Lecture
Famous scientific and philosophical concepts of consciousness agree on its informational nature: “consciousness is information,” “any cognitive act is an information processing process (Dubrovsky, DI,“ Information, consciousness, brain, ”1980; Kochergin, AN” Information and spheres of its manifestation, "2008.)". This is consistent with the views of the author. Whether these ideas bring us closer to understanding the nature of consciousness is hard to say, because methodologically, they mainly serve to indirectly explain events and phenomena peculiar to and associated with consciousness, but not for a systematic understanding of consciousness itself. On the other hand, consciousness cannot be unambiguously attributed either to the thing or to the essence in philosophical understanding, as a result it may turn out that theories oriented, as a rule, to things and essences, simply “beat past the target”. Is not this the reason for the attitude of many philosophers to consciousness as a "paradox, to which it is impossible to get used" (MK Mamardashvili).
We do not revise such theories, but only try to intuitively invade a paradox called consciousness. Most likely, we are driven by an intuitive idea of the ability to understand the paradox by paradoxical methods (wedge - wedge). Confidence in intuition is an important methodological aspect of the phenomenology of the German philosopher E. Husserl (E. Husserl "Method of clarification" // Modern philosophy of science. Reader, 1994; "Philosophy as a strict science", 1994. Phenomenology - a philosophical doctrine, according to which consciousness and spirit have their own meaning independent of reality, and real objects manifest themselves in the form of symbolic phenomena. For the first time, phenomenology was used in the works of Kant and Hegel, and Husserl made the greatest contribution to its development.), why shouldn't we vat this principle?
Understanding is impossible without a creative attitude towards him as a phenomenon that is comprehended in sensory experience, in contrast to intelligible entities and things. Intuition is one of the most important components of sensory experience, and phenomenology is fundamentally significant, for "there is no science in its rears to which it could do any work" (E. Husserl). Husserl's confidence in the adequacy of intuition is based on a lack of confidence in the adequacy of the scientific method. Following Husserl, the Spanish philosopher H. Ortega y Gasset, welcoming the revival in twentieth-century mathematics. half-forgotten geometrical intuition, believed that any scientific knowledge is approximate, while a priori intuitive "is accurate and reliable once and for all."
Husserl takes it for granted that intuitionism should not degenerate into mysticism, but clarify the meanings in a situation where, in the face of expansion of science, which has enriched us not with understanding the world, but with its utility, the mind "sees its inherent goal, namely, understanding the world, insight into the truth, increasingly moving away from it. " Husserl makes a distinction between the natural science of consciousness and the phenomenology of consciousness, between experimental psychology and genuine psychology (by analogy with the difference between social statistics and genuine social science). Phenomenology, according to Husserl, does what "no experiment can do - an analysis of consciousness itself"; "everything that reveals itself through intuition must be accepted as it reveals itself, and within the limits in which it reveals itself."
For a practical analysis of consciousness, which we will do below, it is important not to forget that consciousness, giving meaning to the world, on the one hand, reveals (discovers) this meaning as existing outside consciousness, on the other hand, creates itself (introduces) meaning in the cognizable world.
The analysis of consciousness depends on a priori assumptions about its substantial character, namely, monistic (material OR ideally) or dually (material AND ideally) consciousness. Although a priori there are no sufficient grounds to postulate this or that substantial presupposition, the author is more inclined to a monistic premise, realizing (or rather, “unconscious”) that substantively the world is still one, and consciousness is more ideal than material. Let's be fair - there is an opposite point of view (See, for example, D. Armstrong's work “The Materialistic Theory of Consciousness” // Analytical Philosophy (selected texts), 1993. We believe that with any thesis the antithesis immediately appears in philosophy: "When we learned that good is good, evil also appeared" (Lao Tse).).
The analysis will be carried out by the method of reduction, which consists in the transition from a complex phenomenon of consciousness to more simple phenomena dependent on it up to the so-called. stop phenomenon The latter stops the reduction on the phenomenon, the further simplification of which leads to a phenomenon that does not depend on consciousness. This means that, by reducing the consciousness down the hierarchy of the phenomena included in it, we have no right to descend to levels that are not inherent in conscious activity. For example, psychophysically reducing the subjective consciousness to the quantum bases of matter or space, unless we clarify the meaning of consciousness? The situation is similar with the psychological reduction to the "primary spirit". The reduction of consciousness, undertaken by G. Hegel in his "Phenomenology of the Spirit", dealt mainly with the transcendental phenomenon of objective consciousness as a universal of being, as a universal, rather than an individual phenomenon. Accordingly, Hegel was entitled to transcendentally reduce consciousness through the spirit to Absolute Knowledge (Recall that knowledge is the highest form of information.) Of a religious nature, but with respect to the subjective individual consciousness, we are not entitled to do so.
