CHAPTER 3. PHENOMENOLOGY OF BODY

3.1. The boundaries of the "I" or "probe" of consciousness

The answer to the question of what “my body” is, on the one hand, seems self-evident, since everyone can quite consistently determine what is “my” body and what it is not. But, on the other hand, in trying to do this, I immediately encounter rather complex issues. How do I determine what applies to me and what belongs to the world? I coincide with my body, but sometimes it refuses to obey me. Is my hair and nails part of my body? And the amputated hand? And the prosthetic arm? How to answer the question of N. Wiener: is the artificial hand of a mechanic trying to repair a car, part of the mechanism with which the mechanic is busy, or part of the mechanic engaged in repairing? It is difficult to give a clear answer to these questions, but the underlying subject-objective division of reality — one of the most fundamental oppositions rooted in the human mind of the new time — forms the clearest and, at first glance, a simple intuition. I can easily and simply say whether a phenomenon belongs to another or non-other, that is, in other words, it is I or not-I. Every event that happens to me, I can implicitly qualify as what happened to me or what I did . In the first case, I come across the forces of the objective world that are independent of me, in the second I am the author of my action. The boundary between these events is the boundary that separates the object from the subject.

This simple and obvious intuition immediately becomes confusing if we ask ourselves a few simple questions. What is the criterion for distinguishing these events? Is this boundary stable, what determines it and how is it set?

The ambiguity of the location of such a boundary can be demonstrated in the classical psychological phenomenon of the probe {Bor, 1971; Leontyev A.N., 1975). Its meaning lies in the fact that a person who uses a probe to sense an object paradoxically localizes his sensations not at the border of the hand and the probe (objectively separating his body and not his probe), but at the border of the probe and the object. The sensation turns out to be biased, rendered beyond the limits of the natural body into the world of external things. The probe included in the body scheme and subject to movement is taken as its continuation and is not objectified.

A.N. Leontiev astutely noted that the localization of an object in space expresses its separateness from the subject: it is the “delineation of the boundaries” of its existence independent of the subject. These boundaries are discovered as soon as the activity of the subject is forced to obey the object: “A remarkable feature of the relationship under consideration is that this boundary passes as the boundary between two physical bodies: one of them, the tip of the probe, implements the subject’s cognitive, perceptual activity , the other is the object of this activities. On the border of these two material things, the sensations that form the “fabric” of the subjective image of an object are localized: they appear as shifted to the sensory end of the probe — an artificial distant-receptor that forms the extension of the actor’s hand ” (Leontiev AN, 1975, p. 61–62).

The most important thing in this phenomenon is that the boundary of the localization of sensations (that is, the boundary between I and non-I) directly depends on the boundary of autonomy / predictability. In the case of a probe, for example, the sensation immediately shifts to the hand / probe border, if the probe begins to move not only the subject itself. Moved by another person or an obscure mechanism, the stick that I hold in my hand immediately ceases to be a probe, but becomes an object. The same thing happens if I do not know the configuration of the probe and the expected sensations do not coincide with the real ones.

The probe phenomenon allows you to demonstrate at least two points of subject-object dissociation. First, the fact

mobility of the borders of the subject, and secondly, the universal principle of objectification: the phenomenon receives its phenomenological existence insofar as it reveals its opacity and elasticity. Consciousness manifests itself only in collision with another, receiving an “objection” from it in an attempt to “absorb it” (“other” cannot be predicted, and it is the boundary of this dependence that is the boundary of subject-objective arithmetic). All that is found on one side of this boundary is I, and what lies on the other is different.

The instability of the border makes it possible to change the content of the objective world, and a special situation can be created in which a phenomenon that does not exist under normal conditions appears. Thus, in the well-known illusion of the "eyeball" (James, 1901), a non-existent real movement of the visible world is revealed. Under external simplicity, this illusion contains very unusual moments that should be considered in more detail. Clicking on the eyeball with your finger, we are convinced of the violation of the stability of the perceived object in the form of its non-existent movement. In this case, this phenomenon is of interest because it is associated not simply with the movement of the eyeball itself, but with its unusual forced character. Normally, under the influence of a bright point that reaches the periphery of the retina, the eye immediately moves onto it, and the subject immediately sees it stably localized in objective space. What the subject does not perceive at all is the displacement of this point relative to the retina at the time of the jump and the very movement of the eye. The latter are “transparent”, not objectified and do not exist for the subject precisely because they are completely “predicted” and taken into account in the act of perception. The luminous point is objectified precisely because it is independent of the knowing subject. Spontaneous and forced movement of the eyeball differ only in one: the first is “normal”, therefore the expected changes are taken into account and entered into the picture, and the movement of the stimulus relative to the retina in this case is not perceived. The latter, due to the “abnormality” of such a movement, does not have a program of expected changes, and the projection shift on the retina is regarded as the movement of the object itself. A similar mechanism underlies the “Helmholtz phenomenon”: when paralyzing the eye muscles, an attempt to move the eyes leads to a jump in the image in the same direction in which the eye is translated.

