Cognitive science and knowledge engineering

What is cognitive science?

Cognitive science is a field of activity associated with the analysis of knowledge (in the face of specific theories) and the provision of its (knowledge) further development. To put it more firmly and boldly, then cognitive science is the analysis of knowledge and ensuring its further development . But in order to accomplish the latter, the transfer of this mission (= functions) to the next generations is needed, which means the creation of the theoretical part of cognitive science.

In accordance with this, cognitive science is divided into applied (practical) and theoretical. Applied cognitive science is the analysis of the subject of specific theories . (The subject part of the theory is how the mathematical (formal) part of the theory is connected with the objective world.) Theoretical cognitology is developing the correct procedures for analyzing theories . Theoretical cognitive science is based solely on the logic and analysis of the structure and functioning of a natural language.

Cognitive science has a third, special, part - noocosmology . She became formalized at the current stage of cognitive development. Nookosmology develops the most basic provisions on the universe, on which any science should (or can) rest (including cognitology itself). And its main question is materialism and idealism, the resolution of this duality. Therefore, here cognitive science borders on esotericism.

Thus, cognitive science in its practical part is philosophy. But in the original sense of the word. That is, understood as ... no, not love of wisdom (as usually translated translation of the word "philosophy"). And how the love of reason . That is the correct translation from Greek: "Sophus" is the mind. Isn’t it, after all, these words have different (albeit related) meanings?

But cognitive science in its theoretical part is not a philosophy. Cognitology is differentiated from philosophy, just as philosophy is differentiated from cognitive science, according to the following parameters:

1) cognitive science has a specific subject of research - knowledge and knowledge unfolding (philosophy does not have it, why it draws the line between itself and science).

2) in cognitive science knowledge and knowledge unfolding are the same entities as balls for physics falling from the Leaning Tower of Pisa. Let me explain: in its applied part (analysis and correction of specific theories), knowledge studies receive and record the essential material, which serves as an experimental basis for the development of theoretical knowledge of knowledge. Philosophy has no such thing.

Therefore, cognitive science is a science. But science is a new type.

Cognitive science began to appear when the development of the " concept " topic was started in more detail than it was done in logic. Thus, cognitive science is, in essence, a development of logic. Cognitology (knowledge science) continues the work begun by logic.

A bit of history

08/30/02

The term “cognitive science” quite recently began to appear in the Russian language. Until recently, I myself believed that I was engaged in gnoseology. But then I realized that it was not. Because what Soviet gnoseology does is not what Western epistemology does. (With that, they both claim to be a science of knowledge.) And most importantly, this is not what I do. Therefore, it took a different name. (At first, I thought that I was engaged in the theory of individual cognition .) I already have (now) and more impressive terms: cognitostatics (the science of knowledge in statics) and cognitodynamics (the science of processes in knowledge). Cognitostatics is, as I imagine, a kind of extension of logic (which makes it self-sufficient. But only if we consider knowledge in statics). And this section of cognitive science (now to me) seems to be already quite developed. Cognitodynamics is a section of cognitive science that is just beginning its (real) existence. For example, the topic “the critical and creative components of knowledge” is the topic of cognitive dynamics. Simply put, cognitodynamics - this is the true science of knowledge (knowledge in dynamics - this is knowledge). In contrast, for example, from the same gnoseology, which is more like Naukovedenie (history of science), although with some attempts at generalization (which is inherent in the present theory).  

Knowledge and knowledge do not exist by themselves. Carriers of knowledge and implementers of knowledge are specific people (and in a particular language). But since they communicate with each other and, consequently, cooperation in cognition arises, we can speak of knowledge and cognition as of certain impersonal entities, that is, (as it were) having no place in this world without people. But in order to investigate this, and not just state, it is necessary to begin with the study of personal knowledge and knowledge. The thesis of the impersonality of knowledge and knowledge does not give impetus to the study. But he gives impulses to inflate the cheeks.