Considering that the reduction of the observed subjective consciousness is carried out by another subjective consciousness (observant) removed from it, which in phenomenological reduction must be purely natural from natural and natural-scientific judgments, we will find ourselves in exceptional difficulty, for the observer, i.e. our consciousness, purified from prejudice, will be more likely empty (tabula rasa) than virgin. Any observation is biased; solving the problem, we expect a definite answer. In addition, consciousness is constantly working with information, even in a dream. Moreover, would such a reduction not be a self-reduction, an observation by self-observation, a detachment of self-detachment?
So, a priori doubting, yet "enter into a puddle," in order to measure its depth. Let's start with the psychophysical branch of reduction.
What is consciousness, what is its meaning? In the substance of the brain? Does consciousness have a mass of rest, length, structure, like any substance? Not. Even D. Armstrong in his materialistic theory of consciousness does not risk identifying consciousness and substance.
Is consciousness a property of the substance of the brain, like its density, color, shape, plasticity, etc.? If this were so, consciousness would always be present in the substance of the brain, because the properties of the substance are related to its structure. Consciousness is present "sporadically" depending on the age of the subject, his psycho-physiological state, the presence of the learning environment.
Perhaps consciousness is a function of the substance of the brain, similar to physiological secretion, the secret of some kind of "gland"? Any physiological function of the brain can be fixed instrumentally at the electrochemical level. Consciousness is not physiologically fixed in experience, it is impossible to isolate it according to experienced physiological data. Therefore, consciousness is not the substance of the brain, not its property, not its function. But Armstrong identifies mental phenomena with the physicochemical states of the central nervous system (CNS), giving causal (causal) relations of consciousness with the central nervous system, where the central nervous system is the cause, and consciousness is the effect. In other words, Armstrong consciousness is brain function. D. Davidson does not agree with him, proving after Plato's Socrates that the mental does not boil down to the physical.
But our brain is the immediate habitat of our consciousness, its physical and material base. It is undoubted, as there is no doubt that the violin, the bow and the air mass around them are the habitat and the physical and material base of music. However, music is not the substance of the violin, the bow and the air, not their property and not their function. Of course, the physical condition of the violin and the bow, coupled with the acoustics of the hall, have a significant impact on the sound quality. But sound and music are as different as color and beauty, like text on paper and thought in consciousness. Similarly, the physico-chemical state of the brain and body, their age affect the quality of active consciousness (intensity, speed, duration, depth of associations and memories, etc.). But neither physics, nor chemistry, nor biology have anything to do with the "music, beauty and thought" of consciousness. In turn, does the work of consciousness affect the substance of the brain? It influences, and significantly, how the violinist’s conscious activity affects the state of his instrument. Working consciousness requires valuable (high) forms of energy (as an activity, but not a measure (Recall that "energy" among the ancient Greeks meant "action, activity", only thousands of years later energy became a measure, that is, a number.)) - chemical , mechanical, electrical, which, having fulfilled their function, are dispersed in the form of heat - the lowest in value of the energy form. Then is not consciousness an energy (mental energy) - activity, work? If this were so, then we would have to identify music with the work spent on its extraction, including the work of the psyche of the musician. But such work and music are clearly not correlates. Similarly, the work of consciousness and consciousness itself are not correlates. The brain and the body, on the one hand, consciousness, on the other, are interconnected, not by causal, but by correlation.
So, the brain, together with its energy, is not the source and not the cause, but only the carrier, the tool of natural consciousness, the computer as the carrier, the tool of artificial intelligence (for now let's refrain from the concept of "artificial consciousness"). The immediate meaning, the basis of artificial intelligence, is made up of knowledge bases and software-hardware models of metaprocedures for solving creative problems by humans. By analogy, the immediate meaning of natural intelligence - the basis of consciousness - in the accumulated knowledge base (thesaurus (Lat. Thesaurus - treasure, treasure.)) Brain memory and acquired programs (metaprocedures) of creative management of the thesaurus for solving intellectual and moral problems. Given that the thesaurus and metaprocedures are not active separately, let's call the basis of consciousness active knowledge. Accordingly, the first stage of the psychophysical reduction of consciousness ends with the phenomenon of active knowledge .
Are we reducing the phenomenon of active knowledge? Yes, because knowledge is the highest, most valuable form of information acquired as a result of the search and selection of valuable (useful) information as one of the stages of the information activity of a conscious subject. Consequently, active knowledge is reduced to the phenomenon of valuable information. And not all valuable information is included in the knowledge. Otherwise, many conditioned reflexes, valuable for vital activity, would become conscious acts. But this does not happen - the control of conditioned reflexes is delegated by the brain to the subconscious and the peripheral nervous system, and only occasionally can we consciously control them (for example, in pathologies, in extreme circumstances, with special training). Normal consciousness controls not reflexes, but thoughts and actions, controls them on the basis of useful knowledge: “consciousness” is the act of working with knowledge.