The objective world exists for my consciousness precisely because so much, since it cannot be taken into account once and for all and requires constant adjustment, which is carried out "here and now."

The density of the external world is determined by the degree of its “predictability”, which gives its elements a hue of “mine”, i.e. understandable and familiar, or, on the contrary, “alien”, i.e. unclear, "not transparent." Becoming “its own”, the external world begins to lose its density, dissolving in the subject, pushing its border outward. The world of external things close to me gradually begins to disappear, I cease to notice, hear and feel the construction of my home, my native city, familiar smells and sounds, comfortable and familiar clothes and even other but familiar and familiar people to me, etc. This familiar world, which forms a kind of complex body, permeated with a sense of belonging, is “warmth” (Bakhtin, 1979), and a person who loses his density in it can suddenly discover it with a sharp change in environment. Once in the new conditions of life, faced with abrupt changes, he experiences a “culture shock”, revealing the forgotten density of being with fear and surprise. The dimension of subjectivity is sharply reduced, and in the world of objects, seemingly long-disappeared things appear, inconvenient details, unusual relationships that create the feeling of a hostile, disobedient, “alien”.

The clearest criterion of development, folding into a stable construct is the very “disappearance” of the phenomenon, which I begin to use without experiencing any difficulties, and the very existence of which becomes implicit to me. So, mastering a language (or in a wider sense, according to L. Witgen matte (1991), “language games”), I learn to use it completely unconsciously, finding it difficult to even reflect on the rules underlying it. The language that I have mastered must be “swallowed up”, and the difficulties I encounter are difficulties in what to say, but not how to do it. An example of language is a special case of such dilutions that can be demonstrated both in acts of perception (constructs, perceptual universals, grids, schemes), and in actions with tools. The cultural history of a person, the history of creating tools, tools, metric systems, methods of action, technologies, etc., is at the same time the history of the formation of both the human body and the configuration of subject-object articulation. The tool only becomes a “tool” when it is well mastered and ceases to exist as an object, on the border with which the subject acts. By fitting into the scheme of my body, he transposes the border of subject-object articulation to another object, to which my activity becomes directed. The pianist begins not to press the keys, but to play music, the artist — not to draw a line, but to paint a picture, the craftsman — to work not with an instrument, but with an object of work, a child — not to roar, but to speak.

However, absolutizing this point of view, we are faced with a very interesting phenomenon: with the complete loss of the subject himself, who reveals himself only in the place of collision with the “other” and molded into his form; with a strange "black hole" of a pure knowing Ego, which has neither form nor content, and a mustache gushes from any possibility of its fixation. Phenomenologically, this is manifested in the intentionality of consciousness, which is always “consciousness of” ( Brentano , 1924; Husserl , 1973), and its “transgenomenality” { Sartre , 1949). Actually, the subject, the pure Ego of the cognizing consciousness is transparent to itself, and if you remove from it all objectified content, all non-consciousness, then nothing remains but an elusive, but obvious ability to manifest itself, creating objects of consciousness in the form of the world, body or empirical and special, difficult to convey "sense of author".

In this form, it represents a very specific reality. It is not natural and not substantial. It is difficult to say about him that it has certain qualities: it does not have "nature." Consciousness is “nothing” in the sense that it is impossible to find a phenomenon about which we could say that this is precisely consciousness, and no conscious phenomenon possesses “in villegia” to represent consciousness ( Sartre , 1949).

But how does the obvious fact for everyone agree with this point of view that, apart from the “black hole” and the objectified world, there is a huge area of ​​the “empirical self”? After all, in fact, there is my body. I know that I feel these or those feelings, these are my memories, this is what I think or say. These intuitions that are obvious to everyone cannot simply be discarded. It is necessary to understand what I mean by saying “mine” and what is actually a sense of identity.

3.2. Body phenomenon

You can try to answer these questions, starting with the phenomenon of the "body", using it as a convenient model for understanding the phenomenology of "one's own" and "someone else's". “Our own body is for us a prototype and a key of all forms. Only we know it dynamically, from within, and only by virtue of this knowledge we are able to interpret the spatial facets of things as a form. We guess in them from the inside there is a running pressure, which, meeting opposition from outside,

it is stopped in its increasing effort and, non-humble, tightly fixes itself in space ” (Bakhtin N. M, 1993).

Inside the sensation of “my body” there is a universal principle of the generation of the phenomenon of subjectivity, the reality of which is found only at the point of resistance, in contact with another. If we assume that the sensation is localized not at the receptor boundary, but at the boundary of the subject's autonomy, then the question of the possible existence of bodily sensations themselves, their localization in bodily space, becomes very interesting.