As for epistemology (the authors translated into Russian - I. Lakatos, D. Poya), it seemed to me somewhat limited. In other words, the writings of these authors are rather a cognition of graphics than a cognition of logic (although, perhaps, the works of D.Poya resemble works of cognitive science)

Therefore, I decided to be based on the good old proven (Aristotelian) logic. Although I had “wiped my feet” about it more than once, but I, as an engineer, did not see any other (embodied in the technique) logic except this one. I also saw that no matter how many volumes were written on the so-called dialectical logic, there is nothing in it except for the fact that there are antinomies. But, when I plunged into logic, I found that logic stops at stating the following phenomena discovered by it: 1) concepts; 2) the issue; 3) hypotheses; 4) antinomies; 5) paralogism; 6) induction. It would seem that we must go further, investigate these phenomena. But it was not there that something was in the way. By luck, I resolved this situation, which was the beginning of cognitive science. It happened after I threw my gaze into my knowledge of linguistics, and found that in a language, not all words are homogeneous (since there are different parts of speech), and the logic postulated that all concepts have a volume, that is, all concepts homogeneous. There is an antinomy!

Why did I get cognitive science? Yes, because I saw that there is an impenetrable wall between logic and linguistics. And the connection is obvious. Both that and other subject investigate words and statements, that is, language phenomena. Logic - from the word "logo", which means "word". It means that in order to develop further ( to both of them ), it is necessary to synthesize logic and linguistics. What I did. Since knowledge is carried out by a particular person, knowledge (within it) is a physiological process. After all, for example, receptors are involved in it. So, to go further, you need to synthesize what happened at the 1st step, with physiology. And what to do next - we'll see. Thus, cognitive science (in its applied part) not only synthesizes knowledge around itself, but also itself (in its theoretical part) grows as a result of the synthesis of various knowledge. This once again confirms the thesis "knowledge is one." But the problem is that the synthesis of knowledge is not a simple sum of them. After all, otherwise it would be very simple to do. We need more common concepts. Which do not appear by themselves, but thanks to the work of people.

09/10/02

The history of cognitive science began with what I said to myself: 1) you yourself are the implementer of knowledge (the creator of his phenomena); 2) to explore knowledge, you need to start with a detailed fixation of this process. This and only this will allow further discussion of this material. (And not only discuss); 3) if knowledge finds itself in a situation where it cannot be continued further (= critical situation), it is necessary to analyze this situation without any bias , that is, looking at it as it is (simply). This and only this will allow to resolve this situation. In other words: the bias of looking at a situation is that it is obviously deemed insoluble . The impartiality of this view, respectively, is that it is obviously supposed to be SOLVABLE. For what is knowingness? This is obvious. That is something that can be seen, that is, not negotiable.

11.09.02

It’s realistic to stand in the position of a theoretical cognitive scientist, that is, to cease (for a while) to be a machine generating cognitive phenomena, and to make yourself a researcher of them is very difficult to make. For example, I went on this path. At first I postulated that 1) personal knowledge (therefore, the machine that produces cognitive phenomena can be myself in the singular); 2) everything that I say or write when I reason, exactly corresponds to the process of knowledge in my head (with the only reservation that I give myself the option to display on paper all my thoughts. Of course, certain problems are connected with this. But At first, I simply did not see them. However, the installation to display all thoughts worked and as a result I understood that questions should also be displayed, because the question is also a thought. (And this fact significantly increased the effectiveness of my reasoning.) Thus, analyzing their records of reasoning, I put myself in the position of a cognitive theorist, but at the same time I was an experimenter in one person, and this was what forced my intention to build logic as a science, and not as a philosophy.  

Introduction to the subject (cognitive propedeutics)

1. Definition : truth is the correspondence of the thesis to the objective world (PM).

Postulate: truth exists.

Corollary: truth, up to equivalence, is unique.

2.Postulat: knowledge carries out a specific individual

(Equivalent) Option postulate: knowledge is human action.

Corollary: knowledge personally.

3. Postulate: language (primordial = by nature) is a means of communicating the phenomena of the PM (the objective world).

Corollary: the structure of the language exactly corresponds to the structure of the PM.

4. Postulate: cognition is ontological, not deontichno.

Cognition is carried out by observing and producing statements.

A single (practical) cognition - due to the observation of external phenomena, a non-unit (theoretical) - due to the observation of internal (with respect to the sensory system) phenomena.

There is also the reproduction of knowledge - when internal theses become externalized (= articulated).

The production of theses (and questions) is carried out on the basis of concepts - phenomena internal to the sensory system (= internal phenomena of cognition).

Concept formation is a long process.

Concepts are household (girl, bus, pan, wood, etc.) and non-household (el.tok, potential energy, elastic force, river basin, infrastructure, matter (philosophical), theory, empirical theory, etc. ) In other words, everyday concepts are those that each person uses on a daily basis.

