Lecture
Это окончание невероятной информации про русская журналистика xx века.
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November 1941, and by July 1942 more than 1360 radio relay points were in operation. In May 1942 the Oryol radio relay centre began broadcasting. At first two political news bulletins were transmitted per day; by May 1943 this had risen to 6–8 broadcasts. In a year of operation the radio centre transmitted 850 political news bulletins, 50 international reviews, and 120 political talks and lectures .
In its resolution of 13 August 1942, the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) stated: “Involving activists from outside the editorial staff in the newspaper's work is the direct duty of every war correspondent” . A special place in the system of military propaganda during the war years was occupied by work with soldiers' letters, which ensured the interactivity of the process. Thus, in August 1943 the editorial office of the newspaper “Krasny Baltiysky Flot” received 575 letters, of which 89 were used in newspaper material, and in December the paper received about 700 letters, of which 150 were used. So-called feedback was created: propagandists, by publishing soldiers' letters, drew them into discussion, arousing even greater interest in their medium. At the same time, one must not forget the particular features of the combat situation, which dictated its own conditions to journalists and propagandists: under the Rules for the Preservation of Military Secrecy in the Press, information was not to be disclosed “from which conclusions revealing a military or state secret could be drawn, even indirectly” .
A separate target audience of this influence, no less significant than all the others, was the civilian population of the USSR. Only the unity of front and rear, the common struggle against the enemy, and faith in victory could save the state in its fiercest clash with Germany and its satellites. This explains the importance of the role assigned to propaganda in the rear: people had to know WHAT, HOW, and FOR WHAT PURPOSE they had to act. The clarification of all these questions was handled by propagandists in the field; figures from culture, art, and science, the media system, and so on all worked toward this end. The inhabitants of the rear, for their part, were also effective agitators, since, by means of their letters, appeals, and gifts, they gave strength to the Red Army, acting in a targeted way, addressing individual soldiers and commanders. It is no accident that, much later, the theorist N.D. Fomicheva noted that “the broad masses, appearing within the system of mass information and propaganda, act first of all as an audience – a consumer of information – but also as its creator (which manifests itself in the form of letters to the editor and material prepared on one's own initiative)” .
“A newspaper is air in wartime”, - wrote Ilya Ehrenburg at the very height of the Great Patriotic War. “People open a newspaper before they open a letter from a close friend. The newspaper is now a letter addressed to you personally. Your fate, too, depends on what stands in the newspaper.” These words aptly convey what a charge of optimism and confidence in our victory the journalists and writers carried from the pages of newspapers and journals, and what a role their pieces played in cultivating patriotism and a sacred hatred of the fascist enslavers. The articles and sketches of A. Tolstoy, M. Sholokhov, and I. Ehrenburg, and the poems of Simonov and Surkov, writes A. Werth in his book “Russia at War, 1941-1945”, “were read by literally everyone. Ehrenburg played an especially great role in the battle to raise the morale of the Soviet people… It is known that partisans behind enemy lines readily traded a submachine gun for a bundle of clippings of his articles. He displayed a brilliant ability to render the whole of Russia's burning hatred of the Germans into the language of caustic, inspiring prose, and intuitively grasped the feelings that ordinary Soviet people were experiencing.”
The press was called upon “…to cultivate in the working people hatred for the German-fascist scoundrels.. to inspire our people to fight the Great Patriotic war of liberation, to mobilise the working people to carry out concrete tasks in actively supporting the front”[10]. “Everything for the front! Everything for victory!” – under this slogan were printed materials about labour achievements in the rear. The press immediately supported every patriotic initiative to increase the output of military production and to create labour brigades fighting for the early completion of production targets. From the pages of central, local, and military newspapers, the People's Commissar of Armaments and Hero of Socialist Labour D. Ustinov, academician A. Bogomolets, Alexei Stakhanov, and Hero of Socialist Labour F. Tokarev, among others, spoke about the patriotism of the Soviet people and the everyday help they gave to the front.
The author of a dissertation study on the functioning of the press of the Southern Urals during the war years, A.N. Lymarev, concludes that the main tasks of newspapers during the war years were: 1. carrying out mobilisation campaigns (reports from rallies, letters from volunteers); 2. rallying and mobilising forces to achieve victory (including the rear); 3. propagating the ideas of Soviet patriotism; 4. neutralising rival ideology; 5. heightening vigilance.
There were also special newspapers aimed at propaganda among partisans and the civilian population, for example “Partizanskaya Pravda”[11], one of whose issues, printed on birch bark, has survived. But the best-known medium of this kind is the leaflet-bulletin “Vesti s Sovetskoy Rodiny”, regular publication of which was begun by the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army in August 1941 in Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian.