Valuable information is reduced simply to information. The information phenomenon has a borderline status, because it is inherent not only immanently to consciousness, but also to external objects that are in consciousness of informational-metabolic relations (the subject (his body) is a carrier of consciousness also external to consciousness. These relations are maintained through external information transmitted via the communication channel from the source to the consumer of information. But in order to transfer something (give), you need to have it. The source of information contains it in some internal form that is partially replicated to the external in the inf metabolism, which are reduced to mapping (from the outside) or self-mapping (from the inside) in the thesaurus, which stores the mapping of the environment and the self-mapping of the system. Does this mean that information as a whole is the same stop phenomenon? subjective consciousness deals only with external information, embodied in the so-called mental forms as manifestations of internal information, which, in turn, is accessible to consciousness only psychologically (psychological reduction "Information and Consciousness"). Therefore, strictly speaking, valuable information is psychophysically reduced to the external information of the subject, obtained from its habitat and from its own ego through the corresponding information processes.
A message is a finite set of characters (codes) of a certain semiotic system (language), combined syntactically, semantically and pragmatically based on the corresponding language (code) conventions (agreements). If you do not know the plans of values and the use of codes included in the message, then is there any point in knowing one syntax - the plan of expression? What gives us the syntax of "shkol'ye Shorkov", which "were fingered by waving" by L. Carroll (translated by S. Marshak)? The syntax of the message is an external plan, an expressive means of meaning. The same syntax can correspond to different semantics and pragmatics, and vice versa, the same semantics and / or pragmatics can be expressed by different syntax. Consequently, the message itself, in its perceived syntactic form, is not meaningful and useful. The latter are deeper - in the semantic and pragmatic plans of the meaning and use of the message.
Analyzing the syntax of a message, consciousness extracts from it the subjective sense (concept) and benefit (other Greek pragma), which constitute the subject for the preliminary selection of external information. At the same time, the analysis of the syntax and the allocation of the meaning of the message precede the primary processing of the information contained in the message. In turn, the usefulness of the message is highlighted later - at the stage of selecting valuable information. Thus, external information is perceived by the mind through syntax, concepts, and the use of messages.
In the physical world, the message is carried by the material and energy signal. The signal processing is carried out by the physical elements of the communication channel (transmitter, communication line, receiver) irrespective of consciousness. Thus, in our understanding, the reduction stop-phenomenon of consciousness could accept a message, for apperception as a conscious meta-procedure for perceiving messages is a mental act. However, let us not forget that the next stage of phenomenological reduction leads us to the phenomenon associated with the original reduced phenomenon - consciousness - only so far as the next stage of reduction does not lead us out of the field of consciousness. The message as such plays the role of a "trustee", notifying the consciousness of the need to perceive the "principal" - information of the message in the form of its syntax, meaning and benefit. And this is external information in a broad sense. Therefore, the message cannot be taken as a stop phenomenon; We take external information as a stop-phenomenon of psychophysical reduction.
All stages of the done reduction are shown in Fig. 4.1. They coincide with the stages (according to Hegel - the figures) of the Hegelian phenomenology of consciousness. These figures are sensual authenticity (we have external information), perception (valuable information), reason (active knowledge).
As for the other stages (figures) of Hegel's reduction of consciousness (there are quite a lot of them), they go beyond the psychophysical aspect and belong to the substantial aspects of psychology. We reconsider the mind according to the psychological branch.
First of all, we will face the problem of relations of conscious and unconscious, supraconscious and subconscious, associative memory and thesaurus, ego and superego, libido, eros and thanatos, instincts and spirit, external and internal forms of information. It is apparently not possible to consistently (linearly) reduce these phenomena from one another, as we did above, because their interrelations are not unidirectional. The topology of the functional connections of psychological structures, as a rule, is cellular-hierarchical with circular one-way or two-way lists, whose elements are linked by addresses — by type of addressing in dynamic lists, programmatically organized in the computer’s memory. In addition, different psychological structures in varying degrees are involved in the normal functioning of consciousness.Life confronts us with the "abnormalities" of the psyche when it comes to the consciousness of the geniuses of science and art, or objects that are interesting for parapsychology. For now, refrain from stepping onto this untrodden path that awaits its pioneering researchers.
Let us call the totality of psychological phenomena involved in the work of consciousness, the well-known term “psyche” and try to re-establish the psyche phenomenon, but not in the Hegelian sense, but in the Husserlian understanding, i.e. "back to things". To do this, we conduct a mental experiment. From the moment of birth, we completely isolate the hypothetical carrier of the psyche from the environment and estimate its psyche somewhere in adulthood. Obviously, apart from the hereditary emotions and unconditioned reflexes inherent in any bioorganism, this psyche does not produce anything, and, above all, it does not produce consciousness and "spirit." It is also obvious that it is worthwhile for us to place the subject from the moment of birth in a specific environment, for example, in a pack of wolves, as we obtain the psyche (psyche) of Mowgli. What has changed in the second case regarding the first? Added importantand perhaps the most important act is the knowledge of the environment and its place in it (self-knowledge) as a subconscious intention of the instinct of self-preservation (survival). Psychologically, cognition (along with self-knowledge) is a mental act (metaprocedure) that accompanies the psychophysical process of creating active knowledge. Cognition, in turn, is consistently reduced to psychological acts that accompany the psychophysical acts of the reduction of active knowledge, and just like the procedural phenomenon of cognition, these psychological acts are called in the activity form: search, selection, classification, decoding, identification. Thus, consciousness through psyche is reduced to procedural mental phenomena accompanying psychophysical phenomena of intellectual reduction. Consequently,The stop-phenomenon of the psychological variant of the phenomenological reduction of consciousness is a meta-procedure for processing external information.
