvious behavioral signs of deception.
During the Cuban crisis, two days before the meeting of President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko ^[201]On Tuesday, October 14, 1962, McGeorge Bundy informed the President that after the U-2 reconnaissance mission, he had undeniable evidence that the Soviet Union was deploying its nuclear warheads in Cuba. Numerous rumors spread (the election campaign began in November), and Khrushchev (according to political scientist Graham Alison) “transmitted Kennedy via a direct channel of communication that he understood his internal problems and did not intend to complicate them. And he especially assured the president that he did not intend to deploy nuclear warheads in Cuba ” ^[202] . Kennedy was "enraged" ^[203](according to Arthur Schlesinger), but “despite the fact that he was angry with Khrushchev, who had tried to fool him so awkwardly, he took the latest news calmly and rather with surprise” (Theodore Sorenson) ^[204] . According to Robert Kennedy: "... that morning, after reviewing the materials of the CIA, that is, photos taken from U-2 ... we realized that all Khrushchev's allegations from beginning to end were lies, one giant factory of lies" ^[205]. Presidential advisers began to urgently discuss possible retaliatory actions. The president decided that “there should be no public disclosure of the fact that we are aware of the Union’s deployment of warheads in Cuba until an accurate response plan is ready ... The main thing is safety, and therefore the president made it clear that he firmly intended once in the history of Washington to prevent any leakage of information ”(Roger Hillsman, subsequently a State Department official) ^[206] .
Two days later, on October 16, on Thursday, while his advisers were still discussing the US response, Kennedy met with Gromyko. “Gromyko had been in the States for more than a week, but none of the American officials knew for what purpose ... He asked for an audience at the White House. This request almost coincided with the time of appearance of the materials obtained by exploration. Have the Russians spotted our plane? Did they want to talk to Kennedy to feel his reaction? Or did they simply intend to use this audience to inform Washington that Khrushchev is already openly intending to use the warheads and strike before the United States prepares for retaliatory measures? ” ^[207]
Kennedy “became more and more worried as the meeting approached, but upon seeing Gromyko and Anatoly Dobrynin (the Soviet ambassador), he forced himself to smile” (Sorenson) ^[208] . Still not ready for concrete actions, the president decided that the most important thing now was to hide the fact of the existence of CIA materials from Gromyko and not give the Soviets any advantage ^[209] .
The meeting began at 17.00 and lasted until 19.15. On the one hand, State Secretary Dean Rusk, Livellin Thompson (former US ambassador to the Soviet Union) and Martin Gildebrand (Director of the Department of Affairs with Germany) listened and observed, on the other hand, Dobrynin, Vladimir Semenov (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR) and the third Soviet official. There were also translators from both sides. “Kennedy sat down in his rocking chair, looking at the fireplace, Gromyko on his right hand, on a beige sofa. Operators entered, took pictures (see below) and left. The Russian politician leaned back on the striped pillow and began to speak ... ” ^[210] .
Sit (left to right): Anatoly Dobrynin, Andrei Gromyko, John F. Kennedy.
After talking a little about Berlin, Gromyko finally turned to Cuba. As Robert Kennedy asserts: “Gromyko said that he wanted to appeal to President Kennedy and the United States on behalf of Prime Minister Khrushchev and the Soviet Union about the tension that has recently been exerted against Cuba. The president sat amazed and even partly admired by Gromyko's composure ... and answered firmly, but clearly fearing provocations ... " ^[211] . Journalist Eli Abel reports: “The president gave Gromyko a clear opportunity to move away from the previous assurances of Khrushchev and Dobrynin that the missiles in Cuba represent only air defense ... But Gromyko stubbornly repeated past assurances that, as the president now knew, were pure lies. Kennedy did not set him before the facts. ” ^[212] “The president was completely calm ... and showed no sign of tension or anger” (Sorenson) ^[213] .
Leaving the White House, Gromyko was in a state of “unusual gaiety” (Abel) ^[214] . Reporters tried to find out from him what was discussed at the meeting. “Gromyko grinned, clearly in a good mood, and declared that the conversation was“ useful, very useful ”” ^[215] . As Robert Kennedy writes: “I arrived at the White House shortly after the meeting ended and Gromyko withdrew. The president, so to speak, was quite displeased with the conversation with the Russians. ” ^[216] "I was dying of wanting to put our evidence of their cheating on their nose," Kennedy admitted. This is reported by political analyst David Dettser ^[217] . Without leaving the office, the president commented on the meeting to those who approached Robert Lovett and Mac Bundy: “... just now, ten minutes ago in this very room, Gromyko, with an impenetrable face, uttered such an obvious lie that I hadn’t heard in a long time. During the whole conversation, I had photographs taken from the closest distance on hand in the middle drawer of the table ... and I was greatly tempted to show them to the Soviet minister ” ^[218] .