A body completely subordinate to the subject is a universal probe and must be realized only at the level of its borders, dividing the world and the subject, or rather, precisely by its borders, which are similar to the borders of the world. Since external reality can detect itself only through the impact (Bohr, 1971) on me, my body, I interpret the changes taking place in them as a fact of the external world. The body dimension itself can be changed by including foreign parts in it, but only as long as they enter its borders (for example, a probe, a well-developed prosthesis, etc.) and will not be objectified. The body receives its existence (as an object of consciousness) only by demonstrating the elasticity and opacity, the inadequacy of forecasting and control. When performing an action, I am never in the usual conditions concerned with how I need to control it: trying to take something or go somewhere, I do not take into account that between my willpower and the necessary action lies a completely objective mediator - body mechanism (Bakhtin MM, 1979). If it is not obedient to me or the implementation of such an act is faced with any difficulty, it is only in such a case that I discover the existence of this awkward mediator.

But it is this initial “inadequacy” always inherent in the body and the imperfection of its mechanism that give rise to the stable existence of the phenomenon of the body itself. The body as a physical mechanism obeys a number of objective laws and restrictions: I cannot lift unlimited weight, I cannot move with unlimited speed, the body is not clever enough to fulfill my quirks, it is weak, tired, etc. Its “transparency” is initially incomplete, and the natural forms of its "manifestation" are physiological functions. We cannot control hunger and thirst, are not fully and not always able to regulate natural functions, vegetative manifestations of emotional states, sexual and some other needs. At the end, the body is subject to destruction from the outside world:

for him, and not for the subject, there are the laws of physics, the sharpness of the knife and the heat of the fire. In short, the body is also the organism 1, with which one has to put up.

At the same time, the body is more or less obedient to me, I can manage it. And it is this feeling of authorship that allows me to call him mine. This internal contradiction is fixed by the language in the very definition of “my body”, emphasizing its simultaneous affiliation / non-affiliation. The body is not quite Me, for why would it be isolated, and at the same time mine, i.e. not completely alien. Much of the restrictions imposed on the body are assimilated by the subject in the same way as perceptual schemes and language games, “dissolving” the rigid construction of the organism-object and leaving only its reduced, “transformed” part, which I call my body. .

Strictly speaking, the real and, in fact, the only phenomenon of consciousness is the not so ingrained opposition of the subjective and objective, namely the phenomenon of the body, understood in the broadest sense “translucent” (both objectified, demonstrating resistance, and subject to, admitting management) of reality. In this sense, the body is located in a hypothetical continuum that bridges the gap between the black hole of the pure knowing Ego and the impenetrable wall of the unknown, untapped, unclear, and therefore has no depth of the knowable world. It is necessary to replace the binary subject-object division of reality with a three-term one: subject-body-object (Fig. 1).

If we are to be completely consistent, then we should even talk about only one real-life phenomenon - the body. For only it is one and is accessible to our consciousness, and it is precisely in various degrees of “turbidity” that we call it a subject or an object. We repeat that when it becomes completely “transparent”, fully controllable and predicted, it is not

-1 Here you can make a distinction between an “organism” as an objective reality, obeying its own laws and always equal to itself (regardless of whether we feel the heart or the liver, they work, they have biochemical processes that can cannot be accessible to human consciousness), and the “body” as a subjective reality and not equal to its objective correlate - the body (the “body” may include nonorganistic components: prostheses, probes, etc., illusory organs or parts: phantom mnye oschu scheniya, pseudohallucinations etc. - or, conversely, not to include the objectively existing parts "of the body":. ignoring the parts of the body, lack of access to the minds of many actually occurring processes or functions).

it also loses its density of existence, disappearing as a phenomenon of consciousness.It continues to exist only in the form of necessity, in the literal etymological sense of the impossibility of circumventing, once and for all, taking into account potential changes. Conscious phenomena, in this case, carry out a constant here-and-now адаптацию к таким необходимым феноменам. И именно по отношению к сознательным феноменам действует старый психологический закон ограниченности психической дея тельности 7±2 одновременно существующими объектами (на нео сознаваемом уровне субъект одновременно оперирует куда боль шим их количеством: самый простой акт движения или речи требует учета числа стимулов, на несколько порядков превышающего этот объем). Если же тело избыточно «замутняется», то оно переходит в разряд объектов, причем в случае полной «непрозрачности» мы оказываемся перед плоской стеной «неясного». Это нечто вроде стекла: когда оно абсолютно прозрачно (и мы не можем никаким иным образом ощутить его сопротивления), мы его не видим, если же оно абсолютно непрозрачно, то мы не можем оценить его объем, поскольку мы ограничены лишь его поверхностью; оно доступно восприятию лишь будучи «замутненным», загрязненным, полу прозрачным, давая взгляду одновременно и погрузиться, и «упе реться» в себя. При этом мне хотелось бы подчеркнуть, что речь идет именно о «феноменологическом» теле, включающем в себя все феномены сознания, от внутренних чувств до внешнего мира. Все они в равной степени могут стать феноменами сознания лишь через формирование своебразного «тела». Субъективное — через затруднение автоматизированного исполнения, объективное — че рез частичную предсказанность, «понятность», «прорезанность» субъективным.