At the same time, psychological phenomena are not self-sufficient, i.e. psychophysics of consciousness is a stimulus, psychology is a reaction, but together they are a single whole. Therefore, we believe that the phenomenological reduction of consciousness should be carried out simultaneously and simultaneously along two branches, where each psychophysical stage will have its own psychological stage of reduction (Fig. 4.2.).
According to the foregoing, phenomenological reduction is the path of infinite regress of ontological questions like “what is this?”, “Why is it?”. The reduction of consciousness carried out as an example is anthropic, therefore it does not pretend to generalize, all the more so since we do not have sufficient reasons to single out consciousness as the absolute prerogative of man. Perhaps representatives of the fauna and flora and even minerals have their own special consciousness. If it is, then so far it is beyond our comprehension - that’s all that we now have the right to say.
The depth of clarification of the phenomenon of consciousness in the future is difficult to predict. But this is just the most interesting! Husserl also believed that the world of phenomena is boundless not only in breadth, but also in depth.
Although the reduction was aimed at the transcendental object - "pure consciousness", it was carried out using rational ideas and beliefs of science, as well as "common sense". In other words, we were not able to fully implement the installations canonized by Husserl on a purely intuitive, delineated from science reduction. Moreover, we had no right to describe and explain it, because true intuition can only be experienced . According to phenomenology, consciousness is a stream of experiences. Any external verbality "extinguishes the lantern" of intuition, therefore, the phenomenological reduction in its classical sense.
There is clearly a contradiction with science. For Descartes, one of the pioneers of rational science, intuition was the concept of a clear and attentive mind, so simple and distinct that it left no doubt that we are thinking (Descartes R. "Selected Works", 1950.). It is possible that to realize consciousness as an incomprehensible paradox, is too difficult a task, and mastering the technique of phenomenological reduction based on pure intuitivism, being within the framework of a clear consciousness, is impossible in principle. In this case, phenomenological laboratories should exist in the interests of phenomenological researchers, where the intuition of a researcher would be cleared of the "noise" of natural science, sanity, and language for the unclouded clarification of phenomena. It will require, most likely, some meditation techniques,which gave reason for the positivist R. Carnap to regard phenomenology as "the path to the mystic." Does it not turn out that within the framework of the phenomenological approach we will verify the conscious demon (over) the conscious one, understanding, however, that all of them are interconnected and therefore a pure, independent of consciousness reduction is impossible.
In this connection, the issue of the uniqueness of the phenomenological reduction procedures remains controversial. Perhaps, in this regard, traditional methods of logical positivism and linguistic philosophy, psycho-semantic methods used by psychologists and sociologists (Osgood semantic differential, Lazarsfeld latent-structural analysis, factor analysis, content analysis, etc.) have not exhausted their possibilities. Finally, let us pay attention to the inconclusiveness of any phenomenological reduction, i.e. inconclusive clarification of the meaning of phenomena.
Nevertheless, from the analysis performed it follows: the subjective consciousness is reduced to the phenomena of information nature. Therefore, we associate consciousness with an ideally-informational substance .
Мы попытались проанализировать сознание, разложив его на феномены-структуры и феномены-акты информационного содержания. Но цельное, нередуцированное сознание цементируется и существует благодаря присущим ему синтезирующим механизмам и структурам. Такие механизмы и структуры известны (Блум Ф., Лейзерсон А., Хофстедтер Л. "Мозг, разум и поведение", 1988; Дубровский Д.И. "Управление, информация, интеллект", 1976.) . Это, прежде всего, интеллект (Лат. intellego – замечать, понимать, подразумевать; intellectus – разумение, познание.) и память – информационные основания цельного сознания, его базис. Память имеет дело, в основном, с психофизическими феноменами-структурами, а интеллект преимущественно с психологическими феноменами-актами. Но, повторяем, интеллект, память и прочие не совсем изученные феномены сознания действуют всегда совместно: "Все сливается в едином психическом акте – и разновидности памяти, и восприятие, и мышление, и ваши навыки, и ваши вкусы, пристрастия и "установки" – весь комплекс черт вашей личности (Ломов Б.Ф. "Человек и автоматы", 1984.)" .
Traditionally, natural intelligence is attributed only to humans. But this can be done only with certain caution, if we reckon with the research of ethologists and zoopsychologists. The complex behavior of animals, birds, reptiles, fish, and insects cannot be explained solely by reflexes.