But let's first consider the behavior of Ambassador Dobrynin. Perhaps at this meeting he was the only one who spoke the truth. Robert Kennedy believes that the Russians lied to Dobrynin, not considering him to be a particularly skilled cheater, and he sincerely denied that Soviet missiles were stationed in Cuba, as he had done in previous conversations with the President’s brother ^[219] .
For the sake of such goals, governments often mislead their ambassadors. John Kennedy himself acted in much the same way with Adlai Stevenson, without informing him about the Bay of Pigs ^[220] , and, as Alison points out: “... neither did the Japanese ambassador to the United States; and the German ambassador in Moscow, on the Barbarossa plan. ” ^[221] Between June 1962, when the Soviets probably decided to place their missiles in Cuba, and at this meeting in mid-October, the Russians constantly used Dobrynin and Georgy Bolshakov, responsible for the public information of the Soviet embassy, ​​to periodically reassure members of the Kennedy administration (Robert Kennedy , Chester Bowles and Sourensson) in that no nuclear missiles will be deployed in Cuba. Bolshakov and Dobrynin did not necessarily know the truth, and, most likely, they did not even know it. Neither Khrushchev, nor Gromyko, nor anyone else who knew the truth, had met with the Americans before October 14. True, Khrushchev at that time received in Moscow the American ambassador Foy Kohler, but even then he denied the presence of missiles in Cuba. For the first time, the Russians were worried that their lies could be revealed only when Khrushchev, and after two days Gromyko made unpardonable mistakes.
At the meeting in the White House, two frauds were encountered - one from Kennedy, the other from Gromyko. It may seem strange to some readers that I used the word deception in relation to Kennedy, and not only to the Soviet minister. Most people do not like these words about adorable idols, because they (but not me) consider a lie to be evil. But Kennedy's actions fall under my definition of lies as hiding information. Both: both Kennedy and Gromyko hid from each other what, in the opinion of both, was true, that is, the deployment of nuclear warheads in Cuba. And my analysis makes it possible to understand why it was Kennedy who showed more signs of deception than Gromyko.
Since both leaders prepared their lines of behavior (each had both time and opportunity for this), there were no problems, just how to hide, the truth. Of course, both leaders were afraid of exposing, because too much was at stake; perhaps, the excitement of Kennedy noticed by everyone at that moment when he greeted Gromyko, and showed that very fear. His rate (and, accordingly, fear) was greater than that of the Russian minister. The United States was still undecided about its future plans. There was not even definitive information on how many missiles were deployed and at what stage of readiness they are located. Presidential advisers believed that he needed to keep intelligence information secret, because if Khrushchev had learned about it, the Russians would have a real tactical advantage. As McGeorge Bundy says, “the difference lies precisely in that (I felt it already then and I feel it to this day) that the Russians showed their lies to the whole world and in the most awkward way” ^[222] . The Soviets needed to gain time to complete the construction of their bases, however, if the Americans knew about them at that moment, there would be no particular danger for them; it was clear to everyone that U-2 American intelligence aircraft would still sooner or later discover these bases, if they had not yet discovered.
But even if the stakes were equal, Kennedy could still be afraid to a much greater degree, because he could not have been so confident in his abilities to lie as the Soviet minister. He clearly did not have such a practice as Gromyko’s. In addition, the latter felt more confident also because, most likely, he shared the view of Khrushchev, which was formed a year ago during the Vienna summit and was expressed in the fact that Kennedy was not very strong.
In addition to a much stronger fear of exposure, Kennedy was heavier and the burden of hidden emotions. As I quoted above, the president experienced feelings of surprise, admiration and hostility throughout the meeting. It could have been leaked out about any of these emotions, because in that context, any mistake would mean that the real state of affairs is known to Americans. On the other hand, Gromyko could feel the delight of cheating, which is only confirmed by reports of his unusual gaiety on leaving the White House.
Yet, neither side could count on the leakage of information and the manifestation of signs of deception, since both the one and the other side were acted by very experienced people and possessing certain personal qualities that allowed them to hide any emotions. And yet I repeat: Kennedy had more of these emotions, he was less able and less self-confident. Cultural and language differences could cover up his blunders, but the Soviet ambassador could well notice them. Dobrynin, a highly educated man who had lived in America for many years, fluent in language and well studied the characteristics of national behavior, also had the advantage over the president, who was a stranger rather than a direct participant in the conversation. True, Ambassador Thompson was in the same position.
While I have many opportunities to study the descriptions of this meeting from the American side, there is practically no information from the Soviets, and therefore there is no way to decide whether Dobrynin knew the truth or did not know. The message that he looked stunned and clearly shocked when, four days later, Secretary Rask informed him about the discovery of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and the establishment of the American naval blockade, could serve as proof that Dobrynin really knew nothing ^[223] . If his own government did not inform him of the placement of the missiles, then such a reaction to the Secretary of State’s statement is quite natural. Although, if he knew about the missiles and the discovery of them by the Americans, he could have been shocked by simply responding with US military measures. Most analysts agree that the Russians did not expect such a decisive response from Kennedy.