Своеобразный зонд представляют собой перцептивные схемы. Восприятие и другие познавательные процессы — это не просто опе рации, совершаемые в голове индивида, но и акты взаимодействия

с миром, и такое взаимодействие не просто информирует субъекта, но и трансформирует его (Найссер, 1981). В этом случае сворачива ется не телесная конструкция, а вынесенная вовне когнитивная активность. Именно возможность пренебречь опосредующим звеном, «растворить» промежуточный зонд, задавая особую топологию субъекта, создает и ряд специфических переживаний иного. Параллакс, изменения сетчаточного изображения, последовательность пе реживаются как «расстояние». «Вряд ли будет преувеличением, если уже из психологических опытов заключить, что понятия простран ства и времени в сущности приобретают определенный смысл лишь благодаря тому, что можно пренебречь взаимодействием со сред ствами измерения» (Бор, 1971, с. 60) 2 . Плотность тела, плотность мира, состоящего из неудобных, жестких предметов, осваивается ребенком, пока не исчезает совершенно. Так же, как он обучается языку, не имея представления о лингвистике, он осваивает законы тела-механизма и физические законы мира (закон инерции через столкновение с массой, а закон всемирного тяготения через прак тику падений), и так же, как в случае языковых игр, эти законы не рефлексируются, но их существование всегда можно обнаружить, создавая особую экспериментальную ситуацию.

Для ребенка на стадии овладения произвольными движениями и телесной регуляцией тело должно максимально объективировать ся и восприниматься как «отдельное», «чужое», «предстоящее» образование. Осваивая собственное тело, ребенок тем самым парал лельно формирует и собственное Я, замечая, что он является авто ром собственных телесных движений, присоединяя к себе как субъекту «нехватки» (испытывающему голод, жажду, страх) чув ство субъекта-автора. Ж. Лакан, высказывая гипотезу о роли стадии зеркала как образующей функцию Я, замечает особое чувство, ис пытываемое маленьким ребенком, наблюдающим себя в зеркало ( Lacan , 1949). Можно объяснить странность особого отношения к визуальному образу в холодном стекле, на фоне куда более значимых для ребенка объектов, таких как мать или его близкие, люби мые игрушки и пр., если понять, что причиной такого выделения столь малозначительного объекта служит то, что он относится к числу тех редких зависимых от ребенка предметов, движение, по явление и исчезновение которых определяется им самим.

-2 Существование подобных скрытых опосредующих инструментальных зон дов отчетливо вскрывается при резком переходе к непривычной системе из мерений; например, для европейца, попавшего в США, температура по Фаренгейту, длина в футах и милях, вес в фунтах лишены непосредственного чувственного содержания температуры, веса и размера.

This evolving “author's feeling” as a center of self-identity is well illustrated by the classic case of the children's game “away - here” described by 3. Freud (1925a), in which the child extends his control of the coil with threads to the symbolic mastery of the mother's coming and going.

As mastering in ontogenesis, the body becomes “transparent”, dissolving in the subject and manifesting itself only in special cases of “opposition”, for example, such as mastering unusual movements, awkwardness during intoxication, “stiffness”, “numbness”, “disobedience”, or - a dramatic change in stereotype 3. The existence of an articulatory apparatus becomes evident when teaching a foreign language (as, incidentally, the existence of the language itself, in a normal situation as unobvious for us as it is not obvious for the hero Molière, what he says in prose), and the existence of arms and legs during learning dancing Subsequently, as they automate, they “disappear” again. This can happen not only when a new phenomenon “emerges”, but also when an old one “disappears”: for example, an unusual and clear sensation that arises after a tooth is removed.

As for the “inner body,” in the implementation of the same basic conditions of its generation, one can note much less opportunities for objectification, less unpredictability of random events, related to the homogeneity and autonomy of the environment of a possible topology. Except, perhaps, sensations from the gastrointestinal tract, heartbeat and breathing rhythm for a healthy person “internal body” practically does not exist and he does not know about the work and location of his internal organs until the moment when their activity is carried out automatically.