Non-standard - faced only by people of certain professions. It is noticed that in the household area people invariably understand each other, in the non-household area in the vast majority of cases - they do not understand. Why? Because the specificity of a household area itself requires 100% availability of concepts, the specificity of a non-household is such that misunderstanding, as a rule, does not reveal itself in it, and if it does, it seems to interfere with anyone.

But let us take, for example, love and knowledge - are these everyday or non-everyday concepts?

Statements are: affirmative (theses), interrogative and stimulating. Questions are (as if) motivating statements related to the realization of knowledge.

Noticed: the question, if it is pro-articulated, will always find its answer. (And if publicly politicized, then it will publicly find the answer.)

Thus, there is a fundamental difference in the motivating power of the question and the motivating utterance. While prompting initiates the procedure, the question (as if) initiates the process. That is, the existence of which, unlike the procedure, does not require an expression of will. Here I want to conclude: there is some kind of mystery in it. But as it is not tempting, I will take care of and write: why? (There are, however, such questions that cannot be answered for a long time.)

Questions:

1. Why does the question (somehow) act against will?

2.why does a question need to be pro-justified to trigger a response?

3. why there are long born answers? Or rather, long-term questions.

(apparently, it’s only theoretical issues)

An analogy also suggests itself: the question is the male principle in the process of cognition. But the question, as well as the answer, are the children of knowledge. But they are also (both) the seeds of knowledge. What is the mother of these?

If the question is single, then it prompts the observation of external phenomena (both outside and inside, that is, in the form of internalized theses)

If the question is not unified, it leads to the observation of internal phenomena of knowledge and travel in their world, either from premises to conclusions, or vice versa.

Here again, the necessary role of externalizing in the process of cognition draws attention. This is due to the fact that reasoning, that is, knowledge itself, goes from conclusions to premises. But again it goes in order (now in the reverse order) to be stated, that is, externalized. And so become a particle of culture.

Abstracts can be assessed as:

1) true; 2) false; 3) hypothetical; 4) fantastic. So, in-assessment of the thesis (for truth-falsity) or its d-assessment (hypothetical-reliability) or its ф-assessment is the first reaction to the emergence (articulation) of the thesis. But first, f-, then d- and last but not least in-score! And even earlier - his to-score (that is, for clarity)

(But the very first reaction to the (internal) occurrence of a thesis is its appearance, that is, articulation.)

The 3rd reaction to the thesis depends on its assessment (the result of the 2nd reaction). If the thesis is recognized as incomprehensible - the question "what do you mean by A", if fantastic - the question "what are you talking about?", If hypothetical - the question "what does it follow?", If false, then a counter reaction: a request for a substantiation of falsity. what does (falsehood) follow from? " The reaction to a true thesis is a conclusion from it (or hypothesizing).

Definition : A fantastic thesis is one that is seen as reporting nothing (i.e., these are empty theses).

Examples of empty concepts: CO (reference system), ACTION (inertial coordinate system).

Empty theses may also appear as a result of specific manipulations with pronouns (which are practiced, for example, in NLP - neuro-linguistic programming). Due to this, it is possible to obtain the effect of a preliminary, but implicit throw-off of (future) conclusions to the argument.

Another example of a fantastic statement: I will not be yesterday. And here is another technique of fantasy.

In general, the theme of the fabulousness of theses is a separate topic. Because extensive! Both by generation and by assessment (and, in particular, its seemingly relativity). For example, an important question about the consistency of theses, he is from this, if not strange, opera. And even more than that - he is at the very beginning of this opera.

On the difference between words and concepts. A concept is a concept of perception or thinking, activated by a certain word or activating it.

And why not the concept of action?

Every question also requires evaluation. First, for clarity. Secondly, on the subject of fantasy. What else? It seems to be nothing. Then you need to answer (if it is clear and not fantastic).

Definition : The transition from a single to a non-unitary thesis is induction, and from a particular to a general one - inductive abduction. The transition from non-unit to unit deduction, from general to specific deductive abduction. Deduction according to Aristotle - the transfer of class properties to any subclass of this class is in principle not very relevant. Complete abduction is much more relevant (example: the Pythagorean theorem).

With real reasoning, the distinction between general and particular theses is usually not practiced. (Why?) The reason for this is the inability to control the generality or particularity of the theses. If such an opportunity existed, then the situation of an antinomy (hidden homonymy) would not have arisen.