But my task is not to find out if Kennedy’s deception was revealed, but to explain why and how he could be revealed, despite the complexity of this task. They say that Kennedy could not find any mistakes in Gromyko’s speech, but he didn’t need to find them, since the evidence was already in his desk. Armed with this circumstance, he could even admire Gromyko's skill.
Analyzing these two international deceptions, I argue that Hitler, Kennedy and Gromyko were born liars, inventive and intelligent, excellent interlocutors who can convince a partner ... Moreover, I am convinced that any politician who came to power is partly due to the ability to participate in debates and pronounce public speeches, deftly responding to questions from press conferences, creating a brilliant image for himself on television and radio, has the talent of a born liar. (Although Gromyko did not attain the highest authority, he survived the most difficult period for the Soviet state and by 1963 had a wealth of experience both in diplomacy and in the domestic political struggle.) Such people can convince, this is part of their work. Regardless of whether they lie or do not lie, they are fully capable of lying. Of course, there are many ways to conquer political power. And not every born liar necessarily becomes the head of state. Nor am I talking about rulers who have achieved power due to their bureaucratic dexterity, or by inheritance or by cunning, they are all not necessarily born liars.
The ability to speak (the ability to hide and distort the meaning of spoken words, accompanying them with appropriate gestures and facial expressions) is not required as long as the liar does not need to communicate directly with his victim. It can be deceived in a letter, in a press release ^[224] , through military maneuvers or through intermediaries; however, and all this taken together will not bring success if the liar does not have strategic ability, if he is not able to think out in advance his actions and the actions of his victim. I admit that all politicians should be shrewd thinkers and strategists, but only a few of them have the ability to speak, which allows them to lie right in their faces. Namely, we consider such cases in this book.
Not everyone is able to lie or want to lie. But political leaders all want to lie, at least, to certain representatives and under certain circumstances. Even Jimmy Carter, who swore that he never lied to the American people and who openly confessed to Playboy in his most lustful fantasies, lied, hiding his plans to release the hostages by force in Iran. Analysts specializing in military deceptions have repeatedly tried to identify those politicians who are more inclined or able to lie. It is believed that they mostly originate from cultures where they are deceived by deception ^[225] , but the evidence that such cultures really exist is too weak ^[226] .
There is also an assumption that leaders most prone to lies are found in countries where heads of state play a significant role in military matters (especially dictatorial regimes) ^[227] . However, the attempt to discover this type of cheat leaders on historical material was not crowned with success, but I can’t judge why, since I don’t have access to the results of these studies ^[228] .
There is also no serious evidence in favor of the fact that political leaders prone to lies and indeed the most experienced and skilled people in this business, even more experienced than, say, businessmen. If this were the case, international frauds would be hardly possible at all, and the verifiers would rather have to switch to the identification of exceptions, that is, leaders who do not possess special abilities in the field of lies.
Now let's consider the reverse side of the coin: what are the abilities of heads of state in the field of lie detection? Are they more capable than others or not? Research suggests that some people have a pronounced ability to detect lies, but that this does not correlate with their ability to lie ^[229] .
Unfortunately, such studies are mostly conducted among college students, and no one has yet been involved in the leaders of any organizations. If testing such people shows that some of them are also experienced verifiers, the question will arise whether they can be identified without resorting to testing. And if it is possible to identify them on the basis of only that information which is generally available regarding political leaders, then any leader who faced a lie could always more or less accurately assess how his opponent is able to detect information leaks and signs of deception.
Gros, a well-known political scientist, argues with me in this respect; he argues that heads of state, as a rule, are weak verifiers, much less experienced than their diplomatic assistants, and are ill able to assess the nature and veracity of opponents. “Heads of state and foreign ministers often lack the most primitive ability to communicate, bargain, or catch the information they need at least to competently evaluate their opponents” ^[230] . Jervis agrees with him, noting that sometimes heads of state can overestimate their abilities to detect lies, especially if “their way to power was partially based on a certain ability to evaluate others” ^[231] . But even if the leader rightly considers himself an outstanding verifier, then he may fail, faced with the lies of a person of another culture and speaking a different language.
I believe that Chamberlain was indeed a voluntary sacrifice because of his desire to avoid war at all costs and therefore, desperately wanting to believe Hitler, overestimated his possibilities of penetrating the true essence of the German leader. Still, Chamberlain was far from being a fool; and he was aware of the possibility of a lie on the part of the enemy, but he had too strong a motive to believe, because in the absence of such faith, war was already completely inevitable. Gros believes that such mistakes of the leaders of the countries and an erroneous belief in their own verification capabilities are quite common. In my words, this happens especially when the stakes are very high. It is in anticipation of the enormous damage that the head of state is especially vulnerable in order to turn into a voluntary victim of deception.