The situation changes completely in the case of somatic illness. The pathological process disrupts the normal flow of bodily functions, and they “manifest” themselves, objectifying themselves within the boundaries of the body and receiving the qualities of sensory content. Naturally, the absence of a ready-made dictionary of intraceptive values ​​makes it difficult to fine-differentiate, reflect, or verbalize them. In the first place, at the level of the prodroma, emotional-evaluative coordinates, categories of well-being, ready-made dictionaries of familiar sensations are used, and only then - with the formation of the corresponding categorical

-3 For example, the phenomenon of "stopped escalator." By suddenly stopping an escalator that is virtually indistinguishable from an ordinary staircase, it is very difficult to walk. This can only be explained by a drastic change in stereotype.

networks - the formation of specialized dictionaries, enabling the clear selection of certain states. The use of “ready-made” dictionaries and body constructions leads to frequent diagnostic errors, “masking” of symptoms, and stereotypical response. Thus, almost any ailments in childhood are associated with complaints of "stomach". This situation becomes quite understandable if we consider that the gastrointestinal tract is one of the earliest identified and developed bodily areas (the primacy of the sensations of hunger and thirst, systematic training of correct departures, frequent dyspeptic disorders, attention given to our culture by nourishment child). At the same time, in full accordance with the concept of L.S. Vygotsky, for the formation of conscious and reflective ideas about his own body, the role of the mother is very important. O.G. Motovilin (2001), comparing their development in children under conditions of family and boarding school, notes a lag in children outside the family environment, while the frequency of somatic disorders that could be the basis for the formation of such ideas is significantly higher.

The occurrence of obstacles inside the body creates a specific configuration, the topology of the “inner body”, immersed inside the anatomical body of a person. If the probe carries this body boundary outwards, then in the case of a somatic disease, the body from the universal probe, which coincides with the dimension of the external body, becomes its own object, contracting to the limits of the new resistance.

3.3. "Alienation" as the destruction of the subject's topology

“Elasticity”, “non-compliance”, “opacity” are, apparently, a universal condition for the objectification of both the external world, the body, and consciousness. Usually I easily and simply identify my thoughts, my feelings, my desires, my will, my speech. But in order to understand what serious theoretical difficulties lie behind the deceptive simplicity of these intuitions, we note that special unusual, unfamiliar, unusual states of alienation of thoughts, feelings, memories, desires and will are described in psycho-pathologies. For example, I may experience an amazing feeling of hatred for me that used to love, I come up with strange desires, thoughts or memories. True alienation of states is also possible, which manifests itself in the syndromes of depersonization, derealization, mental automatism, obsessions, etc.

Thinking over the phenomenon of the alienation of consciousness, we are faced with a number of contradictions. Let us ask ourselves what serves as a criterion for distinguishing such states: for example, how can I distinguish the thoughts or feelings I experience from mine? In general, how can you feel not your feelings or think your thoughts - after all, the very fact of their testing directly proves their belonging to me? The universal criterion of such a distinction (as in the phenomenon of the body) is the degree of resistance (measure of control) experienced by the subject on the border of another, already immersed in consciousness itself, and the very existence of the phenomenon speaks of its at least partial objectivity. The content of consciousness (“object-consciousness”) is generated by the “opacity” of thoughts, memory, feelings, on the tense border with which the subjective image of my consciousness - I-for-self arises. I learn about the existence of thinking only when faced with the difficulties of a decision, about memory — when it refuses me. Actually, thinking or memory in their normal course is not available to me, since they are transparent, and I can only fix moments of a collision with an opaque other. “Only in the act of problematization, the mind is open to the existing oneself (truly intensified in relation to it), and, at the same time, only in this act is something realistically existing for the cognizing mind as an independent reality, as unyielding, resisting the understanding of the concept density of being. Only by receiving influence from the outside, the object finds its “mass” and only in the action on another object - “force”. In the same way, the “mass” and “force” of the cognizing mind are revealed only when they come into contact with non-reason ” {Tishchenko, 19915, p. 48). To put it more precisely, the subject can realize himself only in a transformed extra-object form - in the form of an object, as a result of which “when he realizes thinking, thoughts are really perceived as if from the outside” {Freud, 1924, p. 21). When objectifying, the world, body and consciousness acquire the shade of “alien reach”, and only in the “alienated” form can they exist for me and become accessible to analysis.

In the case of a normal course of thinking, it turns out to be very difficult to indicate what it is, strictly speaking, that is. Thinking, I cannot single out any particular instrument of thinking, in the same way as, when making a movement, I do not fix the presence of a mediator-body lying between my will and the object to which it is directed. What I call thought is only the fixation of difficulties, delays, which have as little in common with thinking as the body has with the organism. “The thought is rushing headlong, so it almost always leads us to a conclusion before we manage to capture it. If we manage to capture it, it instantly changes ” (James, 1901, p. 120).