Signs of natural intelligence, we believe, are as follows:
Согласимся, что в той или иной мере эти признаки проявляются в поведении (и общении) не только человека – обратим внимание хотя бы на домашних животных, ворон, крыс, пчел и т.д. С большой вероятностью можно считать, что интеллект – общее свойство биологических систем. У каждой такой системы интеллект присутствует в большей или меньшей степени в зависимости от степени развития того органа, который мы называем мозгом. Если в биологических системах естественный интеллект – это великий дар генетики и жизни, то искусственный интеллект машин в настоящее время имеет право на существование лишь постольку, поскольку естественный интеллект людей делегировал машинам свои алгоритмы. Искусственный интеллект упомянут здесь не случайно. Познавая имеющиеся наработки искусственного интеллекта, мы можем лучше понять естественный интеллект. Ведь естественный, первоприродный интеллект недопустимо "препарировать" так, как это позволительно с искусственным интеллектом.
The fundamentally important differences between the two known types of intelligence:
If the brain genetically appeared in the biosystem as a potential carrier of its thesaurus and intelligence, then in the process of informational metabolism the self-learning brain works like any amplifier - increases the effect from input to output (in our case we should talk about quantitative and qualitative effect). The amount of information obtained from genes during self-study is usually supplemented by a much larger amount of information from the environment. An increased quantity is usually transformed into an improved quality — a progressive jump in intelligence occurs, which is amplified in comparison with the genetically inherited level (the gain factor is greater than one). If the medium is not informative, the intelligence gain is close to unity, i.e. the output of the amplifier is approximately equal to the intelligent input. Intellect in this case is determined only by the gene set of the system. Thus, in biology, there is a multiply approved mechanism for enhancing intelligence, when one natural regulator (genome) creates another natural regulator (brain) capable of learning in the environment and, as a result, enhancing its intelligence relative to the original state, which is determined by the genome.
Example 1. If a person as a natural regulator creates a computer as an artificial regulator, lays his knowledge and self-study program into it, there is no reason to assert that a computer will not be able to strengthen its original “intellect” to a level comparable to that of its genetic creator - a person - or even exceeding the level of human intelligence. The only question is the quality of the self-study program and the informativeness of the learning environment. There are no principal theoretical limitations, with the exception of the possible finite-dimensionality of the space-time parameters of the material systems of artificial intelligence. In this regard, the modern ability of computer systems of artificial intelligence for self-learning is certainly not the limit.
Example 2. The list of operations required in the implementation of self-learning algorithms includes instructions that can be programmed, namely: remember (in programming - write to a file, a dynamic list, an array of variables, terms, frames, etc.), select data (read from file, cluster, set, list, array, one variable), conditional transition (choice algorithm "if ... then ... otherwise .."), forget (erase file, list, etc.), establish similarities (compare), repeat stimulus (repetition algorithm - cycle (Reitman U. "Cognition and thinking", 1 968.)).
Example 3. The modern information expert system (ES), which helps a person with decision-making tips, supports, among others, the function of explaining (transparency) of tips that the EC produces under conditions of a priori uncertainty, including uncertainty, due to incomplete and inaccurate information. Depending on the level of uncertainty, categorical or soft tips and heuristic estimates are developed, differing in the degree of confidence. For this, the ES uses the language of the councils , which operates with the knowledge base and the purpose of the decision. Accordingly, in the language of the councils, so-called target programming is used, based on the procedures “grab”, “free”, “get rid”, “move”, “release”, etc.
The examples given (plus proofs of theorems, intellectual games, robots, etc.) can create a false impression about the intelligence of artificial intelligence. But we repeat: such a "mind" is limited only by logic, because even the name of one of the popular target programming languages "Prolog" means "programming in logic". In its current form, artificial intelligence is applicable in logical inference algorithms, and no more. We would be good (with our mind) if we used only logic - without love, compassion, faith, hope, inspiration, joy, grief - in general, without feelings!
The passionlessness of machine intelligence, as well as the human intellect "mechanized" by logic and reason, is dangerous. For human consciousness and the mind of one reason it is obviously not enough and far from natural intelligence, in particular, if we talk about creativity and a sense of humor, without which it is not proper to speak about intelligence. Natural intelligence backs up our consciousness not only with the cold logic of reason, but also with hot passions of feeling. Only a combination of reason and feeling makes our consciousness truly human. From the standpoint of neurophysiology and cybernetics, this means the unification in the consciousness of information flows from the left (logical-rational) and right (figurative-emotional) hemispheres of the brain.