In addition, journalism was also used as a weapon of anti-fascist propaganda. It is worth noting here that propaganda aimed at prisoners of war was conducted as part of an integrated campaign, distinguished by consistency and unity of aims and objectives. The NKSG began publishing the newspaper “Deutschland” (“Free Germany”), had its own radio station of the same name, and later began publishing the illustrated newspaper “Freies Deutschland im bild” (“Free Germany in Pictures”).
Thus, the propaganda effort proceeded along several lines, defined by the target audiences of the propaganda: the Armed Forces and the population of the USSR (including partisans and the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories); the enemy's troops and population; and the public of foreign states. In working with each of these groups, its own aims and objectives, forms, and means of influence were determined. Soviet party journalism was directed at one group or another depending on demographic (sex, age), ethnic, and social (membership of social groups, sphere of employment) characteristics, that is, a differentiated approach to the audience was applied.
Thus we see that, with the support of the state and a correct vector of development, domestic military journalism accomplished the task of sustaining the spirits of soldiers and those in the rear to an “excellent” standard.
The same cannot be said of the German press. For a considerable period of time its military journalism did nothing but extol the achievements and heroism of the Hitlerites. By 1942, however, the mood of the German army and the German rear began to change.
Thus, in the spring of 1942 an article by Goebbels entitled “A Heart-to-Heart Talk” was published in “Das Reich”. In it Goebbels tries to reassure the German people in connection with the new cut in food rations in Hitlerite Germany, calling on the Germans to “bear all hardships and privations” without complaint. Anyone who expresses doubt or discontent, he warns, “faces severe punishment, up to and including the death penalty”[12]. This latest “heartening” article by Goebbels of 1942 is highly characteristic of the situation in Germany, of the mood among the people and in the army.
Discovering alarming signs of the rapid deterioration of the moral and political state of the population and the army in connection with military setbacks, domestic political troubles and international complications, the Hitlerites, through threats and terror, are trying to halt the moral and political disintegration that has begun in the German army, and are convulsively striving to avert the approaching political and military catastrophe of Hitlerite Germany.
In connection with the mounting difficulties, the Hitlerite press and the command of the German army announced the creation of the so-called “front of the spirit”.
The high command of the German army published in its newspaper “Wacht im Osten”, in issue No. 739 of 9 January 1942, an official directive article addressed to all units of the field army, in which the Hitlerites speak of the difficult times now at hand and the importance of maintaining the fighting spirit of soldiers and officers. The article states: “We speak today of the front of the spirit because in the history of the German people it has sometimes not been given sufficient attention, and every time this omission has been bitterly paid for. An offensive against the front of arms is recognized in good time. It is quite different with the front of the spirit. The threat to the spirit arises imperceptibly, the struggle does not always unfold openly and does not always lead to a final victory... The crisis must be overcome before victory can be celebrated”[13].
The history of wars has not produced examples of a comparable inventiveness on the part of a government and military command in the sphere of maintaining discipline and the moral state of the people and their own army. The Hitlerite clique did not turn to the creation of the so-called “front of the spirit”, alongside the military and domestic political fronts, and to threats of the death penalty against all German skeptics, out of a good life. The Hitlerite “front of the spirit”, as conceived by its organizers, was intended to overcome the very crisis among the people and in the army whose existence even the command of the Hitlerite army was forced to admit.
The successful counteroffensive of the Red Army affected the “front of the spirit” of the Hitlerite army no less than it affected the condition of the armed forces of Hitlerite Germany. Since then the Hitlerite has forever been forced to give up calling his army invincible: he has felt on his own skin the full bitterness and horror of the military defeats of the Hitlerite army; in the winter of 1941-1942 he cursed the fascist government that had sent him to the front dozens of times. The average German, the German soldier, is gradually ceasing to believe Hitler and his gang. In the words of the Swiss newspaper “Weltwoche”, he no longer shows the patriotic feelings he once did, one no longer hears pro-Hitler tirades from him, his vocabulary no longer contains either the “Bolshevik plague” or “red monsters”, but simply “Russians”, “Bolsheviks”. “The course of the military operations,” the newspaper further states, “has awakened in the Germans a sense of the groundlessness of the events of the war, and everyone wants to feel solid ground under him again and to know where he actually stands and how it will all end”[14].
The Hitlerite general von Reichenau, in order No. 01348/41 of 25 December 1941, himself attested to the moral state of the German army: “During the quartering of units in billets previously occupied by other units, the following inscriptions were found on the walls: “We have had enough of this!”; “We want to go home to Germany!”; “We are dirty, lice-ridden, and want to go home!”; “We do not want this war!””. It is no accident that the Hitlerite general was alarmed to discover such notes in the billeting areas, in the dugouts and trenches of the German army. If a German declares that he has had enough of the torments he has endured on the Soviet-German front, if he has been drawn homeward and sheds responsibility for the events now taking place, placing that responsibility on Hitler and his clique, it means that in the German army things are going badly with the notorious “front of the spirit”. The Hitlerite soldier has become something other than what he was at the beginning of the Soviet-German war.