Of particular interest for understanding the subjective phenomenology of thinking is its connection with speech. Speech, in which objectified thought is expressed, does not coincide with the corresponding thought and cannot precede it. A speech statement is successive in nature, whereas the underlying thought is simultaneous: starting a statement, I more or less imagine how it will end. Therefore, initially the statement is rather an intention to which I select adequate words and “it can be assumed that 2/3 of psychic life consists precisely of these preliminary schemes of thoughts not clothed in words” (Ibid.). It is the delay in putting on words that demonstrates the elasticity of a language as an objective linguistic reality, the search for an “accurate” adequate word, the gap between a word and thought form the “reality” of my language (and, to a large extent, thinking) for me. A language does not exist if it is completely under my control; he is mine, if I can control his defiantness (or rather, he can be represented to me only in the form of stubbornness); he is a stranger, if he does not obey me at all. From the alienation of thought, which manifests itself in various psychopathological syndromes (from “leaps of ideas” and obsessive thoughts to Kandinsky's syndrome — Klerambo), this is always a loss of control: from control over the course to control over content.

Likewise, the emotional states experienced by man can be interpreted. True, here we come across some not entirely clear points, but we can try to outline at least a hypothetical line of reasoning. The difficulty lies in the fact that, according to the idea of ​​“transparency”, emotions should be directed only at the external world: it is the external object that is evaluated as scary, pleasant or unpleasant. However, in reality they more characterize my subjective state: I am scared, sad, sad, merry, etc. It can be assumed that the archaic function of emotions as a certain stage of the “first vision” in the perception of the external world was replaced by more developed categorical systems but retained its value for the evaluation of the inner subjective world. The possibility of their “opacity” is apparently connected with the dissociation of the physiological mechanism of emotions (accompanied by vegetative changes, the release of hormones, the activation of the middle parts of the brain) and their phenomenological content 4. Physiological structures can be considered as a kind of analogue of an organism that can become a subjective body. The fact that the "body" of emotions has very little resemblance to their anatomical and physiological apparatus should not confuse us: the subjective body also has a very approximate resemblance to the organism.

Within the framework of such an approach, the theories of emotions of James – Lange and Cannon – Bard can be interpreted in a new way. The statements expressed in them that after the perception of the event that caused the emotion, the subject experiences it as a sensation of physiological changes in the body (which in fact is the emotion itself) was not found an adequate place in later psychological theories, although these provisions were confirmed a number of experimental studies. G. Moranión (see: Bloom, Leiserson, Hofsteder, 1988) showed that when the subject was given adrenaline, some of them felt something similar to emotional states, others said they did not feel emotions, but described the state of physiological excitement. People who reported emotions said that they felt “as if” they were scared. But when Moranyon spoke with these people about some important events of their recent past, about the death of family members, about the upcoming wedding, their feelings lost form “as if” and became real emotions, be it sadness or joy. The need for context for the acquisition of specific subjective content by physiological activation has been repeatedly confirmed in later studies 5.

For our reasoning it is important that in these experiments a special alienation is demonstrated, within which emotional states can be generated. When I talk about my sadness, joy, or anxiety, I mean some special situation of not managing the states that seize me. This is a special form of alienation, remaining (as well as in the case of the body), either in my area , or, in the case of special elasticity or intensity,

-4 Wed: "In the chest, he hit himself and told an irritated heart: Heart, humble yourself ..." (Homer, 1913). Here one can clearly see the objectification of the emotional state (it is not equal to the “irritated heart”, but “speaks” to it) and the mixing of emotion and body sensation (the “irritated heart”).

-s In fact, modern psychiatrists using anxiolytics and antidepressants act on the physiological substrate of emotions, but for some reason do not pay attention to creating the necessary cognitive context.

otherwise, such as depression, vital anguish, obsessive fear or excitement. Such states do not flow from real life events and are clearly reflected by the subject as not his true state: I can’t do anything with my mood, I can not cheer up, be sad, or otherwise “pull myself together.”

From the very beginning, the emotional states and phenomena of the external world are poorly controlled and initially differ in a high degree of estrangement, creating fixed poles of the objectification of the world and me. What I can say about the world is a combination of another opposing me , and at the core of what I can say about myself is a combination of a special other: the world of my emotions and feelings.

The radical alienation is inherent in the entire content of my knowledge, but the degree of its severity depends on the possibilities of arbitrary mastery. Pathological phenomena of alienation are often noted by patients precisely in those areas where this mastery is well developed (voluntary movements, thinking, memory, will), and much less often where mastery is poorly developed; it is also normal (two poles of “normal” estrangement: the external world and emotional states). Alienation is not the appearance of other people's thoughts or desires in me, but a special transformation of mine, experienced as a loss of a sense of self.