Consider another example of such a voluntary sacrifice. And in order to reinforce the impression, of all the examples cited by Groß, I chose Chamberlain's opponent, Winston Churchill. The latter recalls the fact that Stalin "uttered the word" Russia "no less often than the" Soviet Union ", and occasionally commemorated God" ^[232] , which led Churchill to guess, but did the Soviet leader retain some religious beliefs? ^[233]
Another time, having just returned from the Yalta Conference in 1945, Churchill defended his faith in Stalin in such a way: “I feel that their word is strong. I do not know of another government that would keep its promises, even to the detriment of itself, except for the Russian ” ^[234] . One of Churchill's biographers said about him: “... even knowing the whole past of Stalin, Winston was ready to believe in his intentions, and give the advantage of remaining in doubt to the Russian. It was difficult for him to disbelieve the high honesty of the highest officials of the state with whom he dealt ” ^[235] . But Stalin didn’t respond to such respect. Milovan Djilas quotes the words of Stalin, spoken in 1944: “Maybe you think that being allies of England ... we forgot who is who? England only thinks of how to inflate her allies, and Churchill, if you have not seen him, is such a type that will pull a penny straight out of your pocket ... ” ^[236] . So Churchill’s desire to defeat Hitler and the need for Stalin’s help would most likely have made the British Premier a voluntary victim of Stalin’s machinations.
At first, I intended to give fewer examples of the lies of statesmen, but then I changed this intention not because politics is the most promising area for detecting behavioral signs of deception, but because it is most dangerous, because mistakes are too expensive. But for the time being we can only say the following, as in the case of criminal suspects, to cancel the desire to detect fraud on behavioral grounds among politicians there are no reasons. And this process cannot be stopped, for the desire to receive such information on the basis of behavior is inherent in the very nature of man.And, as I have already said with regard to criminal investigations, it will still be safer if the participants in political negotiations and their advisers begin to draw their conclusions more consciously, and not on the basis of mere intuition or a kind of intuition.
But even if it were possible to cancel the interpretation of behavioral signs of fraud in international meetings, it would hardly be desirable. History shows us examples of very recent monstrous international frauds; and who would not want his country to be safe from such lies? The only problem is to do it without increasing the risk of mistakes. And I am very afraid that even the excessive confidence of Chamberlain and Churchill in their verification capabilities fade in comparison with the arrogance of the current behavioral scientist, who wants to make the purpose of his life catching foreign leaders in a lie.
I have already tried to appeal, albeit indirectly, to those American experts who are engaged in behavioral signs of deception, so that they realize the complexity of their task and set up their clients in a more skeptical way. My appeal was indirect only because such specialists (if they really exist) work in complete secrecy ^[237] , as well as those who conduct classified studies to catch industrial magnates and heads of state in a lie. One can only hope that these anonymous surveys are conducted very carefully, and those who pay for them are very demanding and critical about the application of the results obtained.
I hope that they will understand me correctly: I do not mind such studies being conducted, and even I suppose that they are necessary, and I understand why any country has to keep them secret. And although it seems to me that attempts to identify the bad and good verifiers, as well as the strong and weak liars, among the people who have become the arbiters of the states, are practically useless, they still need to be continued. Similarly, I believe that the study of situations resembling meetings and negotiations during crises, when participants are highly experienced and belong to different nationalities, as well as the study of artificial situations with very high stakes (not routine laboratory experiments with college volunteers!) will give. But to continue this work is still necessary, declassifying and widely publishing the results of research.
I hope that I was quite able to show in this chapter that the success or failures of the deceiver are in no way dependent on the area in which he works. Far from all marital lies fail and not all businessmen, politicians and criminals succeed in it. Failure and success depend on the characteristics of the lie itself, on the liar and the verifier. Of course, at the international level, everything is much more complicated than between parents and children, but every parents nevertheless know how difficult it is to avoid mistakes in communication with their own child.
In tab.4 “Full list of questions of the verifier” contains a questionnaire consisting of 38 questions. Almost half of them (18) help to determine whether the one who is lying is going to hide or distort emotions, whether he lies about feelings and what feelings he experiences with this lie.
Of course, using this questionnaire does not always help to provide an accurate estimate. It is possible to get answers not to all questions or answers may be confused. Someone may consider this a deed easy, and someone, on the contrary, difficult, but in any case it is useful to know the following: the assessment may be wrong, even if there is everything to avoid mistakes; sometimes liars can be issued not by their behavior, but by third parties; sometimes you can not accidentally notice the blatant signs of deception. The art of detecting lies interests not only the verifiers, but liars as well, but to whom this knowledge helps more — the verifier or the liar — we will discuss in the following chapters.