In computer science and cybernetics, memory refers to the pragmatic "ability to preserve the results of previous actions for future use" (N. Wiener). Another point of view: “the concept of memory is much deeper: it is closely connected with the problem of time and with the phenomenon of irreversibility of processes in our world” (NN Moiseev). In other words, the memory according to Moses is an attribute of nature, which is consistent with our concept of memory (see the topics “The Concept of Information as a Philosophical Problem”, “Physics of Information”). Understood in such a broad sense, memory can be equally ascribed to a stone with traces of a glacier or dinosaur, the gene set of plants and animals, the brain and computer storage devices, systems adaptation processes, and transients in electrical circuits. But all these are different types of memory, not all of them can participate in the work of consciousness. So, in relation to the physical systems of inanimate nature, the concept of memory without special reservations is just as controversial as the concept of external information - here you can do without these concepts, using physical and chemical laws. Genetic memory arose, most likely, with the advent of biological systems, the life of which, in contrast to the almost "immortal" physical systems, was finite.
For the preservation and development of life, an urgent need was for the storage and transmission of hereditary information. And it was created (by whom / by what? - you can only assume) in the form of the genetic code and the mechanism of its inheritance, including through memory. A striking invention!
Memory is often identified with a thesaurus in which knowledge is stored. But the thesaurus is not identical to memory. Memory is a broader concept that includes, in addition to the thesaurus as a knowledge base, other “bases”.
Pay attention to the procedural nature of the thesaurus, as well as the memory as a whole. After all, the accumulated (stored) knowledge is not a museum exhibit or things in stock. Knowledge is an active thinking process of moving, remembering, forgetting, searching, checking, matching, changing is a process accompanying the process of cognition. Both processes are rigidly (deterministic) interrelated and do not cease even with the seeming achievement of knowledge. You can consider them as a single process under the generally accepted name "knowledge". The input data (external information) is involved in this process, from which valuable information is extracted and, finally, the knowledge put into the thesaurus. The thesaurus stores structural and functional images of the owner-system, a priori images of the environment and those caused by external influences. In other words, the thesaurus contains knowledge and information models of the system owner (as its self-reflection) and environment (as a reflection of the current situation). The content of the thesaurus is useful inside information that determines the ability of the system to recognize the situation and control itself. The ratio of thesaurus and the brain is similar to the ratio of energy and power installations (Power installation - the material carrier of energy resources is similar to the brain - the material carrier of the thesaurus.).
It is known that a normal brain stores in memory much more information than its owner needs. Man consciously uses only a few percent of his long-term memory. According to the experience of teaching, the material is consciously absorbed by the students with no more than half of the traditional methods of teaching. The main share of information is perceived by us unconsciously, and in order to use it, we need an appropriate subprogram within the framework of the self-study program. In the self-study program of the brain, apparently, such a subroutine (if it exists) is not effective enough, because traces of memory (engrams) are scattered throughout the brain, not just the cortical tissue, and are duplicated many times, which may create difficulties for the neural network . As a result, the cumulative efficiency of the natural self-study program is unacceptably low in order to be considered qualitative, but the mind has to put up with the situation: “Everyone complains about their memory, but no one complains about their mind” (F. de La Rochefoucauld).
The memory stores the perceived (consciously or unconsciously) information. Conscious perception of new information in the process of self-learning requires high energy costs and is accompanied by significant information dissipation (scattering). With such self-learning, the energy limit comes fairly quickly, the intelligence gain is relatively low. In turn, the unconscious perception of information requires significantly less energy costs, because the unconscious is a predominantly psychological category, field, from the field of the "subtle information world". If we learn to make full use of unconscious data and knowledge of the information field nature, the effectiveness of self-learning, as we see it, can increase substantially, since in this case, the intelligence gain must exceed the values that are potentially achievable with traditional information and energy self-learning.
The given examples once again testify in favor of the integral study of the processes of self-organization and self-learning of the brain. The integrity of the cumulative process should be understood not in the sense of “joining” in time of two particular independent subprocesses, but as their interpenetration (“diffusion”), mutual influence, mutual stimulation, which does not create an internal contradiction. Self-organization and self-learning flow against each other, intensifying the informational exchange of consciousness with the environment and the work of memory.