3.4. The problem of the "true" subject

Here we are faced with a very important phenomenon of the ontology I-for-self. If we raise the question of what remains in consciousness, if all points of resistance in the form of emotions, feelings, unmet desires, conscience, guilt disappear, then we will again face the disappearance of I-for-self. Having lost the resistance of the other (no matter where I meet him), consciousness turns into a fading “shagreen” skin, into a “black hole” of nothing. The subject’s removal of points of support, the removal of the density of the surrounding world in experiments on sensory deprivation (placing the subject in darkness and silence in a bath filled with liquid with temperature and density equal to the temperature and specific weight of the human body) caused him disorientation in time and space, impaired thinking, special emotional states, hallucinations ( Bexton , 1954). The proposed interpretations of this state as manifestations of the motivation of communication (Nuttten, 1975) do not seem quite convincing. In fact, we are talking about a more fundamental point: the very possibility of delineating the location of the subject, for which it is absolutely necessary to have a gap marking the Ego and the not-Ego. My self-identity is the other side of the non-I border . I am located exactly where the non-I begins . The possibility and necessity of the ontology of the subject are connected with the universality of the gap between me and the not-me, in the lumen of which there is what is called my consciousness, the gap that must be filled here and now, and in which empirical Self is born . On one side of this gap is The “black hole” of the true subject, on the other - the dense world. The world of things and consciousness is possible only in a heterogeneous environment, in a situation of unstable equilibrium, when there is no immediate connection between the state of need and its satisfaction. The moment of birth of consciousness can be attributed, with well-known hooves, to the moment of birth of a person moving from a homogeneous prenatal environment to a heterogeneous one and encountering thirst, hunger, warmth, cold, mastering the first communicative tool — the cry — to master the world personified by the mother. “The unbearable density of being” is not a difficulty, but an indispensable condition for the existence of consciousness: a pillow only seems that the density of water prevents him from swimming, in fact it is she who gives him this opportunity.

From this point of view, the true subject is very similar to the true subject of psychoanalysis - It. Another 3. Freud shrewdly remarked that "consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus," and "I am a modified part of It. The change took place as a result of the direct influence of the external world through the medium of the perceived and conscious ” (Freud, 1924, p. 14). The subject is an unidentified and unconscious It, which is superficially encompassed by the Self, which emerged as the nucleus from the system of perception. I do not fully embrace It, but cover it only as much as the perception system forms its surface. “It is not difficult to verify that I am only a part of It changed under the direct influence of the external world and through external perception ” (ibid., P. 22). A close understanding of the limitations of the conscious self is contained in the philosophy of MM. Bakhtin (1979), who considered that I am for myself is not the whole I. I am exceeding every object in experiencing my own subjectivity and absolute non-exhaustion in an object as opposed to pure exhaustion of the Other.

Understanding the conscious self not as a true subject allows for a revision of the Cartesian evidence of the subject's ontology. For Descartes (1925), the subject is first and foremost a rational subject: I am the thinking self. The ontological justification uses the principle of total doubt: if I can doubt all my feelings and sensations, then the very fact of the existence of me who doubts is beyond doubt . The need for total doubt arises from the idea of ​​searching for the absolutely undoubted and true place of the subject, although in itself total doubt is no more proof of existence than a false sensation. The truth or falsity of my sensations does not matter in principle, the proof is the fact of sensation irrelevant to the problem of truth — someone in fact should still experience false sensations. The question is whether I exist where I feel these sensations, or, in Descartes's terminology, ubi cogito - ibi sum (where I think - I exist there). If we recognize that the place of feeling or the place of the cogito is not the place of the subject, but the place of its collision with another, the place of its transformation into another, only in the form of which it can become clouded, having lost its transparency, then it would be more accurate to say that I, as a true subject I exist where I do not think, or I am there where I am not.

The practice of psychoanalysis led J. Lacan, really in a completely different way, to the same rejection of the Cartesian paradigm. The form of communication between being and consciousness, in his opinion, cannot be two-membered, since thought does not substantiate being directly. Cogito does not exhaust the subject, and out of obviousness does not follow existency. According to Lacan, I think where I am not, but I am where I do not think. The subject of thought and the subject of existence are not identical ( Lacan , 1988).

3.5. Phantom of reality

The form of the phenomenological existence of the subject, requiring its transformation into an alienated form through another (I can exist only in the form of non-I), is in principle a phantom that illusively coincides with the true reality. The body in relation to the organism, the image of the world in relation to the world, the empirical Ego in relation to the pure Ego, are more or less adequately adapted reality phantoms, allowing to live in the real world with a minimized allowance. The assimilated subjective reality scheme, existing in the form of perceptual constructs, language games, collapsed rules that have become “transparent” and imperceptibly for me structuring the world, brings order and the ability to defuse / destroy “unbearable density of being” into it. A set of existing hidden networks forming the phantom structure can be detected in special cases: for example, illusions, narcotic hallucinations, etc.

The exposure of this universal design is realized in the classic phantom sensation. After amputation of the patient

he experiences absolutely real sensations of a limb absent from him, the degree of persuasiveness of which is so great that, even seeing the absence of a leg or arm, he nevertheless may try to stand on it or reach for the object. A phantom is a manifestation of a collapsed probe, whose assimilated scheme became invisible, but whose existence becomes apparent when the operating conditions change.Such probes in the form of perceptual patterns, stereotypes of movement, semantic-perceptual universes, manifesting themselves in special conditions, lead to illusions, within each of which this hidden probe can be found. The corpore phantom is simply the most demonstrative special case of the sudden discovery of a previously hidden pattern, or rather, the fact of the absolute necessity of its existence.