Increasingly pessimistic moods are spreading widely within Germany itself. Indeed, matters have gone so far that the German newspaper “Danziger Vorposten”, in its issue of 10 February 1942, was forced to admit that “there are many pessimists in Germany, hanging their heads... Such grumblers would not be worth mentioning if their gloomy moods were not dangerous... Pessimists should be regarded as saboteurs and deserters”[15]. Such moods in the German army and among the people were becoming all the more dangerous for the Hitlerite clique in that it was powerless against their growth. This explains why the Hitlerites opened an entire campaign in their press for strengthening the “front of the spirit”. Thus they undertook a number of measures, hoping to check the growth of discontent among the soldiers of the German army. Above all, they hastily issued a number of orders to the army and drew up “ten commandments” intended for German workers, employees and soldiers. It is characteristic that these commandments reflected the real state of the German army and its rear. The commandments state: “Do not give in to harmful moods. Do not lose heart. Do not complain of privations and sacrifices. Do not expect more from victory than you are prepared to sacrifice for it”[16], and so on.
In the newspapers “Völkischer Beobachter” and “Das Reich” more than a dozen “heartening” talks and articles were published, intended to instill the necessary measure of cheerfulness and optimism into the German army and the people[17]. But the “heartening talks” did little good, for morale in the German army continued to fall day by day. And indeed, what influence could such “talks” have had, at a time when every family in Germany had lost a loved one on the Soviet-German front. Thus preserving the fighting spirit of the soldiers and of those in the rear of their own country proved to be beyond the powers of German journalism, which indirectly contributed its share to the defeat of the Hitlerites.
In conclusion, we draw the conclusion that journalism was of indisputable significance and played a huge role in shaping mass mood during the war years.
The life of the Soviet (Russian) mass media, for a long time squeezed in the grip of harsh political censorship, began to change with the onset of political glasnost. In the first stage of its development (1985-1987) the ideological or programmatic line of many publications was adjusted, the importance of domestic political themes increased, which led to a growth in politicized publications. A particular type of journalism appeared, distinguished by intolerance of the existing order and active support for new political and economic movements. At the same time, the organizational foundations and ownership structures of the mass media had not yet been touched.
In the second stage of change (1988-1989) numerous semi-official newspapers began to be sold on the streets: “Narodny Front”, “Nabat”, “Pozitsiya”, “Demokraticheskaya Rossiya” and others. As a rule, such publications did not last long, but their appearance allowed a great many forbidden topics to come out of the underground. This relatively short period became a kind of “finest hour” of the samizdat press.
The changed social conditions and the introduction of private forms of ownership into the economy brought new periodicals to life; newspapers became the first hearths of the market economy, not counting the semi-artisanal cooperatives that had arisen at the dawn of perestroika. They were among the first to gain freedom in pricing, the ability to dispose of the greater part of their profits, and to make use of alternative methods of distributing newspaper output.
In 1990-1991 (the third stage) the first leasehold enterprises, joint ventures and joint-stock companies appeared. At the same time the mass media became legal entities and began to conduct business activity; positions of commercial director, advertising agent and marketing specialist arose on the staff of many editorial offices.
But the legal basis for the publication of newspapers, magazines, radio stations, independent television companies and news agencies was laid by the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Mass Media”, adopted on 27 December 1991, which established in law the inadmissibility of censorship and set up a registration (rather than a licensing) principle for the organization of the mass media.
At the end of the nineteenth – beginning of the twentieth century, Russia embarked on the path of capitalist development. The restructuring of the entire economy also swept up the press. Capital intruded ever more actively into publishing, frightening Russian journalists and public figures; an ever-growing number of publishing firms and joint-stock companies took up periodicals, profiting from such a commodity, sacred to Russian society, as the book, the magazine and the newspaper. This process proceeded with difficulty; the best Russian entrepreneurs became pioneers on the dangerous path of the capitalization of a Russian society that retained strong feudal survivals.
The turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, while radically different in its internal processes and in the level of development of the economy and society, echoes in the outward pattern of events, and sometimes purely psychologically, the world view of people at the beginning of the twentieth century, their apprehensions, their failure to understand what was happening. This is reflected with particular clarity in the restructuring of journalism that began in the 1990s. Present-day entrepreneurs working with the press, and journalists themselves, often have to solve problems already solved by their predecessors a century earlier. It is not for nothing that they say the new is simply the well-forgotten old. The experience of the journalism of the early twentieth century may be of inestimable help to the twenty-first century.
Thus the principal moments in the history of twentieth-century Russian-Soviet-Russian journalism are as follows:
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Часть 1 Russian Journalism of the 20th Century
Часть 2 Russian journalism in the second half of the twentieth century
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