Genetic memory has a very remote relationship to the self-learning of the brain, about the same as the mechanism of inheritance of property to the ability to create and increase the latter with their own hands. Mr. Simon remarked: "... a person considered as a behavioral system is very simple. The apparent complexity of his behavior in time basically reflects the complexity of his environment"; "... to predict this behavior, we need only the most approximate knowledge of the information processing system by man (Simon G." The Science of Artificial ", 1972.)". You can not agree with the opinion of a well-known expert in the field of artificial intelligence, but "there is something in it." In any case, even the highest evolutionary forms in the form of a thesaurus, knowledge, mind, consciousness, thinking, creativity appeared, of course, not so much from genetic knowledge, but as a result of long processes of self-organization and self-study, which are unthinkable outside the environment and directly or indirectly associated with this medium. And even the most sophisticated forms of human behavior, due to his consciousness and thinking, are rooted in the present or past interaction with the environment in which man developed as a highly organized biological system. The hidden simplicity of systems in the understanding of Simon is adjacent to the complexity of the environment, causing the external complexity of the behavior of systems. Thus, the complexity of the ant's path is explained, rather, not by the complexity of its thinking, but by the complexity of the relief it overcomes. Unlike behaviorists (Behaviorism (from English behavior - behavior) is a psychological doctrine that considers behavior to be the subject of psychology), Simon does not lock on observable behavioral acts, but also refers to unobserved consciousness, emphasizing that our knowledge and behavior "speak only about what people have learned, developing in a particular social environment. "
Self-study is usually associated with a higher, non-genetic form of memory, which, in turn, is usually divided into procedural (activity) and declarative (intellectual). Procedural memory contributes to the acquisition of skills, abilities and knowledge of how to act in similar situations. Declarative memory allows you to formulate concepts and judgments, assess past experience and current situation, predict the situation and make decisions. Genetic and non-genetic forms of memory are interrelated. Non-genetic memory arose from genetic memory as a need for self-organization of biological systems. Just hatched ducklings can swim, like puppies of most breeds, a butterfly (just from a pupa) flies, so much so that the trajectory of its flight is optimal from the point of view of protection against possible enemies, cats find out the relationship between themselves and with cats, nowhere learning the language and rules of feline etiquette, and everyone from birth is able to open his mouth, demanding bread and circuses (is it not from here that the eternal "Give!", adherents of which, apparently, have not advanced further than genetic memory in their development?). But at a certain stage of self-organization of biological systems, genetic memory was not enough for the survival and development of populations. There was a procedural, and then a declarative form of memory (The following is a declarative memory, many features of which are inherent in more simple procedural memory.).
It is believed that declarative memory functions according to an associative algorithm and has a honeycomb hierarchical list structure (Bloom F., Leiserson A., Hofstedter L. "Brain, mind and behavior", 1988.). The associativity of the memory is based on the cellular communication of representations, which, of course, can be much more complicated than that of the Chekhovian character from the Horse of the Family Name. Thus, the concept of "function" may be associated with completely different ideas in mathematics, programming, physiology, business, politics. Even in one area of knowledge, this concept can cause different associations. In programming, there are functions standard and user, external and internal, built-in and library, with and without parameters, recursive and simple, etc. Depending on the context of the concept, the inclusiveness of the descriptor changes as a key mental representation responsible in the declarative memory for this concept, in one or another association, and the concept is used differently by different memory areas.
Cell-hierarchical and multiply-connected structures and relationships largely explain the vitality of memory and the knowledge stored by it (by analogy with the vitality and strength of the honeycomb structure of a beehive). With the list structure of the cellular declarative memory, synaptic connections between neurons are realized, most likely, just like between subscribers in artificial telecommunications — it is targeted. In this case, the cellular principle of neuron communication successfully solves the problem of saving memory, since the same neurons can be used in different circuits of the nervous system, which allows for the realization of associative thinking. The connectedness of the network contours contributes to the duplication of ways to search for traces of memory and to restore forgotten information. The very fact of the existence of an associative memory mechanism confirms this. We also note that the development of the nervous system, on the one hand, memory and intelligence, on the other hand, is not sequential, but parallel, interdependent processes, the essence of which is still not entirely clear.Hierarchies ("mathematical trees") are implemented in the classification schemes of human knowledge in all areas of activity, without exception, be it a power structure, a classification of arthropods, or a plan of a military operation. And this is most likely not by chance. The commitment of people's consciousness to a similar classification corresponds to the internal hierarchy of memory and intelligence.
Ассоциативный алгоритм самообучения запускается дескриптором, имеющимся в информационном блоке хотя бы одного элемента структуры декларативной памяти. Далее по адресным связям между элементами воспроизводятся подструктуры, необходимые для данного конкретного акта самообучения. При этом большое значение приобретает правильная адресация подструктур. Стоит потеряться одному адресу, как иерархия и соответствующая ассоциация разрываются или искажаются, а знание становится поверхностным, неполноценным, отрывочным, поэтому реальная декларативная память имеет мощное дублирование и взаимопересечение подструктур. Достоинство адресных структур (например, ячеек оперативной памяти компьютера, динамических списков в программировании) с точки зрения самообучения – в скорости доступа к ним и простоте их редактирования (вставки, замены, удаления, дополнения, сортировки). Для этого не требуются физические перестановка и сдвиг информационных блоков памяти (как при работе с массивами), достаточно произвести переадресацию небольшого числа элементов списка, не затрагивая остальных. Энергетически переадресация ячеек памяти всегда экономнее, чем перекачка информации между ними.
Экономия памяти важна также с учетом свойственных ей ограничений. Ведь любое проявление бытия ограничено по координатам пространства-времени, и память – не исключение, она тоже имеет ограничения по объему, производительности и т.д. В частности, ограничения человеческой памяти составили важный и сложный предмет исследования психологов, нейрофизиологов, кибернетиков. Основные ограничения, выявленные ими:
Из-за этих ограничений человек, прежде чем запомнить в кратковременной памяти большой объем входной обучающей информации, пытается перекодировать ее в меньшее число блоков – примерно 7 ("телефонная память"), используя для этого связность символов, текстов и чисел, мнемонические правила, ассоциации.