Фантомность мира нужно понимать не как его нереальность, а как единственно возможный вариант приспособления к миру, за висящий не только от его объективно существующих качеств, но и от возможностей и конструкции совокупности опосредствующих восприятие зондов. Искажения, вносимые в эти конструкции, мо гут менять качество воспринимаемого мира, остающегося на самом деле неизменным. Наркотическое опьянение, специальные психо техники, медитация, трансовые состояния не открывают другой реальности, как склонны думать их апологеты, а скорее строят иной фантом. Причем непосредственно-чувственное переживание его реальности не более доказательно, чем ощущение реальности фантомной конечности или галюцинации. Странные переживания больных в состоянии комы проще понять не как свидетельства «жизни после смерти», а как результат восприятия в условиях измененного функционального состояния, как особый фантом функциональной депривации, неординарных условий функцио нирования. Сходство же подобных переживаний у различных лю дей доказывает не существование особого мира, а универсальность усвоенных перцептивных зондов.

В экспериментах по сенсорной депривации были получены ре зультаты, которые можно интерпретировать как нарушения топо логии субъекта. В особых условиях обедненности или искаженности внешней стимуляции у испытуемых возникали странные ощущения изменения формы и размерности тела, конечностей и пр. ( Bexton , 1954). Г.Бекеши продемонстрированы фантомы пространственного «предвижения» ощущения, которое могло локализоваться вне тела. Используя пару специальных вибраторов, раздражавших кончики пальцев или участки бедра, и изменяя интервалы между стимула ми, Г.Бекеши показал, что ощущение может локализоваться в про странстве между пальцами или между коленями ( Becesy , 1967).

Фантомное ощущение можно рассматривать как реализацию сохранившейся схемы тела при изменившейся анатомии: чем прочнее эта схема освоена, тем прочнее фантом. В ампутированной правой руке ощущения сохраняются дольше, чем в левой, а в руках доль ше, чем в ногах.

Утрата схемы-зонда может порождать не только тактильные или гаптические фантомы. Г. Бекеши описывает изменение локализации звуков при использовании двух слуховых аппаратов, воспроизво дящих звук от микрофонов, расположенных на груди. В этих усло виях при утрате бинаурального параллакса стереофонический эф фект оставался, но восприятие расстояния до источника звука было утрачено {Там же).

Скрытая сеть перцептивных конструктов обнаруживает себя, например, в иллюзиях, заставляя нас искажать реальность в соответствии с упроченными схемами, а их культурная детерминиро ванность как раз и вытекает из культурной детерминированности лежащих в их основе схем. Существуют особые перцептивные схе мы, порождавшие необычные ощущения: например, описанная У. Найссером (1981) «этак» — когнитивная карта мореплавателей острова Палават, не имеющая никаких аналогов со стандартными способами ориентации.

Признание гибкости, подвижности и фантомности границ субъекта, строящихся каждый раз заново, позволяет с иной точки зрения взглянуть на старый спор между Дж.Э. Муром и Л. Витген штейном { Moor , 1925; Витгенштейн, 1991). Причиной этого спора послужило утверждение Дж.Э. Мура о существовании очевидно ис тинных положений типа «Я знаю, что это моя рука». Аргументация Л. Витгенштейна сводилась к тому, что такого рода утверждения находятся за пределами собственно знания и базируются на неко тором пред-знатш: «картине мира» и «языковых играх». Это некий предел обоснования, ниже которого сомнение не может прости раться. В высказывании типа «Я знаю, что это моя рука» или «Я знаю, что мне больно» содержится невыводимый из логики и ле жащий вне ее элемент, базирующийся на непосредственном чув стве, которое не может быть оспорено. Когда человек, хорошо вла деющий языком и не дезинформирующий окружающих, говорит: «Я себя плохо чувствую», то в этом случае он: 1) не подвержен ошибке, 2) не нуждается в дополнительных доказательствах, 3) не может быть опровергнут { Malcolm , 1977). Эмоции и чувства не нуж даются в подтверждении, так как они говорят о самих себе и их доказательством служат они сами. Это очень интересный момент, ибо на самом деле такая же неопровержимость относится и к выс казываниям типа «Я вижу...» или «Я слышу...». Опровержение существования того, что я вижу или слышу, ни в какой степени не является опровержением факта, что это вижу или слышу Я. Вообще следует признать, что ощущение имеет лишь одну модальность — модальность истинности. Иметь ложные ощущения так же невозможно, как невозможно испытывать ложные чувства. Для субъекта ощущение и истинное ощущение — абсолютная тавтология, за фиксированная в языке как «оче-видность». Я принципиально не могу чувствовать ложно. Каждое испытываемое ощущение может быть только истинным, и его ложность, понятая мной