Приведенными ограничениями памяти можно объяснить, почему не все обучаемые способны воспринять и усвоить даже небольшие порции информации. Основные затраты времени обучаемого уходят на освобождение места в кратковременной памяти для вновь поступающих данных (извне и из долговременной памяти), а также для хранения промежуточных результатов мышления. Человек вынужден находить место для текущих данных путем освобождения занятых ячеек кратковременной памяти с пересылкой содержания последних в долговременную память (после принятия решения, что сохранить, а что забыть). А это требует значительного времени, т.к. скорость передачи между соответствующими областями мозга ограничена. Из-за приведенных ограничений люди не всегда способны выбрать правильную стратегию поиска и познания, решать комбинаторные и многофакторные задачи, адекватно реагировать на сложные ситуации в быстро изменяющейся многофакторной среде.
Таким образом, в основе многих сложностей и особенностей нашего сознания лежат, на поверку, немногочисленные и довольно простые ограничения декларативной памяти. Разница между естественной и искусственной формами памяти лишь в значениях верхних пределов пространственно-временных параметров памяти и в ее организации. Системы искусственного интеллекта с более емкой (по сравнению с человеком) оперативной и долговременной памятью, более высокой внутренней скоростью обмена данными имеют преимущество перед людьми в решении нетворческих задач, переборе вариантов решений, управлении технологическими процессами и объектами в реальном масштабе времени и др. Человек выигрывает (пока!) за счет более мощной организации своей ассоциативной памяти в решении творческих, некорректных и плохо формализуемых задач, в самообучении и принятии решений при неполных и противоречивых данных, в задачах классификации и распознавания образов. Если бы еще человек, подобно машине, не уставал физически и психологически!
Одним из первых зафиксировал возникновение феномена "массового сознания" в социуме испанский философ Х. Ортега-и-Гассет в работе "Восстание масс". У Ортеги "масса" отождествляется с толпой, представители которой социально безответственны и находят смысл существования в достижении полной идентичности с себе подобными, т.е. в слиянии с толпой, в превращении личности в "человека массы". С понятием массового сознания синонимичны понятия "социального сознания", "коллективного сознания". В данном контексте массовое сознание не есть "равнодействующая" субъективных сознаний индивидов как некий результирующий однонаправленный вектор разнонаправленных индивидуальных векторов сознания. Нет, однонаправленное массовое сознание есть самоорганизующийся менталитет толпы, аналогичный природным коллективным инстинктам популяций (косяков рыб, полчищ насекомых, птичьих стай, стад животных). Массовое сознание ищет простые и быстрые решения сложных проблем, легко подвергается манипулированию со стороны вожаков, навязывает свои псевдоценности всему социуму, преследует инакомыслящих, склонно к авторитаризму и тоталитаризму. Поэтому полагаем массовое сознание опасным – "сие не здраво", ибо the understanding of the subjective consciousness of the crowd transforms into a misunderstanding , or rather, the madness of the mass consciousness. We believe that, in addition to "mass consciousness", there are other examples of destructive self-organization of people.
В то же время на уровне информационных оснований сознания представляются продуктивными понятия "коллективная память", "коллективный тезаурус" (распределенная база знаний). Например, у людей всегда существовали и существуют сотово-иерархические и многосвязные структуры коллективной памяти и коллективных тезаурусов и отношения между ними в виде непосредственных контактов, книг, радио, TV, электронных коммуникаций, биополей, информационного поля и т.д. Интернет по праву считается распределенной базой знаний (о знании "Знание как высшая форма информации" ). Наличие коллективных знаний у представителей фауны не вызывает серьезных возражений. Существуют экспериментальные подтверждения информационного обмена между растениями; значит, у них, по-видимому, тоже есть распределенная база знаний.
Нельзя не упомянуть и концепцию К. Юнга об архетипах – носителях "коллективного бессознательного", которые согласно Юнгу питают сознание продуктами мифотворчества древних эзотерических систем.
Полагаем, именно благодаря сотово-иерархической структуре коллективная память (впрочем, и индивидуальная тоже) столь живуча, как живуча, прочна сотовая структура в пчелином улье. Отказ (уничтожение, забвение) отдельных носителей и подструктур не приводит к исчезновению знания, поддерживаемого оставшимися носителями и подструктурами. В этом мудрость самоорганизации памяти и интеллекта. Коллективная память и ее тезаурус, хранящий знание поколений, которое приумножается каждым из них, – особо ценное достояние популяции. Не беречь это достояние, не пополнять за счет коллективного самообучения, не поощрять труд его хранителей и созидателей равноценно самоубийству популяции. Не этим ли объясняется священный запрет "Не убий!", возникший на заре становления человеческого разума.
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philosophiya
Terms: philosophiya